The time and space of
Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi’s
Pan-Europe, 1923-1939

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Abstract

This thesis investigates the historical geographies of the Pan-European Union, and its founder and leader Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, focusing in the main on the period from 1923 to 1939. A mixed-race Austrian aristocrat, philosopher and writer who made it his life’s mission to see Europe politically united, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s was a singular life, which he used to his advantage by weaving his life story into his political campaigning. The thesis opens by investigating the relationship between a life lived and a life told, and about the consequences for researchers attempting to recover his biography.

The bulk of the thesis looks at the ways in which Pan-Europeanism both responded and itself contributed to shaping three broad sets of spatial and temporal ideas, each revolving around the notion of a supranational European polity. First, it confronts the way history was invoked both to bring into being a ‘literature’ that would add prestige to its arguments, and to craft a narrative arc that would add the force of apparent inevitability to its arguments. Second, it looks at the way in which Pan-Europeanism employed a form of spatial reasoning that shared many points of reference with the German school of geopolitik, despite a fundamentally incompatible view of international politics. And third, it analyses the Pan-European invention of ‘Eurafrica’ as a neo-colonial system that would offer a ‘third path’ internationalism that fell between the imperialism of the British Empire, and the Mandate-based theory of international governance advocated by the League. Each of these sets of ideas, I argue, persisted both outside the bounds of the Pan-European Union, and after its eventual marginalisation.
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*Archives cantonales vaudoises* (ACV) in Lausanne, Switzerland

*Archives de la Ville et de la Communauté Urbaine de Strasbourg* (AVCUS), Strasbourg, France

Churchill Archives Centre (CAC), Churchill College, Cambridge, UK

Council of Europe (CoE) archives, Strasbourg, France

Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU), European University Institute, Fiesole, Florence, Italy

League of Nations (LoN) Archives, United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG), Geneva, Switzerland

*Muzeum Chodska*, Domažlice, Czech Republic

Russian State Military Archive (*Rossiyskiy gosudarstvennyy voyennyy arkhiv*, RGVA), Moscow, Russia

The National Archives (TNA), Kew, London, UK
Introduction

Ideas are born as sparks fly upwards. … Among innumerable sparks that flash and fade away, there now and again gleams one that lights up not only the immediate scene, but the whole world.

…So when the idea of “The United States of Europe” drifted off upon the wind and came in contact with the immense accumulation of muddle, waste, particularism and prejudice which had long lain piled up in the European garden, it became quite evident that a new series of events had opened.

Winston Churchill, 1930

When I started this PhD in 2013, the political unity of Europe was a given, Britain’s place within it secure. The previous autumn, the EU had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, cited ‘for over six decades contributed to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe’. Accepting the prize on the EU’s behalf, the President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy and President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso gave a joint lecture under the title “From War to Peace”. My goal at the time was to extend the ‘six decades’ timeframe, pushing it back into the interwar period. I would explore the contribution towards European integration of the Pan-European Union (PEU), a private organisation founded in 1923 by Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, a man who had published a whole book on European integration entitled From War to Peace, and who had also been nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts. The PEU had in the interwar years pioneered a number of familiar facets of European integration, from the European

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1 W.S. Churchill, "United States of Europe", Saturday Evening Post, 15 February 1930, p. 25, 48. This article was syndicated internationally, to numerous publications. Hereafter, I refer to the printed manuscript in CAC, CHAR 8/303, 4-12.
3 European Union, "Nobel Lecture: "From War to Peace: A European Tale"" (10 December 2012)
4 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, From War To Peace (London: Jonathan Cape; 1959)
passport\textsuperscript{5} to the adoption of Beethoven’s “Ode to Joy” movement of his 9\textsuperscript{th} Symphony as a European anthem.\textsuperscript{6} In more general terms, it played an important role in establishing ‘Europe’ as a scale at which modern politics could and should take place (see chapter I). And yet Coudenhove-Kalergi never won his Nobel prize. As the institutions that became the EU slowly took shape, Coudenhove-Kalergi found himself written out of a narrative of European integration that took 1945 as its zero-hour, and Jean Monnet \textit{et al} as visionaries operating in an intellectual vacuum. This thesis would be a corrective to that lacuna.

As I conclude the PhD, in 2017, Britain is negotiating its exit from the EU, and the future of Europe is more uncertain than at any point since the war. Reading the surfeit of attempts to analyse what ‘Brexit’ might mean for both Britain and Europe, it is clear that there are as many different courses as there are pundits, and public debate on this issue seems at present to be generating rather more heat than light. This, I contend, is partly because Brexit represents a fundamental challenge not just to the functionality and self-image of the EU as a political entity, but to the progressivist narrative that sustains it, a narrative until now continually bolstered by the steady accretion of new members and deepening of their union. Europhiles remain committed to a view that, implicitly or explicitly, portrays a united Europe as the future, and divided nations as the past. Take, for instance, a 2016 artwork designed as a contribution to the ‘Britain Stronger in Europe’ referendum campaign by the Berlin-based British artist Tacita Dean, in which a simple chalk message is scrawled on a blackboard: ‘vote for a future/not a past/vote to stay in Europe’ (see fig. 1).

In defying this logic, Brexit not only challenges the internal calculation of whether Britain might be better off out of the EU, but fundamentally subverts the master-narrative of the European

\textsuperscript{5} R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Zum Europäischen Pass", \textit{Paneuropa} 3.7 (1927) 20-22
\textsuperscript{6} R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Paneuropa-Hymne", \textit{Paneuropa} 5.9 (1929) 23. On Coudenhove-Kalergi’s suggestion that the anthem be used by the Council of Europe, see Coudenhove-Kalergi to P.M.G. Levy, 3 Aug 1955, CoE webdocs, European Anthem, https://rm.coe.int/16806a9ae7 (last accessed 28 Sep 2017)
project. It forces us to answer the question posed by Mark Gilbert in 2008:

‘what would happen to general narratives of European integration if the EU were to lose its aura of progressivism: if it were to be seen in a negative light; as a failure, or obstacle, rather than as a model to imitate’7

Of course, the narrative and its object are intimately linked, and we might equally ask whether it is precisely because the general narrative of European integration no longer holds sway that, in the eyes of 52% of the British public, the EU has lost this aura. Either way, ‘European integration’ presents itself as more than a means of organising politics, more than this or that political innovation, more than a series of events at which history turned one way or another. It is a meta-narrative with both spatial and temporal dimensions. A way of speaking about time and space, through which European integration is produced as both desirable and inevitable.

Where did this meta-narrative come from? The answer is a long one, and will take up the

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remainder of this thesis. But a word must be said first about the crucial role of the Pan-European Union, and why it remains the perfect lens through which to view this story. In the early twentieth century, Enlightenment progressivism of the sort that assured citizens that the world would inevitably become ever more civilised was undermined by counter-suggestions that Western civilisation was entering a period of decadence, and ruptured by the blunt shock of the First World War. The idea that the nation was the natural locus of politics had seemingly been enshrined by Woodrow Wilson’s policy of ‘self-determination’, as enacted upon the defeated powers in Europe. The same post-war negotiations had determined that these nations would meet in a League of Nations, a universal model of internationalism in which the exigencies of geography were, in theory at least, to be set aside. Pan-Europeanism would challenge each of these notions. It reasserted a sense of progressivism, robustly countered the monopoly of the nation-state upon politics, and advanced a thoroughly territorialised version of what we might today call supra-national politics, and by its advocates was simply known as Pan-European politics.

Narratives are built on literatures, and the question of the curation of literatures runs through the core of this thesis. They are living things, constantly remade, and throughout I prod at received understandings that too often become rigid through repetition. Nowhere is this plainer than in chapter II, in which I examine the genealogy of what we today think of as the literature of the idea of Europe, but do so contextually, with continued reference to how and for what purposes one could speak of a literature at all. In chapter III, I argue for the value in reading geopolitik not through the lens of Hitler, but through the lens of Pan-Europe, and look at how this opens up a new vista of rarely considered influences, a ‘literature’ today balkanised or otherwise lost from view. Chapter IV looks at the specific genealogy of ‘Eurafrica’, a term invented for the Pan-European cause, but which
ultimately ran loose, taken up by other literatures. Throughout these accounts, reference to present-day debates is allowed to bubble under the surface, occasionally breaking through but never seizing the focus from the story being told. It would be senseless to surgically remove such discussion to sit lifeless on its own. Nor would the diverse natures of the respective chapters allow for such a treatment. Rather, these issues are folded into the stories that each chapter tells, before being drawn together in the conclusion.

Though each chapter follows its own tone, structure and style, they are designed to be complementary. Thus, the first chapter, while following its own argument about the nature of biography and its entanglement with history, also serves as an introduction to Coudenhove-Kalergi and the Pan-European movement, and a rumination upon the methodology that underpins the rest of the thesis. The second chapter is broadly an investigation into the role of time in Pan-Europeanism, while the third looks at the role of space within the movement. Closing matters, the fourth chapter works through one particular spatial conception, carrying the narrative forward to discuss the ways in which elements of Pan-Europeanism spread beyond the confines of the movement. What links these various parts is an approach that continually seeks to explore the genealogy of political imaginaries from a geographical perspective. That is: it seeks to limn the development of certain spatio-temporal imaginaries, not seeking their origins, but rather tracing their mutation.8

This method is resource-heavy, and has been facilitated on one hand by extensive archival work, and on the other hand by heavy library usage, allied with exploitation of the exponentially increasing quantity of literature hosted online. While I count my blessings to have access to such riches, it is not without a lingering regret at those pages that remain unturned, and in this regard the following can only ever be regarded as a work in progress.9 Alongside such abundance, many of the

9 See J. Hodder, "On absence and abundance: biography as method in archival research", Area 49.4 (2017) 452-459
sources I have used are not easily accessed, and even published sources can be difficult to track down. (Special mention must be given to the *Paneuropa* journal, a crucial source for research on the PEU, one of the few complete collections of which is held at the ACV in Lausanne.)

Meanwhile, the transnational nature of the topic has also involved a substantial amount of work in languages (mostly French and German) in which I am only too aware of my limitations. No doubt an equally substantial quantity of information written in other languages remains outside my range. In this regard too, then, the thesis is necessarily incomplete, perhaps best seen as a jumping-off point for further research on the time and space of Pan-Europe.

The multilingual nature of the work has also posed a set of questions regarding citation practice. I have had to strike a balance between respecting original texts, recognising the importance of translation to their circulation, accounting for this while ensuring my own footnotes remain digestable, and writing for the benefit of a presumed anglophone reader. Briefly, the practice that I settled on is as follows.

In the main text, original-language titles are retained, augmented where helpful with alternative titles that translations may have been published under. In the footnotes, I have cited English-language translations, where available. When no such translation is available, and for the instances in which I prefer to use my own translation of the original-language source, translations are my own. Where a translation in a secondary text is used, credit is given both to the secondary text and to the original-language publication. Square brackets refer to the date of first publication of the same text in the same language; where the date of publication in the original language is important to the point at hand, this is given in the prose of the main text. And lastly, when there is a good reason

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10 ACV, PP 1000, 217
to depart from this set of practices, I have done so, though such instances are rare and are explained as and when they crop up.
I. The Lives of Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi: Biography and Method

All history is but a mosaic, composed by myriads of individual lives, each a symbol of its time and civilization. For the story of mankind is but the story of human individuals, of their lives, their struggles and their dreams – and every biography is a living key to history.

Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1943

Count Richard Nikolaus von Coudenhove-Kalergi’s was a remarkable life, doubly indivisible from the Pan-European movement. On one level, he maintained an iron grip on the organisation he founded, and served as president for the remainder of his life, whose programme and philosophy he expounded in numerous books, and whose journal he both edited and was the chief contributor for. On a deeper level, it was immediately obvious, both to his contemporaries and to those who have studied him in the years since, that he embodied the very pan-Europeanism that he campaigned for. He was simultaneously a mixed-race cosmopolitan, a living relic of the old transnational connections of the European aristocracy, a fixture in the new transnational connections of European culture and politics, and an Austrian whom the political upheavals of the Versailles settlement had suddenly rendered ‘out-of-place’. Taken together, it is clear that it would be an impossible task to dissociate an analysis of the Pan-European movement from a biographical account of the life of Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi.

Such an approach would be familiar to geographers, who are becoming increasingly comfortable with both the act and terminology of ‘biography’ as a research method. Of course, there

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11 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, Crusade for Pan-Europe: Autobiography of a Man and a Movement (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons; 1943), 8
is nothing new about geographers’ interest in lifeworlds, life-paths and life-histories, each of which dealt in their own way with the dialectic of balancing life and context, individuality and society. Nevertheless, even as the practice of using a life to frame geographical analysis became more common in the 1990s and 2000s, many remained reticent about terming such work biography. The suspicion was that biography as a genre suffered from a privileging of ‘great men’ as movers of history, the artificial application of a ‘fixed arc’ or otherwise linear narrative to a life, an overconfidence that it could access ‘lived experience’, the privileging of an uncritical notion of ‘authenticity’, the imposition or imputation of consistency of subjecthood, an overly tight focus on person/agency to detriment of context/structure (the so-called ‘spotlight’ approach), or conversely the press-ganging of a subject into speaking for a larger issue or body. While these remain serious accusations, they rather overlooked more critical notions of how biography might be done, informed by modernism, postmodernism and feminism, which had by the 1990s encouraged the emergence of ‘new biography’ that told marginalised stories, decentred or disturbed the notion of a

16 L. Stanley, The auto/biographical I (Manchester: Manchester University Press; 1992), 214. Within geography, similar critiques were made (from different perspectives) in Thrift, "On the determination of social action in space and time"; F. Driver, "Henry Morton Stanley and His Critics: Geography, Exploration and Empire", Past & Present 133 (1991) 134-166
18 J. Clifford, "'Hanging up looking glasses at odd corners': ethnobiographical prospects", in Daniel Aaron (ed.), Studies in Biography (Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard University Press; 1978) 41-56
19 Stanley, The auto/biographical I
unitary subject, and often opened the frame onto the biographer’s struggles to understand their subject. Encouraged by this growing trend, in the last decade or so geographers have become more comfortable with use of the term biography, and have in recent years produced a wealth of work that takes a biographical approach, often finding it better captures and affords expression to the marginality, mobility and multiplicity of their subjects.

In the first part of this chapter, I draw upon this approach, sketching the conjoined lives of Coudenhove-Kalergi and his Pan-European movement. This forms the biographical base from which subsequent chapters will develop their arguments about the role of the PEU in reshaping the spatio-temporal understanding of Europe as political entity.

In the second part, I take a step back, and cast a more sceptical eye upon a story that, from some angles, appears too pat, the narrative arc too strong, the moral too easy to pick out. The reason is clear: it was largely authored by Coudenhove-Kalergi himself, whose autobiographies have, in their narrative thrust, largely gone unchallenged. Nicolaas Rupke, in his ‘metabiography’ of Alexander von Humboldt, dealt with a subject whose ‘master narrative’ of his own life was only partially accepted, finding ‘little acknowledgement’ in his home country. The situation here is the reverse, since Coudenhove-Kalergi’s master narrative was not only largely accepted without question, but was a crucial tool in his own campaigning. I therefore conduct a rather different sort of metabiography here, one which the focus is not on the distance between a life and its various retellings, but on the suffocating closeness of a life and its telling, the way in which the story does not just represent the

life, but plays an active role in shaping its course. This section therefore asks how Coudenhove-Kalergi’s biography was mobilised in the service of Pan-Europeanism, and how the two – life and story – were folded into one another.

One of the reasons that Coudenhove-Kalergi’s presentation of his own life remains, in the main, the dominant scholarly narrative is that the principle means through which his life might be re-read, his archive, lies out of easy reach. Indeed, Coudenhove-Kalergi had believed that the central archive of his interwar work had been destroyed when Germany seized the Pan-European offices in 1938. Over half a century later, it turned out that their fate had been much stranger, and that – miraculously – not only had they not been destroyed, they had been remarkably preserved, their pages untouched by the violence outside. However, they had been propelled far from home, and were found held in Moscow as part of the ‘special archive’ of records seized by Soviet forces from previously Nazi-occupied territories during the Second World War, whose existence had remained a state secret until the glasnost days of 1990. Both the central archive of the PEU and that of the German branch remain in Moscow today, among the ‘last prisoners of World War II’. This story constitutes the third section of this chapter, and it carries two distinct messages. First, a methodological message about how the investigations that form the underbelly of this thesis, in Marc Bloch’s terms a confessional answer to the question ‘how can I know what I am about to say?’ And second, a symbolic message about how the archive of a supranational endeavour gets trapped and suppressed within largely hidden contemporary forces that still impresses upon it the grid of the international.

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A life lived

Richard Nikolaus von Coudenhove-Kalergi was born in Tokyo, Japan on 17 November 1894, the second son born to the Austrian diplomat, scholar and renowned polyglot Heinrich von Coudenhove-Kalergi and the Japanese woman he had married in 1892, Mitsuko Aoyama. Heinrich was the Austrian chargé d’affaires in Japan and Mitsuko was the young daughter of a local oil and antiques merchant, a union which caused no small degree of scandal and had to be ratified by the Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph, by the Church, and by the Japanese Mikado. When the family came to Europe in 1896, Richard (known familiarly as ‘Dicky’) was brought up in the Coudenhove-Kalergi family estate, the seat of which was a castle in the small German-speaking town of Ronsperg in south-west Bohemia; it is known today by its Czech name, Poběžovice. There he learned about his transnational aristocratic heritage on his father’s side, the Coudenhoves who had come from the Netherlands to Belgium and then to Austria, and the Kalergis who had come from Crete via Russia and France before uniting with the Coudenhoves in the nineteenth century. His father, whom he worshipped, died suddenly in 1906, leaving the children and estate to be managed by Mitsuko. Richard sought solace in his father’s library, developing a passion for philosophy. His admiration for his father would be expressed in later life by Richard’s re-publication of Heinrich’s critique of antisemitism, Das Wesen des Antisemitismus (‘The Essence of Antisemitism’), first published in 1901.

From 1908, Richard was educated at the prestigious Theresianum Academy in imperial Vienna, before studying philosophy and modern history at the University of Vienna. It was in the capital that he met the famous Austrian-Jewish actress Ida Roland, whom he married in 1916. Like his parents’, this coupling was the cause of some controversy, both public and private. Mitsuko disapproved of the union, partly because of Ida’s occupation, partly because she was non-noble and a divorcée, and partly because she was thirteen years Richard’s senior. However, the marriage also

25 Though often reported as 1915, their marriage certificate is dated 31 August 1916. See ACV, PP 1000/36/1
brought him a certain amount of celebrity, and opened the doors onto a new cultural milieu. Though Richard had disliked the Viennese high society into which he had been thrust, he relished the cosmopolitan theatrical world, accompanying his wife on all her theatrical tours and meeting the stars of the literary world, including future allies like Heinrich Mann.

Though Coudenhove-Kalergi was excused from military service due to a lung affliction, he was appalled by the ‘chauvinistic’ nationalism and anti-Semitism that the outbreak of the First World War had only intensified. In a letter to his then-fiancée shortly after the outbreak of war, he wrote:

‘I do not consider the terrible murders and cruelties now raging in all parts of the world the most tragic elements of the World War. What is more terrifying than anything, perhaps for centuries to come, is the awakening of the aggressive tendency of nationalism which is nothing but the apparently vanishing religious fanaticism, reappearing under a new form. …the guilt for all this lies with scholars like Gobineau and Chamberlain rather than with war-minded statesmen.’

Coudenhove-Kalergi embraced the American entry into the war under Woodrow Wilson (and Russian exit from it), which he saw as ideologically transforming it from a war between competing imperialisms, to a war against militarist imperialism. Coudenhove-Kalergi later wrote that ‘I became passionately Wilsonian, though Wilson was fighting on the other side of the fence’. He was particularly sold on the prospect of a League of Nations:

‘On the ruins of this old world a new world seemed to rise: democratic, republican, socialist and pacifist. … my thoughts were fixated on this new world, on the glorious vision of a League of Nations uniting all nations and continents of the world in peaceful collaboration. A League that would replace international anarchy by order, arms by arguments, aggression by justice, revenge by understanding. Could anything more beautiful be imagined?’

The end of the war and subsequent peace settlement brought the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, rendered Ronsperg part of the new state of Czechoslovakia, and made Coudenhove-Kalergi a Czechoslovak citizen. More specifically, Ronsperg was now part of the Sudetenland, a new name

26 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi to I. Roland (31 August 1914), ACV, PP 1000/75/1; quoted and translated in Coudenhove-Kalergi, Crusade for Pan-Europe, 54-55
28 Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers The World, 67
given to the lands in which the German-speaking population, a minority within the new state, constituted a local majority.

Meanwhile, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s enthusiastic Wilsonianism swiftly soured into disillusionment, as first the perceived victory of European nationalism in deciding the Paris Peace Treaties,\(^{29}\) and then the American failure to ratify the League of Nations, fatally undermined the envisioned ‘rebirth of the world under the impulse of new and generous ideals’.\(^{30}\) He was highly critical of the organisation that the League of Nations would become, damned both by its real failures and its failure to live up to its Wilsonian ideals:

‘Instead of an international parliament, the League of Nations has become a rump parliament. It has no title to function as representing mankind; for it represents merely a fortuitous collection of states which use it in the interest of schemes devised for their own aggrandizement. If the League of Nations should dare to tamper with the interests of any World Power among its members—say, in Indian or Korean affairs—that World Power would forthwith announce its withdrawal: and no one could prevent it from doing so. … Thus the Geneva League of Nations has gravely compromised itself; it has become, on the one hand, an impotent wielder of power, and, on the other, an unjust dispenser of justice.’\(^{31}\)

A ‘frustrated Wilsonian’,\(^{32}\) Coudenhove-Kalergi resolved to construct his own system by which the League’s abandoned ideals could be fulfilled. Influenced by the pacifist Alfred Fried’s 1910 book *Pan-Amerika*,\(^{33}\) as well as the idea of Pan-Islam (see chapter III), Coudenhove-Kalergi began to formulate the idea of a Pan-European organisation, which would be a natural complement to the Pan-American Union, and therefore sit alongside it in a truly global reformulation of the League of Nations (see fig. 2). After being gently rebuffed by his attempt in spring 1921 to persuade the new President

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\(^{29}\) Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote that ‘Wilson’s opposite numbers in Europe, Clemenceau and Lloyd George, forced so many concessions on him and led to compromise on so many matters that the final text of the Peace Treaty turned out to be a mere caricature of the famous Fourteen Points.’ Coudenhove-Kalergi, *An Idea Conquers The World*, 69

\(^{30}\) Coudenhove-Kalergi, *An Idea Conquers The World*, 68


of Czechoslovakia Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk to lead the movement, Coudenhove-Kalergi decided to seize the mantle himself, starting with an article on “The European Question” published in summer 1922 in the Berlin Vossische Zeitung and the Vienna Neue Freie Presse (the leading liberal dailies in Germany and Austria respectively). After appealing to the new Italian leader Benito Mussolini in an open letter published in Neue Freie Presse (unanswered), Coudenhove-Kalergi set about writing

34 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Crusade for Pan-Europe, 74-76 (This meeting was wrongly dated as 1920 in Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers The World, 87). Masaryk, whose own version of The New Europe bore many consonances with Coudenhove-Kalergi’s, and Coudenhove-Kalergi saw Masaryk’s ‘Little Entente’ as a potential ‘future point of crystallization’ for Pan-Europe. Moreover, Masaryk’s position as a neutral made him palatable to both French and German audiences. Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 130, c.f. T.G. Masaryk, The New Europe (The Slav Standpoint) (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode; 1918)

what would become his programmatic book for the new movement. *Pan-Europe* was published by the movement’s own house, the *Paneuropa-Verlag* in October 1923, with each copy sold or sent to men of influence containing a card inviting the recipient to become a member of his new ‘Pan-European Union’. While *Pan-Europe* as a term had a longer provenance that Coudenhove-Kalergi gave it credit for – certainly, Fried had already explicitly called for a Pan-European Bureau and/or Union – it was at least true that as an organisation, *Pan-Europe* ‘began with the appearance of this book’. The Austrian Chancellor Ignaz Seipel looked favourably upon this new organisation, and granted it the considerable prestige of offices in the imperial Hofburg Palace in Vienna.

*Pan-Europe* both sold well and received a great deal of attention, including a front-page review in the *Neue Freie Presse*. By 1926 it had sold 16 000 copies, and by 1928 it had been translated into most major European languages. Contemporaneous accounts of its tremendous influence abound; as Alfred Bingham wrote in 1940, *Pan-Europe* ‘did more to make Europe think of its own unity than any other one book’. In addition to receipts from this book, the organisation was given a considerable financial boost from the donation of 60 000 German gold-marks by the financier Max Warburg, to cover operational costs for the first three years of the organisation’s existence. In April 1924 the movement launched its official organ, the German-language journal *Paneuropa* – occasional French issues were also published – which was to continue regular publication (ten issues

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36 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Paneuropa* (Vienna: Pan-Europa-Verlag; 1923). To avoid confusion, here and hereafter I refer to the 1923 book by its English language title *Pan-Europe*, and the journal that ran from 1924 to 1938 as *Paneuropa*.


39 Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Pan-Europe*, 82n*


42 A.M. Bingham, *The United States of Europe* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce; 1940), 53
yearly) until 1938. In these early years, political signs too were encouraging, especially when filtered through Coudenhove-Kalergi’s rose-tinted lens:

‘This book [Pan-Europe] appeared in 1923, the year of the Ruhr occupation, the darkest and most discouraging year that Europe had known since the World War. The following year, 1924, passed under the sign of the French May elections, of the Dawes Plan, and of the London Conference. The road was opened to a European understanding. The year 1925 was the year of Locarno, which led to the first practical step toward European understanding and unification. Thus Pan-Europe was a utopia in 1923, a problem in 1924, and a program in 1925.’

The Pan-European movement continued to grow in popularity through the 1920s, and began to attract the attention of the political and cultural elite. Coudenhove-Kalergi received unofficial encouragement from two key political figures: the foreign ministers of Czechoslovakia, Edvard Beneš, and Germany, Gustav Stresemann. Others openly signed up to the movement, including in Germany the president of the Reichstag Paul Löbe and the banker and politician Hjalmar Schacht, in France the ex- and future-prime ministers Joseph Caillaux, Paul Painlevé, Édouard Herriot and, most significantly of all, Aristide Briand. A tour of England earned him allies in the erstwhile editor of the Times, Wickham Steed, and the Colonial Secretary Leo Amery. Among cultural figures, the membership of the PEU included Fridtjof Nansen, Sigmund Freud, Albert Einstein, Paul Valéry, Heinrich and Thomas Mann, Gerhard Hauptmann, Stefan Zweig, Bronislaw Huberman and Richard Strauss. At the invitation of the Foreign Policy Association, Coudenhove-Kalergi toured the US in the winter of 1925-26 with the Norwegian pacifist Christian Lange, and while there formed an American Committee headed by the director of the ‘Institute of International Education’ Stephen

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43 A complete collection is to be found at ACV, PP 1000, 217 (German editions), 218 (French editions)
44 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 197
Duggan, with backers including Felix and Paul Warburg (brothers of Max).

In addition to the ideas he propounded, Coudenhove-Kalergi won followers through his undeniable charisma. In both speech and writing, and in a number of languages, Coudenhove-Kalergi made his arguments with great clarity. In person, he could be charming, and was certainly at home within elite society, whether that be political, cultural or academic. Salvador de Madariaga spoke of his ‘exceptional’ charm, noting that his ‘gift for exposition and his ability to handle human beings – not by the thousand, but in small groups – were so remarkable that his ideas made considerable progress’. Coudenhove-Kalergi’s character was often wrapped up in descriptions of his appearance (see fig. 3), perhaps most vividly described by Thomas Mann:

‘Coudenhove, the little red-and-gold symbol of Pan-Europe in his buttonhole, is one of the most curious and, incidentally, one of the best-looking persons I ever met. Half Japanese, half mixed from the breed of Europe’s international nobility, he really represents, as one knows, a Eurasian type of noble cosmopolite, exceedingly fascinating and giving an average German the feeling of being somewhat provincial.’

Certainly, Coudenhove-Kalergi cut a striking figure among his interwar contemporaries. First, he was at least a generation younger than most of his political contemporaries, and he was frequently referred to as ‘the young count’. Second, his difference was racialised: his mother had been rumoured to be the first Japanese person in Bohemia, and was certainly the first in Austrian high society. References to his mixed-race background were evident in descriptions of him by Leo Amery as ‘rather like a

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46 Viscount Chilston, the British Ambassador to Austria, was impressed with Coudenhove-Kalergi at 1926 PEU Congress: ‘Count Coudenhove’s speech by its sincerity and conviction, as well as by the clarity and beauty of its style – he is one of the few who can employ effectively with complete precision and economy the cumbrous German language – made a deep impression on his hearers and explained to an onlooker the wonderful success his ambitious campaign has already achieved’ (Viscount Chilston, “Despatch No. 260” (6 October 1926), TNA, FO 371/11246, 132-136, 134). Likewise, Madariaga said that Coudenhove-Kalergi was ‘one of the few who can lend spring, speed and sprightliness to the heavy German language’ (S.d. Madariaga, Morning Without Noon. Memoirs (Farnborough: Saxon House; 1974), 335)
47 Madariaga, Morning Without Noon. Memoirs, 335
48 Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers The World, 124. Mann’s original text may be found in T. Mann, "Pariser Rechenschaft", Reden und Aufsätze 3 (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag; 1974 [1926]), 46
young Buddha in appearance and outlook’,\textsuperscript{49} and by Louise Weiss as ‘l’étrange et charmant bâtard gréco-autrichien métissé de japonais’ (‘the strange and charming Greek-Austrian-Japanese mongrel’).\textsuperscript{50} Though these were compliments, they were not so far from the anti-Semitic caricature

\textbf{Figure 3: Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi (1936). Source: RGVA, 771/1/299, 2. Also used as frontispiece to Europe Must Unite (Glaris: Paneuropa Editions Ltd; 1939)
of the Jewish cosmopolitan, an equally racialized figure that was also applied to Coudenhove-Kalergi. And third, he was an aristocrat, and moreover one who had not succumbed to the temptation to become ‘nationalised’, but instead embraced his transnational heritage. Indeed, in his philosophical writings he advocated for a ‘new nobility’, a fusion of the noble ‘aristocracy of birth’ and the intellectual ‘aristocracy of mind’.

This curious mixture was perhaps best captured in a caricature by the Hungarian cartoonist Alois Derso (see fig. 4), the highest possible honour for an interwar political figure, which hung in the famous Bavaria brasserie in Geneva, the favourite haunt of the international diplomats and journalists connected to the League of Nations. Derso satirised not just Coudenhove-Kalergi’s distinctive, almost other-worldly appearance, but also the idealism and dogmatism of his sermonising. The cartoon was punningly titled ‘Sermon on the Mount (Salève)’, after the mountain overlooking Geneva, and the spoken caption ran: ‘Blessed are the simple-minded, for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven (Pan-Europe)!’ This resonated with a common charge to be laid at the feet of Coudenhove-Kalergi: his surfeit of idealism, or utopianism. The British Ambassador in Vienna, Viscount Chilston, reported an impression along these lines:

‘This wild dream of a theorist provokes at first only a smile. I must confess that I have found some difficulty in taking Count Coudenhove’s proposals seriously. He is known to me and members of my staff. He appears to be deeply in earnest and his genuine and fanatic

49 L.S. Amery to E. Wood, 1st Earl of Halifax (26 February 1941), CAC, AMEL 2/2/5, File 2
50 L. Weiss, Mémoires d'une européenne, Tome II (1919-1934) (Paris: Payot; 1969), 258
54 On the Bavaria, see its frequent (fictional) appearances in F. Moorhouse, Grand Days (London: Picador; 1993)
55 A. Derso, 1929, “Discours sur la Montagne (Salève)”, Documents prêtés par Madame Marie-Paule Burrus, provenant de l’ex-brasserie Bavaria à Genève, Fondation Jean Monnet pour l’Europe, Lausanne. The original French, ‘Heureux sont les simples d’esprit, car le royaume des cieux (Paneurope) leur appartient!’ is a pun on Matthew 5:3, which is rendered in the Louis Segond Bible [1880/1910]) as ‘Heureux les pauvres en esprit, car le Royaume des Cieux est à eux’. 
Figure 4: Alois Derso, "Discours sur la Montagne (Salève)" (1929) © Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe, Lausanne. Documents prêtés par Madame Marie-Paule Burrus, provenant de l’ex-brasserie Bavaria à Genève
enthusiasm seems likely to convince more people than I should have expected.\textsuperscript{56}

This was taken to heart at the Foreign Office in London, where the cover of the file on the Pan-European movement was annotated with a note from the Permanent Under-Secretary, William Tyrrell, which read: ‘I know Count Coudenhove: he is a thoroughly impractical theorist’.\textsuperscript{57} This accusation of idealism was repeated, in a more forgiving tone, by Winston Churchill in a 1930 article for the American magazine the \textit{Saturday Evening Post}: ‘The form of Count Kalergi’s theme may be crude, erroneous and impracticable, but the impulse and the inspiration are true’.\textsuperscript{58} Coudenhove-Kalergi was flattered enough by the reference to later use it as the introduction to his 1953 autobiography.\textsuperscript{59}

Its membership, organised according to national chapters, was remarkable for being relatively gender-balanced. Rebecca Shriver has calculated that in the German branch of the PEU in 1927, approximately 29\% of its members were female, a proportion that exceed that of other pacifist organisations and political groups.\textsuperscript{60} This was reflected in both financial contributions\textsuperscript{61} and in the prominence of some of the women involved, particularly in the German branch. For instance, Constanze Hallgarten, the women’s rights activist, pacifist, and the director of the Munich group of ‘Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom’ (WILPF), whose Munich house, next door to Thomas Mann’s, was an intellectual hub that Coudenhove-Kalergi attended on occasion.\textsuperscript{62} Or the novelist Annette Kolb, whose pacifism and advocacy for Franco-German relations earned her a letter-and travel-ban during the First World War. Or women’s rights activist and politician Marie-Elisabeth Lüders, the co-founder and president of the German Federation of University Women (\textit{Deutsche Akademikerinnenbund}). The most visible female presence within the organisation, however, was

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\textsuperscript{56} Viscount Chilston, “Despatch No. 250” (22 September 1926), TNA, FO 371/11246, 123-125, 124, p.2
\textsuperscript{57} W. Tyrrell, note of 2 Oct 1926, in TNA, FO 371/11246, 122
\textsuperscript{58} Churchill, United States of Europe, CAC, CHAR 8/303, 4-12, 8.
\textsuperscript{59} W.S. Churchill, "Introduction", in Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi (ed.), \textit{An Idea Conquers The World} (London: Hutchinson; 1953) ix-x
\textsuperscript{60} R.R. Shriver, "Women, Pacifism, and the Pan-European Union: Searching for Support in Weimar Political Culture", in Isabel Valente (ed.), \textit{Pela Paz! Pour la Paix! For Peace!} (Brussels: Peter Lang; 2014) 289-306
\textsuperscript{61} Shriver, "Women, Pacifism, and the Pan-European Union"
\textsuperscript{62} T. Mann, \textit{Briefe 1889-1936}, ed. Erika Mann (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag; 1961), 496
\end{flushright}
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s wife, Ida Roland, who performed at a number of Pan-European Congresses. Though it is more the exception than the rule, she was even credited on first page of 1932 Basle Congress pamphlet as co-founder of the Pan-European movement.

The case should not be overstated: the most important meetings of the Pan-European Union were invariably dominated if not entirely represented by men. Nearly all positions of influence within the organisation were filled by men, and however much credit Coudenhove-Kalergi paid his wife for her support, the organisation was very much his organisation. Nevertheless, the relatively high proportion of female members was both celebrated and actively encouraged by Coudenhove-Kalergi.63 One on hand, this reflected his sincerely held belief that the political sphere was one that women could inhabit, and indeed needed to inhabit for the good of humanity. He was a product of his time insofar as he strongly believed in essentialised gender characteristics, but rather than using this to justify excluding women from politics, he argued instead that the masculinism of politics – both its imperialism and its Machiavellianism – was hurting humanity.64 Thus, Coudenhove-Kalergi reasoned, ‘a radical change in Europe towards peace policy is not to be expected from men’s insight, but only from the growing political influence of women’.65 On the other hand, one can read this as a more calculated strategy to tap into the strength of feminist support for pacifist groups,66 and co-opt it for his own ends.67 Though Coudenhove-Kalergi often mentioned women’s ‘natural’ inclination toward peace, he was critical of pacifism per se, and tried to present Pan-Europeanism as a productive fusion of pacifist ideals and political realism, a combination he termed ‘realpolitical pacifism’ [realpolitischer Pazifismus].68 Thus, for example, he proclaimed Joan of Arc a hero ‘despite the

63 See, for example, the explicit appeal to ‘the women of Europe’ at the first Pan-European Congress in R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Manifest des Kongresses", Paneuropa 2.13/14 (1926) 1-2, 2.
64 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Jeanne D'Arc", Paneuropa 5.5 (1929) 1-9, 2.
67 On Coudenhove-Kalergi’s co-option of pacifism, see Sorrels, Cosmopolitan Outsiders.
68 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Europa ohne Elend, 51.
opposition of our pacifist friends', a view that chimed with the Suffragettes’ adoption of Joan as a feminist icon.

In July 1925, Coudenhove-Kalergi sent the League Secretariat a ‘memorandum’ he had written entitled ‘World Organisation and Pan-Europe’. If it was not already clear enough that this document was targeted specifically at the League, it carried the subtitle ‘A Memorial to the League of Nations’, and contained a set of proposals for a proposed re-organisation of the League along continental lines. The memorandum was also distributed more widely, both privately to a broad range of prominent political figures and publicly via the London-based Review of Reviews, its New York-based affiliate The American Review of Reviews and the PEU’s own Paneuropa magazine. If this memorandum was blunt in its criticisms of the League’s structure, it was incisive enough to attract interest within the League, with Arthur Salter offering a particularly flattering assessment of its

69 Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Jeanne D'Arc"
71 Coudenhove-Kalergi himself refers to it as a memorandum - see, for example R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi to M. Warburg, 4 Aug 1925, HAEU, PAN/EU 1, 554/4/74, 1559, p.2
73 including the Czech Foreign Minister Edvard Beneš, the Austrian Chancellor Ignaz Seipel, the French Prime Minister Paul Painlevé, the British internationalist public intellectual Gilbert Murray, and the director of research at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace James T Shotwell (see Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi to Max Warburg, 4 Aug 1925, HAEU, PAN/EU 1, 554/4/74, 321-323, 322)
74 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1925, “A Scheme for World Reorganisation: Memorial to the League of Nations” Review of Reviews, September, LoN, 39/45485/45485
75 In condensed form as R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, "A Schema for world organisation", The American Review of Reviews 73.1 (1925) 71-73
76 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Weltorganisation und Paneuropa: Memorandum an das Generalsekretariat des Völkerbundes", Paneuropa 2.4 (1925) 14-29

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merits:

‘This memo, which I had already read in the Review of Reviews, is extremely able and illuminating. It is packed with ideas, which deserve my careful study & some of which are likely to prove of great importance. I recommend everyone whom this reaches to read it. It is one of the best pieces of condensed argument I’ve ever seen.’

On the strength of this endorsement, the League Secretary-General Eric Drummond was recommended to respond positively to Coudenhove-Kalergi’s invitation to send a League representative along to the first Pan-European Congress the following year, albeit with the explicit caveat that ‘the usual stipulation that the representative of the Secretariat should do no more than give information concerning the work of the League should perhaps be observed with particular care in this case’. The Congress was held in Vienna from 3rd to 6th October 1926, and attracted more than 2,000 participants, and international press coverage. In Britain, where Coudenhove-Kalergi had recently taken his campaign to London in spring 1925, in the process convincing the Colonial Secretary Leo Amery to send the Congress a friendly message, the Manchester Guardian reported on the Congress in glowing terms, writing that ‘The United States of Europe is no longer a dream; it has entered on the world of realities’.

The man sent by Drummond to be the League’s representative, H.R. Cummings, reported back from the Congress that:

‘Count Coudenhove-Kalergi … is a remarkable young individual and in the present stage of the Pan-European Union a good deal depends on his personality. I consider that he is honest in his purpose, with no political arrière pensée, but that he is vain and extremely ambitious though confessedly without any knowledge whatever of economic affairs, with which I believe the movement will be mainly concerned, and without any political experience. I think that he has felt and probably still feels, despite his utterances, that there is a certain rivalry with the League but some of his closer collaborators have frankly told him that any development of the movement in the terms of hostility to the League would be hope less and he seems to have acquiesced. I am convinced that his only interest

77 J.A.S[alter], 6 May 1925 [the date is almost certainly recorded erroneously, and should probably be 6 May 1926], LoN, 39/45485/45485
78 J.V. Wilson, 31 Aug 1926, LoN, 39/45485/45485
79 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 207; Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers The World, 123-128
80 Manchester Guardian, "The Oneness of Europe" (5 October 1926), 12
in having a representative present from the League Secretariat was to secure that amount of recognition, for although my presence was emphasised in the press there was evident reluctance to have any close collaboration during the Congress.\textsuperscript{81}

Cummings went on to describe the contribution of the Greek representative to the League of Nations Nikolaos Politis, whose speech at the Congress attempted to smooth relations between the League and PEU, which Politis argued could be mutually strengthening: not ‘rivals’ but ‘intimate collaborators’.\textsuperscript{82} Cummings felt that Politis gave too much ground on the matter, writing that his speech ‘surprised a good many who understood the work of the League and it certainly did the League a good deal of damage’;\textsuperscript{83} upon reading Cummings’ report, Eric Drummond shared this feeling, noting:

‘I agree with Mr. Cummings’ estimate of Monsieur Politis’s speech. We should note the line he now takes; to my mind it shews that we should not consider Monsieur Politis as a good choice for any important speech on League affairs.’\textsuperscript{84}

Nevertheless, despite these reservations, Cummings concludes by recommending the maintenance of close relations between the two organisations, writing that the Pan-European Union:

‘may have considerable political importance spiritually, so to speak, and may become, if anything, a valuable aid to creating a public opinion for League tasks, especially in the economic field. The Secretariat certainly should keep in touch and I discussed this with Count Coudenhove-Kalergi. I told him that I thought it extremely unlikely that it would be possible to set up a Pan-European Section in the Secretariat in view of the way in which the Secretariat and the League were organised, that in any case it would require a definite decision by the Council and budgetary appropriation, but I said that what probably could be done without any trouble would be to designate a member of the Secretariat to keep in touch with the organisation, to keep him informed of relevant League work and in turn be kept informed of all the developments of the Pan-European Union. He seemed to be quite satisfied with this.’\textsuperscript{85}

Drummond endorsed this sentiment, noting that ‘The line taken by Mr Cummings … with regard to

\textsuperscript{81} H.R. Cummings, 1926, “Notes on the First Pan-European Congress”, LoN, 39/45485/45485, p.3-4
\textsuperscript{82} N. Politis, 1926, “Le Pan Europe et la Société des Nations”, speech at 1st Pan-European Congress, Vienna; LoN, 39/45485/45485, p.4
\textsuperscript{83} H.R. Cummings, 1926, “Notes on the First Pan-European Congress”, LoN, 39/45485/45485, p.6
\textsuperscript{84} E. Drummond, 1926, “Note by Secretary General”, 15 Oct, LoN, 39/45485/45485
\textsuperscript{85} H.R. Cummings, 1926, “Notes on the First Pan-European Congress”, LoN, 39/45485/45485, p.7-8
possible future liaison with the Secretariat seems to me to have been very wise’ and that ‘It certainly is desirable that the movement should be followed somewhat closely’.  

Although relations between the two organisations would cool significantly in the 1930s, these early interactions give a good sense of a relationship in which the PEU was taken seriously by important figures in the League as both a potential ally and a source of ideas, as well as a serious enough rival to blacklist a figure like Politis simply for failing to assert the League’s position sufficiently strongly. Though Cummings’ report betrays scepticism on the part of the League, calling the PEU’s programme ‘ambitious’ and ‘of doubtful realisation’, it concedes that this programme ‘at any rate gives it a goal’, and that ‘there is no doubt that it makes an appeal to the imagination, to interests and, in its emphasis on the necessity of European entente, to common sense’.

Coudenhove-Kalergi was delighted to have been taken seriously by the national and international political establishment, and in an article on “The Results of the Pan-European Congress” in the Neue Freie Presse, Coudenhove-Kalergi claimed that ‘The fact alone that both the League of Nations and a number of Governments were officially represented at this Congress shows that Pan-Europe has definitely left behind it its first phase of not being taken seriously’. Having enthusiastically welcomed the cordial relations established at the Congress within the Pan-European movement and with these outside representatives, Coudenhove-Kalergi celebrated that ‘the first Pan-Europe Congress has definitely raised the thought of Pan-Europe from the subconsciousness to the consciousness of our part of the world’.

Though the Congress was a success, Coudenhove-Kalergi knew that further progress had to

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86 E. Drummond, 1926, “Note by Secretary General”, 15 Oct, LoN, 39/45485/45485
88 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, “Die Ergebnisse des Paneuropakongresses. Die Aufgaben der Propaganda und der Aufklärung sind erfüllt”, Neue Freie Presse, 10 October 1926, p. 2-4, 2. This article was translated and transmitted to the Foreign Office by Viscount Chilston; see Coudenhove-Kalergi, “The Results of the Pan-Europe Congress”, TNA, FO 371/11246, 145-148, 145
be made to win over people with real political influence. His primary target in this respect was the French multiple-term Prime Minister and long-term Foreign Minister Aristide Briand, whom he had met earlier in 1926, and who was known to harbour his own plans for a United States of Europe. Each saw in the other a useful ally, and an agent for the advancement of their own ideas. This partnership was publicised in May 1927 at the second formal session of the Central Council of the Paneuropean Union in Paris, days before all eyes would be turned to Geneva for the very first World Economic Conference, as Briand accepted Coudenhove-Kalergi’s offer to become honorary president of the Pan-European Union. A year later, their partnership was renewed, as towards the end of 1928 Briand informed Coudenhove-Kalergi of his ‘decision to submit the project of Pan-Europe to the next Assembly of the League [of Nations],’ which was scheduled for the following September. Briand was then at the height of his powers and fame, having been elected Prime Minister (for the final time) in July 1929, and he brought unprecedented publicity to the idea of a federal Europe.

Briand spoke to the League on Thursday, 5 September 1929, with Coudenhove-Kalergi sat in the diplomatic gallery. He admitted the utopian aspect of a united Europe, ‘an idea that is politely described as magnanimous – perhaps in order to avoid terming it rash’. While admitting the difficulties of the venture, and being careful to stress it would be ‘primarily economic’ in nature, Briand made the case to the gathered Assembly that ‘among peoples constituting geographical groups

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90 Contrast Briand’s view that ‘even though he [Briand] did not agree with some of the basic tenets in the Paneuropean program, felt that Coudenhove was doing a good job of popularizing the general idea’ (C.H. Pegg, *Evolution of the European Idea, 1914-1932* (Chapel Hill & London: University of North Carolina Press; 1983), 82-83) with Coudenhove-Kalergi’s view that ‘Briand’s initiative had no political results, but it was none the less the best possible propaganda for the European idea and movement. For two years the Press of the world, the politicians, and the parties of Europe were forced to interest themselves in the European idea.’ (R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Europe Must Unite* (Glarus, Switzerland: Paneuropa Editions Ltd; 1939), 64-65)


93 Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote that ‘Insignificant local papers in the Balkan countries, in Scandinavia and in Portugal, discussed the announcement in their leading articles.’ Coudenhove-Kalergi, *An Idea Conquers The World*, 153-154


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like the peoples of Europe, there should be some kind of federal bond’. 95 His address was met with ‘a storm of applause’, though Coudenhove-Kalergi confessed in his account of the event that ‘no one was quite sure whether this was meant for Briand the orator, or for Briand the statesman’. 96 The message was reinforced the following Monday, 9 September. In the morning’s plenary meeting, the German Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann spoke in support of Briand’s proposal, disavowing the pessimism of those who thought it utopian, and instead quoting Goethe: ‘Every great idea seems mad at first’. 97 In the same session, Briand and Stresemann’s Czechoslovak counterpart Edvard Beneš also lent his support to the idea, arguing that while the League’s first decade had seen the return of ‘economic nationalism’ to stabilise Europe’s post-war economies, now the League was entering upon a ‘new phase of its existence’ in which attention could switch from the liquidation of war to economic integration. 98 Each of these addresses was published in the following issue of Paneuropa, under the title ‘Pan-Europe in Geneva’. 99 However, perhaps the most important event occurred just after the morning session at which Stresemann and Beneš spoke, at a luncheon convened by Briand at the Hôtel des Bergues. This special meeting, involving representatives of all 27 European members of the League, concluded by deciding that Briand would draft a memorandum setting out the projected organization. 100 Though Coudenhove-Kalergi was not present at this meeting, his looming spirit was

95 A. Briand, in “Records of the Tenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly. Plenary Meetings. Text of the Debates” League of Nations Official Journal Special Supplement 75 (Geneva; 1929), p.52; LoN, Records of Tenth Assembly, Plenary Meetings and Committees
96 Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers The World, 156
98 E. Beneš in “Records of the Tenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly. Plenary Meetings. Text of the Debates” League of Nations Official Journal Special Supplement 75 (Geneva; 1929), p.74, 73; LoN, Records of Tenth Assembly, Plenary Meetings and Committees
99 A. Briand, G. Stresemann, and E. Beneš, "Paneuropa in Genf", Paneuropa 8.5 (1929) 1-4
100 "The United States of Europe", The Round Table 20.77 (1929) 79-99, 80; A. Salter, The United States of Europe and other papers, ed. W. Arnold-Foster (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock; 1933), 83; O. Keller and L. Jílek (eds.), Le Plan Briand d'union fédérale européenne: Documents (Geneva: Fondation Archives Européenne; 1991); C.
certainly felt both inside and outside the hotel, with Salvador de Madariaga reporting that ‘The story ran in Geneva, with more than the usual assurance, that on the eve of the historic luncheon the French Prime Minister asked Count Koudenhove-Calergi [sic] to put a few ideas on paper’.101

Despite these advances, between September 1929 and May 1930 several key events changed the course of the Pan-Europe movement. As Coudenhove-Kalergi would later ruefully note,

‘The political wind, which had blown fair for the Pan-European movement since the 1924 elections in France, now began to veer in the opposite direction at the very moment when the idea was about to become practical.’102

First, the untimely death of Briand’s German counterpart and crucial ally Gustav Stresemann in October left Briand politically isolated; Stresemann’s successor Julius Curtius, while similarly minded to endorse plans for European cooperation, had none of Stresemann’s authority or diplomatic skill. Second, the Wall Street Crash, also in October 1929, which had a double-effect: its shock waves reached across the Atlantic, triggering a global economic crisis and raising grave doubts over the benefits of global economic interconnectedness, which in turn sparked a protectionist response from governments seeking to insulate themselves from the volatility. Quickly, ‘autarky’ became the watchword of the day, and Coudenhove-Kalergi’s message of economic integration was an impossible sell. Third, the collapse of Hermann Müller’s Grand Coalition in Germany, and his replacement as Chancellor by Heinrich Brüning in March 1930, robbed Pan-Europe of official German support: as Mark Hewitson notes, that Curtius hesitated despite his new Chancellor’s opposition to Briand’s memorandum indicates the high degree of popularity Pan-Europe had obtained in Germany at that time.103 Fourth, and more positively, British scepticism about Pan-Europe seemed

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102 Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers The World, 159
to be waning, with the publication of an influential article by Winston Churchill in February 1930 advocating a (non-British) United States of Europe, and explicitly name-checking Coudenhove-Kalergi. However, the sympathetic Churchill and Leo Amery, Chancellor of the Exchequer and Colonial Secretary respectively in the Conservative government that had recently lost the 1929 general election, were no longer in a position to influence British policy, while the new Labour government reacted coolly to the Briand memorandum, arguing that ‘We ought surely to make it clear that we only accept the introduction of political influences in so far as they help to promote economic union, that we can’t encourage any ideas of political union’. A Pan-European discussion group was held in the House of Commons in March 1931, though it came to nought as, in Amery’s evaluation, ‘most of the people there were strong League of Nations enthusiasts inclined to be suspicious of the Pan-European movement’.

Briand’s memorandum was eventually launched on 17 May 1930, a date that had been arranged in communication with Coudenhove-Kalergi to coincide with the opening of the second Pan-European Congress in Berlin. Coudenhove-Kalergi declared that to honour this synergy 17 May would hereafter be Pan-Europe Day. However, the responses of the various European states to Briand’s memorandum was ambivalent, and by September when the matter was officially discussed at Geneva it was clear that Briand’s plan was dead in the water. This was only confirmed when in the middle of the talks news came of the German election results, in which Adolf Hitler’s Nazi Party had increased its strength tenfold; European political union was now out of the question.


104 Churchill, United States of Europe, CAC, CHAR 8/303, 4-12.

105 Quoted in P.M.R. Stirk, *A History of European Integration Since 1914* (London: Pinter; 1996), 38

106 L.S. Amery to R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, 13 March 1931, CAC, AMEL, 2/2/5, File 2


108 Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Europe Must Unite*, 75
As Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote, ‘No Frenchman wanted closer ties with Germany so long as there was any danger of Hitler becoming Chancellor in Berlin’. The impression of a new mood in Germany that ruled out multilateral political cooperation was confirmed in March 1931 with the announcement of a secret Austro-German protocol for the creation of a bilateral customs union that would unite the two states in Anschluss, sparking protest and suspicion elsewhere in Europe. Though in the 1920s Coudenhove-Kalergi had tried to channel German-Austrian attempts at unification into the pacifist concept of a European community, Hitler’s rise had severed this possibility and forced Coudenhove-Kalergi to change tack. Instead, he now gave his unequivocal support to Austrian independence, and stressed that the peace of Europe (and the cause of European unity) depended upon preserving it.

Recognising the importance of gaining German support for his plans and combating the rise of an ultra-nationalism that explicitly rejected the notion of European brotherhood, Coudenhove-Kalergi redoubled his campaigning in Germany, making ever-greater compromises in order to turn the tide. At the 3rd Pan-European Congress, held in the predominantly German-speaking Swiss town of Basel in October 1932, he relaxed his opposition the concept of a Pan-European dress code, allowing the Pan-European Youth organisation to adopt the blue shirt (adorned with the Pan-European emblem) as its uniform. A German journalist, Wilhelm Grottkopp, caustically noted the allusion:

> ‘In Basle the new [Pan-Europe] party already presented itself in its new robes, which had been designed in the light of Mussolini’s and Hitler’s examples. The party’s young forces wore blue shirts and blouses, the honourable gentlemen the uniform Pan-European tie. The new party’s “storm troopers” greeted their leader enthusiastically. However, the fascist salutation does not seem to have been copied yet.’

However, Hitler’s rise was not to be stopped, and the respective trajectories of the Nazi and

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111 As he put it, ‘Berlin became a kind of battle-ground for the future of Europe’. Coudenhove-Kalergi, *An Idea Conquers The World*, 176
Pan-European movements were perfectly illustrated by an uncannily symbolic crossing of paths. On 30 January 1933, the day of Hitler’s swearing in as the new Chancellor of Germany, Coudenhove-Kalergi gave a long-awaited talk in the Hotel Kaiserhof in Berlin. Hitler too was staying in the Kaiserhof; the front entrance of the hotel was therefore reserved for Hitler and the members of the new government, while Coudenhove-Kalergi and his audience were advised to use a side door. Though apparently in the discussion following Coudenhove-Kalergi’s talk ‘the doctrine of National Socialism came under heavy fire’, the torches, jackboots and singing outside the hall told a different story (see fig. 5); Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote that ‘Throughout the assembled company, there was a deep awareness of the historical significance of that day’s events’. Nor was the symbolism lost on the Nazis, for whom Coudenhove-Kalergi had long been a thorn in the side (Hitler’s unpublished 1928 Zweites Buch had described him as ‘that everybody’s bastard’), with the Nazi historian and ideologue Karl Richard Ganzer writing that one ‘rising [National Socialism] and one sinking political world [Pan-Europe], the latter a true child of the Weimar and Versailles systems, stood together at the same place and time under the critical gaze of History’. More materially, Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor meant the dissolution and prohibition of the German branch of the Pan-European Union, the destruction of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s books in Germany, and as Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler notes ‘the loss of the most important financier of Pan-Europe: German industry’. As Coudenhove-Kalergi would later claim, ‘The worst blow which befell the [Pan-European] movement was not Briand’s failure, but the abandonment of Paneuropa by Germany when the Third Reich was established’.

113 Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers The World, 177-180; Orluc, ”A last Stronghold against Fascism”, 23-24
114 Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers The World, 179
116 K.R. Ganzer, Das Reich als europäische Ordnungsmacht (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsgesellschaft; 1941), 5-6, quoted in Orluc, ”A last Stronghold against Fascism”, 23
117 Pretenthaler-Ziegerhofer, ”Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi”, 99 In this regard, Coudenhove-Kalergi specifically mentions the forced resignation from the Pan-Europa promotion syndicate of the wealthy industrialist Robert Bosch (Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers The World, 186).
118 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Europe Must Unite, 66
Nevertheless, the movement continued, with a 4th Pan-European Congress held in May 1935 in Vienna, following by other events which sidelined talk of political union in favour of economic and cultural union: in May 1936 the first Pan-European Agricultural Conference, and in 1937 the first Pan-European School Conference (on the latter, see chapter III). Meanwhile Coudenhove-Kalergi diverted his political efforts into securing a European alliance that could isolate Hitler, first renewing his efforts to win over Mussolini to the concept of a Franco-Italian partnership, and then in late 1936 when Mussolini had decided to instead ally with Germany, making a last desperate effort to save the project of Pan-Europe by securing British involvement. Previously happy to assume that Britain’s future lay in its empire, Coudenhove-Kalergi now stressed that Britain was ‘daily more and more closely involved in the common fate of Europe’.\footnote{Coudenhove-Kalergi, \textit{Europe Must Unite}, 109. He pointed to the 1931 Statute of Westminster (which granted effective legislative independence to Britain’s colonies) as justification that, as he argued, ‘Great Britain has more scope than formerly to pursue a constructive European policy.’ (ibid.)} The necessity of this change in tack was confirmed by the German annexation of Austria in March 1938, with Coudenhove-Kalergi fleeing Vienna on the
night of invasion in dramatic circumstances. His subsequent British charm offensive included: the reappearance of the Pan-Europe journal (March 1938 had been its last issue before its Vienna offices were seized by the Nazis),\textsuperscript{120} retitled \textit{European Letters} and published in English as well as German and French;\textsuperscript{121} the 1939 English publication of \textit{Europe Must Unite} with a preface by Leo Amery,\textsuperscript{122} two lectures at the Royal Institute of International Affairs,\textsuperscript{123} and the inaugural meeting of the British Pan-European Committee in the House of Commons.\textsuperscript{124} Though the ultimate aims of Pan-Europe remained pacifist, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s new British allies were interventionists dissatisfied with Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement. The goal of Pan-Europe had drifted from the prevention of a European war to a means of ensuring that the coming war would be Europe’s last. This engagement with the Anglophone world, solidified during a politically active wartime exile in New York from 1940 to 1946,\textsuperscript{125} was to profoundly influence post-war plans for European unity, but by then the Young Count had become a ‘grand seigneur’, and had sidelined the PEU in favour of a new venture: the European Parliamentary Union.\textsuperscript{126} Pan-Europe’s last hurrah would be Churchill’s September 1946 speech on European unity at Zurich University, in which he explicitly paid tribute to ‘the exertions of

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{120} The Pan-European Union central office in the Hofburg Palace was immediately seized by the Nazi Chancellor (and subsequent Governor of the newly-named Ostmark [i.e. Austria] province) Arthur Seyss-Inquart for his personal residence (Coudenhove-Kalergi, \textit{An Idea Conquers The World}, 212)
\bibitem{121} Coudenhove-Kalergi, \textit{An Idea Conquers The World}, 216. For German editions (\textit{Europäische Briefe}), see ACV, PP1000/227; for French editions (\textit{Lettres européennes}, published from November 1939), see ACV, PP1000/228. The English editions are lost, though mention is made of the 1 May 1940 edition in “A Spectator’s Notebook”, \textit{The Spectator}, 14 June 1940, p.5. The Letters ceased soon after, the last issue being that of 15 June 1940, before – as France fell to Germany and Italy entered the war – Coudenhove-Kalergi fled via Lisbon to New York.
\bibitem{122} Coudenhove-Kalergi, \textit{Europe Must Unite}
\bibitem{123} In June 1938 on the Sudeten crisis, and in June 1939 on Pan-Europe; the latter was published as R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Europe To-Morrow", \textit{International Affairs} 18.5 (1939) 623-640
\bibitem{124} Attendees included Amery, Duff Cooper, Sir Edward Grigg, Sir Arthur Salter, Harold Nicolson, Somerset de Chair, Haden Guest and Sir Geoffrey Mander; a few days later non-parliamentary figures including Gilbert Murray, Stephen King-Hall, Sir Walter Layton, Sir George Clerk, Rennie Smith and Sir Evelyn Wrench were included. See Coudenhove-Kalergi, \textit{Europe Must Unite}, 72-73; Coudenhove-Kalergi, \textit{An Idea Conquers The World}, 219
\end{thebibliography}
the Pan-European Union which owes so much to Count Coudenhove-Kalergi’.127

**A life told**

When the League’s representative at the first Pan-European Congress, H.R. Cummings, had reported that ‘a good deal depends on his personality’,128 he was not only talking about Coudenhove-Kalergi’s charisma. Cummings was also referring quite literally to the Count’s person, his seeming embodiment of the Pan-European cause in his own life and situation. Along with other outside representatives and members of the press in attendance, he was supplied with a ‘biographical sketch’ of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s cosmopolitan-aristocratic heritage and life story.129 After summarising it in his report, Cummings noted that ‘This personal allusion may seem irrelevant, but so long as he remains the soul of the movement it is necessary to have some understanding of his exceptional character’.130 Coudenhove-Kalergi was well aware of this dynamic, and happy to play into it, folding his own life story into his political campaigning by presenting it as ‘a life born and educated for internationalism’.131 His own biography was therefore not incidental to, but a self-conscious and integral part of the Pan-European story, and while we might take the obvious resonances between his life and the politics he espoused at face value, we must also consider the ways in which this biography was cultivated precisely for this purpose.

This weaving of his own life into that of his movement is perhaps most apparent in his autobiographies, the first of which, *Europa erwacht!* (‘Europe awakens!’), he published in 1934, the

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128 H.R. Cummings, 1926, “Notes on the First Pan-European Congress”, LoN, 39/45485/45485, p.3-4
129 “Biographical Sketch of Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi” (received in registry 16 October 1926), LoN, 39/45485/45485
130 H.R. Cummings, 1926, “Notes on the First Pan-European Congress”, LoN, 39/45485/45485, p.4
131 Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Crusade for Pan-Europe*, 8
year of his 40th birthday. New versions would appear at regular intervals throughout his life: in 1943, *Crusade for Pan-Europe: Autobiography of a Man and a Crusade*; in 1949, *Kampf um Europa: aus meinem Leben* (published in English as *An Idea Conquers the World*, 1953); and in 1958 *Eine Idee erobert Europa: meine Lebenserinnerungen* (‘An idea conquers Europe: my life memories’; an expanded and updated edition was published in 1966).132 These were supplemented by innumerable biographical sketches such as that given out at the Pan-European Congress, remarkable not for their content so much as for their ubiquity.

Coudenhove-Kalergi justified this sharing of his own life story as a journalistic device to add some human interest to a political message, in his own words as ‘an attempt to spread my ideas without boring my readers by presenting them in a dry political volume’.133 Read only slightly more cynically, we might see it as an attempt to humanise his rather otherworldly image. Or rather, to ground his critique of nationalism in terms other than those of the ‘rootless’ cosmopolitan. This stereotype was not just held by nationalists and anti-Semites, as might be demonstrated by Alfred Zimmern’s eloquent expression of it:

“‘A man without a city’, said Aristotle, ‘is either a god or a beast’. No one can render true service in the cause of international co-operation if he has not first thoroughly absorbed in his own mind and soul the meaning and value of nationality. … Too often, indeed, has the advocate of international co-operation been identified with the déraciné. In reality the two are at opposite poles. The déraciné may sometimes render good service in other fields of human achievement. In the sphere of politics he is not only useless but mischievous, for he is constitutionally incapable of entering into that which is the deepest element in all political and social experience—the attachment of a people to its home, its traditions, and its institutions.”134

By spelling out Coudenhove-Kalergi’s background, the story of his attachment to ‘home’, the various ways in which he too was ‘rooted’, it was hoped that his autobiographies would qualify him in these

132 Coudenhove-Kalergi, *autobiog* refs  
133 Coudenhove-Kalergi, *An Idea Conquers The World*, 301; he was speaking about R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Europa erwacht!* (Zurich/Vienna/Leipzig: Paneuropa Verlag; 1934)  
terms to enter the sphere of politics. As Dina Gusejnova has argued, aristocratic intellectuals like Coudenhove-Kalergi used their biography to give ‘a personal face to elusive abstractions like “Europe”’.  

However, the connection between life and narrative ran deeper than this, for the story he told reflected the politics he espoused in important ways. It was no accident that the metaphors provided by his own story – the cosmopolitan left without a nation after the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire; the young, modern aristocrat in a new, democratic world; the fusion of Orient and Occident, the product of the Old World at home in the New – all resonated with the message he was telling. In short, his narrative cultivated the impression that he *embodied* Pan-Europe. One can detect this not only in his texts, but in the paratextual use of his own image.  

Unafraid to reproduce Thomas Mann’s description of him as ‘one of the best-looking persons I ever met’, he was not shy to use his own portrait as a frontispiece in his publications (see fig. 3). Indeed, the level of care taken is indicated by a 1927 letter sent by the German Pan-European Baron Friedrich von Lupin to the printing engineer at the Pan-European Press, worrying that a certain image of Coudenhove-Kalergi made him look more like an ‘aesthete’ than a ‘political leader’. In this regard, it is telling that while his political works were illustrated with photographic portraits of himself, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s 1931 aphoristic philosophical work *Gebote des Lebens* (‘Commandments of life’) was illustrated with a sparse line drawing by the Norwegian artist Olaf Gulbransson (fig. 6). Story and image were crafted with equal care to mesh with the goals of the movement.

This same fusion of Pan-Europeanism with Coudenhove-Kalergi’s own person even lurks beneath the surface of the PEU’s consistent visual symbology, what we might today call branding. Central to this branding was the PEU symbol, the *Sonnenkreuz* (‘Solar Cross’), which was described

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135 Gusejnova, *European Elites and Ideas of Empire, 1917-1957*, xliii
138 F. von Lupin to Klausner, 24 Feb 1927; HAEU, PAN/EU 1, 554/4/7, 309
Figure 6: Olaf Gulbransson, Portrait of Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi (1931). Source: R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, Gebote des Lebens (Leipzig/Vienna: Paneuropa Verlag; 1931), frontispiece
at the outset of the movement, in the last lines of his 1923 *Pan-Europe*:

‘The emblem under which the Pan-Europeans of all states will unite, is the Solar Cross [*das Sonnenkreuz*]: the red cross on a golden sun, the symbols of Humanity and of Reason.

This banner of love and of the spirit will wave one day, from Poland to Portugal, above a united World Empire of Peace and Freedom!’

In the second issue of the *Paneuropa* magazine, he expanded upon the symbology:

‘The Solar Cross connects the two primordial symbols of European culture; Christian ethics and pagan beauty; international humanitarianism and modern education; heart and mind; Man and cosmos.’

This new symbol was given pride of place on the front cover of the *Paneuropa* journal, where it would remain until the very last issue. It also played a starring role at the first Pan-European Congress in 1926, where a Bach fugue accompanied the unfurling of an enormous Pan-European flag, containing the additional element of 26 rays emanating from the central symbol, symbolising the 28 states of Europe. Indeed, so committed was Coudenhove-Kalergi to this flag that after 1945, it became the centre of an acrimonious dispute (Coudenhove-Kalergi dubbed it the ‘flag conflict’) with Duncan Sandys, who preferred his own design: a red (later green) letter “E” on a white background. Sandys won the battle, with his flag adorning the Congress of Europe at The Hague in 1948, but lost the war as this flag quickly fell from favour, becoming known as ‘Sandys’s Pants’ due to its resemblance to white underpants against a red (or green) background. A subsequent effort by Coudenhove-Kalergi to suggest that the Council of Europe adopt the Pan-European flag was less bitter, but no more successful, vetoed by Turkey and the UK who both objected to its inclusion of the Christian symbol of the cross.

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139 Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Pan-Europe*, 193
140 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Die Pan-Europäische Bewegung", *Paneuropa* 1.2 (1924) 3-20, 20. Original: ‘Das Sonnenkreuz verbindet die beiden Ursymbole europäische Kultur; christliche Ethik und heidnische Schönheit; internationale Humanität und moderne Aufklärung; Herz und Geist; Mensch und Kosmos.’
141 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Kongressbericht", *Paneuropa* 2.13/14 (1926) 7-19, 8
142 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi to E.D. Sandys, 14 June 1948; ACV, PP 1000/4/8
144 On Coudenhove-Kalergi’s efforts, see Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1953, “L’Europe a besoin d’un Drapeau”/*Europa
The red-and-gold colour scheme was repeated in the stylised block-borders that would frame not just every issue of *Paneuropa*, but every official PEU publication\(^{145}\) until Coudenhove-Kalergi’s death (compare figs. 7 & 8, from 1924 and 1957 respectively). This remarkable consistency served both to make the PEU’s works instantly recognisable, and to imply a stability of purpose throughout its history. However, lurking behind Coudenhove-Kalergi’s rationalisation of the symbolism is the rarely-considered yet remarkably strong resemblance to Coudenhove-Kalergi’s own heraldic badge: a red diagonal wave across a golden shield. This was no trivial symbol, but rather a motif that was repeated throughout his family’s portraiture, property and presentation (see figs 9, 10, 11 & 12).\(^{146}\)

Likewise, the cross too was often prominently featured in the Coudenhove-Kalergi family portraiture. Indeed, portraiture was another medium through which this symbolism was reinforced, woven back into the family history through new portraits of the medieval relation Gerolfus Ide Coudenhove and Richard’s great uncle Heinrich Coudenhove, commissioned from the Austrian painter Alfred Offner, in which both the Coudenhove heraldic badge and the cross were foregrounded (see figs. 9 & 10).\(^{147}\)

Needless to say, when the colours of the wave are combined with the form of the cross, the result is the *Sonnenkreuz*. Indeed, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s incorporation of the symbolism and colours of his family into that of the PEU mirrored his wider investiture of self into the movement he ran. If it helped him internalise the movement’s goals, it also led to a defensiveness and unwillingness to compromise on the issue of symbology.

\(^{145}\) As distinct from Coudenhove-Kalergi’s monographs, which often had more commercial covers.


\(^{147}\) Offner, a Jewish-Austrian artist from Czernowitz in the province of Bukovina (known today as Chernivtsi, now in Ukraine), ended up seeking refuge during the war as a guest of Richard’s elder brother Hans Coudenhove-Kalergi in Ronspieg castle. Regimental records show that Offner died at the castle in 1947 (see “Offner Alfréd”, [http://chodsko.net/beta/www/chodskem/celeb-detail/819](http://chodsko.net/beta/www/chodskem/celeb-detail/819) (last accessed 30 Sep 2017); citing Božena Němcová Town Library in Domažlice)
As his use of biography, autobiography, portraiture and symbology all amply demonstrate, and as Coudenhove-Kalergi himself acknowledged, ‘This single life, this dream, this fight are inextricably interwoven’. However, the ultimate reward for such an investment of self into his cause was the one that eluded him: the Nobel Peace Prize. This was not in fact such an outlandish ambition. In contrast to today’s broader emphasis on human rights, during Coudenhove-Kalergi’s lifetime the criteria for the Nobel Peace Prize more tightly followed a literal reading of Alfred Nobel’s will, which decreed that the prize be awarded to:

‘the person who shall have done the most or the best work for fraternity between nations, for the abolition or reduction of standing armies and for the holding and promotion of peace congresses.’

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148 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Crusade for Pan-Europe, 8
149 “Full text of Alfred Nobel’s Will”, http://www.nobelprize.org/alfred_nobel/will/will-full.html (last accessed 26 Apr 2015)
Figure 9: Alfred Offner, portrait of Gerolfus Ide Coudenhove (c.1930). Horšovský Týn Castle, Horšovský Týn, Czech Republic

Figure 10: Alfred Offner, portrait of Heinrich Coudenhove (c.1930). Horšovský Týn Castle, Horšovský Týn, Czech Republic

Figure 11: Family crest, Ronsperg castle, main building. Photo: author’s own

Figure 12: Crest of Franz Karl Coudenhove, Richard’s grandfather. Horšovský Týn Castle, Horšovský Týn, Czech Republic
Accordingly, many of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s contemporaries were recipients of the prize, from those who directly influenced him (Alfred Fried won in 1911, and Woodrow Wilson in 1919) to the politicians he worked with (Briand and Stresemann won in 1926) to his immediate peers (Christian Lange, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s lecture tour companion in the US, won in 1921)\textsuperscript{150} to signed-up PEU members and supporters (Fridtjof Nansen won in 1922, Nathan Söderblom in 1930, Nicholas Murray Butler in 1931 and Carl von Ossietzky in 1935). Coudenhove-Kalergi was in fact nominated many times: 54 times between his first nomination for the 1931 prize and the current 50-year cut-off for publication of the nomination database in 1967.\textsuperscript{151} Many of his nominees made no secret of it: Harold Nicolson,\textsuperscript{152} Leo Amery,\textsuperscript{153} Fernando de los Rios,\textsuperscript{154} Jose de Aguirre\textsuperscript{155} and Arnold Zurcher\textsuperscript{156} all wrote to Coudenhove-Kalergi to inform him of their nominations. And nor did Coudenhove-Kalergi shy away from publicising his nominations, releasing press releases that lobbying for his receipt of the award by boasting of his nominations by Edvard Beneš and Erich Koch-Weser in 1931,\textsuperscript{157} and Paul-Henri Spaak in 1953.\textsuperscript{158} Given his contemporaries’ successes, and his own weight of nominations, it is perhaps not impertinent to instead ask (as no doubt Coudenhove-Kalergi himself did) what accounted for his failure to sway the Nobel Prize Committee. Of course, there is a danger in over-analysing such non-decisions, but surely it points towards a reluctance on the part of the Nobel Committee to endorse the PEU as part of the story of European pacifism and integration, and by

\textsuperscript{150} Coudenhove-Kalergi, \textit{An Idea Conquers The World}, 117-118
\textsuperscript{152} H.G. Nicolson to Coudenhove-Kalergi, 16 Jan 1940; ACV, PP 1000/3/2
\textsuperscript{153} L.S. Amery to R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, 12 Jan 1940; ACV, PP 1000/3/2
\textsuperscript{154} F. de los Rios to R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, 18 Oct 1945; ACV, PP 1000/3/8
\textsuperscript{155} J.A. de Aguirre to Nobel Prize Committee, 25 Oct 1945; ACV, PP 1000/3/8
\textsuperscript{156} A.J. Zurcher to R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, 14 Nov 1945; ACV, PP 1000/3/8
\textsuperscript{157} “Coudenhove-Kalergi für den Nobelpreis vorgeschlagen” (n.d. [c.1931]); HAEU, PAN/EU 1, 771/1/50, 229. In fact, this year he was also nominated by the Austrian Chancellor Johann Schober.
\textsuperscript{158} “Spaak Proposes Count Coudenhove-Kalergi for the Nobel-Prize” (17 Mar 1953), ACV, PP 1000/75/5. In fact, this latter nomination was something of a phantom: Coudenhove-Kalergi received a letter from the Nobel Committee informing him of the deadline for nomination which, taken with the lack of record of Spaak’s nomination of Coudenhove-Kalergi, suggests that there was some mix-up in this regard.
extension a reluctance to buy into the mythos that Coudenhove-Kalergi liked to promote.

Coudenhove-Kalergi has by no means been forgotten. Indeed, after decades punctuated by an occasional, idiosyncratic title taking the Pan-European movement as its focus, Coudenhove-Kalergi began to be rediscovered towards the end of the twentieth century, first with Carl Pegg’s 1983 *Evolution of the European Idea, 1914-1932*, which allotted a fair amount of space to Coudenhove-Kalergi, and then with Peter Stirkl’s edited collection on European unity in the interwar period, containing a chapter by Ralph White on “The Europeanism of Coudenhove-Kalergi”. Relying almost solely on Coudenhove-Kalergi’s 1943 autobiography and the 1926 English translation of *Pan-Europe*, White’s analysis came to typify treatments of the PEU that were unable to access archival material (justifiably, as we shall see in the following section). Alongside these, we might file the innumerable titles of the history of European integration, which pay Coudenhove-Kalergi and the Pan-European Union a perfunctory sentence or two.

The millennium has seen an upsurge in studies of Coudenhove-Kalergi and the PEU. Most significant among these has been Anita Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler’s 2004 *Botschafter Europas* (‘Ambassador of Europe’), though other valuable scholarly works include monographs (and related

160 Pegg, *Evolution of the European Idea*
chapters and articles) by Anne-Marie Saint-Gille in 2003,\textsuperscript{163} Verena Schöberl\textsuperscript{164} and Christian Pernhorst in 2008\textsuperscript{165} and Walter Göhring in 2016,\textsuperscript{166} slender biographies by Hanne Dézsy in 2001\textsuperscript{167} and Vanessa Conze in 2004,\textsuperscript{168} and theses by Katiana Orluc in 2005\textsuperscript{169} and Anne-Isabelle Richard in 2010.\textsuperscript{170} Meanwhile, a number of works dealing with European unity in the interwar years have dealt skilfully with the PEU’s place in this narrative.\textsuperscript{171} Among scholars of the political and intellectual history of the interwar period, then, there is a rising swell of academic scholarship on Coudenhove-Kalergi and the PEU, although a notable gap remains between their significant presence in German and French scholarship and their relative absence in English scholarship.\textsuperscript{172} Katharine Sorrels’ \textit{Cosmopolitan Outsiders}, in which Coudenhove-Kalergi shares the limelight with Alfred Fried,

\begin{footnotesize}

\textsuperscript{164} V. Schöberl, „Es gibt ein großes und herrliches Land, das sich selbst nicht kenn... Es heißt Europa.“ Die Diskussion um die Paneuropäidee in Deutschland, Frankreich und Großbritannien 1922–1933, Gesellschaftspolitische Schriftenreihe der Begabtenförderung der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (Münster / Hamburg / Berlin / London: Lit; 2008)

\textsuperscript{165} C. Pernhorst, \textit{Das paneuropäische Verfassungsmodell des Grafen Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi} (Baden-Baden: Nomos; 2008)

\textsuperscript{166} W. Göhring, \textit{Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi. Ein Leben für Paneuropa} (Vienna: Kremayr & Scheriau; 2016)

\textsuperscript{167} H. Dézsy, \textit{Gentleman Europas. Erinnerungen an Richard Graf Coudenhove-Kalergi} (Vienna: Czernin Verlag; 2001)

\textsuperscript{168} V. Conze, \textit{Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi. Umstrittener Visionär Europas}, Persönlichkeit und Geschichte (Göttingen: Muster-Schmidt; 2004)


\textsuperscript{170} A.-I. Richard, "Colonialism and the European movement in France and the Netherlands, 1925-1936", PhD thesis (University of Cambridge, 2011); see also A.-I. Richard, "In search of a suitable Europe: Paneuropa and the Netherlands in the interwar period", in Carlos Reijnen and Marleen Rensen (eds.), \textit{European Encounters: Intellectual Exchange and the Rethinking of Europe 1914-1945} (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press; 2014) 247-269


\textsuperscript{172} Though see R. Carr and B.W. Hart, "Machinations of the Centre-Right and British Engagement with the Pan-European Ideal, 1929-48", in Bradley W. Hart and Richard Carr (eds.), \textit{The Foundations of the British Conservative Party} (New York/London/New Delhi/Sydney: Bloomsbury; 2013) 107-132

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remains the only English-language monograph to take Pan-Europeanism as a primary focus.

And yet, for all this swell, it is hard to escape from the feeling that Coudenhove-Kalergi’s own presentation of his life still forms the dominant narrative. Biographical sections invariably reproduce passages from his autobiographies, in the order that he set them out. It is difficult to say whether this is testament to the quality of his prose, whether it is simply the case that the recollections, context and incidental detail of an autobiography will inevitably better conjure a life than a mélange of archival traces that the researcher can assemble, whether it is a matter of archival access, or whether there are simply only so many ways one can tell the story of a life. Whatever the cause, the effect is a blurring of the lines that separate biography from autobiography.

Records of a life

On the morning of Friday 11 March 1938, Alwine Dolfuss, widow of the assassinated Austrian chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss, was visiting the Coudenhove-Kalergis at their Vienna residence, relaying Mussolini’s private advice to her that she should seek safety in Switzerland. Unfazed by this, Coudenhove-Kalergi and his wife stayed put: after all, they had guests for dinner that evening. However, shortly after their guests’ arrival, the phone rang, with news that the Austrian Chancellor Kurt Schuschnigg had resigned, and the Germans were invading. Now the dinner guests were sent home, and Coudenhove-Kalergi fled with his wife and their two dogs (a white Pekingese called Pai-Chouan and a Russian sheep-dog called Sascha) first to the Swiss Legation, and then, pistol in hand, across the border into Czechoslovakia. When a few days later they arrived in Switzerland, where they had a summer-house near Gstaad, Coudenhove-Kalergi discovered two things: firstly what a narrow escape they had had, with many of their friends and acquaintances back in Vienna rounded up and arrested on the night they had escaped, and secondly that the Pan-European Union offices in the Hofburg palace had been seized for use as the private residence of the new Nazi ‘Governor’ of Austria,
Arthur Seyss-Inquart’s 1943 autobiography, in which he tells this story, ends by lamenting that ‘One of his [Seyss-Inquart’s] first actions had been to destroy forty-thousand volumes published by the Pan-Europe Editions as well as all our archives and correspondence’.174

However, on this last point, Coudenhove-Kalergi was mistaken, though he wouldn’t discover it during his lifetime. Today, we know that the Nazi operations on the night of 11 March 1938, ahead of the military invasion the following day, were twofold. On one hand, Heinrich Himmler and his SS staff had flown to Vienna to round up ‘political undesirables’ who were then taken to camps at Dachau and, later, Mauthausen concentration camps.175 Meanwhile, in the material complement to this human operation, Adolf Eichmann had been dispatched to Vienna to head the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) Hauptamt operation to seize various pieces of property belonging to such undesirables and oversee their transferral to the Reich.176 While it was true that the PEU’s offices in the Hofburg palace were commandeered for use by Seyss-Inquart, their archives had not been destroyed, but instead were seized by Eichmann’s SD Hauptamt. Joining the PEU archives on the journey to Berlin were the archives of Masonic lodges, Jews who had fled or been deported, and other opponents of the regime. This set of confiscations were by no means a one-off, but rather constituted an early foray into what would become under the Nazi regime an archive-hunting operation of unprecedented scale. In autumn 1939 the SD Hauptamt was consolidated with Gestapo archive-hunting operations under the new umbrella of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA) organisation.177 From 1940, these units were

173 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Crusade for Pan-Europe, 195. More properly, following two day as Austrian Chancellor, in which he had ‘invited’ the German invasion on the evening of 11 March, Seyss-Inquart was made Governor (Reichsstatthalter) of the newly re-named province of Ostmark.
174 Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers The World, 212
175 L.H. Nicholas, The Rape of Europa: The Fate of Europe’s Treasures in the Third Reich and the Second World War (London: Macmillan; 1994), 38
177 Grimsted, "From Nazi plunder to Russian restitution", 47
complemented by Alfred Rosenberg’s *Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg* (ERR), whose mission was to seize ‘cultural assets’ from conquered territories, including archives.\(^{178}\) Together, these operations formed what Patricia Kennedy Grimsted has described as ‘a vast network of pseudo-scholarly propaganda forces – often competing with one another – mobilized in occupied areas subordinate to and providing intellectual support for the Nazi regime’.\(^{179}\)

Once in Berlin, the PEU archives were housed in Emser Strasse 12/13 and Eisenacherstrasse 11/13, properties that had themselves been seized from the Freemasons, where they were joined by an array of other so-called ‘trophy’ archives after the general outbreak of war in 1939.\(^{180}\) In spring 1943, as Allied bombing of Germany intensified, these trophy archives were evacuated for their own protection to a variety of castles, manor houses and mines in Saxony, Bohemia and Silesia (see fig. 13). The first stop for the PEU archives was the imposing hilltop castle of Fürstenstein (present-day Książ), around 8km north of Waldenburg (Walbrzych).\(^{181}\) Later on that year, Fürstenstein was taken over by other Nazi agencies (including the railroad administration), with a secret underground railway tunnel built for Hitler’s occasional visits,\(^{182}\) and the archives were forced to move again. Finally, in April 1944 the RSHA leased the remote Silesian village castle of Wölfelsdorf (Wilkanów), near Habelschwerdt (Bystrzyca Kłodzka), moving the PEU and other archives there in May 1944.\(^{183}\)

They remained hidden there until ‘liberated’ by the Red Army in July 1945. Their recovery, however, was no accident: both the US and the Soviet Union had their own dedicated teams of

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\(^{178}\) P.K. Grimsted, "Reconstructing the Record of Nazi Cultural Plunder: A Survey of the Dispersed Archives of the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg (ERR)", *IISH Research Papers* (2011). The ERR would earn its infamy by seizing visual art, and in terms of archival materials, its collections were surpassed by those of the SD/RSHA (P.K. Grimsted, "Twice plundered or "twice saved"? Identifying Russia's "trophy" archives and the loot of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt", *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 15.2 (2001) 191-244, 197)


\(^{180}\) Grimsted, "From Nazi plunder to Russian restitution", 47-48

\(^{181}\) Grimsted, "Twice plundered or 'twice saved'", 202

\(^{182}\) Grimsted, "From Nazi plunder to Russian restitution", 57; this is the site being currently explored in the hunt for the legendary 'Nazi gold train'

archive-hunters, who successfully re-plundered vast quantities of archival material. Konstantin Akinsha and Grigorii Kozlov called this Soviet theft at the end of WWII ‘the most prodigious secret removal of looted cultural property in human history, carefully organised and carried out by the Red Army and the Soviet military administration’. It was also hastily organised, after the February 1945 Yalta Conference, as teams of experts were assembled and disguised in military uniform, and then SMERSH (an abbreviation of Smert ‘shpionam, or ‘Death to Spies!’), the three counter-intelligence


185 Akinsha and Kozlov, Stolen Treasure, xix
agencies embedded in the Red Army, became involved in the operation.

As Grimsted reports, ‘A Red Army counter-intelligence SMERSH unit of the Second Ukrainian Front was apparently the first to uncover the Wölfelsdorf treasures, but a Moscow historian discovered the Masonic deposits in a nearby abandoned brewery’;\(^\text{186}\) it is not clear whether the PEU archives were found in the brewery or the castle.\(^\text{187}\) What is clear is that from October to November 1945 they were then transferred from Wölfelsdorf back to Moscow, 28 freight-car loads of archives in all.\(^\text{188}\) Once in Moscow, they were placed (in common with the majority of the trophy archives ‘recovered’ by the Soviet Union at the end of the war) in the top-secret ‘Central State Special Archive’ (\textit{Tsentral’nyi gosudarstvennyi osoboiy arkhiv}, TsGOA, hereafter [in line with common usage] simply ‘Special Archive’) newly established in March 1946 for precisely this purpose.\(^\text{189}\) It was not at all obvious that these archives would be kept: according to one Soviet archival director,

‘Our government might declare some of the other materials as our property, but … clearly the government cannot consider fonds such as those brought from Czechoslovakia, for example, as part of the State Archival Fond of the USSR. And there are more than a few such fonds. We have a right to them only until such time when questions of an international character are regulated. Such temporary rights until that time we need to use for the processing of those materials and to arrange their appropriate storage. … In any case the archive would probably exist for only three, four, or maybe at most five years.’\(^\text{190}\)

However, there the PEU archives remained, almost entirely untouched\(^\text{191}\) and unknown in the West, believed destroyed, throughout the entirety of the Cold War. After five years at the Main

\(^{186}\) Grimsted, “Twice plundered or ‘twice saved’”, 205

\(^{187}\) Part of the uncertainty is due to the thorough destruction of the Nazi paper trail in their eventual retreat from Wölfelsdorf; unusually, no Nazi inventories of the Wölfelsdorf cache have ever been found. (Grimsted, “From Nazi plunder to Russian restitution”, 57-58)

\(^{188}\) Grimsted, “From Nazi plunder to Russian restitution”, 62

\(^{189}\) Grimsted, “Twice plundered or ‘twice saved’”, 192

\(^{190}\) “Protokol soveshchaniia pri zam. nachal’nika Glavnogo arkhivnogo upravleniia NKVD SSSR—Izuchenie voprosa o sozdani Osobogo Tsentral’nogo gosudarstvennogo arkhiva” (21 August 1945), GA RF, 5325/2/3623, fols. 2–3, 8; quoted in Grimsted, “Why do captured archives go home?”, 300; Grimsted, “From Nazi plunder to Russian restitution”, 88. The official in question was Vladimir V. Maksakov, then Director of the Central State Historical Archive in Moscow (\textit{TsGLAM}).

\(^{191}\) Although see Jilek on the work of Vsevolod Borisovitch Kniazhinskii, who he describes as the only researcher in 40 years of Cold War to access the PEU archives. (L. Jilek, “L’Union paneuropéenne: la traversée du siècle d’un fonds d’archives”, in S. Ghervas and S. Guindani (eds.), \textit{Penser l'Europe: quarante ans d'études européennes à Genève} (Geneva: Université de Genève; 2004) 97-107)
Archival Administration (GAU) premises on ulitsa Bol’shaia Pirogovskaia 17, the Special Archive was transferred to ulitsa Vyborgskaia 3, where it would remain for the next 64 years. The first hint of their existence was the sensational series of articles by the Russian journalist Ella Maksimova entitled ‘Five Days in the Special Archive’, published in Izvestiia from 18-22 February 1990. Amid the heady rush of the glasnost days of 1990 and 1991, the contents of the Special Archive finally emerged, including ‘Fond 554: The Pan-European Union, Vienna’. In January 1991, a small team of Swiss researchers (working with the support of the Moscow State University’s Institute of Universal History) became the first Westerners to see the PEU archive since its move to Moscow. Returning in October 1991, shortly after the failed August Putsch, this Swiss team made extensive photocopies, and harboured hopes of concluding a swift restitution of the PEU archive to Europe, where it might join the post-1938 archives of the PEU, then held at the Coppet castle in Geneva. George Browder encapsulated this mood of optimistic expectancy in his 1991 assertion that ‘The improved international atmosphere has led the Russians to consider returning to Germany (and perhaps other appropriate countries of origin) those documents not originating in the territory of the former Soviet Union’, confident of total restitution, eventually. Change was afoot: in 1992 the Special Archive

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193 See Browder, "Captured German and Other Nations' Documents", 432
194 Jilek, "L'Union paneuropéenne".
195 Jilek, "L'Union paneuropéenne". The archives formerly at the Coppet now reside at the Archives Cantonales Vaudoises in Lausanne, and have incorporated the photocopies taken in Moscow in 1991. Hopes for swift restitution were widely shared in the West: as Grimsted writes, ‘When news of the secret depositories spread around the world, Western countries hoped those cultural hostages could soon go home, as had Hitler’s loot found in the Western occupation zones half a century earlier.’ (P.K. Grimsted, "Legalizing 'Compensation' and the spoils of war: the Russian law on displaced cultural valuables and the manipulation of historical memory", International Journal of Cultural Property 17.2 (2010) 217-255, 218)
196 Browder, "Captured German and Other Nations' Documents", 425. Browder continued by warning that ‘the process could take at least five years’, but writes confidently of a point when ‘they [the Russians] return everything’ (ibid.).
was renamed¹⁹⁷ and opened more widely to researchers for access.

However, these hopes were soon dashed, as by 1993 it had become clear that there was little appetite for restitution on the Russian side. In 1999 the Special Archive was incorporated into the larger Russian State Military Archive (Rossiiskii Gosudarstvenni Voennyi Arkhiv, RGVA); as Grimsted notes ‘yet another symbol of their [the trophy archives’] wartime fate and ill-defined status’.¹⁹⁸ (In 2015, this institutional transferral would be made physical, as the archive was moved next door to the RGVA building on ulitsa Admirala Makarova 29). In 1995, Russia’s failure to resolve questions of restitution of cultural property became a sticking point in negotiations for membership of the Council of Europe. Eventually, a compromise was reached whereby Russia signed a ‘statement of intent’ which promised:

‘to settle rapidly all issues related to the return of property claimed by Council of Europe member states, in particular the archives transferred to Moscow in 1945.’¹⁹⁹

Not only was this promise roundly ignored, but just a few months later, ‘in the heat of the 1996 Russian presidential campaign, a week after Victory Day (9 May), the Duma passed a first reading of the proposed law nationalizing the spoils of war’.²⁰⁰ In 1998, this law was eventually passed, and though president Boris Yeltsin (who had actively protested the law) forced a formal appeal in the Constitutional Court, a revised version was signed into law by the Vladimir Putin, just days after his inauguration as president in May 2000.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁷ Rather euphemistically, to the Centre for the Preservation of Historico-Documentary Collections (Tsentr khraneniiia istoriko-dokumental’nykh kollektii, TsKhIDK) (P.K. Grimsted, Trophies of War and Empire: The Archival Heritage of Ukraine, World War II, and the International Politics of Restitution, Harvard papers in Ukrainian studies (Cambridge, MA: Distributed by Harvard University Press for the Ukrainian Research Institute of Harvard University; 2001), 310)

¹⁹⁸ Grimsted, Trophies of War and Empire, 313


²⁰⁰ Grimsted, "Legalizing 'Compensation' and the spoils of war", 228

²⁰¹ Grimsted, "From Nazi plunder to Russian restitution", 120-123; Grimsted, "Legalizing 'Compensation' and the spoils of war". For the text of the law (and its amendments), see Russian Federation, "Appendix 1: Federal Law on Cultural Valuables Displaced to the USSR as a Result of the Second World War and Located on the Territory of the
USSR as a Result of the Second World War’ simultaneously legally bolstered Russia’s legal claim on these trophy archives, while allowing for their ‘restitution’ in exceptional circumstances, and for a price. It is true that since the fall of the Soviet Union, ‘archival restitution… has been much more successful than the return of trophy art or library books’, but these things are both relative (speaking to the almost complete refusal to restitute books or art) and contextual (depending on the ‘exceptional circumstances’ under which restitutition might be countenanced). One important factor mandated by the new law is that ‘claims from abroad for cultural valuables must be presented through diplomatic channels of the country involved, negotiated on a state-to-state basis’. Thus, many of the Masonic files that have been successfully restituted (or are in the midst of such a process) have indeed been negotiated on such a basis, although such processes have proven long, fraught and uncertain to the last. However, in the case of the PEU archives, which are not merely non-state but which abrogate the very logic of such classification, this clause presents a serious obstacle to restitution.

Nevertheless, there is one case of the restitution of a private archive from Russia outside of state-scale diplomatic channels: that of the Vienna Rothschild archives, which were in 2001 returned...
to The Rothschild Archive in London. The historical-geographic trajectory of the Vienna Rothschild archive shares much with the PEU archive, having travelled together ever since their initial seizure in Vienna. However, after years of negotiation, the Rothschild restitution was eventually enabled by the agreement of a return ‘gift’ of a collection of letters between Tsar Alexander II and his morganatic wife Catherine Dolgorukov, bought by the Rothschild Archive for a princely sum at auction with this trade in mind. Quid pro quo in hand, the restitution was approved not under the 1998/2000 ‘Federal Law on Cultural Valuables’, but instead under the normal Civil Code of the Russian Federation on the import and export of cultural valuables, which meant that neither an inter-governmental agreement nor state approval from the Duma were required. The Rothschilds’ success was therefore a result of negotiating a set of complex and somewhat mercurial geopolitical, legal and financial conditions. While the geopolitical and legal conditions for the restitution of the PEU archive remain debatable, it seems clear that the present version of the PEU lacks the funds it would take to come to a similar arrangement.

From the point of view of the expediency of conducting research into the PEU today, the story of its archives bears on the researcher in two opposing ways: first, insofar as it conspired to preserve the archives, in the midst of immense destruction and despite the open hostility of its keepers; and second, insofar as its presence in Moscow makes archival research arduous, time-consuming and expensive. However, my contention here is that by interrogating this story further, we can stand to deepen our

209 Gray, "The Rothschild Archive"
understanding of the PEU, of the regimes responsible for the double-theft of its archives, and of the nature of archives in general. Specifically, the question we must start with is: what made the archives of the PEU valuable enough for two successive superpowers to decide to spend the significant amounts of time, energy and resources necessary in order to seize, protect and indefinitely store them? In short, why did the PEU archives move? How do we read this archival mobility? And what historico-geographical implications can we draw from their travels and travails?

The first, partial cut on this question is to interpret the Soviet seizures at the end of WWII as motivated by revenge for German seizures of Soviet archives earlier in the war, during the German advances of 1941 and 1942 under the direction of the Russian-born, Moscow-educated Alfred Rosenberg.\textsuperscript{210} German looting during the war was no secret, and widely felt within Soviet society (see fig. 14). In response to this indignity, detailed ‘wish-lists’ were drawn up of potential trophies to be brought back from Nazi-occupied territories as compensation, a ‘restitution in kind’ justified via the use of complex formulas designed by Soviet art historians to determine the respective values of the property looted by the Nazis and the treasures that might replace them.\textsuperscript{211} The communist system both confounded the calculation of such values, and led to a disregard of the distinction between state-owned and private collections when it came to drawing up targets for ‘restitution in kind’.\textsuperscript{212} However, in the event such difficulties were dwarfed by the chaos of war, and the efforts by trophy-hunting brigades to get trophies before the regular soldiers had a chance to loot them first. As Konstantin Akinsha writes, ‘by the second part of 1945 the necessity to compensate for Soviet cultural losses by equally important artifacts from specific named German collections was forgotten and replaced by

\textsuperscript{210} L. Barnickel, "Spoils of war: the fate of European records during World War II", \textit{Archival Issues} 24.1 (1999) 7-20; Nicholas, \textit{The Rape of Europa}, 185-202. Rosenberg was born in Reval (now Tallinn), then part of the Russian Empire; he fled to Germany after the Revolution.


\textsuperscript{212} Akinsha, “Stalin's decrees and Soviet trophy brigades"
the conception of total removal of cultural property from the Soviet-occupied territories’. Nevertheless, the justification of ‘restitution in kind’ remained pervasive: the seizure and transportation to the Soviet Union of nine freight cars full of archives, including vast medieval Hanseatic records, was justified by Soviet officials as possible ‘compensation for the losses wrought by the German occupiers on scholarly and cultural institutions in the Soviet Union’. Between the emotional response of eye-for-an-eye revenge archival theft to be levied against the Germans, and the rationalisations of restitution in kind to offset those Soviet losses that could not be recovered, we might therefore begin to uncover the Soviet motives for the theft of the PEU archives as compensation, broadly conceived. This helps shed some light on post-1990 Russian demands for

\[\text{Figure 14: Russian cartoon showing Leo Tolstoy looking on as Adolf Hitler loots Soviet cultural treasures. Source: A. Sumpf & V. Laniol with D. Rolland, Saisies, spoliations et restitutions. Archives et bibliothèques au XXe siècle (Rennes: Presses Universitaires)}\]

\[\text{213 Akinsha, “Stalin's decrees and Soviet trophy brigades”, 196}\]
\[\text{214 G. Aleksandrov to TsK VKP(b) Secretary G.M. Malenkov, RGASPI, fond 17/125/308, fols. 49–51 (the quote is from fol. 51); quoted in Akinsha, “Stalin's decrees and Soviet trophy brigades”, 205}\]
'compensation’ in order to restitute trophy archives, notwithstanding that the logic of such compensation claims tends to focus on the costs of Russian ‘stewardship’ since the war. These archives were (in part) taken for their exchange value, so it should not surprise us that they still possess exchange value.

This said, they were not taken only for their exchange value, and this line of argument does not help us at all in explaining the PEU archive’s original removal to Germany. To take a second cut on the explanation for their double-theft, we need to consider the use value of the PEU archive. For the Nazis, this can be reduced still further, to what Linda Barnickel calls intelligence value: ‘A document can have intelligence value, not only for the military, but also for personal enemies (blackmail); for business rivals (trade secrets); for political enemies (scandals); and for others’. As previously noted, the Nazis kept the PEU archives alongside other archives of ‘politically suspicious groups’. This designation reflects the PEU’s status as outspoken critics of the Nazi regime. As such, the PEU archive would clearly contain valuable information (and incriminating evidence) on other opponents of the regime. Some suspicions could be confirmed, and others could spread, for what could be more suspicious than associating with known opponents of the regime?

In the case of the Soviet seizure of the PEU archives, we can also see indications of their perceived ‘intelligence value’. Here we must remind ourselves that whereas much of the Soviet looting of Axis art and libraries was accomplished by teams of archive-hunters appointed by various Soviet academic institutions, it was the SMERSH units that were responsible for looting archives. While the former tended to justify the seizure of property as compensation, the latter justified it ‘for the purposes of intelligence utilization and political control’. Indeed, the instructions for the seizure of archives, as recommended from Deputy NKVD Commissar Sergei Kruglov to the Head of the NKVD Lavrentiy Beria, and from Beria to Minister of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov, commanded SMERSH units.

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215 Barnickel, "Spoils of war", 8
to search thoroughly through all German archives and libraries to effect means of preservation and bring to the Soviet Union materials, including printed editions, that have scientific-historical and operational significance for our country. 216

If the ‘scientific-historical’ significance was a catch-all by which the plunder of prized cultural artefacts could be justified, 217 ‘operational significance’ was a direct reference to the intelligence value of archives. Perhaps the capacity of special agents scanning enormous troves of papers of unknown provenance pulled from mines and castles (in languages they may not be familiar with) to make snap decisions on the ‘operational significance’ of archives should not be over-analysed. Perhaps the fact that the Nazis considered them valuable enough to hide them in the first place was recommendation enough. Nevertheless, their potential to possess intelligence value certainly played a large part in their seizure, their relocation to Moscow, and the secrecy they were held in once they got there. 218 Once part of the Special Archive, it is unclear how much usable intelligence they could have contained for the Soviet authorities. However, outside the realms of ‘intelligence’, the PEU archives were catalogued between 1949 and 1965, 219 and were accessed by at least one Soviet researcher for academic purposes. This man, Vsevolod Borisovich Kniazhinskii, drew extensively on the PEU archives for his 1958 book on the history of ‘imperialist’ plans for European unification in the interwar period, a hot topic at the time given the 1957 signature of the Treaty of Rome. 220 And repeated reference to Pan-Europe in contemporary Russian political discourse suggests that the presence of the PEU archives within the RGVA in Moscow somehow continues to legitimate the idea

216 Grimsted, Trophies of War and Empire, 278, quoting Kruglov to Beria (5 April 1945), GA RF, 5325/10/2025, fol.4; Beria to Molotov (6 April 1945), fol.5
217 Grimsted, Trophies of War and Empire, 281-2
218 For one official, whose views Grimsted claims represented the norm, these files only had intelligence value: ‘Use of these fonds, in my opinion, should have an exclusively specific, limited character, namely utilisation only for operational aims of the [NKVD] … No scholarly research whatsoever can be carried out on the basis of those archives, and to be sure, no access whatsoever can be permitted for representatives of any scholarly institutions. … I consider there is no need for compiling detailed inventories [opisi] of those fonds, nor is there need for arranging the files in binders with foliation, etc’ (“Protokol soveshchania” (21 Aug 1945), GA RF, 5325/2/3623, fol. 6v.; quoted in Grimsted, “From Nazi plunder to Russian restitution”, 89)
219 Jílek, “L’Union paneuropéenne”, 101
220 Kniazhinskii, Proval planov “ob‘edinienia Evropy”, for brief commentary, see Jílek, “L’Union paneuropéenne”, 100
of Russia as an important actor in the political history of ‘Europe’, despite present geopolitical tensions.\textsuperscript{221} Thus, on one level it is possible to read the Russian reluctance to restitute the PEU archive in terms of contemporary geopolitics; certainly, it would be remiss to consider the fate of the archive without making reference to its contents.

What connects these two notions, the contents of the archive and its external existence as a trophy of war – or, the archive-as-source and the archive-as-subject – is an essential transcendence of the nation-state. Quite aside from the PEU’s anti-Nazi campaigning, it both recorded and represented an idea of politics antithetical to the \textit{Blut und Boden} of Nazi ideology. As we have seen, the Nazi persecution of the PEU ran deeper than mere political opposition: it was based on Hitler’s personal animosity towards Coudenhove-Kalergi, an animosity borne of his embodiment of cosmopolitanism and interrasciality. Neither Coudenhove-Kalergi nor his organisation fitted into a world in which politics was state business, and the state was tied to a (racially defined) nation. The PEU archive, being that of a private organization that was both operationally and aspirationally transnational, broke both of these norms, making it deeply and essentially transgressive.

There is a growing body of work in the archival literature that focuses on how non-state and transnational organizations are obscured by the state-based ‘archival grain’. Transnational stories, this literature tells us, are rendered extraordinary, exilic, and difficult to follow: they do not obey the logic of the archive, and so their records are either split across multiple locations, dealt with in anomalous or ‘special’ series, or otherwise obscured.\textsuperscript{222} As Tony Ballantyne notes, the ‘profound disjunction’ between records of transnational stories (even those that were not fragmented) and the highly national

\textsuperscript{221} See, for example, S.V. Lavrov, "Transcript of Address by Sergey Lavrov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, at the Spring Part of the 61st Parliamentary Assembly Session of the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 29 April" (2010)

\textsuperscript{222} See A. Prescott, "Archives of exile; exile of archives", in Louise Craven (ed.), \textit{What are archives?: cultural and theoretical perspectives: a reader} (Aldershot: Ashgate; 2008) 129-142, in which he uses the example of the 1870 to 1945 archives of the départements of Bas-Rhin and Haut-Rhin (which form Alsace-Moselle) to show how the traumatic stories of exile which were so important to regional, national and European politics were instead presented as fleeting anomalies by the state-centric logic of the archives
'instituting imaginary’ of the institutions that housed them has often served to marginalise those collections in subsequent research. However, in the case of the PEU archives, its abnormal transnationality served not to obscure it, but rather to highlight it as something of interest. Today, as we have seen, its transnationalism remains one of the obstacles standing in the way of the archives’ restitution, since the entire framework within which restitution might take place is both de facto and de jure one of nation-state diplomacy. It seems that the price for contravening the state’s natural monopoly on the assembly and possession of archives is to fall outside the grid within which the transference and re-possession of archives can take place. If the PEU archive’s dissonance with the statist idea of politics was what marked it out as suspicious and threatening, worthy of the extraordinary measures necessary to drive its movements from Vienna to Moscow, it is now also the very quality that prevents its movement.

The final cut I want to take on the mobility of the PEU archive is to consider the symbolic value of its custody. We have already seen something of how for the Nazis, the PEU archive stood for something larger: a world order entirely incommensurate with their own. Accordingly, the archive was ghettoised: it was kept in isolation where it could be monitored, and if necessary accessed, but could not infect society at large. Control of the archive symbolised control of these undesirable elements, the prevention of their metastasising into the body politic. However, in the case of the Russian inheritance of Soviet custody of the PEU archives, almost the reverse is the case. The archives have been so thoroughly incorporated into the body politic that their removal is an unthinkable affront. Possession of the PEU archive (and the other trophy archives) has come to stand (in part) for the nation’s war dead. Thus, the ex-Soviet Minister of Culture Nikolai Gubenko argued that the 1998 law aimed at regularising Russia’s legal claim upon these archives should be signed in the name of ‘the

27 million who perished [during World War II] and the graves on the Volga’, and that even a token restitution would be like ‘spitting on those graves’. Logic of scientific-historical interest and operational significance are overshadowed by a more existential symbolism based not on the contents of the archive but on its simple presence.

If thus far we have been concerned with why the PEU archive moved when it did, this interpretation offers an insight into why it didn’t move when it could have, in the heady days of glasnost and perestroika. That the expected wave of restitution never broke says as much about early-90s Western complacency as it does about Russian intransigence; a geopolitical bellwether every bit as eloquent as its double-theft in 1938 and 1945. Likewise, the European insistence on inserting a clause demanding that Russia initiate restitution proceedings as a condition of admittance to the Council of Europe said as much about the symbolic importance of these archives as the subsequent Russian disregard for this clause. If Nazi custody symbolized control, Russian custody symbolises something more intimate. This case speaks to a larger truth, for archival loss is often expressed via bodily metaphors: archives reveal ‘the most intimate facets of a nation’, their exposure is ‘humiliating’, their theft unnatural and destabilising, even akin to rape. In some way, then, to read archival mobility is to analyse the body politic, and thereby to critically interrogate the all-too-often assumed relationship between archive and nation.

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224 Grimsted, "Legalizing 'Compensation' and the spoils of war", 230
225 The clause required Russia ‘to settle rapidly all issues related to the return of property claimed by Council of Europe member states, in particular the archives transferred to Moscow in 1945’ (C.o.E. Parliamentary Assembly, "Opinion 193: Application by Russia for membership of the Council of Europe” (1996); quoted in Grimsted, "Legalizing ‘Compensation’ and the spoils of war", 228)
226 Grimsted notes that ‘Since that document was signed, Russia’s parliament has flagrantly disregarded those intents’ (Grimsted, Trophies of War and Empire, 390)
227 “Geschichtsquellen als Kriegsbeute. Die Acten des Auswärtigen Amts kehren zurück”, article found in the business records of the Bundesarchiv, without source citation, but stamped as received on 7 May 1956 (BArch, B198, vol. 132); quoted in Eckert, The Struggle for the Files, 296
228 Eckert, The Struggle for the Files, 296
229 Gerhard Ritter, "Denkschrift betreffend planmässige Neuorganisation wissenschaftlicher Studien zur Geschichte der neuesten Zeit, n.d. [January 1949], Hausarchiv IfZ, ID1, vol. 1; quoted in Eckert, The Struggle for the Files, 293
230 c.f. Nicholas, The Rape of Europa
As far as the story of the original documents that constitute the central Pan-European Union archive goes, that’s it: the Pan-European Union archives are still in the RGVA in Moscow. However, when it comes to doing research on the Pan-European Union, this does not tell the whole story. If we want to give a more complete account of the mobility of the Pan-European Union archive, we need to retrace our steps, and return to the point in the story in October 1991 when the Swiss researchers were permitted to make photocopies of the newly opened Special Archive in Moscow.

These researchers were from the University Institute of European Studies (L’Institut universitaire d’études européennes), an institute linked to the University of Geneva that had been set up by the historian of European integration Denis de Rougemont in 1963. In 1984 the European Archive Foundation (Fondation Archives européennes) had been established there, thanks to support both from de Rougemont himself, and also from Vittorio Pons, then Secretary General of the still-existing Pan-European Union. Pons’s involvement meant that there was already in Geneva a good deal of residual interest in, and a trove of post-1938 documents from, the Pan-European Union. Furthermore, there was also already an awareness of the riches that were secreted away in Moscow. Vittorio Pons’s son, Marco Pons, had known of Vsevolod Kniazhinskii’s work that drew on the supposedly destroyed archival material, and communicated with him in 1978. Kniazhinskii told him that although the Pan-European Union archive existed, he did not know where. This inside knowledge in fact allowed the Swiss team to bring back a small number of documents from the Pan-European Union archive in 1989, before the existence of the Special Archive was ‘revealed’, and before the more substantial 1991 missions.231

In sum, these Swiss missions brought back 3 boxes, or 96 envelopes, of copied material from the Russian archive. However, at that moment, the Institute was in a period of crisis, and was in fact

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231 Jílek, "L’Union paneuropéenne"
closed that year, to be reopened in 1992 as the European Institute of the University of Geneva (Institut européen de l’université de Genève). Prompted in part by this new material, in November 1994 the Fondation Archives européennes released a comprehensive research guide to the published and unpublished work relating to Coudenhove-Kalergi and the Pan-European movement; this remains a valuable resource. Another institutional reshuffle in 2002, this time in happier circumstances, saw the archives of the European Institute moved to the new ‘European Centre’ (Centre européen) at the Coppet château just outside Geneva city limits.

However, here the story gets another twist, as in 2001 a PhD student named Katiana Orluc instigated another collection of copies from the Pan-European Union archive. Orluc was studying at the European University Institute in Florence, an institution funded by the EU, signed into being in 1972 and opened in 1976, who mission was ‘to foster the advancement of learning in fields which are of particular interest for the development of Europe’. In 1984, the European University Institute signed an agreement to house the new ‘historical archives of the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community’, now known by the slightly snappier title of the ‘Historical Archives of the European Union’ (HAEU). In 1986, these archives were opened in Florence. Orluc, whose PhD on the Pan-European movement was in the Department of History and Civilization under the supervision of Bo Stråth, visited Geneva and Moscow, and brought back photocopies from both, which she deposited at the Historical Archives of the European Union, where they remain open to researchers. In 2012, the archive moved from Villa Il Poggiolo to Villa Salviati, which is where I found them in 2014.

Back in Switzerland, in 2011 the European Centre at the Coppet in Geneva closed, and the archives it housed were moved, first to a furniture depository (gardemeubles) in the Geneva suburbs, and then in 2013 to the Archives of the Canton of Vaud (Archives Cantoniales Vaudoises, or ACV) in

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232 Jílek, Pan-Europe (1923) et le mouvement paneuropéen. Richard N. de Coudenhove-Kalergi entre l'Empire d'Autriche-Hongrie et une Europe gaulleenne. Guide de recherche
233 Orluc, "Europe between Past and Future"
Lausanne. Here they are located on the campus of the University of Lausanne, a stone’s throw from the Fondation Jean Monnet pour l’Europe, established in Lausanne in 1978, another institution aiming to ‘organise the archival heritage’ of Europe. The Pan-European Union archives were re-catalogued, and opened to researchers on 17 November 2014. Visiting in January 2015, I was therefore among the first to make use of this re-catalogued collection in its new Lausanne home.

The Pan-European collections held by the ACV and HAEU constitute two independent but interlinked troves of material from the twice-stolen Pan-European Union archive, which have at various points been housed in three cities keen to establish themselves as the keepers of European history. Or, at least, the keepers of the archives of European history. Each of the cities boasts a unique claim to a particular version of Europeanness. First, Geneva, where in an 1867 pacifist Congress the call to constitute the United States of Europe went out, fusing the pacifist and federalist movements for decades to come; and where after the First World War the League of Nations was set up, making it a cosmopolitan city that symbolised interwar internationalism. Second, Lausanne, which shared with Geneva the Swiss heritage of federalism, and which has given a home to the records of many of the post-World War II efforts at European integration. And third, Florence, which in addition to its cultural claims as one of the epicentres of the Renaissance that defined European civilisation, is the home to the archives of the EU’s specific institutional iteration of European integration.

This second take on the mobility of the Pan-European Union archive, the movement of photocopies, sheds light on a quite different historical geography. If the first version was a story of the isolation and quarantine of the Pan-European Union’s specific form of transnationalism, this second version is a story of the appropriation of this transnationalism. In both cases, what marks the Pan-European Union archive out is the way in which it defies the norms that locate politics at the scale of the nation-state. It does so both in terms of its internal content (archive as source) and in terms of its external history (archive as subject). However, while in the first version of the story this transnationalism cast suspicion upon the archive, in the second version of the story it lent it prestige.
Curiously, in both versions, the Pan-European Union archive is something of a trophy, albeit for wildly divergent reasons.

Conclusion

This chapter has offered three rather different takes on a life, each resting on a different understanding of what we might call the epistemology of biography. First, an attempt to get close to the subject, to give an impression of a life by way of the familiar litany of geographical metaphors we measure lives by: its contours, its points of references, its turning points, its course. For the reader, this section constitutes an introduction to Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi and the Pan-European Union, upon which the subsequent chapters depend. Second, an attempt to see the subject at a stage remove, a metabiography that seeks to expose and describe the scaffolding holding up the Potemkin façade of a life story. This is by no means a matter of questioning the authenticity of the telling, and while it challenges the notion of a singular life story, I have not dwelt on this point. Rather, it is about asking how and to what ends this story is created, what its effects are, and how story loops back into life. And third, a story of archival afterlife, of the rupture between a life and its ‘trace’, and the strange ways in which this trace on one hand symbolically refracts the story of a life, and on the other hand materially constrains its telling.

It is thus both a fractured methodology and a methodology of fracture. By taking this multi-pronged approach to biography, it seeks to gain a sense of what James Clifford called the ‘myth of personal coherence’, exploring both the content of this myth, how it was built and circulated, and its material moorings. It is worth noting, however, that this scepticism of a unitary notion of selfhood was not alien to Coudenhove-Kalergi, a philosopher after all. Recalling his mother’s change in

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234 Clifford, “‘Hanging up looking glasses at odd corners’: ethnobiographical prospects”, 44
temperament following the death of his father, from submissive and ‘childlike’ wife to ‘despotic’ and
‘distrustful’ countess and mother, he speculated on ‘how a change as radical as hers was possible’,
theorising it with a political analogy:

‘An individual character is far from being a homogeneous unit. It is a composite being
which may be compared to a parliament where many individuals and factions strive for
power but end by expressing the will of the majority. The human character too is split into
divergent factions ruled by impulses that originate in various individual and background
elements.’

This metaphor hints at a malleability of subjecthood rarely admitted to elsewhere, though of course
it ultimately seeks to rationalise it, to tell a meta-story that explains the ruptures of the story.

What the present discussion has contributed is the flipside to Clifford’s notion of the myth at
the heart of conventional biography. It is not just a matter of crafting a story to give a sense of unity
to a life, but of crafting a life to give a sense of unity to a story. Coudenhove-Kalergi lived his story.
The leadership of the Pan-European movement was not merely a position but a permanent and
immersive role. The narrative arc of his life was not a post-hoc invention, but a live weapon, one to
which he knowingly tied his fate. This predicament was incisively described by Leo Amery, who told
Coudenhove-Kalergi in 1950:

‘I am always interested in the fertility of resources with which you are able to adapt the
essential purpose of your life’s work to the inevitable changes which come about in the
European situation.’

Amery’s words can be read in two ways. On one hand, they might be read as an acerbic comment on
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s whole-hearted subsumption of self into his political goals, from Amery’s very
British perspective a muddying of the boundaries between public and private spheres. The subtext
being: how can you possibly claim something so grand as a life’s purpose, when like all of us you
must work within the ever-shifting limits of political context? On the other hand, we might take
Amery at face value, and read his words as genuine admiration of how Coudenhove-Kalergi

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235 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Crusade for Pan-Europe, 40
236 L.S. Amery to R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi (21 October 1950), CAC, AMEL 2/2/5, File 1
negotiated a perilous three-way balancing act between self, narrative and context. The subtext here is one of heightened stakes: to risk political defeat is an occupational hazard, but to stake one’s life’s purpose is an altogether more dizzying gamble.
II. A New Europe

Introduction

In May 1948, Winston Churchill was at the apogee of his career as a European unifier, as ‘the intellectual prophet of the European idea’. His famous 19 September 1946 speech at Zurich University in which he had positioned himself at the head of those calling for a United States of Europe (and paid tribute to the work of Coudenhove-Kalergi and the PEU) had won widespread acclaim, and his 14 May 1947 speech at the Albert Hall in London had seen the formal inauguration of the new United Europe Movement that Churchill set up with Duncan Sandys to pursue this goal.

It was as both figurehead and leader that Churchill was to give the opening speech at (and preside over) the 7-10 May 1948 Congress of Europe in The Hague, which attracted high-profile political figures from across the continent; Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi sailed back from New York to attend. The primary objective at The Hague was to bring together of all the various groups petitioning to unite Europe, including Churchill and Sandys’s United Europe movement and Coudenhove-Kalergi’s European Parliamentary Union, in order to agree upon the institutional form that this unity ought to take. (The agreement ultimately reached was for the creation of the Council...

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237 H. Young, *This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair* (London: Macmillan; 1998), 14
238 W.S. Churchill, “Winston Churchill’s speech [on a Council of Europe], Zurich, 19 September 1946”, Archive of European Integration (AEI), University of Pittsburgh, [http://aei.pitt.edu/14362/](http://aei.pitt.edu/14362/) (last accessed 4 Aug 2016); for published version, see Churchill, "Speech at Zurich University"
239 W.S. Churchill, "United Europe Meeting, A Speech at the Albert Hall, 14 May 1947", in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), *Europe Unite: Speeches 1947 and 1948* (London: Cassell; 1950) 77-85. For more from this meeting, see *United Europe: Speeches at the Royal Albert Hall, 14th May, 1947*, CAC, AMEL 1/7/40, File 2
241 On the European Parliamentary Union at the Congress of Europe, see “Congress of Europe, Friday, 7th May, to Monday, 10th May, 1948 to be held at The Hague”, London Offices of European Parliamentary Union; in HAEU, WL 24, 270
of Europe, which was indeed founded the following year.) Keenly aware of the disagreements and rivalries that had to be overcome first, in his opening speech Churchill sought to dampen dispute over the ownership of the idea of European unity, saying:

‘We need not waste our time in disputes about who originated this idea of United Europe. There are many valid modern patents. There are many famous names associated with the revival and presentation of this idea, but we may all, I think, yield our pretensions to Henry of Navarre, King of France, [and] his great Minister Sully.’

Churchill proceeded to briefly elaborate Henry and Sully’s 17th century ‘Grand Design’ for a united Europe, concluding that ‘After this long passage of time we are the servants of the Grand Design’. 243

After Churchill’s speech, Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi took to the podium, and in his own (shorter) speech took the opposite tack, attempting to reassert the primacy of his own organisation over and above the new post-war groups campaigning for European unity. He did so by contextualising the Congress in a very different historical frame:

‘Our Congress, my friends, marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Pan-European movement. Twenty-five years of struggle for Europe, its peace and its liberty is little in the course of history but it is much in a human generation.’

However, a month or so after the Congress had concluded he changed tack once more, writing to Churchill on 24 June to directly take issue with Churchill’s allusion to Henry IV of France, and to extend the historical framing for the idea of European political unity:

‘In this speech you gave the credit for having first proposed the organisation of a united Europe to Henry of Navarre. But most modern historians who have studied this question, including Edouard Herriot, have come to the conclusion that Henry of Navarre had nothing to do with the Grand Design. They believe that it was exclusively Sully’s brainchild …

But even if the Grand Design should have originated in confidential conversations between Henry and Sully, it can by no means be considered the first blueprint for a united Europe.’

Coudenhove-Kalergi proceeded to lecture Churchill on Pierre Dubois’s fourteenth-century and

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242 Churchill, "The Congress of Europe", 311
243 Churchill, "The Congress of Europe", 311
244 Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers The World, 288
245 Coudenhove-Kalergi to Churchill, 24 Jun 1948; ACV, PP 1000/4/8, p.1
George of Poděbrady’s fifteenth-century schemes for a united Europe. Churchill, wishing to retain good relations with Coudenhove-Kalergi, replied by telegram to thank him for his ‘deeply interesting letter’.

It is tempting to read this exchange simply as evidence of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s capacity to be both prickly and pedantic. While this interpretation has some truth, it misses the deeper point: that these historical points were important enough to Coudenhove-Kalergi for him to feel compelled to puncture, or at least compromise in some way, what he himself described as Churchill’s ‘personal triumph’ at the Hague, and furthermore to jeopardise relations with the man who then seemed most likely and able to bring about the united Europe that Coudenhove-Kalergi sought. Analysed at this deeper level, this exchange illustrates the two crucial aspects of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s concern with historicity, which I shall develop over the course of this chapter.

First, that history mattered. That is, that Coudenhove-Kalergi believed in the intrinsic value of providing (and getting right) historical perspective as part of his political campaign. This may seem like an obvious point, but it must be placed in the context of an interwar literature of internationalism which was remarkable for its eschewing of the past. Even limiting the scope of enquiry to those works promoting some kind of united Europe, it is clear that whether in the fields of politics, economics, law or philosophy, interwar writers preferred to treat their subject in a ‘scientific’

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246 Churchill to Coudenhove-Kalergi, 29 Jun 1948; ACV, PP 1000/4/8
247 Coudenhove-Kalergi to Churchill, 24 Jun 1948; ACV, PP 1000/4/8, p.1
250 A. Álvarez, La réforme du pacte de la Société des nations sur des bases continentales et régionales. Rapport présenté à la Ve session de l'Union juridique internationale, juin 1926, par Alejandro Álvarez, membre correspondant de l'Institut de France, membre de l'Institut de droit international, secrétaire général de l'Institut américain de Droit international (Issoudun: Impr. rapide du Centre; 1927); G. Scelle, "Essai relatif à l'Union européenne", Revue générale de droit international public 38.5 (1931) 521-563
251 J. Ortega Y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses (New York: W.W. Norton & Company; 1932); J. Benda, Discours à la
manner that focused on the conditions of the present rather than those of the past. Perhaps most emblematic of this trend was the trope of a ‘New Europe’, which was claimed by multiple projects in the interwar period;\textsuperscript{252} by the British historian R.W. Seton-Watson and the Czechoslovak statesman T.G. Masaryk (\textit{The New Europe} was used as the title of both the journal Seton-Watson edited from 1916-1920, and Masaryk’s book of 1918);\textsuperscript{253} by the German geopolitically-inclined historian Walther Vogel, whose \textit{Das neue Europa} went through three editions within four years of its publication in 1921;\textsuperscript{254} by the Danish physician and political activist C.F. Heerfordt;\textsuperscript{255} and by the London-based New Europe Group founded by the Yugoslav philosopher Dimitrije Mitrinović in 1931.\textsuperscript{256}

This orientation towards the present and the new was motivated by two broad factors. First, a general sense that time was speeding up; that the past was becoming more and more distant from the concerns of the present.\textsuperscript{257} While this feeling has been analysed with reference to the ‘hostility toward the historical consciousness’ exhibited in early twentieth-century fiction,\textsuperscript{258} it is also referred to quite directly in the literature of internationalism, most often framed in terms of a time-space compression that was rendering modern life simply incommensurable with what had gone before. This was complemented by a more specific belief that since the old ways of doing things had led to the horrific

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\textit{nation européenne} (Paris; Gallimard; 1933)
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\textsuperscript{252} On the popularity of the discourse of a ‘new Europe’ in general, see E. Stern-Rubarth, \textit{Three Men Tried...: Austen Chamberlain, Stresemann, Briand and Their Fight for a New Europe} (London: Duckworth; 1939); C. Wege, "\textit{Das Neue Europa" 1933-1945: German Thought Patterns about Europe} (Stuttgart: Edition Axel Menges; 2016)


\textsuperscript{254} W. Vogel, \textit{Das neue Europa und seine historisch-geographischen grundlagen}, 2 vols. (Bonn & Leipzig: Kurt Schroeder; 1921) See D.T. Murphy, \textit{The Heroic Earth: Geopolitical Thought in Weimar Germany, 1918-1933} (Kent, OH & London: Kent State University Press; 1997), 118-125


\textsuperscript{258} H.V. White, "The Burden of History", \textit{History and Theory} 5.2 (1966) 111-134
catastrophe of the Great War, Europe needed instead to break with the past and try something new. That is: it was not just that the lessons from history were irrelevant, but that they had been shown to be malign, and if scholars were at all interested in a peaceful future, they needed to focus instead on present realities.

Both of these senses are certainly present in the writings of Coudenhove-Kalergi, and he was liable to flashes of the anti-historicism that pervaded this literature. He began *Pan-Europe*, for example, with the assertion that ‘The eyes of Europe are turned backwards instead of forwards’, 259 which was not a compliment but a damning indictment of a failure to move with the times. Yet he combined this with an insistence that history *did* matter, and accordingly set about providing that history. As we shall see, in doing so he would play a major role in the curation of a canon of European integration, a historiography that is still with us today, largely unchanged. If perhaps Coudenhove-Kalergi picked the wrong target in scolding Churchill for his apparent ignorance of this history, 260 it was a battle he was well used to fighting, and a war that by the end of his life he could well claim to have won.

After examining how Coudenhove-Kalergi conducted this process of curation, I step back to ask how he reconciled the apparently paradoxical combination of futurism and historicism. The solution, I argue, lay in a second key aspect of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s historicity: that it was not merely that he retained an interest in history, but that he retained an interest in a certain shape of history. Namely, he retained a clear directionality to his history that paid a clear debt to progressivism. Moreover, he did so at a time when progressivism was being dislodged from its previous dominance, with contemporaries questioning firstly whether history did indeed lead in a positive direction, and

259 Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Pan-Europe*, xii
260 Churchill had long emphasised its historical pedigree, writing in 1930 that: ‘this idea of European unity so novel to untutored ears is no more in fact than a reversion to the old foundation of Europe. Why should it appear startling to its inhabitants?’ (Churchill, United States of Europe, CAC, CHAR 8/303, 4-12, 6) Indeed, in a draft of this article, Churchill had included a long historical diversion on ‘the idea of an authority wider than national’ in the respective visions of Europe expressed by the Catholic church, the Holy Roman Empire, and Napoleon (Churchill, n.d. [1930], “The U.S.E.”, CAC, CHAR 8/279A-B, 5-26, 6-8)
secondly whether history had a direction at all. Coudenhove-Kalergi not only retained the progressivist notion of an arc of history, but made this notion a central element of his argument. He also spatialised it, giving a dynamic reading of political geography in which polities were being progressively scaled up, driven by the time-space compression than new communications technologies were delivering. The present moment, he argued, was one in which the leap was being made from state-scale politics to continental-scale politics, and European politics needed to change with the times rather than regressing into a nationalised, balkanised system that would doom Europe to failure and decline.

In addition to bolstering the weight of the argument that Europe needed to federate in order to survive, the line of progress that Coudenhove-Kalergi drew passed very explicitly through the Pan-European Union. This was to become a crucial point in the post-WWII wrangling amongst those calling for European federation, as it formed the grounds upon which Coudenhove-Kalergi could assert both his authority over and authorship of the European idea. Regarding the upcoming 1948 Congress of Europe at the Hague, he wrote to Leo Amery that ‘I could not come to the Hague simply as one of the Delegates, … but only if invited to address the Assembly as the founder of the Pan-European Movement, the root and source of all the post-war organizations sponsoring the Hague Congress’.

On this point, Duncan Sandys (who was organising the conference) acquiesced; as we have seen, at The Hague Coudenhove-Kalergi was given the prime slot directly after Churchill’s keynote address. Indeed, he shared with Churchill a curious dual-role: he thought of himself as an author of history, in two senses, both a historical actor and a historian. By considering the ways in which Coudenhove-Kalergi both curated history into a canon that gave his arguments historical perspective, and sculpted history into a shape that used this perspective to assert teleological force, this chapter

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R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi to L.S. Amery (25 March 1948), CAC, AMEL, 1/7/40, File 2. To be specific, he would have been a delegate of the E.P.U. (European Parliamentary Union), the organisation he had devoted his efforts to since the end of WWII.
shows how these contrasting versions of authorship (that is, of events and of narrative) became deeply entangled in one another.

The arcs and gaps of history

Interwar silences

Today, the history of the idea of Europe is a well-rehearsed stroll through a series of figures who wrote, more or less seriously, more or less idealistically, more or less approvingly, of a political arrangement in which Europe would or could be united. We have already mentioned Pierre Dubois, George of Poděbrady and the Duc de Sully; it is my purpose neither to provide an exhaustive list nor to evaluate these claim, but see Table 1 for an indication of the figures commonly cited as providing some form of precedent for the idea of a politically united Europe. An indication of the familiarity of this list might be given by F.H. Hinsley’s 1963 complaint about the way in which these figures were summoned:

‘People often study history less for what they might learn than for what they want to prove. This is one reason why so much is known about internationalist theories since the end of the Middle Ages. Vast efforts have been made, innumerable books have flowed, from the wish to cite Dubois or Dante, Crucé or Sully, as forerunners of the League of Nations or United Europe or the United Nations experiment — and from the even more curious supposition that it was necessary to study these early writings for guidance in creating, improving or saving these twentieth-century projects.’

It was true that since the end of WWII, there had been a rush to uncover the genealogy of the ‘idea of

[^263]: Hinsley, *Power and the pursuit of peace*, 13
**Table I: Totems of a politically united Europe**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Charlemagne (742/747/748-814)</th>
<th>Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Pierre Dubois (c.1255-after 1321)</td>
<td>Joseph de Maistre (1753–1821)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dante (1265-1321)</td>
<td>Henri de Saint-Simon (1760-1825)</td>
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<tr>
<td>George of Podebrady (1420-1471)</td>
<td>Friedrich von Gentz (1764-1832)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Erasmus of Rotterdam (1466–1536)</td>
<td>François-René de Chateaubriand (1768–1848)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Henry IV of Navarre (1553–1610)</td>
<td>Napoleon (1769–1821)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Duc de Sully (1560-1641)</td>
<td>Adam Jerzy Czartoryski (1770–1861)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugo Grotius (1583–1645)</td>
<td>Novalis (1772–1801)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Émeric Crucé (c.1590–1648)</td>
<td>Alexander I of Russia (1777–1825)</td>
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<tr>
<td>John Amos Comenius (1592–1670)</td>
<td>Victor Hugo (1802–1885)</td>
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<tr>
<td>William Penn (1644–1718)</td>
<td>Giuseppe Mazzini (1805–1872)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716)</td>
<td>Charles Lemonnier (c.1808–1891)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Bellers (1654–1725)</td>
<td>Johann Kaspar Bluntschli (1808–1881)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbé de Saint-Pierre (1658-1743)</td>
<td>Elihu Burritt (1810–1879)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Montesquieu (1689–1755)</td>
<td>Charles Sumner (1811–1874)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778)</td>
<td>James Lorimer (1818–1890)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Immanuel Kant (1724–1804)</td>
<td>John Robert Seeley (1834-1895)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Voltaire (1694–1778)</td>
<td>Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900)</td>
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</table>
Europe’ among historians across Europe. As Hinsley said, these histories were often plainly instrumental; indeed, one of the key figures in this new wave, Denis de Rougemont, was quite open that to ‘search for Europe is to build Europe! In other words, it is the search that creates her.’ In this field, then, the ‘politics of canonicity’ – that is, the notion that the historiography is not simply given, but actively constructed, and that this construction is a political process – has long been acknowledged. However, beyond this admission, the ‘search’ itself is rarely put in the spotlight, and too often today it is assumed that the post-war historians of the idea of Europe (i.e. de Rougemont et al) were the first to undertake it.

There are good reasons why we might make such an assumption. First and foremost, that in the interwar period, those who we might expect to have discussed historical ideas of European political unity simply did not do so. As we have seen, much of the political, economic, legal and philosophical literature advocating European union eschewed historical perspective in favour of a forward-facing stance that was only interested in factors in the present. As might be expected, this tendency was severely criticised by the historians of the day, most harshly by those, like Christopher

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Dawson, who shared a Europeanist politics. Internationalists, Dawson wrote in 1932,

‘with few exceptions are as oblivious of the European tradition as their opponents [i.e. nationalists]. They put their faith in an abstract internationalism which has no historic foundation, and consequently they provoke a fresh outburst of nationalist sentiment which is in some respects more excessive than anything the nineteenth century experienced.’

The task of the historian, Dawson argued, was to provide this historical foundation while overcoming the methodological nationalism that they saw as having marked the great histories of the nineteenth century:

‘modern history has usually been written from the nationalist point of view. Some of the greatest of the nineteenth-century historians were also apostles of the cult of nationalism, and their histories are often manuals of nationalist propaganda. … We must rewrite our history from the European point of view and take as much trouble to understand the unity of our common civilisation as we have given hitherto to the study of our national individuality.’

These sentiments were shared by many historians across Europe, as was attested by a number of significant works aimed at revealing a common European history (and therefore identity).

What we might not expect is that these very works also largely overlooked the figures that would later form the backbone of the canon of European integration. H.A.L. Fisher’s monumental 1936 tome *A History of Europe* mentions George of Poděbrady and Giuseppe Mazzini without mentioning their contributions to the idea of Europe as a political project, while Benedetto Croce’s 1932 *History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century* briefly mentions Mazzini’s campaign for a United States of Europe. Edward Eyre’s yet more monumental 7-volume edited collection *European Civilization: Its Origin and Development* (1934-1939) made similarly few references to these figures,

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268 Dawson, *The Making of Europe*, xxiv, xxvi
269 See, for example, P. Schöttler, "Marc Bloch as a critic of historiographical nationalism in the interwar years", in Stefan Berger, Mark Donovan, and Kevin Passmore (eds.), *Writing National Histories. Western Europe since 1800*, trans. Laura Deiulio and Stefan Berger (London: Routledge; 1999) 125-136
270 He wrote: ‘there were moments when it almost seemed as though Europe might turn that way [i.e. into a United States of Europe], as soon as she had removed the chief obstacles. Especially did this seem possible in 1859-60’ (B. Croce, *History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century*, trans. Henry Furst (London: George Allen & Unwin; 1934), 325)
though Richard O’Sullivan’s 1937 chapter on “Internationalism” did mention Hugo Grotius’s proposal to James I ‘that a conference should be summoned and should be charged with the duty of effecting the reunion of Christendom’, and the Duc de Sully’s Grand Design, while other figures were acknowledged in a footnote. Paul Hazard’s 1935 *Crise de la conscience européenne (1680-1715)* mentions the Abbé de Saint-Pierre and his correspondence with Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, though Hazard downplayed the Abbé’s significance. Neither Henri Pirenne’s 1936 *A History of Europe* nor Christopher Dawson’s 1932 *The Making of Europe* make any reference to these figures at all.

However, their low profile was certainly not due to obscurity. Rather, they were consciously sidelined. For instance, Albert Pollard explained in his 1918 *The League of Nations: An Historical Argument* that he decided to omit ‘the schemes fathered on Sully’ on the basis that ‘codes and contracts are worthless without the will to maintain them’. The feeling was that these dreams of a united Europe were just that, utopian curiosities dreamt up by idiosyncratic figures, and were undeserving of serious scholarship. Rather than look at schemes for political unity that never materialised, interwar historians instead devoted their energies to uncovering the apparently more real phenomena of socio-cultural and religious unity, which they tended to find in medieval and early-modern Europe. It is worth noting that both Dawson and Eyre’s European histories were overtly Catholic, seeking to reassert Europe’s shared Christian heritage. On one hand, this was a response to decline-of-civilisation narratives that had broken out into the mainstream, about which more later. On the other hand, it tapped into an early nineteenth-century literature that purported to rediscover mediaeval unity of Europe-as-Christendom, itself a reactionary backlash against late eighteenth-

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272 Hazard wrote of him: ‘When…the Abbé de Saint-Pierre began to pile up, one upon another, his cloud-girt castles in the air, his contemporaries just let him go on dreaming his untimely dreams in undisturbed tranquillity.’ (P. Hazard, *The European mind: the critical years, 1680-1715* (New York: Fordham University Press; 1990), 436)

century expressions of revolutionary secularism. Building on Johann Gottfried Herder’s sympathetic treatment of the Middle Ages, Romanticist works like François-René de Chateaubriand’s *Génie du christianisme* (1802) and Novalis’ *Die Christenheit oder Europa* (written 1799, but not published until 1826) had found in mediaeval Europe the brotherhood and enchantment of life that they felt so desperately lacking in the overly mechanistic, governmental modern states. However, while the Romanticists’ arguments had obvious resonance for interwar thinkers seeking to make similar points, they were not themselves cited, as the gaze of analysis continued to be thrown back to the Middle Age. Ironically, it would be left to other, less ideologically-aligned histories to raise Chateaubriand and Novalis to the pantheon of Europeanists.

**Mobilising history**

If Coudenhove-Kalergi’s work to establish a new form of historiography was grounded in a belief that history mattered, its fusion with the futurism of the day was grounded in a belief that the shape of this history mattered. That is, a belief that history had a structure, that certain dynamic narratives determined its flow. History was not formless, but proceeded along certain arcs, which one could detect through study of the past and which gave an indication of the way things were moving. This

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274 Herder was arguing against the linear progressivism of the philosophes, which will be dealt with more fully later in this chapter. He wrote:

‘All the books of our Voltares, Humes, Robertsons and [Isaak] Iselins are, to the delight of their contemporaries, full of beautiful accounts of how the enlightenment and improvement of the world, philosophy and order, emerged from the bleaker epochs of theism and spiritual despotism. All of this is both true and untrue. It is true if, like a child, one holds one colour against another, if one wishes to contrive a bright, contrasty little picture – there is, alas, so much light in our century! It is untrue, if one considers the earlier epoch according to its intrinsic nature and aims, its pastimes and mores, and especially as the instrument of the historical process. Often in these apparently coercive institutions and corporations there was something solid, cohesive, noble and majestic, which we certainly do not feel, nor are scarcely able to feel, with our refined ways, disbanded guilds yet shackled states, and with our innate cleverness and all-embracing cosmopolitanism.’ (J.G. Herder, "Yet Another Philosophy of History", in F.M. Barnard (ed.), *J.G. Herder on social and political culture*, trans. F. M. Barnard (Cambridge University Press; 1969), 191-2)

275 See A.O. Lovejoy, "The meaning of romanticism for the historian of ideas", *Journal of the History of Ideas* 2.3 (June 1941) 257-278
was not simple fatalism, since as we shall see, Coudenhove-Kalergi believed that was a very real (and very grave) danger that Europe would fail to follow the arc of history. Nor was Coudenhove-Kalergi particularly concerned with the end-point of this arc, though he did occasionally gesture towards an eventual world-state that lay beyond the horizon. Rather, he was concerned with the direction of history, a dynamic framing that positioned the study of the past as an important guide to a future that was very much in sight.

In presenting a history that had such a clear shape and direction to it, Coudenhove-Kalergi owed a great intellectual debt to progressivism, that school of thought that held that history was marked by a linear pattern of continual change that was both welcome (since it brought improvement) and inexorable. This belief had dominated since the Enlightenment, when thinkers like Turgot, Smith and Condorcet systematised ideas of amelioration directed by providence into a broadly secular theory of stadial progress directed by political and economic factors. Though this progressivism was informed by transformation of the geography of the present (the barbaric ‘new world’ was contrasted with the civilized ‘old world’) into a historical model, its invocation of a direction of history made it inherently future-oriented. It is no coincidence that it was around this time (1770) that Louis-Sébastien Mercier wrote L’An 2440, the first Utopia to be located not in a remote place, but in (the Paris of) the future. Indeed, the idea of progress oriented toward an indefinite future, rather than an apocalyptic end-time, had been broached even before the philosophes, with Leibniz writing in his 1697 work On the Ultimate Origin of Things that ‘progress never comes to an end’. This future-orientation was foregrounded by J.B. Bury in his 1920 study of The Idea of Progress, in which he claimed that the establishment of belief in progress was intimately tied to the displacement of ‘the

276 G.W. Leibniz, "On the Ultimate Origin of Things", The Philosophical Works of Leibnitz: comprising the Monadology, New system of nature, Principles of nature and of grace, Letters to Clarke, Refutation of Spinoza, and his other important philosophical opuscules, together with the Abridgment of the Theodicy and extracts from the New essays on human understanding, translated from the original Latin and French, trans. George Martin Duncan, 2nd edn. (New Haven: The Tuttle, Morehouse & Taylor Company; 1908) 106-113, 113
afterlife’ by ‘the future’ as the animating force behind society, the object that mankind believed it
ought to work towards. A progressivist interpretation of the past does not just enable futurism, it
demands it.

However, the context Coudenhove-Kalergi was working in was one in which progressivism
was beginning to be seriously challenged. A new wave of literature offered a pessimistic view, taking
up progressivism’s concern with civilisation, but questioning whether things were indeed getting
better, and downcast about Europe’s future prospects. These doubts themselves had a long history,
from the rich variety of terms and metaphors for ‘decline’ bequeathed by the pre-Enlightenment
society for whom ‘change was usually considered to be change for the worse’, via significant
Enlightenment figures whose work was key in the development of a non-providential view of history
that proceeded along grand arcs, yet who gave accounts of civilizational decline rather than progress
(Montesquieu, Gibbon, Rousseau); to the late nineteenth-century Decadent movement within art and
literature that rejected the ‘progress’ of modernity (Baudelaire, Huysmans, Wilde). Max Nordau’s
1892 bestseller Degeneration Entartung had attacked the Decadent movement, but re-cast it in
civilizational terms as evidence of societal decline. The horrors of the First World War gave such
theses new force, most famously expressed by Oswald Spengler in his 1918-1922 The Decline of the
West Der Untergang des Abendlandes, but also in a raft of other significant works on the
decadence of Europe published in the decade following the Great War. As Christopher Dawson
argued in 1932,

279 M. Nordau, Degeneration (New York: D. Appleton and Company; 1895)
II: Perspectives of world history (New York: Alfred A. Knopf; 1928)
Aldington (London: G. Routledge & Sons; 1928); Ortega Y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses; J. Huizinga, In the
Shadow of Tomorrow, trans. Jakob Herman Huizinga (New York: W.W. Norton & Company; 1936)
‘To-day our illusions have disappeared and there is a danger that a pessimistic fatalism will take the place of the old optimistic faith in the inevitability of progress.’

In short, doubts over progress had always been the flip-side to faith in progress, yet by the early part of the twentieth century, the sceptics and pessimists were gaining the upper hand.

Alongside this, a more fundamental critique was beginning to emerge that transcended the debate over which direction civilization was heading by arguing against the very idea that history had a direction at all. J.B. Bury’s *The Idea of Progress* had in 1920 suggested that rather than being an underlying truth of history, progress was itself a historical artefact, which might someday fall out of favour. This scepticism was expressed far more strongly by Herbert Butterfield in his 1931 *The Whig Interpretation of History*, in which he attacked what he called ‘whig historians’ for their propensity to ‘draw lines through certain events’, since ‘if he [the historian] is not careful he begins to forget that this line is merely a mental trick of his; he comes to imagine that it represents something like a line of causation’. History, Butterfield argued, ‘is a story that cannot be told in dry lines, and its meaning cannot be conveyed in a species of geometry’. Likewise, it was in the early 1930s that Karl Popper was developing his attack on *The Poverty of Historicism*, whose ‘main outline’ was completed in 1935 (although it would not be published until 1944-45 in journal form, and 1957 in book form).

‘Historicism’, for Popper, was ‘an approach to the social sciences which assumes that historical prediction is their principal aim and which assumes this aim is attainable by discovering the “rhythms” or the “patterns”, the “laws” or the “trends” that underlie the evolution of history’. For Bury, Butterfield and Popper, the drawing of grand arcs through history was a dangerous fallacy. If those interwar advocates of a united Europe who neglected history did so because they believed that there was – or ought to be – a caesura between past and present, many of those who were inclined to

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284 Butterfield, *Whig Interpretation of History*, 68
286 Popper, *The poverty of historicism*, 3
pay attention to history either saw it pointing toward decline, or doubted that it could point at all.

Curating the canon

Construction of the canon in the canon

If in the interwar period more political writers eschewed historical visions of European unity, and more historical writers eschewed political visions of European unity, where did the canon of ‘European peace league’ proposals come from? The first step to answering this is to acknowledge that there is a degree to which it was self-selecting, insofar as each new proposal for a politically united Europe tended to cite previous proposals in order to make its case. However, the manner in which they did so deserves closer scrutiny.

The Duc de Sully, the man Churchill credited with being the first to speak of uniting Europe, prefaced his seventeenth-century plans for a ‘Grand Design’ of a united Europe (which he ascribed to his patron, Henry IV of France) with an extended discourse upon the rulers of the Kingdom of France, particularly lauding the first four kings of the Capetian dynasty, whose rule stretched from 987 to 1108. M.d.B. Sully, Duc de, Memoirs of Maximilian de Bethune, Duke of Sully, Prime Minister to Henry the Great. Containing The History of the Life and Reign of that Monarch, And his own Administration under Him. Translated from the French. To which is added, The Tryal of Ravaillac for the Murder of Henry the Great, III vols., vol. III (London: Charlotte Lennox; 1756 [1638/1662]), 321-322. Continuing Sully’s penchant for misdirection, the first 2 volumes of his Memoirs, labelled as being printed in Amsterdam in 1638, were actually printed in his home, the Château de Sully-sur-Loire, from 1639-40, while the 3rd and 4th volumes (in one binding) were published after his death, by Jean Le Laboureur in 1662. A significant addition was made by the Abbé Pierre-Mathurin de L’Écluse des Loges, who in 1745 published a new edition of Sully’s Memoirs in which all the scattered passages relating to the Grand Design were collated together at the end as ‘Book XXX’. This chapter formed the basis for subsequent publications of the ‘Grand Design’ and, as Ogg later recognised, ‘elevated [it] to the level of a philosophical system’ (D. Ogg, "Introduction", in Maximilien De Béthune Sully, Duc De (ed.), Sully's Grand Design of Henry IV from the Memoirs of Maximilien de Béthune, Duc de Sully (1559-1641) (London: Sweet and Maxwell; 1921) 3-13, 9,10)
of Europe or the ‘too considerably augmenting’ of their territory, which had brought almost perpetual war upon the peoples of Europe. When it came to describing how his own system would work, Sully again invoked history, writing that ‘The model of this general council of Europe had been formed on that of the antient Amphyctions of Greece, with such alterations only as rendered it suitable to our customs, climate, and policy’. Both the style and form of Sully’s suggested mode of governance were thus justified by way of historical precedent.

Meanwhile, Sully’s near-contemporary Émeric Crucé suffused the argument in his 1623 Le Nouveau Cynée with historical examples, including the Greek Amphictyonies (‘never was a council so august, nor assembly so honorable’), and also made reference to political theorists like Jean Bodin. And for the writers that followed, Sully himself (via Henry IV) proved a common touchstone. The English Quaker William Penn concluded his 1693 proposal by humbly citing his forebears:

‘For this Great King’s Example [i.e. Henry IV’s] tells us it is fit to be done; and Sr. W. [William] Temple’s History shews us, by a Surpassing Instance, that it may be done; and Europe, by her incomparable Miseries, makes it necessary to be done.’

His compatriot John Bellers not only mentioned ‘the Model of Henry the Fourth’ in his 1710 Some Reasons for an European State, but included his own ‘Abstract’ of Sully’s plans, while also directing the reader to Penn’s proposal. Likewise, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre wrote in the Preface to his

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288 Sully, Memoirs of the Duke of Sully [1756], III, bk. XXX, p.325
289 Sully, Memoirs of the Duke of Sully [1756], III, bk.XXX, p.343
291 W. Penn, An Essay Towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe, by the Establishment of an European Dyet, Parliament, Or Estates (London; 1693), 67, italics in original
292 Bellers shows himself ignorant of Crucé, writing that ‘I have seen nothing upon this subject, but what that Author [i.e. Hardouin de Pérefixe, whose 1661 Histoire du Roy Henry Le Grand incorporated Sully’s account of Henry’s Grand Design] saith; and what hath been Writ by the Eminent and Accomplished Gentleman, William Penn Esq; Governour of Pensilvania.’ However, Bellers does allow that precedents and like minds may exist, continuing: ‘But if any Gentleman, knows of any other Authors on this subject: A publick Advertisement of them, would tend the more to Illustrate this great Design, and stir up many Worthies in the several Kindoms and States, of Europe, that would contribute their assistance, towards such a happy Day in Europe.’ (J. Bellers, Some Reasons for an European State (London; 1710), 20)
influential 1712 Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe:

‘what greatly persuaded me that this Project was no Chimera, was the Information I received from one of my Friends, soon after I had shewn him the first Sketch of this Work: He told me that Henry IV had form’d a Project, which, in the main, was much the same; and so I found in the Memoirs of the Duke of Sully, his Prime Minister; and in Monsieur de Perefixe’s History of his Reign: Nay more, I found that this Project had been even agreed to by a great many Princes, in the Beginning of the last Century: This gave me Occasion from thence to draw some Inferences, to prove that the Thing was far from being impracticable.’

Indeed, when Saint-Pierre’s plans were translated into English, just over a year after their initial publication, the full title began A Project For Settling an Everlasting Peace in Europe. First Proposed by Henry IV. of France, and approved of by Queen Elizabeth, and most of the then Princes of Europe… In the text itself, meanwhile, Saint-Pierre discussed both Sully’s Grand Design and the so-called ‘Germanick Society’ or ‘Germanick Union’ at length, and also made reference to the ‘Assembly of the Amphictyones’. References to antiquity and to the plans of Sully/Henry IV functioned as evidence both that the plans could be done, and that they were wise.

The writings on a united Europe produced during the following century intensified this citation of precedent by being framed overtly as being in communication with these plans. This was most clear in the example of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, who really was in personal communication with the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, who had sent Leibniz his 1712 text. Leibniz’s direct thoughts on the idea of a united Europe, which took the form of a set of written up Observations sur le projet de

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293 C.-I.C. Saint-Pierre, abbé de, A Project For Settling an Everlasting Peace in Europe. First Proposed by Henry IV. of France, and approved of by Queen Elizabeth, and most of the then Princes of Europe, and now discussed at large, and made practicable by the Abbot St. Pierre, of the French Academy (London: J.W.; 1714), iv-v, italics in original. Original: ‘ce qui m’aïda beaucoup à me persuader que ce Projet n’estoit point une chimere: ce fut l’avis que me donnay bien-tôt aprés un de mes amis, lorsque je luy montray la premiere ebauche de cet Ouvrage dans ma Province: il me dit que Henry IV avoit formé un Projet tout semblable pour le fond, je le trouvay effectivement dans les Memoires du Duc de Sully son premier Ministre, & dans l’Histoire de son Regne par Mr de Perefixe: je trouvay même que ce Projet avoit déja esté agréé & approuvé par un grand nombre de Souverains au commencement du siecle passé: cela me donna occasion d’en tirer quelques consequences pour montrer que la chose n’estoit rien moins qu’impraticable’ (C.-I.C. Saint-Pierre, abbé de, Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe, II vols., vol. I (1712), 7-8)

294 As Riley notes, the Abbé was guilty of ‘an utterly erroneous analysis of the nature of the 17th-century German Empire as a federal system’ (P. Riley, "The Abbé de St. Pierre and Voltaire on perpetual peace in Europe", World Affairs 137.3 (1974) 186-194, 186)

295 Saint-Pierre, Project For Settling an Everlasting Peace in Europe, 23-56, 45
l’Abbé de Saint Pierre (1715, published 1720) and letters he wrote concerning the scheme (including to Saint-Pierre himself), are thus recorded entirely in relation to the Abbé’s scheme.296 However, more than this, they are triangulated through two other schemes. On one hand, Leibniz was sceptical that political conditions were as ripe as they had been in the time of Sully, writing in a 1715 letter to the Abbé that ‘it would be necessary that another Henry IV, together with some great princes of his time, favor your project’.297 On the other hand, his Observations gently redirected the reader to two extant schemes: Émeric Crucé’s Nouveau Cynée, and the unpublished writings of Leibniz’s friend Ernst von Hesse-Rheinfels.298 In a letter of 1712 to Jean-Léonor Le Gallois de Grimarest, Leibniz had put this references in a starker light, writing that ‘I do not know whether M. l’Abbé de St Pierre will have [read] a book entitled Nouveau Cynée’ and concluding, in a pointed dig at Saint-Pierre that referred doubly to both these earlier schemes and the days of the papal respublica Christiana, ‘since it is permitted to write romances, why should we find bad the fiction which would recall the age of gold to us?’299

Though of a different generation, Jean-Jacques Rousseau also expressed his thoughts on such a scheme through the lens of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, whom he had met at the salon of Mme Dupin when Saint-Pierre was at the end of his life, and Rousseau was still an unknown.300 Like Leibniz,

296 For accounts of Leibniz’s thoughts on European unity that bring in consideration of his other political writings, see L.K. Sosoe, "Leibniz and European cosmopolitanism", Re-Thinking Europe 2 (2015) 4-22; S. Elden, The Birth of Territory (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press; 2013), 315 - 321
298 G.W. Leibniz, "Observations sur le projet d'une paix perpétuelle de M. l'Abbé de Saint-Pierre [1715]", in Pierre Des Maizeaux (ed.), Recueil de diverses pièces sur la philosophie, la religion naturelle, l'histoire, les mathématiques, &c, II vols., vol. II (Amsterdam: Duvillard et Changuion; 1720) 173-184 For English translation, see Leibniz, "On the works of the Abbé de St Pierre"
299 Leibniz, "On the works of the Abbé de St Pierre", 184
Rousseau’s direct verdict on the Abbé’s plans (the *Jugement sur la paix perpétuelle*, written in 1756) was posthumously published (in 1782, as part of his collected works). In it, the example of Sully/Henry IV served not as a reminder of the changed political context, but rather as evidence that, despite the Abbé’s rather naïve reasoning, his plans were indeed plausible:

‘To prove that the project of the Christian Commonwealth is not utopian, I need do no more than name its original author. For no one will say that Henry IV was a madman, or Sully a dreamer. The Abbé de Saint Pierre took refuge behind these great names, to revive their policy.’

The collapsing of past precedent into Rousseau’s own thought was even more pronounced in another text: Rousseau’s rather free reworking and condensation of the Abbé’s plans, like the *Jugement* written in 1756 but published in 1761 as his *Abstract of Monsieur the Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s Plan for Perpetual Peace*. Just as Sully had presented his own plans through the lens of the dynastic ambitions and geopolitical negotiations of Henry IV, so Rousseau expressed his vision through the lens of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s scheme. One part of the *Abstract* which was entirely Rousseau’s own hand was a section dedicated to the historical and geographical contexts for the political unity

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301 J.-J. Rousseau, *Collection complète des œuvres*, vol. XII (Geneva; 1782)
303 J.-J. Rousseau, *Extrait du projet de paix perpétuelle de M. l’abbé de Saint-Pierre* ([Paris]; 1761)
304 As Rousseau later recalled, ‘not being confined to the functions of a translator, I was at liberty sometimes to think for myself; and I had it in my power to give such a form to my work, that many important truths would pass in it under the name of the Abbé de Saint Pierre, much more safely than under mine’ (J.-J. Rousseau, *The Confessions of Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, IV vols., vol. III (London: Gibbings & Company; 1901), bk.IX, p.97). Original: ‘en ne me bornant pas à la fonction de traducteur, il ne m’étoit pas défendu de penser quelquefois par moi-même, & je pouvois donner telle forme à mon ouvrage, que bien d’importantes vérités y passeroient sous le manteau de l’abbé de St. Pierre, encore plus heureusement que sous le mien.’ (J.-J. Rousseau, *Seconde Partie des Confessions de J.J. Rousseau, Citoyen de Geneve. Édition enrichie d’un nouveau recueil de ses Lettres*, IV vols., vol. III (Neuchatel: L. Fauche-Borel; 1790 [1789]), bk.IX, p.206). Though Rousseau went on to claim to have separated his own views (in the *Jugement*) from those of Saint-Pierre (in the *Extrait*) (Rousseau, *Confessions*, III, bk.IX, pp.338-342; Rousseau, *The Confessions of Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, III, bk.IX, pp.120-123), the content of the *Extrait* shows this to be an oversimplification.
of Europe, which expanded greatly upon Saint-Pierre’s brief mention of antiquity.

‘Such a form of Government [i.e. federation] is to some extent a novelty, and its principles have been fully understood only by the moderns. But it was not unknown among the ancients. The Greeks had their Amphictyons and the Etruscans their Lucumonies; the Latins had their feriae and the Gauls their city-leagues; the Achaean League gave lustre to the death-struggles of Greece.’

In highlighting Rousseau’s ‘improvements’, we can see the concerns he had with Saint-Pierre’s text: namely, that in order to dodge the charge of utopianism, it needed to be moored to a better and more complete invocation of historical precedent. Moreover, the very fact that he was choosing to speak through the Abbé de Saint-Pierre invoked a chain of intellectual precedent, a chain recognised (albeit mockingly) by Voltaire in his immediate response to Rousseau’s Abstract, in which Voltaire adopted the persona of the Chinese emperor:

‘We have attentively read the pamphlet of our beloved Jean-Jacques, citizen of Geneva, in which Jean-Jacques has written the abstract of a Plan of Perpetual Peace by the bonze Saint-Pierre, which bonze Saint-Pierre had abstracted from a clerk of the mandarin Marquis De Rosny, Duc de Sully, an excellent economist, who had abstracted it from the depth of his brain.’

306 All too brief for Rousseau, one of whose complaints of the Abbé was his overly high opinion of the Moderns vis-à-vis the Ancients: ‘The high opinion he [the Abbé de Saint-Pierre] had of the knowledge of the moderns had made him adopt this false principle of perfected reason, the basis of all the institutions he proposed, and the source of his political sophisms’ (Rousseau, The Confessions of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, III, bk.IX, p.120-121)
307 Original: ‘Quoique cette forme paroisse nouvelle à certains égards, & qu'elle n’ait en effet été bien entendue que par les Modernes, les Anciens ne l’ont pas ignorée. Les Grecs eurent leurs Amphictions, les Etrusques leurs Lucumonies, les Latins leurs Fériés, les Gaules leurs Cités, & les derniers soupirs de la Grece devinrent encore illustres dans la Ligue Achéenne.’ (Rousseau, Extrait du projet de paix perpétuelle de M. l’abbé de Saint-Pierre, 21)
Voltaire’s cynical (and entirely correct) suggestion that Henry IV’s Grand Design was a figment of Sully’s imagination\(^{309}\) both cemented its status as utopia divorced from historical reality, and ironically bolstered the idea that suggestions for a Plan of Perpetual Peace among the states of Europe constituted not idiosyncratic musings, but a literature unto itself.\(^{310}\)

It was not until Immanuel Kant’s 1795 *Zum ewigen Frieden* (‘Towards Perpetual Peace’) that a coyness around citing historical precedent emerges, a symptom partly of the scorn that these figures had accrued, and partly of a tension beginning to be felt between historicity and futurism. Far from being couched in the terms of others, Kant did not make any explicit reference in this text to previous schemes to secure perpetual peace. Nevertheless, it is clear that he is familiar with them, not least because he referred to them in other works. In his 1784 *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose*, Kant accompanied mention of a ‘great federation’ [‘großen Völkerbund’] with the hybrid Latin-Greek term ‘Fœdus Amphictyonum’ [Amphictyonic League] in parentheses, and wrote that ‘However wild and fanciful this idea may appear – and it has been ridiculed as such when put forward by the Abbé St Pierre and Rousseau… – it is nonetheless the inevitable outcome of the distress in which men involve one another’.\(^{311}\) And in a 1793 essay, Kant explicitly defended the

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\(^{310}\) To which Voltaire added his own *De la paix perpétuelle* in 1769, albeit under the satirical pseudonym ‘Docteur Goodheart’ (Voltaire, *De la paix perpétuelle, par le Docteur Goodheart* ([Amsterdam]: [M.-M. Rey.]; 1769); reprinted in D. Adams et al. (eds.), *Œuvres complètes de Voltaire*, ed. Nicholas Cronk, vol. 70B: Writings of 1769 (IIB) (2016)

\(^{311}\) I. Kant, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose", in H.S. Reiss (ed.), *Kant: Political Writings*, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1970), 47-48
Abbé de Saint-Pierre and Rousseau, arguing that contrary to the cliché that utopias were good in theory but not in practice, in fact ‘whatever reason shows to be valid in theory, is also valid in practice’. Finally, the opening lines (and very title) of *Zum ewigen Frieden* contained a veiled reference. In these lines, Kant wrote of the slogan *Zum ewigen Frieden* appearing on ‘a Dutch innkeeper’s signboard above the picture of a churchyard’. This story is simply lifted from one Leibniz had told in the opening lines of his 1693 *Codex Iuris Gentium*:

‘a fashionable joker in Holland, after he had attached to the façade of his house, according to the local custom, a sign which read ‘perpetual peace’, had placed under this fine slogan a picture of a cemetery – since there death does bring about peace.’

Moreover, the context Kant used this visual joke in was to hint that it gently satirised ‘the philosophers who cherish the sweet dream of perpetual peace’. Leibniz too had made this allusion, referring to one such philosopher in particular:

‘I have seen something of M. de St. Pierre’s plan for maintaining perpetual peace in Europe. It reminds me of an inscription outside of a churchyard, which ran Pax Perpetua. For the dead, it is true, fight no more. But the living are of another mind, and the mightiest among them have little respect for tribunals.’

The key difference between the two philosophers was that whereas Leibniz embraced precedents in order to accrue intellectual cachet and to be able to express himself more freely, for Kant they were a burden, albeit one he used creatively to argue in favour of utopian thinking.

Kant’s contemporaries shared this sense of tension between on one hand the desire to *wake* Europe, by emphasising the historical depth of the unity of Europe, and on the other hand the desire to *make* Europe, by finding a modern, enlightened, progressivist solution to the perpetual violence

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312 Kant, "Theory and practice", 92
314 Leibniz, "Codex Iuris Gentium (Praefatio)", 166
315 Kant, *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay*, 106
that had besmirched her history thus far, and highlighting how the present cosmopolitanism was bringing a new unity. This was the context in which Chateaubriand and Novalis were to call for a ‘return’ to an idealised version of medieval unity, arguing for ‘a new stirring of Europe that had hitherto been asleep’. However, the most influential voice to argue along these lines was Henri de Saint-Simon, who coloured in their sketch of a Europe united in *respublica Christiana* in his 1814 *On the Reorganisation of European Society*. However, Saint-Simon tempered this nostalgia by also appealing to the revolutionary spirit and Enlightenment values of the present age:

‘Of course, I do not suggest that that old organization, which still encumbers Europe with its useless ruins, should be raised from the dust: the nineteenth century is too far removed from the thirteenth. A constitution, strong in itself, grounded in natural principles and free from ephemeral beliefs and opinions is what Europe needs and this is what I am now proposing.

When the revolutions in empires are caused by the advance of enlightenment, they will always lead to a better state of affairs; in the same way the political crisis which has broken up the great European body is paving the way for a more perfect organization for Europe.’

Unlike Chateaubriand and Novalis, Saint-Simon did engage with the literature on European peace leagues, devoting a chapter to such schemes in a “Review of Perpetual Peace”. This focused on two figures:

‘Two men alone saw evil and approached the remedy, Henry IV and the Abbé de Saint-Pierre; but one died before he had achieved his design, which was forgotten after him; the other was

\[317\] See, for example, Chateaubriand, who wrote: ‘If there existed in Europe a tribunal to judge nations and monarchs in the name of God, and to prevent wars and revolutions, this tribunal would doubtless be the master-piece of policy and the highest degree of social perfection. The popes, by the influence which they exercised over the Christian world, were on the point of effecting this object.’ (F.-R. Chateaubriand, Vicomte de, *The Genius of Christianity, or the Spirit and Beauty of the Christian Religion*, trans. Charles I. White (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co.; 1856), pt.IV, bk.XI, 661)

\[318\] Novalis, “Christendom or Europe”, in Margaret Mahony Stoljar (ed.), *Novalis: Philosophical Writings*, trans. Margaret Mahony Stoljar (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press; 1997) 137-152, 149-50


\[320\] Saint-Simon and Thierry, “On the Reorganization of European Society”, 85

\[321\] C.H.d.R. Saint-Simon, comte de and A. Thierry, *De la réorganisation de la société européenne, ou De la nécessité et des moyens de rassembler les peuples de l'Europe en un seul corps politique, en conservant à chacun son indépendance nationale* (Paris: Adrien Égron; 1814), Ch. 3: “Examen de la Paix perpétuelle”, 27-32
treated as a dreamer for having promised more than he could give.’

Saint-Simon found the Abbé’s scheme ridiculous, but nevertheless praised its intentions, writing that ‘The Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s book has hardly been read, and little is known of it but the title, and the dream of a good man, who named it thus’. For Saint-Simon, the familiar European peace league totems were not figures of embarrassment, but of regret: they neither proved the viability (by their precedent) nor the impracticability (by their failure) of such a league; indeed, the example of the respublica Christiana was for Saint-Simon proof enough of the merits of European unity.

The problem, according to Saint-Simon, was one of visibility: due to various circumstances, these figures had been ‘forgotten’ (Henry IV/Sully) or ‘hardly read’ (Saint-Pierre), and thus Saint-Simon’s objective was to reach a new audience, specifically the princes then gathered at the Congress of Vienna.

Meanwhile, the man whose actions were both the cause and subject of the Congress, Napoleon Bonaparte, was about to invoke the same literature in quite different circumstances. Namely, while detained on St Helena, Napoleon attempted to negotiate his place in history by reinterpreting his imperialist conquering (in conversation with his biographers) as efforts made towards securing European unity. To this end, Las Cases’s version of Napoleon’s story recalled both the Greek Amphictyonies and the United States of America, while Montholon’s telling recalled the Abbé de

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323 Saint-Simon and Thierry, De la réorganisation de la société européenne, 26. Original: ‘Le livre de l’abbé de Saint-Pierre a été peu lu, on n’en connaît guère que le titre, et le nom de rêve d’un homme de bien, par lequel on le désigne.’

324 The idea to link all the European peoples in one political institution is certainly not a dream, since for six centuries such an order of things existed, and during those six centuries wars were more rare and less terrible’ (Saint-Simon and Thierry, De la réorganisation de la société européenne, 26). Original: ‘Certes, ce n’est pas une vision que l’idée de lier tous les peuples européens par une institution politique, puisque pendant six siècles un pareil ordre de choses a existé, et que pendant six siècles les guerres furent plus rares et moins terribles.’

325 F.E. Manuel, The new world of Henri Saint-Simon (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 1956), 172. Manuel points out that Saint-Simon & Thierry were far from alone in producing unsolicited counsel in this direction.

326 ‘One of my great plans was the re-uniting, the concentration, of those same geographical nations which have been
Saint-Pierre. In Napoleon just as in Saint-Simon there was a tension between Enlightenment and Romantic visions of European unity, between nostalgia and progressivism. This tension spoke to an essential and pervasive ambivalence as to whether a united Europe was revolutionary or counter-revolutionary; whether it was a new innovation, or soaked in history, or both.

Three points stand out from this potted history of the developing historiography within the European peace league literature from Sully to Saint-Simon. Firstly, that the idea that a politically united Europe was necessarily new and future-oriented a) took a long time to emerge, b) was the product of a specific set of circumstances (Enlightenment, progressivism, secularism and revolution), c) even when it did emerge, it was itself contested and contradictory, and d) it inspired – indeed, it was mutually constituted by – its inverse (i.e. the idea that European unity was necessarily backward looking, for better or worse). Of course, it would be wrong to kick too far against this proposition: I do not mean to suggest that these utopian visions were entirely nostalgic, but merely that they had some form of historicity, and it was through this historicity and citational practices that the outlines of a canon began to emerge.

The second point to make is that these citational practices were often incredibly complex, with authors not just citing texts (both openly and tacitly), but speaking to texts and speaking through texts in ways that blur the lines of authorship, let alone citation. This is further complicated by the publication histories and geographies of the texts themselves, which tend to get misleadingly flattened into a single data point (plotting the date of original publication). Texts were not simply published

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327 It would be a magnificent field for speculation, to estimate what would have been the destinies of France and of Europe, had England satisfied herself with denouncing the murder of Louis XVI., … kings would not have shaken on their thrones, but their states would have all, more or less, passed through a revolutionary process, and the whole of Europe, without a convulsion, would have become constitutional and free, without jealousy and without ambition. The fancy of the Abbé de St. Pierre would have been realized.’ (C.T. Montholon, marquis de, History of the Captivity of Napoleon at St. Helena, II vols., vol. II (London: Henry Colburn; 1846), 13)
once and for all, but were republished at certain times, in certain places, translated into certain languages, to serve certain needs. At each stage they could be revised, abridged, re-ordered, republished in juxtaposition with other texts or wrenched from their context and published alone, with each of these decisions tending to involve more actors than just the author. And the circulation of texts often bypassed the publishing industry altogether, circulating instead as private correspondence, papers, and archives.

The third and final point is that the historiography within the European peace league literature itself has a dynamic historical geography. At the risk of wildly overgeneralising, there is a broad pendulum swing from the tendency to cite notional examples of unions, whether Greek, Roman or Germanic, to an eighteenth-century tendency to cite authors who have advocated for such schemes, and back to an early nineteenth-century re-evaluation of the respublica Christiana as the prime example of a politically united Europe. Likewise, we can track the changes in how this historical perspective is seen, which broadly move from unproblematically positive political capital, to positive intellectual capital, to a gradually growing sense of scepticism and even ridicule, to the early nineteenth-century position in which this history is neither clearly positive nor negative, but highly dependent upon the context in which it is called forth.

A literature of pacifism

While each new iteration may have been to some extent historicised, and connected into these complex citational networks, by the nineteenth century there was still no systematic attempt to group together or survey these schemes; in short, there was no sense in which the various schemes for a European peace league constituted a literature. This would begin to change throughout the nineteenth century, as new proposals for European unity became more rigorous and systematic in their discussion of precedent. However, these expression of a new, shared canon were most fully developed among
those for whom European union was not an end but a means.

In the course of the nineteenth century, two such schools of thought inducted the historic promoters of political European union into new literatures devoted to their own cause. The first such cause was that of pacifism, particularly as institutionalised in Quaker peace societies, notably the British-based ‘Society for the Promotion of Permanent and Universal Peace’ (commonly known as simply the ‘Peace Society’) founded in 1816, and the ‘American Peace Society’ formed from the amalgamation of state and local peace societies in 1828. William Ladd, the first president of the American Peace Society, wrote two pieces in relation to a competition the Society ran to attract essays the subject of a ‘Congress of Nations’: the first an entry under the pseudonym ‘Philanthropos’, and the second a purported survey comprising material from the papers rejected from the final shortlist of five. In each, Ladd undertook a historical survey both of instances of real-world precedent for a Congress of Nations, from the Greek Amphictyons via the Hanseatic League and Swiss Confederacy to the 1826 Congress of Panama, and of schemes that remained as mere proposals, comprising Sully, William Penn, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre and Rousseau, as well as the petitions of the British and American peace societies. Though not particularly complimentary about these works and ignorant of any other schemes, Ladd’s essays, widely circulated among the Society’s members, thus subtly instigated the interpretation of European peace league in an internationalist vein, playing down their civilisational ties to ‘Europe’, and instead focusing on their pacifist aims.

328 Philanthropos [William Ladd], A Dissertation on a Congress of Nations (James Loring; 1832)

329 W. Ladd, “Essay on a Congress of Nations for the adjustment of international disputes, and for the promotion of universal peace, without resort to arms”, in William Ladd and Geo. C. Beckwith (eds.), Prize Essays on a Congress of Nations for the adjustment of international disputes, and for the promotion of universal peace without resort to arms. Together with a sixth essay, comprising the substance of the rejected essays (Boston: Whipple & Damrell; 1840) 509-638

330 Ladd wrote: ‘When the American Peace Society first entered on this work, there were only two Essays in the whole world on the subject, viz., Penn’s and St. Pierre’s, both very meagre, crude and undigested. Beside these, we had only what could be gathered from Sully’s account of the Great Scheme of Henry IV.’ (Ladd, "Essay on a Congress of Nations", 637)

331 That is, in the universalist sense of internationalism derived from Bentham, a significant influence upon Ladd and the peace societies (see Hinsley, Power and the pursuit of peace, 92-100)
The pacifist campaign for a congress of nations recovered its explicit connection to Europe with the invention of the idea of a ‘United States of Europe’ in the middle of the century, variously promoted between 1848 and 1851 by the Scottish poet Charles Mackay, the American editor and publisher Eliakim Littell, the Italian philosopher and writer Carlo Cattaneo, his friend, the Italian pro-unification political activist Giuseppe Mazzini, and most famously of all, the French poet and novelist Victor Hugo in his presidential address at the 1849 Paris Peace Congress. However, these calls were all made in a revolutionary spirit that invoked the past only in order to call forth a progressivist teleology. It was only in a second wave of calls for a United States of Europe, instigated by the 1867 inaugural congress of the Ligue internationale de la paix et de la liberté (‘International League of Peace and Freedom’) in Geneva, that a literature of pacifist-federalist thought began to be invoked. At the congress itself, the charismatic Russian activist and future anarchist Mikhail Bakunin delivered a speech in which he described a genealogy of European federation that was built upon the proto-socialism of the French political philosophers François-Noël Babeuf, Henri de Saint-Simon, Charles Fourier and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. Though accepted by the Central Committee,
Bakunin’s suggestions ultimately proved too radical for the congress, and he resigned the following year. Instead, the League chose as their leader the French philosopher and barrister Charles Lemonnier, a fellow admirer of Saint-Simon but for whom the social question was secondary to the pacifist-federalist cause. Lemonnier both co-edited the League’s bilingual monthly journal, *les États-Unis d’Europe — Die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa*, and in 1872 published a book of the same name, in which he celebrated as pioneers of European federation the duc de Sully, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Kant, Saint-Simon, and Mazzini and Hugo. Indeed, Lemonnier retrospectively placed Hugo’s revolutionary rhetoric within this historical frame, crediting him with the invention of the term ‘United States of Europe’, proclaiming that ‘In three words Victor Hugo had summarized Kant!’

Lemonnier’s historical perspective on a United States of Europe was mirrored by two other contemporary figures. In England, the newly appointed Regius Professor of Modern History at Cambridge, John Robert Seeley, gave a lecture in 1871 before the Peace Society with the title ‘The United States of Europe’, in which he embraced political union as the best means of abolishing war. As a professional historian, Seeley concerned himself only with those precedents of federalism that had been tested; of these, he argued that the Amphictyonic league of ancient Greece, the Holy Roman Empire, the German Confederation and the pre-1789 American Confederation were all unsuccessful, and that only the closer post-1789 United States of America offered a successful model for federation. Across the Atlantic, the American Unitarian minister Edward Everett Hale agreed that

339 Lemonnier’s co-editor was Amand Goegg, the German democrat and former member of the provisional revolutionary government in Baden. See F. Spoltore, "Charles Lemonnier", *The Federalist: a political review* 45.2 (2003) 114-126
343 Seeley, "United States of Europe", 442
the US was a living proof of the potential hardiness of a federal system, but also emphasised the imagined precedents for European union, discussing at length Sully’s ‘Great Design’, and mentioning too the contributions of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Rousseau, Kant, Bentham, and Joseph de Maistre. Hale justified the discussion of these totems of peace as a corrective to the warlike bias of conventional history, writing that ‘We are constantly misled in this matter, because we go to school, and study the histories of mere families, – of Bourbons, of Tudors, of Hapsburgs, – and their wars’. His point was that if peace was to be achieved, history would needed to be rewritten to valorise peacekeeping and the wellbeing of citizens rather than victory in war and the expansion of borders.

Though the pacifist movement grew from strength to strength into the start of the twentieth century, the idea of a League for Peace became rather more ambiguous, and oscillated between visions of global and European federation. In terms of the literature invoked in support of such a league, two developments must be mentioned. First, the historiography grew as new prophets of a peace league were unearthed, and as this literature was cross-fertilised with a parallel movement in support of international law (about which more below). Thus, Andrew Carnegie’s 1905 rectoral address to the students at the University of St Andrews, published under the title A League of Peace, discussed Émeric Crucé along with Henry IV, while also mentioning on one hand the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, the Due de Lorraine, Penn, Bentham, Kant and J.S. Mill, and on the other hand the legal theorists Hugo Grotius, Samuel von Pufendorf, Cornelius van Bynkershoek and Emer de Vattel. The vice-president of the American Peace Society Edwin D. Mead, who was one of those engaged in hunting for historical peace leagues – he claimed to have found in a letter of Erasmus reference to a sixteenth-

344 E.E. Hale, "The United States of Europe", Old and New 3.3 (March 1871) 260-267, 262-265, 260
345 Hale, "The United States of Europe", 265
346 A. Carnegie, A Rectorial Address delivered to the Students in the University of St. Andrews 17th October, 1905 (Boston: Published for The International Union by Ginn & Company; 1906), 20
347 Carnegie, Rectorial Address, 14-15
century ‘Grand Design’ by William of Ciervia, John Sylvagius and Erasmus himself – in 1909 published a pamphlet containing a survey of ‘The Literature of the Peace Movement’. In it, Mead recalled the lectures he had given on ‘Men who have Worked to Organize the World’, which he had organised around the totems of Dante, Henry IV, Grotius, Penn, Kant, Charles Sumner, and the Hague Peace Conference, while also making mention of more recent American contributions to this literature, including William Ladd and Edward Everett Hale.

The second development is betrayed by the context in which Mead compiled his ‘Literature of the Peace Movement’: as part of an effort to educate the public about this history by physically distributing its core texts. Mead’s article was originally published in the Chautauquan, the monthly journal of the adult-education Chautauqua Institution, with the following ‘editor’s note’:

‘All publications, books and pamphlets mentioned in this article may be obtained from The Chautauqua Press, Chautauqua, N.Y., to which orders, subscriptions, and requests should be sent. … This article was written at our request, not only for its bird’s-eye view of the movement, but for the very practical purpose of indicating the most available supplementary material for readers, circles, libraries, etc.

Meanwhile, Mead himself served as editor of the publisher and philanthropist Edwin Ginn’s ‘International Library’, whose mission was to publish and re-publish peace literature ‘at a price low enough for the general public to afford’.\(^{353}\) Mead’s article made repeated reference to texts printed in this series, and the article itself would be reprinted in pamphlet form by Ginn and Mead’s new

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348 Edwin D. Mead’s “An Early Scheme to organize the World”, published in the Independent (29 August 1907), republished as E.D. Mead, "An Early Scheme to Organize the World", The Advocate of Peace 70 (January 1908) 18-19 and adapted for E.D. Mead, "Introduction", in Maximilien De Béthune Sully and Edward Everett Hale (eds.), The great design of Henry IV from the memoirs of the Duke of Sully and The united states of Europe (Boston, Massachusetts: Ginn and Company, for the International School of Peace; 1909) vii-xxi

349 E.D. Mead, "The Literature of the Peace Movement", The Chautauquan 54.3 (May 1909) 337-350

350 This course of lectures was given to the Boston teachers at the Old South Meetinghouse. See Mead, "The Literature of the Peace Movement", 342

351 Mead, "The Literature of the Peace Movement", 339. In this connection, see also his wife Lucia Ames Mead’s 1905 A Primer of the Peace Movement, whose brief list of ‘famous workers for peace’ gave equal billing to Henry IV, Grotius, Penn, Kant, William Ellery Channing, Sumner, Elihu Burritt and Andrew Carnegie (L. Ames Mead, A Primer of the Peace Movement (Boston: American Peace Society; 1905), n.p.)

352 Mead, "The Literature of the Peace Movement", 337n*

venture, the ‘International School of Peace’, soon to become the ‘World Peace Foundation’, which in its first full year circulated 300,000 contemporary and historic pacifist texts in pamphlet form. Mead also referred to ‘Old South Leaflets’, another Boston-based publishing venture to distribute (abridged) historical texts for a nominal fee, including such pacifist-federalist texts as Dante’s *Monarchia*, Grotius’s *Rights of War and Peace*, William Perm’s *Plan for the Peace of Europe*, Elihu Burritt’s *Address on a Congress of Nations*, and The Hague Arbitration Convention of 1899.

The constitution of a pacifist-federalist literature through re-publication (and, where necessary, translation) in the early twentieth century extended to full books too, often annotated and with substantial introductions added to place the work within the context of a pacifist canon. An incomplete overview would include Mary Campbell Smith’s 1903 translation of Kant’s *Perpetual Peace*, Thomas Willing Balch’s 1909 translation of Émeric Crucé as *Le Nouveau Cynée - The New Cyneas* (in a bilingual format that also reproduced the original French text), C.E. Vaughan’s 1917 translation and re-edit of Rousseau’s *Abstract and Judgement* under the new title *A Lasting Peace*, and Elizabeth York’s 1919 *Leagues of Nations* which contained extracts of Penn, Saint-Pierre and Rousseau. William Penn’s *The Peace of Europe* was republished in 1896 in American Peace Society’s *Advocate of Peace* journal, in 1912 as a standalone pamphlet by the American Peace Society, in 1914 by the late pacifist John Bellows’ publishing house in Gloucester, and around the same time by the British publisher J.M. Dent’s cheap-print Everyman Library. Sully too saw

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355 Mead, “The Literature of the Peace Movement”, 342
356 Kant, *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay*. Republished in further impressions in 1915 and 1917
357 Crucé, *Le Nouveau Cynée*
358 Rousseau, *A Lasting Peace Through The Federation Of Europe and The State Of War*
359 E. York, *Leagues of Nations: Ancient, Mediaeval and Modern* (London: The Swarthmore Press; 1919). ‘Elizabeth York’ was the *nom de plume* of Lottie Elizabeth Bracher
360 The Advocate of Peace, "William Penn’s Essay towards the Peace of Europe" (58 1896), 245–246; W. Penn, "An
multiple editions, first in a joint volume with Hale’s *United States of Europe*, published in 1909 by Ginn’s International School of Peace and introduced by Mead, and second in 1921 by the Grotius Society with an introduction by the historian David Ogg. The latter was part of a series that also included works by Erasmus, Grotius, Saint-Pierre, Bentham and Kant, and a compilation of *Quakers and Peace*. What made this wave of republications remarkable was that many of these texts had previously been long out of print, forgotten about, and badly or un-translated. The pacifist movement both brought them together into a cohesive ‘literature’, expounding a history in which peace was afforded the same weight as war, and made a real commitment to making this literature accessible to all.

**A literature of international law, arbitration and organisation**

While the pacifists placed the stress of the European peace leagues on ‘peace’, a related but distinct literature was being assembled that would put the stress on ‘league’. This was the post-Benthamite field of international law, which interpreted earlier centuries’ utopian plans for a united Europe as precedents for the nineteenth-century idea that arbitration could at least partially replace violence as a means of resolving disagreement between states.


the first comprehensive overviews of international law, in 1838 expanded his historical introduction to that work, reformulating it as a *Mémoire* in answer to the prize question set by the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences at the *Institut de France*: ‘What progress has been made by the law of nations in Europe since the Peace of Westphalia?’ This *Mémoire* was published in its original French and then translated into English and enlarged as the 1845 *History of the Law of Nations in Europe and America*. Wheaton gave a detailed and systematic account of ‘international law’ from antiquity to the present day, in which he blended statutes and proposals, history and ideas, law and theory. Thus political-legal theorists like Grotius, Pufendorf, Leibniz, Cornelius van Bynkershoek and Emer de Vattel were placed in the same narrative as historical federations like the Greek Amphyctionies and the Swiss Confederation, as well as the federal schemes of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Rousseau, Bentham and Kant. Wheaton believed that the improvement of international law had ‘sensibly mitigated’ the practice of war between ‘civilized nations’, yet did not go so far as to suggest it could prevent war.

Wheaton was not alone in arguing that the Abbé de Saint-Pierre ought to be taken seriously. In 1857, the Belgian free-tradist political economist Gustave de Molinari published the hagiographical *L’Abbé de Saint-Pierre*, which sought to reinterpret its subject not as a ‘benevolent and sincere dreamer’, but instead as a practical theorist whose ideas anticipated many of those who would follow. For Molinari, the Abbé was a Bentham who merely lacked a Bowring (Bentham’s

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363 H. Wheaton, *History of the Law of Nations in Europe and America; from the earliest times to the Treaty of Washington, 1842* (New York: Gould, Banks & Co.; 1845), iii. Wheaton quoted the prize question as is was posed in French: ‘Quels sont les progress qu’a fait le droit des gens en Europe depuis la Paix de Westphalie?’


Molinari did not limit himself to the Abbé, but instead allowed his pen to stray into other peace league writers, who by association ought also to be remembered as useful rather than utopian. This scope was made clear by the book’s full title, which continued: ‘…his life and works, preceded by an appreciation and a historical summary of the idea of perpetual peace, followed by Rousseau’s judgment on the project of perpetual peace and the Polysynody as well as the project attributed to Henry IV, and the plan of Immanuel Kant to bring about universal peace, etc., etc’. Though Molinari did not engage with international law in his history of perpetual peace, his secular economism was far closer in tone to the lawyers than it was to the Anglo-American pacifists.

This tension was also reflected in the division between Lemonnier’s pacifist-federalist Ligue internationale de la paix et de la liberté, and the French economist Frédéric Passy’s Ligue internationale et permanente de la paix, established the same year, 1867. Passy’s group thought of itself as more pragmatic and less ‘political’, and therefore more inclined to look to international law. As the Belgian lawyer Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns said in an explicit attack on Lemonnier’s group, ‘We believe the time has come to move on to something more tangible than vaguely worded wishes and diatribes against warfare’. What Rolin-Jaequemyns had in mind was the group he founded in 1873 with the Swiss jurist Gustave Moynier (himself a founding member of Passy’s Ligue), the Institut de Droit International (‘Institute of International Law’), whose founding members included many of the most renowned practitioners of international law of the day, two of whom are of particular note here: James Lorimer and Johann Kaspar Bluntschli.

Lorimer, Regius Professor of Public Law at the University of Edinburgh, had in 1867 asserted

369 Molinari did not limit himself to the Abbé, but instead allowed his pen to stray into other peace league writers, who by association ought also to be remembered as useful rather than utopian. This scope was made clear by the book’s full title, which continued: ‘…his life and works, preceded by an appreciation and a historical summary of the idea of perpetual peace, followed by Rousseau’s judgment on the project of perpetual peace and the Polysynody as well as the project attributed to Henry IV, and the plan of Immanuel Kant to bring about universal peace, etc., etc’. Though Molinari did not engage with international law in his history of perpetual peace, his secular economism was far closer in tone to the lawyers than it was to the Anglo-American pacifists.


at the Royal Society of Edinburgh that the central problem of international jurisprudence was the establishment ‘of a self-supporting and self-vindicating international legislature and executive’. He regretted that social and political philosophy had been relatively neglected in the Society, and argued that rather than such study being necessarily airy and unscientific, a ‘Political Methodology’ that embraced (but was not limited to) historical study had the potential to enable its practitioners ‘to distinguish between the difficult and the impossible,—between schemes which ought never to be relinquished, and schemes which ought never to have been entertained’. Having defended his methodology, he then invoked a history that was comprised of both the efforts of ‘statesmen and diplomatists’, and of ‘speculative politicians’, and gestured towards the figures he had in mind:

‘Those which received the sanction of diplomacy are embodied in the treaties which have followed all our great wars, and belong to general history; and I shall probably recall the general character of the other class sufficiently to your recollection when I mention the well-known names of their authors, St Pierre, Rousseau, Kant, Bentham, Cobden, and of one, the latter phases of whose much-contested policy seem to combine the practical sagacity of the statesman with the dispassionate thoughtfulness of the philosopher—I mean the Emperor Napoleon III.’

Although Lorimer did not have time for a ‘satisfactory criticism’ of these schemes, he returned to the topic ten years later in a paper published in the journal Rolin-Jaequemyns had co-founded, the *Revue de Droit International et de Législation Comparée*, expanded and translated into English as Book V of his landmark 1884 *The Institutes of the Law of Nations*. Citing the British politician and man-of-letters George Cornewall Lewis and, most frequently of all, Wheaton’s *History* in his

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372 Lorimer, "On the Application of the Principle of Relative Equality", 559, 558
373 Lorimer, "On the Application of the Principle of Relative Equality", 563
374 Lorimer, "On the Application of the Principle of Relative Equality", 563
375 Lorimer, "On the Application of the Principle of Relative Equality", 563
376 J. Lorimer, "Le problème final du droit international", *Revue de Droit International et de Législation Comparée* 9 (1877) 161-206
analysis, Lorimer gave a historical overview of the ideas of Henry IV, Leibniz, Penn, Cardinal Alberoni, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Rousseau, Kant, Bentham and ‘the Author of The Mission of Sovereigns’ (that is, the French occultist Alexandre Saint-Yves d’Alveydre). Each of these Lorimer interpreted as failures whose flaws, correctly analysed, might point the way to a version of international organisation that might succeed.

Lorimer developed his plan in dialogue with, and against, the Swiss jurist Bluntschli. Bluntschli similarly advocated for an international legislature of government delegates, though his proposal was remarkable for being heavily weighted in favour of the six Grossmächte of Europe. Bluntschli too thought it important to include a retelling of the history of the idea of a united Europe, which had been thought of as ‘by no means chimerical’. Thus, in the 1878 paper in which he most fully developed his proposal, he began with Henry IV, and walked through the ideas of Napoleon, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Rousseau, Voltaire, Leibniz and Kant, as well as those of Lorimer. In contrast to Lorimer’s methodological self-consciousness, Bluntschli simply assumed these figures to be objects of serious study, though in both cases, their association and familiarity were breezily taken for granted.

In the 1880s, the international law societies increasingly became specifically directed towards international ‘arbitration’ as an ultimate goal, with Passy’s society merging in 1889 with the Comité de Paris de la Fédération internationale de l’arbitrage et de la paix to became the Société française pour l’arbitrage entre nations. Meanwhile in London, Lewis Appleton, until recently associated with the Peace Society, in 1880 founded the ‘International Arbitration and Peace Association’. As well

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379 C.f. A. Saint-Yves d’Alveydre, Mission actuelle des souverains par l’un d’eux, 3rd edn. (Paris: E. Dentu; 1882) Despite the title of his work (‘Current mission of sovereigns, by one of themselves’), which Lorimer took literally, Saint-Yves was not a monarch himself.

380 i.e. Germany, France, Britain, Italy, Austria-Hungary and Russia. J.K. Bluntschli, "Die Organisation des europäischen Statenvereines [1878]", Gesammelte kleine Schriften, II vols., vol. II (Nördlingen: C.H. Beck; 1881) 279-312, 300

381 Bluntschli, "Die Organisation des europäischen Statenvereines [1878]", 281

382 M. Ceadel, Semi-detached Idealists: The British Peace Movement and International Relations, 1854-1945 (Oxford:
as a tighter focus on arbitration, these organisations continued to differentiate themselves from the peace movement in their secular style, their refusal to rule out war entirely, and their acceptance of the present state system (rather than its transcendence) as the basis for a solution, while Appleton’s association made the significant step of allowing women on its executive committee (which they were denied by the Peace Society). Nevertheless, as demonstrated by the secretary of Passy’s society, Henry Bellaire, in a speech immediately following that of Passy at an 1872 congress, the ‘historical study of arbitration in international conflict’ still invoked the peace leagues of Henry IV and the Abbé de Saint-Pierre as crucial historical precedents.

Perhaps the most comprehensive body of work to fold the European peace league theorists into the canon of international law was produced across the turn of the century by the Belgian magistrate and professor of international law Ernest Nys, also a member of the Institut de Droit International. Throughout his career, Nys explored the history of international law over the course of his more-than-200 publications, including a monograph on Tommaso Campanella, bibliographical articles on Bentham, Saint-Pierre and a multitude of others, and translations of the contemporary English legal scholars Lorimer and John Westlake. This scholarship, for which Nys invented the term ‘literary history of international law’, involved extensive archival work, particularly in the

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383 Ceadel, Semi-detached Idealists: The British Peace Movement and International Relations, 1854-1945, 114
384 The meeting was the Congrès de l’Alliance universelle de l’ordre et de la civilisation (‘Congress of the Universal Alliance of Order and Civilization’), and Passy’s society had the same year changed its name to Société française des amis de la paix.
385 H. Bellaire, Étude historique sur les arbitages dans les conflits internationaux (Paris: Librairie Franklin; 1872)
386 E. Nys, Thomas Campanella, sa vie et ses théories politiques (Bruxelles; 1889)
387 E. Nys, "Notes inédites de Bentham", Revue de droit international et de législation comparée 19 (1887) 446-460; E. Nys, Les Bentham Papers du British Museum (Bruxelles: Bureaux de la revue; 1891) The latter was also published as E. Nys, "Les "Bentham Papers" du British Museum", Revue de droit international et de législation comparée 23 (1891) 474-492
388 E. Nys, "Les ouvrages de politique et deux lettres inédites de Charles Irénée Castel de Saint-Pierre", Revue de droit international et de législation comparée 23 (1891) 427-431
390 J. Westlake, Études sur les principes du droit international, trans. Ernest Nys (Brussels: A. Castaigne; 1895)
391 See, for an early example, E. Nys, "Histoire littéraire du droit international - Antonio de’ Bernardi, évêque de
collections of the British Museum. This frequently resulted in new discoveries to add to the canon; it was Nys, for instance, who discovered the true name of Émeric Crucé, while elsewhere he advocated for the inclusion in the ‘intellectual family’ from Sully to Bluntschli of four sixteenth-century figures: John Colet, Thomas More, Erasmus and Juan Luis Vives. The best single compilation of this work was Nys’s 1894 Les origines du droit international (‘The Origins of International Law’), dedicated ‘to the imperishable memory of James Lorimer’, in which Nys approached the subject systematically, dividing the canon of international law by subject. The peace league theorists Nys grouped together as ‘Irenists’, a term he borrowed from Saint-Pierre himself, and which he used in preference to ‘utopians’ because ‘the utopian believes in something imaginary’. Nys’s scholarship served both to cement the place of such figures in the serious business of international law, and transform a rather one-dimensional roll-call of names into a deep, fertile and constantly expanding field of inquiry. Some indication of this exponential increase in extent is given by his colleague and countryman Henri La Fontaine’s 1904 Bibliographie de la paix et de l’arbitrage international, the first volume of which, concerning the ‘pacifist movement’, ran to 2 222 entries.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, pacifist and legal traditions began to merge as proponents of international law started embracing the populist tactics of the peace societies, and attempted to repackage these histories for a more general readership. One of the most famous of these endeavours was *International Tribunals* by Revd William Evans Darby, who himself straddled these traditions as long-term term secretary of the Peace Society (from 1885 to 1915) and vice-president of the International Law Association. First published (jointly by both organisations) in 1897, *International Tribunals* was initially intended as a readable precis of historical schemes, from which delegates might develop a putative new ‘International Court of Arbitration’.

However, while Darby boasted that it was ‘the only contribution … specifically acknowledged in the Official Report of The Hague Conference as having been of service in its deliberations’, over the course of multiple new editions, each significantly enlarged, the text became something else: a compendium of silently abridged and freely translated standalone abstracts of the various schemes for international government in general. While neither possessing nor aspiring to Nys’s scholarship, Darby’s approach – narrative-free, at once unapologetically technical and accessibly concise – was to prove the most popular as a reference for a new generation of writers, with the pacifist Elizabeth York crediting it as ‘of great assistance to me’ and the political scientist Lindsay Rogers recommending it as ‘an inaccurate but useful work’.

Darby bridged traditions in more ways than one. As we have seen, he marked the confluence of the traditions of pacifism and international law, while the evolution of *International Tribunals* is representative of a wider shift in focus from arbitration (that is, resolving political disputes without

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*Arts in Britain and Europe at the Fin de Siècle* (Oxford: Peter Lang; 2009) 247-271

397 An explanation of its original intentions was given in Darby’s “Preface”, which appeared from the 1900 3rd edition.

398 W.E. Darby, *International Tribunals: a collection of the various schemes which have been propounded; and of instances in the nineteenth century*, 4th edn. (London: J.M. Dent; 1904), vi

399 It swelled from 168 pages in the 1st edition to 927 pages in the 1904 4th edition

400 York, *Leagues of Nations*, vi


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recourse to war) to a more general impetus towards what became known as ‘international organisation’. The historical consciousness of international organisation developed along two different paths. On one hand, Darby’s opening up of the Peace Society to women was both response and encouragement to the growing involvement of women in the pacifist movement, and in Britain and the US presaged a wave of historic overviews of the literature of international organisation written by women, intended for a general readership. These included the previously mentioned Elizabeth York’s *Leagues of Nations* and Mary Campbell Smith’s comprehensive introduction to her translation of Kant’s *Perpetual Peace*, as well as the economic and medieval historian Eileen Power, who contributed a concluding chapter on ‘The Teaching of History and World Peace’ to F.S. Marvin’s historical introduction to the League of Nations. This trend was perhaps best exemplified by the Australian classicist (and active member of the League of Nations Union) Melian Stawell’s 1929 pocket book *The Growth of International Thought*. It is telling that while her more academic 1923 tome *The Making of the Western Mind* (written with F.S. Marvin) was a supra-national history that made scant reference to European peace leagues, *The Growth of International Thought*, produced for the popular ‘Home University Library of Modern Knowledge’, was devoted to just such a narrative stroll through the totems of international organisation.

On the other hand, in continental Europe the trend hewed closer to the traditions of international law, with these same totems appearing in lengthy, often quite technical works, among which four deserve brief mention. First, Alfred Fried, the Austrian pacifist from whom Coudenhove-Kalergi borrowed the term ‘Pan-Europe’, whose 1905 *Handbuch der Friedensbewegung* (‘Handbook

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403 York, *Leagues of Nations*
404 Campbell Smith, “Translator's Introduction”
of the Peace Movement’, revised and considerably expanded in the 1911-13 two-volume second edition) contained a long chapter on the ‘History of the Peace Movement’, albeit one in which a long and inclusive roll-call of apparent internationalists was outweighed by an even longer analysis of the past century’s congresses and international legislation. Second, the German politician and professor of international law Walther Schücking, who in the years leading up to WWI was one of the leading publicists for ‘international organisation’. Schücking argued that international law needed to take the pacifist movement seriously, especially in Germany where the two camps had remained divided. He also had a keen historical sensibility, and like Nys collected past historic projects of international organisation; Darby credited Schücking for ‘unearthing’ George of Poděbrady for the literature of international law, and it was via his student Ernst Heinrich Meyer that Pierre Dubois was added to it. Third, the Dutch pacifist and historian Jacob Ter Meulen, who was librarian of the Peace Palace at The Hague from 1924 to 1952, and whose three-volume Der Gedanke der internationalen Organisation in seiner Entwicklung (‘The idea of the international organization in its development’) became the standard work in which this canon was enshrined. And fourth, the Norwegian historian and political scientist Christian L. Lange, with whom Coudenhove-Kalergi undertook a lecture tour of the US in the winter of 1925-26, organised by the Foreign Policy

409 Schücking mentioned the schemes of Pierre Dubois, George of Poděbrady, Émeric Crucé, the Duke of Sully, Count Ernst of Hessen-Rheinfels, Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Christian Wolff, and Immanuel Kant in Schücking, "Die Organisation der Welt"
411 Meyer credited Schücking for first suggesting Dubois’s ‘outstanding importance’ in the field of international law. See E.H. Meyer, Die staats- und völkerrechtlichen Ideen von Peter Dubois (Marburg: Verlag von Adolf Ebel; 1908), 5; c.f. Schücking, "Die Organisation der Welt", 559n2-560
Association, upon which they became (in Coudenhove-Kalergi’s account) ‘inseparable travelling companions and close friends’. 413 Lange, from 1909 the secretary-general of Passy’s Interparliamentary Union, made it his life’s project to compile the multi-volume *Histoire de l’internationalisme*. Although only the first volume (taking the narrative up to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia) 414 was published in his lifetime, 415 this work was to prove highly influential: in Melian Stawell’s bibliography, Lange’s *Histoire* is one of very few non-primary texts she lists, and is the only text she annotates with a comment: ‘an invaluable book for the student’. 416 For all their differences, what Fried, Schücking, Ter Meulen and Lange shared was a bulk that spoke to a gluttonous attitude to history. Whereas earlier writers had invoked historical precedents as buoys by which to map out their own position on the water, these early twentieth century figures saw history as an entire seabed of submerged features that needed to be explored.

**A literature of European integration**

We have seen how a canon was assembled, first as texts were refracted in complex ways through existing texts, and then as they were invoked as a ‘literature’ by two nineteenth-century streams of thought that gradually converged: pacifism and international law. Along the way, the essential meaning of this canon has itself shifted, and I have attempted to trace it across the coordinates formed by the general term ‘European peace league’. Though the imposition of any such general analytical

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413 Coudenhove-Kalergi, *An Idea Conquers The World*, 118. For archival records of this trip, see RGVA, 554/4/2; some of these documents and others from related files are also collected in HAEU, PAN/EU 2. For the content of their lecture-debates, see, for example, the talking points summarised in RGVA, 554/4/1, 251-252, as copied in HAEU, PAN/EU 2, 554/4/1.


416 Stawell, *The Growth of International Thought*, 247
categories risks losing contextual nuance, it serves to indicate the way in which the meaning of the canon, the thread connecting its various constituent parts, was definitively shifted towards ‘peace’ and ‘league’ and away from ‘Europe’. While the former pair were the interdependent ends sought by the pacifists and international lawyers respectively, ‘Europe’ was at best a means, which perhaps explains why among internationalists, Europeanism was progressively sidelined in favour of the universalist dream of international organisation.

It was against this seemingly inauspicious context that we see the emergence of a reading of this literature that swung back towards the foregrounding of ‘Europe’ as the true linking thread; that is, one in which this literature was taken out of the hands of pacifists and international lawyers, and repackaged as the history of European integration. This reading would chime with the twentieth-century rejection of methodological nationalism begun by Alfred Stern’s 10-volume Geschichte Europas (1894-1925), a rejoinder to the nationalist historiography of Treitschke, and further developed in the interwar Histories of Europe of Dawson, Fisher, Croce, Eyre, Hazard and Pirenne. However, its content was for the most part simply lifted from the pacifist-legalist canon that had been developed over the previous century.

The first significant such re-reading was that of the English historian Walter Alison Phillips in his 1914 The Confederation of Europe. Phillips readily admitted that he risked being ‘condemned as “journalistic” by the straiter sect of historians’, and that despite being based on lectures given in the Faculty of History, his book’s ‘object and scope … are not purely historical’. He meant by this that he was taking a methodological stance intended ‘not only to throw light on the problems of the

417 N. Schmitz, Alfred Stern (1846 - 1936); ein europäischer Historiker gegen den Strom der nationalen Geschichtsschreibung (Hannover: Wehrhahn; 2009)
past, but more especially to show what light these can reflect upon the problems of the present’.\textsuperscript{420} Phillips aimed to bring a historian’s ‘exact scholarship’ and ‘clearness of narrative’ to a subject ‘too often discussed from a standpoint wholly out of touch with the realities of life’, by which he meant both pacifists and lawyers.\textsuperscript{421} He thought the former to be lacking in realism, later recalling how ‘During a prolonged visit to the United States in 1911 I had been impressed with the danger likely to arise from the shallow and uniformed idealism of the pacifist movement … and my object was to counter this by an appeal to the relevant facts of history’.\textsuperscript{422} Regarding international law, he shared Albert Sorel’s cynical \textit{bon mot} that it was ‘only known through the declamations of publicists and its violation by the Governments’,\textsuperscript{423} an attitude that would soon be confirmed in the eyes of many by the German Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg’s infamous dismissal of the treaty preserving Belgium’s neutrality as a mere ‘scrap of paper’. Phillips’s insight was that even if the legalist-pacifist vision of European unity was but a fiction, this fiction mattered; he argued that ‘it is precisely such “legends” and “imaginary memories” that have been the impelling forces of nearly all great human movements’.\textsuperscript{424} The unity of Europe may be phantasmal, but ‘we do not quite realize the part played in the world by phantoms’.\textsuperscript{425} To emphasise the point, Phillips gave Part I of his book, in which he analysed the familiar canon of European peace leagues,\textsuperscript{426} as its epigraph Francis Bacon’s famous anti-utopian lines:

‘As for the philosophers, they make imaginary Lawes for imaginary common-wealths, & their

\textsuperscript{420} Phillips, \textit{The Confederation of Europe}, 1st edn., 3-4
\textsuperscript{421} Phillips, \textit{The Confederation of Europe}, 1st edn., 4, v
\textsuperscript{422} Phillips, \textit{The Confederation of Europe}, 2nd edn., vi
\textsuperscript{424} Phillips, \textit{The Confederation of Europe}, 1st edn., 8
\textsuperscript{425} Phillips, \textit{The Confederation of Europe}, 1st edn., 17, quoting an unnamed ‘French writer’, possibly Georges Blondel
\textsuperscript{426} Phillips mentioned Sully, Crucé, Grotius, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Alexander I, Napoleon, Voltaire, Kant, and the modern peace societies. He claimed to be the first to also consider Emperor Alexander I’s ‘Instructions to Novosiltsov’, countersigned by the Polish statesman Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski. In the 1920 2nd edition, Phillips pushed back the start of his narrative to include the eleventh-century ‘Truce of God’, and also included discussion of political philosophers like Emer de Vattel and Freidrich von Gentz.
discourses are as the Stars, which give little light because they are so high.\textsuperscript{427}

Phillips accepted the logic but inverted the sentiment of those lines in his text, writing that ‘The discourses of philosophers may give as little light as the stars; but, like the stars, they may win reverence by their mystery, and be held to influence the destinies of men’.\textsuperscript{428} By suggesting that the idea of a united Europe was as important as its accomplishment, Phillips thereby created a new, more robust justification for its study. However, the rather modern tone of detached scepticism with which Phillips wrote prevented his shifting of the frame of study to the specifically European from spilling over into active promotion of European confederation. While Phillips was happy to claim that ‘modern peace propaganda’ closely paralleled the debates surrounding the Holy Alliance, and was sympathetic to its demands, he did not believe that a new confederation of Europe was likely to be any more durable than the peace of 1815.

After the war, as we have seen, this insistence upon the historicity of peace leagues was largely dropped by the majority of political writers looking to create a League of Nations that would definitively break from the violence of the past. In the preface to the 1920 second edition of \textit{The Confederation of Europe}, Phillips wrote that:

\begin{quote}
‘Of the innumerable books and brochures advocating a League of Nations which have been issued since the beginning of the war I do not think it necessary to speak. I have read many of them, and they have left my own standpoint unchanged.’\textsuperscript{429}
\end{quote}

One exception was the British historian-turned-politician John Marriott, who in 1918 published an essay collection, \textit{The European Commonwealth: Problems Historical and Diplomatic}, in which like Phillips he sought to ‘make some modest contribution’ to problems traditionally addressed by ‘the political philosopher or the international jurist’: namely, whether a new form of political organisation

\textsuperscript{427} F. Bacon, \textit{The Two Bookes of Francis Bacon. Of the proficience and advancement of Learning, divine and humane} (London: Henry Tomes; 1604), 106v-107r
\textsuperscript{428} Phillips, \textit{The Confederation of Europe}, 1st edn., 14
\textsuperscript{429} Phillips, \textit{The Confederation of Europe}, 2nd edn., vii
might take the place of the ‘States-system’. However, while Marriott reinforced the idea that a study of peace projects could complement more traditional diplomatic history, the latter field rather blinkered his analysis of the former. Moreover, despite their chosen titles, both Phillips and Marriott slid easily between European and global forms of organisation, and neither broached the crucial question of what a European confederation or commonwealth might mean in terms of relations with the extra-European world.

A literature of Pan-Europe

It was into this void that Coudenhove-Kalergi confidently strode. What Phillips and Marriott had hinted at noncommittally, Coudenhove-Kalergi stridently asserted: that the lesson offered by the canon of peace leagues was above all else one of European unity. His own account of the Pan-European movement emphasised this literature at the very point of its inception:

‘I cast about for an organization which might have studied or promoted a Pan-European union at an earlier date. There was none. This lack of any organization for a closer union of Europe was still more amazing in view of the fact that for centuries outstanding Europeans had suggested a European union. This was done by men like Pierre Dubois in the early fourteenth century, Sully, the chancellor of the French King Henry IV, or the Quaker William Penn, who had not only conceived the idea of a United States of America but given years of his life to the idea of a United States of Europe.’

This account, characteristically, attempted to portray this mission as at once new and old, unprecedented yet proven by its precedents. Yet it was written after the fact, in 1942 when from his New York exile Coudenhove-Kalergi had the benefit of a closed bracket on interwar history, and thus a sense of historical perspective on his own actions. One might say the same about later lectures he

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431 Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Crusade for Pan-Europe*, 71
gave on the topic of the idea of Europe. In each case, Coudenhove-Kalergi the author was looking back on the role of Coudenhove-Kalergi the actor. But in what sense was Coudenhove-Kalergi the actor actively trying to craft his own history in the moment, as part of his the act of promoting Pan-Europe?

In fact, this invocation of historical precedent for Pan-Europe can be detected in one of the very earliest announcements of the Pan-European mission. In Coudenhove-Kalergi’s 20 February 1923 ‘Open Letter to Benito Mussolini’, first published in the Neue Freie Presse, he flattered the then prime minister of Italy that he was ‘the successor of [Gaius] Marius and [Julius] Caesar’, and appealed to him that: ‘As a good Italian you must also be a good European, just as the greatest Italian of the past century, Giuseppe Mazzini, was the greatest European’. However, when Pan-Europe was published later that year, it omitted any such sense of historicity, instead falling in line with the norm set by political writing in support of the League, and limiting itself to a forward-looking view that focused upon factors that could be detected in the present.

The first embrace of a canon of Pan-European precedents might be dated to the first Pan-European Congress, held from 3 to 6 October 1926 at the opulent Konzerthaus in Vienna. As befit its venue, the spectacle of the congress had been carefully thought out, and succeeded in making an impression upon its delegates, with H.R. Cummings reporting back to the League that:

‘The Congress was well staged. All the arts of lighting effect were employed, with a Bach fugue at the same time on the organ, during the solemn unfurling of the Pan-European flag at the back of the platform, which was surrounded with portraits of exemplary and kindred Pan-European spirits such as Napoleon and the Abbe St. Pierre, Nietzsche and Mazzini, Kant and Victor Hugo, and others.’

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434 H.R. Cummings, “Note on the First Pan-European Congress” (12 Oct 1926); LoN, 39/45485/45485, p.1. For other
These ‘monumental images of the great predecessors of Pan-European thought’, as they were described in *Paneuropa*, had been commissioned from the Austrian-Jewish painter Fritz Schwarz-Waldegg. Kant, ‘the creator of the first Pan-European constitution’, was placed centrally, while the other giant portraits were hung between the marble pillars of the hall (see fig. 15). Each were cited in terms that made clear their contribution not just to peace or the development of international organisation, but rather to the specific cause of European unification. Thus, Napoleon’s ‘political testament called for the federation of Europe’, Nietzsche was ‘the great European and fierce enemy of European parochialism’, John Amos Comenius ‘the Czech thinker who in an earlier and darker time believed in the unification of Europe and advocated for it’, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre ‘spent his entire life in the service of European integration’, Mazzini was ‘the great champion and prophet of European unity on the basis of the nation and freedom’, and Victor Hugo ‘the seer of the United States of Europe, to which he lent the work and enthusiasm of his twilight years’. That Coudenhove-Kalergi was fully aware of the purpose of such iconography may be judged by his awareness that ‘When Napoleon united Europe for the first time in modern times, he constantly referred to both his forerunners, Julius Caesar, and Charlemagne’.

Each of these totems were individually celebrated for their contributions to pan-Europeanism at various points in Coudenhove-Kalergi’s stewardship of the PEU. To stay with the theme of conference spectacle, Victor Hugo’s 21 August 1849 speech at the Paris Peace Congress in which Hugo called for a United States of Europe was published in *Paneuropa* in 1929, and performed onstage at PEU events on multiple occasions. Hugo’s speech was performed by Ida Roland in 1930.
at the second Pan-European Congress in Berlin,\textsuperscript{440} a performance that was reprised in 1934 at a ‘Europe Day’ rally in the Assembly Hall of the Austrian Parliament.\textsuperscript{441} It was also quoted at length in Coudenhove-Kalergi’s speech at the memorial service to Aristide Briand in New York on 28 March 1942.\textsuperscript{442} These figures were also given attention in Pan-European literature, whether in individual articles in \textit{Paneuropa} devoted to Napoleon,\textsuperscript{443} Hugo,\textsuperscript{444} Mazzini\textsuperscript{445} or the Abbé de Saint-Pierre,\textsuperscript{446} or taken together in Coudenhove-Kalergi’s monographs. In the 1934 \textit{Europa Erwacht}, for instance, Coudenhove-Kalergi devoted a chapter to figures ranging from Pierre Dubois and Dante via George

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{440} "Berliner Paneuropa-Tagung", \textit{Paneuropa} 6.6/7 (1930) 201-271
\item \textsuperscript{441} Coudenhove-Kalergi, \textit{An Idea Conquers The World}, 200
\item \textsuperscript{442} Coudenhove-Kalergi, \textit{An Idea Conquers The World}, 242-243
\item \textsuperscript{443} "Napoleons politisches Testament", \textit{Paneuropa} 5.9 (1929) 18-22
\item \textsuperscript{444} Hugo, "Víctor Hugos Friedensrede"
\item \textsuperscript{445} Kuranda, "Giuseppe Mazzini"
\item \textsuperscript{446} H.H. Post, "Der Abbé de Saint-Pierre und Paneuropa", \textit{Paneuropa} 9.3 (1933) 92-96
\end{itemize}
of Poděbrady, the Duc de Sully and the Abbé de Saint-Pierre to Napoleon, Mazzini and Hugo, along with full-page portraits of each to emphasise their significance.\textsuperscript{447} In the same work, he also highlighted the historicity of a united Europe cartographically, by printing simple, clear maps of the Roman & Napoleonic empires.\textsuperscript{448} This selection reflected the list of maps kept at the Pan-European head office in Vienna, which in addition to this pair included maps of ‘The European Empire of Charlemagne’, of ‘The European Catholic Empire of the Middle Ages’ and of ‘Europe when she was not the governess of the world (1490)’.\textsuperscript{449}

When it came to precisely how these figures were invoked, Coudenhove-Kalergi paid more attention to the geography of this historiography than most of the writers before him. Aware that the figures he cited would be refracted through the lens of modern nationalism and present-day tensions, he made sure to aim for a sense of geographical balance in his citation. As he wrote in 1929,

‘The pan-European idea itself is rooted as much in Germany as in France. While France refers to the preliminary work of Sully and Saint-Pierre, Rousseau and Napoleon, Saint-Simon and Victor Hugo, Germany can include Leibniz and Kant, [Christoph Martin] Wieland and Novalis, Friedrich List and Werner von Siemens, and above all Nietzsche, among the predecessors of Pan-Europe.

The common historical symbol of Pan-Europe, however, will be the Franco-German Emperor of Europe, Charlemagne.’\textsuperscript{450}

Likewise, he also sought political balance, writing in 1939 of the ‘three serious enterprises designed to unify Europe’ that were undertaken in the nineteenth century: ‘the imperial attempt of Napoleon, the conservative attempt of the Holy Alliance, and the revolutionary attempt of Young Europe’.\textsuperscript{451} In seeking to appease those from the entirety of the political spectrum, Coudenhove-Kalergi also set

\textsuperscript{447} Coudenhove-Kalergi, \textit{Europa erwacht}. See also R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, "The History of Paneuropa", \textit{Europe Must Unite} (Glarus, Switzerland: Paneuropa Editions Ltd; 1939) 78-96; Coudenhove-Kalergi, \textit{An Idea Conquers The World}, 89-97

\textsuperscript{448} Coudenhove-Kalergi, \textit{Europa erwacht}, 51, 60

\textsuperscript{449} RGVA, 554/7/421, 4, 1, Cartes I-V

\textsuperscript{450} ‘Die paneuropäische Idee selbst wurzelt ebenso stark in Deutschland wie in Frankreich. Während Frankreich auf die Vorarbeit von Sully und St. Pierre, Rousseau und Napoleon, St. Simon und Victor Hugo hinweist, kann Deutschland Leibniz und Kant, Wieland und Novalis, Friedrich Liszt und Werner von Siemens und vor allem Nietzsche unter seinen Vorläufern Paneuropas zählen.’ R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Briandsvorschlag und Deutschland", \textit{Paneuropa} 5.7 (1929) 1-7, 7

\textsuperscript{451} Coudenhove-Kalergi, \textit{Europe Must Unite}, 78
himself apart from the pacifist-legalist tradition, within which the inclusion of imperialists like Napoleon would have been nonsensical. Their inclusion in the canon, and the exclusion of nineteenth-century Anglo-American pacifist groups from it, spoke both to the ideological ambivalence of Pan-Europeanism, as well as a deliberate strategy of courting a mainstream audience.

Lastly, it is important to note how, like the pacifists and international lawyers before him, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s histories were designed to climax in the movement he helmed. The vision of history that Coudenhove-Kalergi offered was not merely pan-European in a general sense, but specifically Pan-European, and was labelled as such. It is telling that one of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s first significant general histories of European integration, from Julius Caesar on, was published as “The History of Paneuropa”; 452 the Pan-European Union was always presented in genealogical terms as the inheritor, heir or descendant of these earlier proposals for European unification. Simultaneously inverting and complementing this trend, later histories of the organisation alone—in which the role of his organisation was mythologised every bit as much as he mythologised his own life elsewhere—were occasionally given much more general titles, as in the case of “The European Movement at Thirty Years”. 453 Likewise, Coudenhove-Kalergi was all too happy to provide a chronicle of the PEU’s history for the exhibition organised by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe for the inauguration of the Maison de l’Europe in 1950. 454 These examples demonstrate that just as Coudenhove-Kalergi’s autobiographical accounts of his life bled into the political history of his organisation, so the latter bled into the general history of European integration. The intended effect of this conflation was twofold: to corral the force of history behind his own organisation, and reciprocally to imply its ownership of the movement to unite Europe. While, as we have seen, this

452 Coudenhove-Kalergi, "The History of Paneuropa"
454 See AVCUS, 198 MW 77
would come to the fore in the post-WWII jockeying for position among competing groups seeking European unity, including those led by Sandys and Churchill, even in the interwar period this imperative was strong.

Conclusion

This winding journey through a series of figures seemingly far removed from the Pan-European movement may have been rather a long way round. Yet there is value in delving into these twists and turns, historicising the very idea of a literature of Europe rather than simply plotting the points it refers to, and inferring some general sweep. This has been the error of current scholarship, which if it was tired when Hinsley wrote in 1963, must be positively exhausted by now.

Furthermore, it is only when the historiography is carefully unpicked that the contributions of the Pan-European movement become clear. First, they did not invent, but rather subtly recontextualised a pantheon that had before their intervention been a signifier of pacifism and international law. There were certainly enough synergies between these movements for such a move to bear fruit, and its success may be judged by the fact that the interpretation of these figures as emblems of European unity remains with us today.

Second, Coudenhove-Kalergi also played a significant part in redeeming the Enlightenment ideal of progressivism. This is perhaps more commonly associated with post-war modernism, and perhaps exemplified by Walt Rostow’s 1960 ‘stages of growth’ theory. However, this high-point of faith in progressivism must be seen in light of what came before, and the early twentieth century saw a tremendous challenge both to the direction of the arc of history and the very notion that history might have a shape. This was the context in which Coudenhove-Kalergi spelled out his radically reactionary version of history, a defiantly progressivist narrative in which European integration was presented as both logical and inevitable, the product of undergirding meta-historical logics that
posited the continuously increasing scale of polities. Coudenhove-Kalergi argued that while it was true that this trend spelled doom for Europe’s divided nations, a supranational structure could see Europe surf this wave rather than be smashed in the breakers. By invoking such an arc of history, he found that he could play the roles both of dispassionate observer of historical trends, and of campaigner-propagandist. As E.H. Carr said,

‘It is this sense of direction in history which alone enables us to order and interpret the events of the past – the task of the historian – and to liberate and organize human energies in the present with a view to the future – the task of the statesman, the economist, and the social reformer.’

Coudenhove-Kalergi’s genius was in marrying these two roles seamlessly. In the following chapter, we will explore the spatial implications of this arc of history in more detail.

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III. ‘Thinking in Continents’: Pan-Europe and *Geopolitik*

In the latter part of 1919 I found myself wistfully inspecting a map of the world. …

Presently I noticed the north-south line which in Europe divides the democracies of the West from the territory of the Soviet Union and which, beyond the Mediterranean, corresponds to the boundary between British Africa and the colonial territories of continental Europe. To the east of this African boundary, the British Empire extends in a gigantic arc round the Indian Ocean, all the way from Capetown to Sydney.

This observation gave me the clue to a possible division of the world into five huge regions…

Three of these regions were already in an advanced stage of organization: Pan-America; the northern part of the Old World, where the Soviet Union was predominant; and the southern part of the Old World, which was the preserve of the British Empire. In the Far East, Japan was attempting to organize a Mongolian bloc incorporating China. Only the fifth region, Pan-Europe, lacked all organization, notwithstanding the fact that it forms a clear-cut geographical unit between the Petsamo-Katanga line and the Atlantic Ocean and that it is based on a common civilization, a common history and common traditions.

Could these twenty-six European democracies not be merged into one large union, modelled on that of Pan-America?

Richard Nikolaus von Coudenhove-Kalergi

To-day we think in continents, and it is only our philosophers and historians who have not realized that we do so.

Oswald Spengler, 1918

*Introduction*

At first blush, it seems counterintuitive to be talking about Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi’s interwar Pan-Europe movement and *geopolitik* in the same breath. On one hand, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s books studiously avoided much of the theoretical terminology of geopolitics in favour of a more

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457 Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, I: Form and actuality 22
458 I use the German-language word here to distinguish German-centred interwar geopolitics from American-centred Cold War geopolitics
common-sensical style of argument. On the other hand, geopolitics as a discipline is (rightly) inextricably bound up in the racist and imperialist politics of Nazi Germany, which was ideologically opposed to the broadly liberal Pan-Europe movement, shutting their offices, banning (and indeed burning) their books, and denouncing their ideas. However, as the epigraph above suggests, there is much in Pan-Europe that is curiously consonant with geopolitics: the analysis of international affairs through the lens of space and territory, the insistence that political space is dynamic rather than fixed, the frequent use of organic metaphors to describe the requirements and interrelationships of politics, and a commitment to thinking big: that is, adopting a broad-brush approach that sought to consider politics within an explicitly global perspective. If interwar internationalism tends to be remembered today for its deterritorialised visions of universal law and governance, the story of the relationship of Pan-Europeanism to geopolitics offers a radically different take on the imagination of political space in the interwar period.

Specifically, both Coudenhove-Kalergi and the geopolitikers shared the belief that the Versailles settlement’s reorganisation of Europe into a raft of new nation-states had effectively imposed a set of artificial borders that were economically and politically suffocating the continent; and that in a world dominated by the ascendant superpowers of the US and Soviet Union, Europe’s survival depended on it uniting into a continental power. The overlap between Coudenhove-Kalergi

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459 T. Botz-Bernstein, "European Transfigurations—Eurafrica and Eurasia: Coudenhove and Trubetzkoy Revisited", The European Legacy 12.5 (2007) 565-575, 568. As Botz-Bernstein (ibid.) notes, ‘Given that [geopolitical] theories were very fashionable in the 1920s and 1930s, [their absence in Coudenhove-Kalergi’s work] is astonishing.’

460 One might even say ‘viewing International Relations’; it is no coincidence that the roots of this discipline are also to be found in this period.

461 As Murphy notes, ‘the language of Pan-Europeanism intersected with that of geopolitics at many points. There can be no doubt that the two were part of a shared discourse about politics and state relations, and their joint use of organic and geocentric theoretical frameworks illustrates the extent to which such notions had become the common property of Germanophone intellectuals across the political spectrum.’ (Murphy, Heroic Earth, 232-3)

462 Gorman, for example, writes that ‘Interwar experiments in international governance were premised on a de-territorialization of world politics. If the First World War had been caused by traditional geopolitical conflicts, the path to international peace lay in separating politics from spatial ordering. The ideas of Halford Mackinder were replaced by the more abstract conceptions of international law and international society.’ (D. Gorman, The Emergence of International Society in the 1920s (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2012), 9)
and the geopolitikers’ idea of a world carved up between global superpowers is plain to see in Coudenhove-Kalergi’s own map (fig. 2),\textsuperscript{463} which was reprinted – with attribution – by Karl Haushofer in his own work (fig. 16). Not only did Coudenhove-Kalergi’s pan-regions broadly accord with Haushofer’s Panideen, by which the world was split into various regional blocs under the influence of a hegemonic power, but Haushofer acknowledged the Pan-European world map as a prime example of an ‘object of geopolitics’, which occupied the same discursive terrain as his own ‘science of space’\textsuperscript{464}. These consonances are even more surprising when one considers that Haushofer continued to use this map at late as 1935, two years after Coudenhove-Kalergi had become persona non grata in Germany.\textsuperscript{465} In fact, this only scratches the surface of what, as we shall see, was a friendly relationship of mutual influence between the two men.

The question of whether Haushofer’s infamy is deserved or not continues to be debated today.\textsuperscript{466} However, important though it undoubtedly is, this debate has had the unfortunate side-effect of implying an overly linear intellectual history of interwar geopolitik, interpreting it solely through the prism of Haushofer’s relationship with Hitler. Whether carried out with the purpose of rehabilitating geopolitics as a legitimate mode of study,\textsuperscript{467} or of indicting it as irredeemably complicit in Nazi crimes,\textsuperscript{468} such accounts tend to analyse geopolitik solely in terms of how it was used (or

\textsuperscript{463} Coudenhove-Kalergi made frequent use of this map, including in his first and most famous book, Pan-Europe (1926 [1923]), and as the rear cover of most issues of the Paneuropa journal.

\textsuperscript{464} K. Haushofer, Geopolitik der Pan-Ideen, Weltpolitische Bücherei (Berlin: Zentral-Verlag; 1931), 7-8

\textsuperscript{465} K. Haushofer, Weltpolitik von Heute (Berlin: Verlag und Vertriebs-Gesellschaft Zeitgeschichte; 1935), 95


\textsuperscript{468} This critique was made at the time too- see A. Demangeon, "Géographie politique", Annales de Géographie 41.229 (1932) 22-31; Y.M. Goblet, The Twilight of Treaties, trans. Warre Bradley Wells (London: G. Bell & Sons; 1936), 16-20; I. Bowman, "Geography vs. Geopolitics", Geographical Review 32.4 (1942) 646-658; D. Whittlesey,
abused) to justify Nazi geostrategy. Though I do not wish to diminish Haushofer’s centrality, a nuanced understanding of the role of geopolitics can only be achieved by treating it as a complex and diffuse network of ideas, plugged into wider intellectual and institutional contexts in which academic geography played a significant role.  

Furthermore, it was a body of work marked by multiplicity,

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German Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Farrar and Rinehart; 1942); R. Hartshorne, "Political geography", in Preston E. James and Clarence Fielden Jones (eds.), American geography: inventory and prospect (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press; 1954) 167-225. On the post-WWII fall from favour of geopolitics, see L.W. Hepple, "The revival of geopolitics", Political Geography Quarterly Supplement to 5.4 (1986) S21-S36. More recently, while the name ‘geopolitics’ has been reclaimed, the continuing toxicity of interwar geopolitik has demanded that an arms-length qualifier – most popularly ‘critical’ – be applied to indicate the intellectual breaks being made from this tradition (See, for example, G. Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics (London: Routledge; 1996))

insofar as it was invoked, expressed and interpreted in many different ways.\textsuperscript{470} Thus, I follow Geoffrey Parker in tracing an ‘alternative geopolitics’, in which geopolitical thinking led in other directions than Nazi geostrategy, other even than German expansionist imperialism.\textsuperscript{471} This is not necessarily to cleanse geopolitics of its imperialist or racist reputation, but it is to claim that it is not reducible to these qualities, and moreover than culpability for them ought not to be confined to the rather narrow limits of those who defined themselves as \textit{geopolitikers}.

The intersection of Pan-Europeanism and \textit{geopolitik} can be approached from three distinct perspectives, by which this chapter is organized. First, through a contextual analysis of their shared intellectual heritage, and the cross-pollination of their respective influences. This includes those who are familiar from the typical narrative of \textit{geopolitik}: the geographers Friedrich Ratzel and Halford Mackinder and the political scientist Rudolf Kjellén. Each of these figures offer much more rounded and ambivalent contributions and inspirations than their view through the lens of the Haushofer-Hitler relationship allows; in each case, analysing the role they played in the development of Pan-Europeanism helps to flesh out their significance to interwar geopolitical thought. However, contrary to the impression given by much of today’s geopolitical literature, a geopolitical mode of thinking was not invented from thin air by Ratzel in his 1897 \textit{Politische Geographie}.\textsuperscript{472} Rather, it was

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\item \textsuperscript{471} G. Parker, "Ratzel, the French School and the birth of Alternative Geopolitics", \textit{Political Geography} 19.8 (2000) 957-969
\item \textsuperscript{472} Though this is the dominant impression, it is by no means universal. Other accounts of the birth of geopolitics that look beyond Ratzel, Mackinder and Kjellén include: K.-G. Faber, "Zur Vorgeschichte der Geopolitik. Staat, Nation und Lebensraum im Denken deutscher Geographen vor 1914", in Heinz Dollinger, Horst Gründer, and Alwin Hanschmidt (eds.), \textit{Weltpolitik, Europagedanke, Regionalismus: Festschrift für Heinz Gollwitzer zum 65. Geburtstag am 30. Januar 1982} (Münster: Aschendorff; 1982) 389-406; R. Strausz-Hupé, \textit{Geopolitics: The
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
developed by a range of nineteenth-century political economists and geographers, many of whom advocated for the creation of a *Mitteleuropean* union, and whose work throws yet more light on to the consonance between Pan-European and geopolitical forms of argument.\(^{473}\) While a comprehensive account of the roots of geopolitical thought is beyond the scope of this chapter, a focus on those thinkers who were to prove important to pan-Europeanism and the cause of European federation more generally casts a light on the roles played by the economic integration of Friedrich List, the *Weltpolitik* of Constantin Frantz, and the *Mitteleuropa* of Joseph Partsch and Friedrich Naumann. Lastly, although pan-Germanism is often mentioned in the context of the aggressive German expansionist imperialism of the *geopolitiker*, it is rarely connected up to the wider context of pan-regionalism of which it was a part. In 1951, Hannah Arendt argued in _The Origins of Totalitarianism_ that ‘Nazism and Bolshevism owe more to Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism (respectively) than to any other ideology or political movement’, and that Nazi and Bolshevik geostrategy was directly indebted to that of ‘the pan-movements before and during the first World War’.\(^{474}\) However, these claims have rarely been followed up, let alone pursued for what it may tell us about the consonances of Nazism and Pan-Europeanism.\(^{475}\)

The second perspective on the relationship between geopolitics and pan-Europeanism focuses

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on the direct links between the PEU and the interwar geopolitikers themselves. As we have seen, the most significant connection was that between Coudenhove-Kalergi and Karl Haushofer, the self-appointed leaders of their respective movements. However, these links stretch further, as many geopolitikers either actively supported or engaged with the ideas of the PEU, and many participated in PEU events, including Adolf Grabowsky, Gudmund Hatt and Otto Maull. By discussing the nature of these links, we might temper the tendency to see either Pan-Europeanism or geopolitik as monolithic or uncontested.

The third cut examines the geopolitics of Pan-Europe. That is, the spatial reasoning that lay at the heart of the arguments put forward by the PEU in their propaganda. This may be separated into two distinct categories: a theorisation of the nature and location of the limits of political space and a dynamic, progressivist conception of the scale of politics. In both, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s texts are connected up with the contexts of the geopolitical imaginaries that he invokes. Coudenhove-Kalergi may have been reluctant to cite influences, but his recognition of the role of academic geography in determining the geopolitics of Europe may be judged by his repeated canvassing of the opinion of geographers in surveys, particularly on the question of the borders of Europe. The chapter concludes by asking, given all the consonances and shared elements, how the spatial imaginaries of the PEU differed from those of its contemporaries, and suggesting that while it is rarely thought of in geopolitical terms, the European political geography that the PEU helped to sketch was to prove hugely influential in the decades that followed.

Shared intellectual heritage

Pan-regionalism

One of the few intellectual influences that Coudenhove-Kalergi cited, and the only one acknowledged in the pages of his 1923 Pan-Europe, was that of pan-regionalism. Specifically, Coudenhove-Kalergi
drew on the Austrian pacifist Alfred Fried’s 1910 book *Pan-Amerika*, reproducing Fried’s rather inflated account of the significance of the Pan-American Union, which Coudenhove-Kalergi called ‘the political model for Pan-Europe’s development’. However, he glossed over Fried’s own argument for the creation of a Pan-European Union, instead claiming that Pan-Europeanism ‘began with the appearance of this book [*Pan-Europe*]’. Later, Coudenhove-Kalergi admitted that the first pan-movement he had been exposed to was in fact Pan-Islamism, when the founder of the Pan-Islamic Society of London, Abdullah Al-Mamun Suhrawardy, stayed as a house guest of his father’s at Ronsperg when Coudenhove-Kalergi was a child. He recalled that

‘listening to Suhraworthy [Suhrawardy] …, I learned for the first time the conception of a Pan-movement, of a group of divergent countries and people banding together in common cause to defeat the barriers the world had placed around their existence. From then on I saw world problems through different eyes.’

However, neither Fried nor Suhrawardy had invented the concept of a pan-movement; rather, they, like Coudenhove-Kalergi after them, merely contributed to their vogue in the early twentieth century. Conspicuous by their absence in Coudenhove-Kalergi’s account are the two oldest pan-movements, which had by WWI become indelibly associated with aggressive imperialism: Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism. Since these would have been the immediately obvious reference points for Coudenhove-Kalergi’s readers, their development demands greater attention; moreover, as we shall see, it is intimately associated with the development of geopolitical thinking in general.

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476 Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Pan-Europe*, 74. Coudenhove-Kalergi was in fact criticised at the time for relying too heavily on Fried, with Quincy Wright suggesting in his review of *Pan-Europe* that ‘the author supplement the information he has gained from Alfred H. Fried's *Pan-America* by a dose of F. Garcia Calderon, Manuel Ugarte or Samuel Guy Inman’ (Q. Wright, "Pan-Europe. By Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi", *Political Science Quarterly* 42.4 (1927) 633-636, 634)

477 Fried, *Pan-America*, passim, esp iv-v, 298-299. Coudenhove-Kalergi did acknowledge that ‘Fried, in his work entitled “The Pan-American Union,” asserts that in the year 1914 the existence of a Pan-European Bureau would unquestionably have prevented the outbreak of the World War—which is very likely true.’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Pan-Europe*, 83; the text of Fried’s that he is referring to is unclear). For an excellent analysis of the Fried-Coudenhove-Kalergi relationship, see Sorrels, *Cosmopolitan Outsiders*

478 Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Pan-Europe*, 82n*

The emergence of the ‘pan-region’ as a conceptual category may be traced back to debates around ‘Pan-Slavism’, which first appeared in print in the Slovak philologist Ján Herkel’s 1826 *Elementa Universalis Linguae Slavicae* (*Elements of a Universal Slavonic Language*). As his title suggests, Herkel’s Pan-Slavism was purely literary, and as a programme was limited to the advocacy of a common Slavic alphabet. This movement grew stronger through the 1830s, attracting influential figures (mostly poets and philologists) like Herkel’s fellow Slovaks Pavel Jozef Šafárik, Ján Kollár and Ľudovít Štúr, and the Czech Josef Dobrovský. Influenced by German Romanticism, their support for a wider Slavic identity was tempered by an urge to retain national specificity, and their propositions for orthographic reform made few concessions to include any Russian Cyrillic script. This was perhaps unsurprising given that the brutal Russian suppression of the Polish November uprising in 1830-31 was still relatively fresh in the memory.

Indeed, it was a London-based exile of this uprising, the Polish Count Walerian Krasiński, who was among the first to convert this literary notion into a geopolitical one in his *Panslavism and Germanism*, written in English and hurriedly published to capitalise on the revolutionary unrest of 1848. It was a move he made no attempt to elide:

‘Panslavism … was originally intended only as a literary connexion between all the Slavonic nations. But was it possible that this originally purely intellectual movement, should not assume a political tendency! And was it not a natural consequence, that the different nations of the same race, striving to raise their literary significance, by uniting their separate efforts, should not arrive, by a common process of reasoning, to the idea and desire of acquiring a political importance by uniting their whole race into one powerful empire or confederation, which would insure to the Slavonians a decided preponderance over the affairs of Europe!’

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481 Maxwell, "Walerjan Krasiński’s *Panslavism and Germanism*", 107. Herkel was not in fact the first to make this argument: the Slovene Jernej Kopitar had in 1808 called for Slavs to adopt ‘one and the same alphabet, one and the same orthography!’ (Maxwell, "Walerjan Krasiński’s *Panslavism and Germanism*", 107; quoting B.J. Kopitar, *Grammatik der slavischen Sprache in Krain, Kärten und Steyermark* (Ljubljana: Wilhelm Heinrich Korn; 1808), iv,xi,xx-xxi)


483 Krasiński, *Panslavism and Germanism*, 111-112 Krasiński was writing in English.
Krasinski, whose ultimate goal was the restoration of Poland, was caught between the celebration of Pan-Slavic unity and the denunciation of German oppression, of whom he demanded: ‘how will you be able to contend with the united Slavonic race with whom your press and your politicians so wantonly provoke a war of race against race?’ Specifically, the provocation that loomed largest in Krasinski’s mind was the 1848 Frankfurt Assembly, which had sought to include Bohemia as an integral part of the Großdeutsche Lösung (Greater German Solution) to the formation of a new German state; it was in response to this Assembly too that the Czech nationalist historian (and close friend of Dobrovský) František Palacky convened the first Pan-Slav Congress in Prague from 2nd to 12th June 1848. One notable attendee at this conference was the Russian anarchist Mikhail Bakunin, who shortly afterwards published his Appeal to the Slavs (1848) in which he ‘rejected the absurd claims of the Frankfurt [parliament], which has now become the laughing-stock of Europe, which had wanted to make Germans of us all’, and advocated for a ‘vast democratic State’ for the Slav peoples as a first step towards ‘as the last result, the Universal Federation of European Republics’.

The need for such a solution was only confirmed when the young Austrian emperor, Franz Joseph I, proceeded to ignore the demands of the Slavic national councils, thus ending the more
moderate aspirations of ‘Austro-slavism’. Instead, Pan-Slavists like Ľudovít Štúr began looking to Russia for geopolitical patronage, conceiving it as the power that could support a sovereign ‘Pan-Slavic Union’.

The publication of Štúr’s *Slavdom and the world of the future* (translated into Russian) in time for the 1867 2nd Pan-Slav Congress in Moscow, at which specially printed copies of Štúr’s book were distributed, ‘broke the ice’ for the idea of a Russian-led Pan-Slavic Union at a time when Russia was treating foreign policy cautiously following its diplomatic isolation and defeat in the Crimean War. Once the Slovak Štúr had let this genie out of the bottle, Russian authors were able to follow, and the following years saw hugely influential works by the Russians Nikolai Danilevsky (*Russia and Europe: an Inquiry into the Cultural and Political Relations of the Slavic to the Germano-Latin World*, 1869) and Rostislav Fadeyev (*Opinion on the Eastern question*, 1870), each of which helped to push Pan-Slavism firmly into the orbit of Russian imperialism.

In circular fashion, the popularity of Pan-Slavism prompted the revolutionary movement for the formation of a unified German state to start being called ‘Pan-German’, its Greek stem translated into German to form the calque ‘Alldeutsch’. Pan-Germanism’s debt to German Romanticism was

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490 Petrovich, “Ľudovít Štúr and Russian Panslavism”, 2

491 Indeed, Pan-Slavism had previously been entirely absent from Russia: as Petrovich writes, ‘Panslavism as a public movement did not assert itself in Russia until the Crimean War and the beginning of Alexander II’s reign in 1855’ (M.B. Petrovich, *The Emergence of Russian Panslavism, 1856-1870* (New York: Columbia University Press; 1956), 3; quoted in Kohn, “The Impact of Pan-Slavism on Central Europe”, 323n2). Danilevsky’s *Russia and Europe* was published first (in 1869) as a series of articles in the magazine *Zaria [Dawn]*, and then (first in 1871) as a book (Rossiia i Europa: uzgliad na kul’turnyiia i politicheskiia otmoshenia slavianskago mira k germano-romanskому, St Petersburg). For English translations, see R.A. Fadeyev, *Opinion on the Eastern Question*, trans. Thomas Mitchell (London: Edward Stanford; 1871); N.I. Danilevskii, *Russia and Europe: the Slavic world’s political and cultural relations with the Germanic-Roman West*, trans. Stephen M. Woodburn (Bloomington, IN: Slavica; 2013)

492 This is not to say that there was not independent precedent for the term *alldutsch*. Its coining was variously attributed to the Geneva schoolmaster and Pan-German supporter August Diedrichs (date not specified; see W.O.
even more clearly drawn, particularly to Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s 1806 Reden an die deutsche Nation, in which he had spoken of a (superior) German nation [Nation] or people [Volk] defined both by their common language, and by their Teutonic descent.\footnote{A. Abizadeh, "Was Fichte an ethnic nationalist? On cultural nationalism and its double", History of Political Thought 26.2 (2005) 334-359} Any ambiguity over the connection of linguistics, ethnography and race was glossed in the mid-century scientific racism of Arthur de Gobineau, who combined these elements in the idea of an Aryan master race, which he argued was the governing factor that lay behind human history.\footnote{A.d. Gobineau, Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines, 4 vols. (Paris: Librairie de Firmin Didot frères; 1853-1855)} However, in aspiring to unify the Teutonic peoples in a single state, Pan-Germanism was simply a variant of German nationalism. It was only after Otto von Bismarck’s 1871 victory in the Franco-Prussian War had ensured that his Prussian-based unification (that is, the Kleindeutsche Lösung or Lesser German Solution) won out, that Pan-Germanism acquired its more specific meaning as an umbrella term for those who had argued for a Großeutsche Lösung, and who still wished to forge this ‘lost’ German unity.\footnote{H. Kohn, "Pan-Movements", in Edwin R.A. Seligman and Alvin Johnson (eds.), Encyclopaedia of the social sciences, XV vols., vol. XI (New York: Macmillan; 1933) 544-554, 547-548} The leading voice in pushing this agenda (until his death in 1891) was that of the German orientalist Paul de Lagarde, who wrote widely and prolifically on the topic. His programme included the creation of a national religion, German colonisation of (Slavic) land to the East (the Drang nach Osten), and a necessarily imminent war to secure this land; these arguments were explicitly anti-Russian and violently anti-Semitic.\footnote{Masaryk called Lagarde the ‘leading philosophical and theological representative’ of Pan-Germanism. (Masaryk, New Europe, 4). See A.G. Whiteside, The Socialism of Fools: Georg Ritter von Schönerer and Austrian Pan-Germanism (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press; 1975), 55-56}
In Germany, this movement was formalised with Ernst Hasse’s 1891 establishment of the *Allgemeiner Deutscher Verband* (General German League), from 1894 renamed the *Alldeutscher Verband* (Pan-German League). This organization formed an effective tool to systematise, publicise and lobby for a nationalist, expansionist-imperialist foreign policy informed by scientific racism and anti-Semitism; in concrete terms, their demand was the expansion of the Bismarckian state to encompass all extant German-speaking lands, as well as the pursuit of overseas colonies to create new German lands.\(^{497}\) However, in Austria Pan-Germanism acquired a more radical edge, as under the influence of Georg Ritter von Schönzerer it emphasised not just a greater Germany, but the destruction of Austria-Hungary. Schönzerer shared Lagarde’s virulent anti-Semitism,\(^{498}\) and added to it an antipathy to political Catholicism and Habsburg parliamentarianism, neither of which were seen as sufficiently connected to the nation, and a willingness to embrace violence, chaos and authoritarianism. He aspired not just to the unity of German peoples, but to the ethnic domination of the ‘lesser’ nations of the Habsburg Empire.\(^{499}\) Though Schönzerer was displaced as the voice of German nationalism in Vienna by his political rival Karl Lueger, who served as mayor of Vienna from 1897 to 1910, Lueger married Schönzerer’s anti-Semitic rhetoric to an appeal for Catholic political unity. Such was the extremist Pan-Germanism rife in *fin de siècle* Vienna, the milieu in which both Adolf Hitler (who acknowledged the influence of Lagarde, Schönzerer and Lueger in *Mein Kampf*)\(^{500}\) and Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi would form their respective politics. Coudenhove-Kalergi would

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\(^{497}\) On Pan-Germanism in Germany, see R. Chickering, *We Men Who Feel Most German: A Cultural Study of the Pan-German League, 1886-1914* (Boston: George Allen & Unwin; 1984)

\(^{498}\) It is worth noting in passing Arendt’s thesis that Pan-Germanism’s embrace of anti-Semitism was integral to its nature: for Arendt, the Pan-Germans’ ‘furious interest in the so-called “suprastate powers” (*überstaatliche Mächte*)—i.e., the Jesuits, the Jews, and the Freemasons—did not spring from nation or state worship but, on the contrary, from envy and the desire also to become a “suprastate power”.’ (Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, 258; citing E. Ludendorff, *Die überstaatliche Mächte im letzten Jahre des Weltkrieges* (Leipzig: Th. Weicher; 1927))

\(^{499}\) On Pan-Germanism in Austria, see Whiteside, *Socialism of Fools*

\(^{500}\) See also the Nazi propaganda film *Wien 1910* (dir. E.W. Emo; 1943), which portrayed Schönzerer and Lueger as, respectively, the ideological and demagogic forebears of National Socialism. See R. Geehr, J. Heineman, and G. Herman, "*Wien 1910: An Example of Nazi Anti-Semitism*", *Film & History: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Film and Television Studies* 15.3 (1985) 50-64
later describe Vienna in these years as ‘definitely international only at its top and at its base’, while the middle classes were swept up in a mania of aggressive nationalism and Pan-Germanism.\(^{501}\)

However, the imperialist and racist ethno-centrism that characterised Pan-Germanism, and which Pan-Slavism increasingly tended towards, was not necessarily copied by other Pan-movements, which borrowed the pan-prefix, but tied it to either civic-minded, federal enterprises, or else more diffuse projects based upon a cause rather than a prospective state. Rather, the common denominator was an aspiration to up-scale politics to the level of the continent. First among these movements to adopt the pan-regional label was the Pan-American movement, whose supporters were keen to retroactively claim Simon Bolívar’s attempts to unite the New World as *América*,\(^{502}\) culminating in the 1826 Congress of Panama, as the birth of Pan-Americanism. While Bolívar did not use this term,\(^{503}\) it is easy to see how his continentalist view chimed with later activists: in his famous *Carta de Jamaica*, Bolívar had written:

‘Would to God that some day we might enjoy the happiness of having there an august Congress of representatives of the republics, kingdoms and empires of America to deal with the high interests of peace and of war with the nations of the other three parts of the world’\(^{504}\)

However, this sentiment only began to appear under the moniker of Pan-Americanism in the late 1880s,\(^{505}\) as the US Secretary of State James G. Blaine pushed for, and eventually in 1889-90 convened, the First International Conference of American States, widely known in the media of the

\(^{503}\) Indeed Bastert, dissenting from the popular wisdom that Bolívar was the progenitor of Pan-Americanism, argues that ‘Bolivar’s “grand idea” [was] at best a shadowy rather than a substantial expression of latter-day Pan Americanism’ (R.H. Bastert, "A New Approach to the Origins of Blaine's Pan American Policy", *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 39.3 (1959) 375-412, 377)
\(^{505}\) The term first appeared in 1879 (*The Weekly Kansas Chief*, "Some Fizzles, Ancient and Modern" (XXIII; Troy, KS 31 July 1879), 1), but was sparsely used until the latter half of 1889, when its usage in the popular press exploded.
time as the First Pan-American Congress. Just as the growth of Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism had been fuelled by mutual suspicion, so Pan-Americanism was to the spectre of Europeanism. Certainly, one of Blaine’s primary goals was to head off the possibility of European intervention to quell unrest in South America. Likewise, the prospect of a Pan-American commercial and diplomatic union was met with concern in Europe. Nevertheless, while ‘Europe’ as a geopolitical entity remained a spectre, Pan-America acquired from 1890 a permanent secretariat based in Washington DC, and from 1910 a purpose-built, million-dollar headquarters in that city for the newly renamed ‘Pan American Union’. The notion had even gathered enough goodwill to be used as the theme for a 1901 World’s Fair, the ‘Pan-American Exposition’ held in Buffalo, NY, which would earn infamy as the event at which President William McKinley was assassinated. As these locations suggest, although Pan-American sentiment was avowedly egalitarian among all the states of the Americas, in practice it tacitly accepted US hegemony.

Perhaps encouraged by the pace of developments, perhaps by wishful thinking, and perhaps from a journalist’s zeal for exaggeration in the name of publicity, in 1910 the Austrian pacifist Alfred Fried published *Pan-Amerika*, an account of the Pan-American Union that dramatically over-stated

506 Wilgus, "James G. Blaine and the Pan American Movement", passim
507 Concern which travelled back to the US, with Harper’s Weekly reporting: ‘the assembly has been regarded with much more interest and even curious anticipation in Europe than in this country. It seems to be the European apprehension that there will be a commercial Union of the [//] North and South American states which will practically exclude other countries.’ (Harper’s Weekly, 12 October 1889; quoted in Wilgus, "James G. Blaine and the Pan American Movement", 693-694)
509 Indeed, there had been a series of multinational conferences between 1824 and 1889 to which the US was not invited; despite being scarcely less effective than Bolivar’s 1824 Congress (to which the US was invited), they were mostly omitted from the Pan-American mythology.
its significance and power. Fried came from the same Viennese milieu, though as a Jewish pacifist he occupied the opposite end of the political spectrum to the Pan-Germanists. Rather, his was the Vienna of Bertha von Suttner, with whom he collaborated closely, and who had in 1891 founded the ‘Society for the Defense against Anti-Semitism’ (Verein zur Abwehr des Antisemitismus). Fried was a committed internationalist, who was convinced that war could not simply be outlawed, as it was but ‘the symptom of a condition, that of international anarchy’. Therefore, he reasoned, ‘If we wish to substitute for war the settlement of disputes by justice, we must first substitute for the condition of international anarchy a condition of international order’. Naturally, it was the potential implications of a Pan-American Union upon the fabric of the international political system that Fried chose to dwell on, and that in 1923 Coudenhove-Kalergi reproduced. Summarising the story of its development from Bolívar onwards, Coudenhove-Kalergi optimistically concluded: ‘These practical successes of the Pan-American movement are supplemented by the ideal values which it releases. Under its influence a Pan-American consciousness, a Pan-American sense of solidarity, a Pan-American public opinion, have been formed.’

While Pan-Slavism, Pan-Germanism and Pan-Americanism each promoted the regional

510 On Fried, see Sorrels, *Cosmopolitan Outsiders*. Fried wasn’t the only one to offer such an analysis- see also E. Deckert, "Die Nordamerikanische Union als Weltmacht. (Ein Vortrag.)", Geographische Zeitschrift 6.8 (1900) 417-434.

511 Though he would spend much of his career in Germany.

512 On Suttner, see for example R.R. Laurence, "Bertha von Suttner and the Peace Movement in Austria to World War I", Austrian History Yearbook 23 (1992) 181-201. For an overt attempt to secure Suttner’s place in the history of European integration, see European Economic and Social Committee (ed.), *Bertha von Suttner* (Brussels: European Economic and Social Committee; 2006).


515 Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Pan-Europe*, 80. Reviewing *Pan-Europe*, Quincy Wright criticised Coudenhove-Kalergi’s exaggeration of Pan-Americanism, cuttingly suggesting that ‘the author supplement the information he has gained from Alfred H. Fried’s *Pan-America* by a dose of F. Garcia Calderon, Manuel Ugarte or Samuel Guy Inman’ (Wright, "Pan-Europe").

516 One might add to this the Japan-centric Pan-Asianism, often traced back to the 1880 founding of the Kôakai organisation (S. Saaler and C.W.A. Szpilman, "Introduction: The Emergence of Pan-Asianism as an Ideal of Asian Identity and Solidarity, 1850–2008", in Sven Saaler and Christopher W.A. Szpilman (eds.), *Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History*, vol. II: 1920–Present (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield; 2011); V. Tikhonov, "Korea’s
hegemony of an established imperial power, others used the pan-moniker to oppose these powers.
The first of these began in the 1880s as local resistance to European imperialism in Muslim lands started to adopt the banner of Pan-Islamism, primarily under the guidance of the movement’s prophet and philosopher Jamāl ad-Dīn al-Afghānī. Together with the Egyptian Islamic jurist Muhammed Abduh, al-Afghānī founded the anti-British Arabic newspaper al-‘Urwat al-Wuthqa [‘The Indissoluble Link’] in 1884 in Paris, with the purposes of campaigning for ‘the unity of all Muslim peoples and states against Western aggression and domination’. By al-Afghānī’s death in 1897, Pan-Islamic centres had been established as far afield as Java, Tunis and Shanghai. Indeed, it was one of his followers, Abdullah Al-Mamun Suhrawardy, who in 1903 – on the back on a six-month stay at the Ronsperg estate of Heinrich Coudenhove-Kalergi – founded the Pan-Islamic Society of London, and established the Society’s journal, entitled simply Pan-Islam.

However, Pan-Islamism’s monopoly on Muslim allegiance was challenged by a swelling Pan-Turkist movement, which called instead for the political union of Russian, Ottoman and Central Asian Turks, explicitly rejecting Pan-Islamism on the contradictory grounds that Pan-Turkism was both more modern (in that it was more tied to the idea of the ‘nation’) and more ancient (in that Turkic peoples pre-dated the founding of Islam). Pan-Turkism was both informed by and reacted against

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517 G. Yo.ung, "Pan-Islamism", in Edwin R.A. Seligman and Alvin Johnson (eds.), Encyclopaedia of the social sciences, XV vols., vol. XI (New York: Macmillan; 1933) 542-544, 542. Regarding the various claims upon the first usage of the term Pan-Islamism, Dwight Lee concluded that ‘The word Pan-Islamism in its various forms is apparently of European coinage and was probably adopted in imitation of Pan-Slavism, which had become current in the 1870s’ (D.E. Lee, "The Origins of Pan-Islamism", The American Historical Review 47.2 (1942) 278-287, 280).

518 Snyder, Macro-nationalisms, 135

519 Young, "Pan-Islamism", 542. Suhrawardy was credited by M.H. Kidwai as the first to use the term ‘Pan-Islamism’ ‘in its true and correct sense’ (M.H. Kidwai, Pan-Islamism (London: Lusac & Co.; 1908), 1).


521 C.f. Snyder, Macro-nationalisms, 121; Kohn, "Pan-Movements", 548. This ideological conflict also played into domestic Ottoman politics: the last Ottoman sultan, Abdul Hamid II, was a committed Pan-Islamist, while the
Russian Pan-Slavism, which had itself been exhibiting rising anti-Turkism. Like Pan-Islam, it too was embedded in the imperial power in significant ways, since it had been founded in Russia by the Crimean Tatar political activist Ismail Bey Gaspıralı, and the journal he edited, the *Tercüman*, was based in the Crimean Tatar city of Bahçesaray and had to be published alongside a Russian translation. Simultaneously, others in the Islamic world promoted the cause of Pan-Turanism (which itself varied from being synonymous with Pan-Turkism, to encompassing Finns, Hungarians and Japanese), Pan-Arabism and Pan-Africanism, as with other pan-movements, the rivalry tended to be rooted in academic debates about how the group in question was to be defined, which all too often depended on its purported racial-linguistic origins. This anti-colonial mirroring of colonial ideology extended to the spatial terms being invoked, for instance in the Cambridge-based Ottoman Pan-Islamist Halil Hadid’s 1907 *The Crescent versus the Cross*, which described a global ‘encirclement’ of the Islamic world by the Christian world. This, of course, was a product as much of the embedding of key anti-colonial figures within imperial powers as it was of the way that imperialism itself created the very networks that gave oxygen to anti-colonial movements; while this has been well studied in relation to national liberation movements, it is equally true of anti-colonial

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524 In the former camp was the Turkish sociologist and political activist Ziya Gökalp, while in the latter camp were those who were more faithful to the Finnish ethnologist Matthias Alexander Castrén’s theory of a common ‘Turanian’ origin of the so-called Ural-Altaic languages (see Younis, "United by blood", 500n4)
525 Kohn, "Pan-Movements", 548-549
527 A notable exception was the Indian barrister Mushir Hosain Kidwai, who argued for Pan-Islamism based precisely on Islam’s lack of colour prejudice (Kidwai, *Pan-Islamism*, 18-19)
By the early twentieth century, pan-regional movements were in vogue, such that the American writer Sinclair Kennedy in 1914 recast British imperialism in terms of the unity of English-speaking peoples (including the US), whom he called The Pan-Angles.\textsuperscript{530} Kennedy’s overly keen interest in race, as well as his apocalyptic tone – arguing that ‘no co-operation short of unity of government will form an effective means of safeguarding the Pan-Angle Civilization’\textsuperscript{531} – render him little more than a caricature of more significant movements elsewhere. Also in 1914, the German geographer Emil Deckert, despairing at the blood being shed in the name of the nationality principle, developed a scheme whereby Europe be reorganised into three parts, in order to reflect the ‘wider tribal consciousness’ represented by the Pan-Latin, Pan-Slav and Pan-Teutonic factions.\textsuperscript{532} The existence of such pan-regionalist claims as Kennedy’s and Deckert’s flag up the important fact that far from having invented the idea of a pan-movement, or even borrowing it from Fried, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s ‘Pan-Europe’ was working within a geopolitical genre; furthermore, it was a genre freighted with an extraordinary amount of ideological baggage. Pan-movements were at best intimately tied to scientific racism, at worst to the most virulent forms of anti-Semitism. They were at best dependent on an ideal that tacitly collapsed state, ethnicity, race and language into a unitary whole; at worst complicit in aggressively expansionist and exclusionary imperialism. Coudenhove-Kalergi knew this well, and often portrayed WWI in terms of an inevitable clash between the expansionist forces of Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism.\textsuperscript{533} By contrast, while Coudenhove-Kalergi would not exactly exclude race and imperialism from Pan-Europeanism, he recoiled from either overt racism or war-

\textsuperscript{529} See S. Alavi, \textit{Muslim Cosmopolitanism in the Age of Empire} (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 2015); M. Goebel, “‘The Capital of the Men without a Country’: Migrants and Anticolonialism in Interwar Paris”, \textit{American Historical Review} 121.5 (2016) 1444-1467

\textsuperscript{530} S. Kennedy, \textit{The Pan-Angles: A Consideration of the Federation of the Seven English-Speaking Nations} (New York: Longmans, Green and Co.; 1914)

\textsuperscript{531} Kennedy, \textit{The Pan-Angles}, 227

\textsuperscript{532} E. Deckert, \textit{Panlatinismus, Panslawismus und Panteutonisimus in ihrer Bedeutung für die politische Weltlage. Ein Beitrag zur europäischen Staatenkunde} (Frankfurt a.M.: Heinrich Keller; 1914), 4

\textsuperscript{533} Coudenhove-Kalergi, \textit{Crusade for Pan-Europe}, 54
mongering, instead presenting Pan-Europe as a voluntary, defensive alliance. So why did he choose to work within this genre?

First and foremost, pan-regionalism to Coudenhove-Kalergi suggested a territoriality of politics. While this may seem self-evident today, at a time when the orthodox interpretation of internationalism was the League’s determinedly deterritorial universalism, the notion of supranational territoriality needed a name. We see this in the very first iteration of his theories, in his 1922 article in the *Neue Freie Presse*, in which he embraced the terminology whole-heartedly, and branded the other five political world-regions [*Weltteile*] Pan-America, Pan-Britain, Pan-Russia and Pan-Mongolia.534 (By the following year, he had begun referring to the latter three regions using the less idiosyncratic terms British Empire, Russian Empire and East Asia.)535 While it was true that Pangermanism and Panslavism had merely amplified the tensions of nationalism by couching them in the terms of race, the examples that Coudenhove-Kalergi chose to cite were evidence that pan-regionalism was not necessarily racial-national: both Fried’s Pan-Americanism and Suhrawardy’s Pan-Islamism were explicitly civic, non-national constructions. In Coudenhove-Kalergi’s eyes, what connected pan-regionalisms was not any similarity in the causes they promoted, but rather a shared a way of thinking and talking about the spatiality of politics. In order to account for this fundamental commonality, I will now take a step back, and place these pan-movements in their rightful context, as part and parcel of the development of the language and conceptual arsenal of geopolitics.

**Mitteleuropa, Weltpolitik, Metapolitik**

The efforts to campaign for pan-regions are inseparable from the intellectual history of the various attempts made to theorise the spatiality of international politics, theoretical developments that would

535 See, for example, Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Paneuropa*, 20-23
climax in the ‘invention’ of geopolitics at the beginning of the twentieth century. This proto-
geopolitical literature was primarily Germanic, and despite a consistent interest in politics that 
transcended the state, was largely distinct from (and even hostile to) the nineteenth-century Anglo-
French free-tradist internationalism and pacifist plans for a United States of Europe. While 
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s explicit invocation of the pan- 
moniker flagged up the influence of 
panregionalism, the influence of Germanic proto-
geopolitical theory remained for the most part 
implicit in his work, although no less obvious to his readers. In order to understand the subtleties of 
how Coudenhove-Kalergi made his argument, we must first understand the intellectual context within 
which he did so: which concepts he adopted, which he adapted, and which he kicked against. By 
doing so, we can fulfil three broad goals. First, we can recover the complexity of a literature that is 
too often seen only through the lens of the interwar German nationalists that invoked it for their own 
ends. Second, we can better understand exactly what was novel about Pan-Europe and what was 
borrowed. And third, we can begin to get a sense of the points of difference and commality between 
geopolitical and Pan-European schools of thought.

One of the first and most influential writers to combine the idealist abstractions of political 
economy with a ‘scientific’ appreciation of space and geography was the German economic theorist 
and publicist Friedrich List. Confronted by the byzantine mess of tariffs between the German states 
in the wake of the 1806 dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire, List initially played a leading role in 
campaigning for, in the words of the 1819 petition he presented to the Federal Assembly, the ‘removal 
of all custom-duties and tolls in the interior of Germany, and the establishment of a universal German 
system founded on the principle of retaliation against foreign states’.536 During a spell abroad in the 
US in the 1820s he developed his argument further, advocating protectionism there. In the Outlines 
of American Political Economy (1827), List attacked Adam Smith’s notion of the beneficial effects

536 F. List, "Petition on behalf of the Handelsverein to the Federal Assembly, 1819", in Margaret E. Hirst (ed.), Life of 
Friedrich List and Selections from his Writings, trans. Margaret E. Hirst (London: Smith, Elder & Co.; 1909) 137-
144, 137

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of free trade for describing ‘a more perfect but entirely imaginary state of the human race’ that wilfully ignored the question of what was in the national interest; he mocked Smith (as Herder had mocked the French *philosophes* half a century prior) for providing not a political economy, but a *cosmopolitical* economy.\(^{537}\) Having returned to Germany, List drew upon his first-hand experiences in America in his magnum opus, *Das nationale System der politischen Oekonomie* (‘National System of Political Economy’, 1841), in which he expounded ‘a system which … is not founded on bottomless cosmopolitanism, but on the nature of things, on the lessons of history, and on the requirements of the nations’.\(^{538}\) List argued that not only was the cosmopolitan case for free trade premised upon a perpetually peaceful universal federation in the vein of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, it also disguised the fact that free trade would only serve to benefit the most developed economy, that of Britain.\(^{539}\) Furthermore, it was not free, since as the dominant maritime power, Britain in fact controlled trade. Once the nations of the world had attained a similar degree of industry, List reasoned, a truly free trade might well bring mutual benefit; until that day, it constituted a ‘chimerical cosmopolitanism’ that actually served British interests.\(^{540}\)

List’s compromise between the theory of free trade and the practice of having to look after the national interest was a German Customs Union (*deutsche Handels-Union*), which would act as a unified economic unit. Although he spoke in terms of the nation, he did not mean by this the

\(^{537}\) F. List, *Outlines of American Political Economy, in a series of letters addressed by Friedrich List to Charles J. Ingersoll, To which is added the celebrated letters of Mr. Jefferson to Benjamin Austin, and of Mr. Madison to the Editors of the Lynchburg Virginian* (Philadelphia: Samuel Parker; 1827), 7, 8. It is worth noting that the version of Adam Smith that List critiqued was highly caricatured. Herder had in 1774 ironically described a cosmopolitan perpetual peace in which national character and tradition had been erased in favour of a passionless, rational society in which everyone spoke French; see Herder, *Yet Another Philosophy of History*, 209


exclusionary ethnic Volk of Fichte, and the Union he envisaged stretched from Holland and Belgium to Switzerland and the Black Sea. It was this that would see List universally proclaimed as the earliest prophet of Mitteleuropa by a later generation. What is important for present purposes is that List’s proposed union brought together three key geographical arguments. First, that a disunited Germany upset the European balance of power: ‘Nothing,’ List wrote, ‘so greatly impedes a closer union of the continent of Europe as the fact that the centre of it still never takes the position for which it is naturally fitted. Instead of being a mediator between the east and the west of that continent, … for which it is qualified by its geographical position, … this central part of Europe constitutes at present the apple of discord for which the east and the west contend.’ Second, building on Montesquieu’s theory that the environment was a key influence upon human development, List inserted real-world geography back into Smith’s abstract globe, differentiating between the ‘countries of the temperate zone’ which were ‘especially fit for the development of manufacturing industry’ and the ‘countries of the torrid zone’ which possessed ‘the natural monopoly of many precious commodities which the inhabitants of temperate climates greatly prize’. This international division of labour split the world into core and periphery areas, or rather, into spheres of influence since the US, Britain and France each had their ‘torrid’ colonies or hinterlands. Germany’s natural hinterland, List argued, was south-eastern Europe; this was where German emigration ought to be directed.

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541 ‘If Germany, with her sea-coast, with Holland, Belgium and Switzerland, would form a strong commercial and political union, … Germany might guarantee a long peace to Europe, and at the same time form the centre of a durable continental alliance [Continentalallianz].’ (List, National System of Political Economy, 480)

542 Meyer, Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action, 11

543 List, National System of Political Economy, New [1885/1904] edn., 332


545 List, National System of Political Economy, 75

546 ‘We have our backwoods as well as the Americans, the lands of the Lower Danube and the Black Sea, all of Turkey, the entire Southeast beyond Hungary is our hinterland.’ (F. List, "Die Ackerverfassung, die Zwergwirtschaft und die Auswanderung [1842]", in Edgar Salin, Artur Sommer, and Otto Stühler (eds.), Friedrich List. Schriften, Reden, Briefe, X vols., vol. V: Aufsätze und Abhandlungen aus den Jahren 1831-1844 (Berlin: Verlag von Reimar Hobbing; 1928) 418-547, 502 (c.f. 497-547); quoted in & translated by Meyer, Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action, 13)
Third, and most groundbreaking, having been impressed by (and himself invested in) the railroad during his spell in the US, he argued that the economic integration of the proposed German Customs Union relied upon the construction of railroad infrastructure (at the time, Germany had none).\footnote{List said: ‘In the midst of the wild Blue Mountain country [in Pennsylvania] I dreamt of a German railway system. It was evident to me that only through such means could the Commercial Union attain full efficiency.’ (F. List, Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Ludwig Häusser, III vols., vol. I: Friedrich List's Leben. Aus seinem Nachlasse (Stuttgart & Tübingen: J.G. Cotta'sche Verlag; 1850), 165, quoted in & translated by M.E. Hirst, Life of Friedrich List and Selections from his Writings (London: Smith, Elder & Co.; 1909), 58). See F. List, Ueber ein sächsisches Eisenbahn-System als Grundlage eines allgemeinen deutschen Eisenbahn-Systemes, und insbesondere über die Anlegung einer Eisenbahn von Leipzig nach Dresden (Leipzig: A.G. Liebeskind; 1833) (‘Thoughts on a Railway System for Saxony, as the Foundation of a System for the whole of Germany, and in particular on the building of a Line from Leipzig to Dresden’).
}

Commerce was the lifeblood of the nation, and the railroad made commerce more efficient. Indeed, List was one of the first to imagine a railway network as a network: that is, as a life-giving circulatory system for the nation (see fig. 17). In this way, List attached the eighteenth-century physiocrats’ celebration of the circulation of trade to a new technological driver, albeit while at the same time insisting on political limits within which such a system could work. Precisely this formula, supported by a very similar strategy of simultaneously campaigning in the press and via letters, pamphlets and petitions to prominent political figures, would later be adopted by Coudenhove-Kalergi.\footnote{This point is made by Sträth, who writes that ‘In those political entretiens to promote his ideas he [List] was the predecessor of later entrepreneurs for European economic cooperation such as Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi and Jean Monnet’ (B. Sträth, "Mitteleuropa: From List to Naumann", European Journal of Social Theory 11.2 (2008) 171–183, 178).
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In the 1850s and 1860s, a variety of schemes for a Central European customs union, or expansion of the German Zollverein, were proposed, primarily from Austrian-affiliated supporters of a \textit{Großdeutsche Lösung} who sought to reconcile German unification with the ethno-national complexity of the Austrian Empire (and beyond). From 1849 to 1859, the Austrian Karl Ludwig von Bruck published a series of pamphlets arguing for an enlarged customs union that would include, and thereby preserve, the Austrian Empire.\footnote{See Meyer, Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action, 16-18 Von Bruck was rediscovered during WWI with the publication of R. Charmatz, Minister Freiherr von Bruck, der Vorkämpfer Mitteleuropas; sein lebensgang und seine denkschriften (Leipzig: S. Hirzel; 1916)} Similarly, two German political economists, each later to

\footnotetext[548]{This point is made by Sträth, who writes that ‘In those political entretiens to promote his ideas he [List] was the predecessor of later entrepreneurs for European economic cooperation such as Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi and Jean Monnet’ (B. Sträth, "Mitteleuropa: From List to Naumann", European Journal of Social Theory 11.2 (2008) 171–183, 178).
\footnotetext[549]{See Meyer, Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action, 16-18 Von Bruck was rediscovered during WWI with the publication of R. Charmatz, Minister Freiherr von Bruck, der Vorkämpfer Mitteleuropas; sein lebensgang und seine denkschriften (Leipzig: S. Hirzel; 1916).}
gain fame as sociologists, moved to Vienna and promoted großdeutsch political projects: Lorenz von Stein and Albert Schäffle. While Stein’s logic leaned on balance-of-power arguments that emphasised the ‘geographical form of the European body’, and the significance of the centrality of Mitteleuropa.
as a natural mediator between Western and Eastern Europe,\textsuperscript{550} Schäßle’s was a more Manichean vision in which a Central Europe that included France and was allied to Britain was necessary in order to counter the growing politico-economic threat of Russia.\textsuperscript{551} These proposals for a \textit{Mitteleuropean} union, whether political or economic, were reactionary in their rejection of nationality as the defining principle of politics – Schäßle, for instance, viewed \textit{kleindeutsch} liberal-nationalism as ‘an instrument for French hegemony in Europe’\textsuperscript{552} – but there was never any doubt that at heart, \textit{Mitteleuropa} was Germanic. It was also highly geographical: as Hans-Dietrich Schultz and Wolfgang Natter have noted, in these projects ‘Seas, coastlines, river networks, mouth areas, mountains and plains were ascribed a role legitimising territorial divisions and zones of influence, permitting the differentiation between nations with “normal” and “crippled” bodies’.\textsuperscript{553} Stein, for example, explained that Europe’s shape was unique since on other continents river basins ran parallel, thus limiting the opportunities for trade to coastal ports at the mouth of the river, while territories not blessed with rivers or sea-coast were destined to stagnate in perpetuity.\textsuperscript{554} Efforts to divide Europe into homogeneous natural regions were balanced by efforts to explain Europe’s (or Germany’s) superiority through its diversity of natural landscapes.

Despite this clear geographical emphasis, most academic geographers preferred to leave the matter of state systems to political economists.\textsuperscript{555} Nevertheless, three figures with a geographical background, each of whom spent significant periods in the US, did engage with these questions in the


\textsuperscript{551} R.J. Gentry, “Organic Social Thought and Mitteleuropa: Albert Schäßle’s Response to Modernization in Central Europe”, \textit{Austrian History Yearbook} 17 (1981) 57-79; Meyer, \textit{Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action}, 25

\textsuperscript{552} Gentry, "Organic Social Thought and Mitteleuropa", 66

\textsuperscript{553} Schultz and Natter, "Imagining Mitteleuropa", 278

\textsuperscript{554} Stein, \textit{Oesterreich und der Frieden}, 6

\textsuperscript{555} While the nineteenth-century academic geography did include a human element, this was generally limited to speaking in general terms of the interactions of man and nature, occasionally of ‘nations’, but very rarely of political formations. For an influential work than exemplifies this approach, see Ritter’s 1852 \textit{Einleitung zur allgemeinen vergleichenden geographie}, translated as C. Ritter, \textit{Geographical Studies by the late Professor Carl Ritter of Berlin}, trans. William Leonhard Gage (Boston: Gould and Lincoln; 1863)
second half of the nineteenth century. First, Johann Georg Kohl, a pioneering transportation and urban geographer, who before his own American sojourn had argued for the unity of the Danube basin as the key to a healthy and productive German territory, though this argument was made in the context of a warning of a Russian-Turkish plot to seize the Danube delta, and thereby ‘cut the throat’ of this territorial unity.556 Significantly, Kohl used ‘Mitteleuropa’ in a political sense to describe ‘the entirety of all German and Austrian states along with their smaller neighbouring states of Switzerland, Belgium, Holland, and Denmark’, whereas the physical region whose borders were admittedly vague he termed ‘Central Europe’.557 Second, Julius Fröbel, a German geologist and political activist who was one of the leaders of the democrats during the 1848 revolutions, and a member of the Frankfurt Parliament. Fröbel argued that ‘the circumstances of our era dictate the creation of a confederation comprising all Germany, Poland, and Hungary plus the South Slav and Wallachian areas, united under a constitution similar to that of the United States, with Vienna as its federal capital’.558 After the dissolution of the Parliament in 1849, he went in exile to the US, before returning to Germany in 1857 and on to Vienna in 1863, where like Stein and Schäffle he again campaigned for a großdeutsch union. Third, and perhaps most significantly, the Ritter follower Ernst Kapp, who like Fröbel was forced to leave Germany after the revolutions of 1848, and with Fröbel joined the Freidenker community established in Sisterdale, Texas, of whose society Kapp was elected president.559

With regard to his promotion of großdeutsch politics, most prominently in the 1845

556 J.G. Kohl, "Die streitenden Interessen Oesterreichs und Deutschlands auf der einen und Rußlands auf der andern Seite an den Donauumündungen und am schwarzen Meere", Deutsche Vierteljahrschrift 1.1 (1849) 99-132 ("The conflicting interests of Austria and Germany on the one hand, and Russia on the other, concerning the banks of the Danube and the Black Sea"); Schultz and Natter, "Imagining Mitteleuropa", 280
557 Schultz and Natter, "Imagining Mitteleuropa", 281; no citation given
558 J. Fröbel, Wien, Deutschland und Europa (Vienna: Joseph Keck & Sohn; 1848), 13; quoted in (& translated by) Meyer, Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action, 21
Philosophische oder vergleichende allgemeine Erdkunde (‘Philosophical or Comparative Universal Geography’), Kapp was important in three regards. First, like others, Kapp emphasised its central position [Mittellage], though for Kapp this went beyond geostrategic considerations and encompassed physical and metaphysical unity, harmony and balance, which gave Germany ‘an all-surpassing standpoint’,560 and therefore bestowed upon it the task of determining the fate of the world.561

Second, combining the influences of Hegel and Ritter, Kapp viewed the German Confederation both dynamically and organically, calling it ‘a new and promising form’,562 a ‘prototype’ or ‘model’ of an ‘organic confederation’ or ‘state-organism’ that would soon spread across Europe and the world.563 It was not an end-point, but an evolutionary process,564 and one which possessed a spatial dimension:

‘The German Zollverein is the core, which is surrounded by tendencies ever larger and ever wider, the core and surely the first prototype of a great oceanic trade policy, which, in accordance with its gradual expansion though ever-new unions, first of course of all the German states and then of all the neighbouring states, must destroy one customs barrier after another.’565

The mention of an oceanic trade policy connected this into a grand progressivist theory of Kapp’s that civilisations pass through three aquatically-defined ‘stages of political geography’: a prehistoric

560 ‘einem alle überragenden Standpunct’, E. Kapp, Philosophische oder vergleichende allgemeine Erdkunde als wissenschaftliche Darstellung der Erdverhältnisse und des Menschenlebens nach ihrem inneren Zusammenhang, II vols., vol. II (Braunschweig: George Westermann; 1845), 298. Physically, Germany was said to contain ‘the greatest variety of harmonically ordered natural forms’ in Europe (‘die größte Abwechslung harmonisch geordneter Naturformen’; Kapp, Philosophische der Erdkunde, II, 332)

561 Schultz, "Fantasies of Mitte", 319. Kapp wrote that ‘as the body’s centre of life [Lebenspunct] is the heartbeat, so the whole world’s geographical and historical centre of unity [Einheitspunct] is Germany.’ (‘der ganzen Welt, wie der Körper im Herzschlag seinen Lebenspunkt hat, in Deutschland ihr geographischer und historischer Einheitspunkt gegeben sei.’ Kapp, Philosophische der Erdkunde, II, 300)

562 ‘eine neue zukunftreiche Gestalt.’ Kapp, Philosophische der Erdkunde, II, 328

563 Kapp, Philosophische der Erdkunde, II, 332


565 ‘Der deutsche Zollverein ist der Kern, welcher sich rings durch neue Ansätze immer mehr vergrößern und erweitern wird, der Kern und das freilich erst werdende Musterbild einer großartigen oceanischen Handelspolitik, welche in Uebereinstimmung mit seiner allmäßigen Ausdehnung durch immer neues Anschluß, erst natürlich aller deutschen und dann der Nachbarstaaten, ein Zollschanke nach der andern vernichten muß.’ (Kapp, Philosophische der Erdkunde, II, 336)
‘potamian’ culture centred on rivers, a classical ‘thalassic’ era centred on closed seas, and an expansionist ‘oceanic’ era. Whereas the thalassic era favoured the ‘Romance states’ on the ‘Mediterranean side of Europe’, Kapp argued that the oceanic era favoured the ‘Germanic states’ on the ‘oceanic side of Europe’; in other words, politics was both up-scaling, and being recentred on Germany.

Kapp’s third contribution to the theorisation of großdeutsch politics came a little later. After returning to Europe following the American Civil War, Kapp re-entered academic life, though like List his American experiences had made him profoundly interested in technology. The central thesis of his 1877 Grundlinien einer Philosophie der Technik (‘Principles of a Philosophy of Technology’) was that ‘humans unconsciously transfer form, function and the normal proportions of their body to the works of their hands’, which ran from simple tools to complex machines and even political systems. Thus, he devoted a chapter to analysing how the railway system imitated the structure of the circulatory system, and another to how the form of the state replicated that of a biological organism. Kapp’s argument was not simply that politics was unconsciously designed according to an organic model; it was that an organic model was necessary to best serve humanity, and that a more self-conscious, machine-like, technical-rational design would prove deathly. Crucially, what Kapp was providing was a justification for treating the state as an organism. This spoke to the growing trend

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566 Kapp, Philosophische der Erdkunde, v. I (potamian and thalassic stages) & II (oceanic stage)
568 Kapp, Grundlinien einer Philosophie der Technik, Ch.7, “Dampfmaschine und Schienenweg” (“Steam engine and railroad”), pp.126-138; Ch. 13, “Der Staat”, pp.307-351. The latter metaphor was by no means new, and is perhaps best seen as a nineteenth-century adaptation of the ancient metaphor of the body politic. For the legal, theological and philosophical complexity and implications of this metaphor in the mediaeval period, see E.H. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press; 1957)
569 For Kapp, a state ‘remains an organism and is never a machine’ ‘bleibt Organismus und ist nie eine Maschine’ (Kapp, Grundlinien einer Philosophie der Technik, 344); see also Brey, "Theories of technology as extension of human faculties"
for treating society as an organism, sparked by Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer, and elaborated most fully by the advocate of Mitteleuropa Schäffle in his 1875-1878 work Bau und Leben des Soziale Körpers (‘Structure and Life of the Social Body’), in which Schäffle undertook a forensic examination of the ‘biology’ of the ‘social body’.

Though Bismarck’s 1871 unification of the kleindeutsch German Empire pushed Mitteleuropean schemes out of mainstream political discussion, in the work of the Prussian political theorist Constantin Frantz this exclusion merely served to sharpen his political theorisations of an anti-Bismarckian, multinational großdeutsch polity. Like Schäffle, he opposed the adoption of political theory based on the French idealisation of the nation-state, which he argued was unjustified in – and detrimental to – the ethnically mixed central European lands. As a Young Hegelian (alongside Kapp), Frantz too argued that politics was dynamic, and that it was absurd to become ‘obsessed with narrow nationalism’ at a time when ‘the astonishingly increased means of communication, and the resulting movement of goods and persons, together with the circulation of capital and ideas, demand, as a matter of course, universal association and co-operation’; Germany was thus acting ‘in patently obvious contradiction to the real conditions of development of our age’.

Like List, he saw this development as being driven by technology, chiefly the rapidly expanding

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571 A.E.F. Schäffle, Bau und Leben des Soziale Körpers, IV vols. (Tübingen: H. Laupp'schen; 1875-1878); S.A. Reinert, "Darwin and the Body Politic: A Note on Schäffle, Veblen and the Shift of Biological Metaphor in Economics", in Jürgen G. Backhaus (ed.), Albert Schäffle (1831-1903): the legacy of an underestimated economist (Hanau: Haag + Herchen; 2010) 129-152. As per his earlier advocacy of a Mitteleuropean union, Schäffle was not insistent that linguistic and national unity was absolutely necessary within the social body, and argued that a decentralised, federative system could also secure a ‘happy, free and peaceful political life’ (Schäffle, Bau und Leben des Soziale Körpers, I, 317)
572 Meyer, Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action, 29
573 Meyer, Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action, 26
574 ‘Statt dessen hat man sich in enge Nationalitätstendenzen verrannt, welche in den tatsächlichen Verhältnissen gar keinen Anhalt mehr finden, wo vielmehr die so erstaunlich gesteigerten Kommunikationsmittel, und der daraus entsprungene Waren- und Personenverkehr, nebst der Zirkulation der Kapitalien und der Gedanken, wie von selbst zu allgemeiner Vereinigung und zum Zusammenwirken auffordern. … — da soll dieses Deutschland, im offenbarsten Widerspruch zu den realen Entwicklungsbedingungen unsres Zeitalters’ (C. Frantz, "Offener Brief an Richard Wagn", Bayreuther Blätter 1.6 (June) (1878) 149-170, 161)
railway network, and Frantz drew out the spatial implication: ‘the railways make the individual European countries ever smaller’. Therefore, he argued,

‘in order to develop a truly German political science, instead of coming up with with theories about the state [Staatstheorien], we must look back to the example of the Holy Roman Empire, which is the only way to understand that Germany should be recognised as a supra-state [überstaatliches] and supra-national [übertionales] entity.’

Frantz proposed a federal system of unique states that would retain their individual character, but be economically and militarily united into a mitteleuropäische Bund. Together, they would constitute an ‘occidental community of nations’ [abendlandischen Völkergemeinschaft], reuniting the Christian churches, though Frantz envisaged this union as being culturally Germanic, as well as being riven with an explicit antisemitism.

After 1871, such a scheme was no longer part of the political conversation, but Frantz was most influential in the way he shifted discussion onto a different plane: he was arguing for a federal system, but he was also arguing for a political theory in which such a federal system became self-evident. In his own terms, he argued for ‘a metapolitics [Metapolitik], which stands in a similar relation to common school-politics as metaphysics does to physics’. What differentiated metapolitics from Bismarckian realpolitik (the clear target of the ‘school-politics’ jibe) was not that it escaped a German parochialism: Frantz’s was self-professedly still a German standpoint. Rather, it was in part a matter of theoretical abstraction (focusing on the game rather than the players), and in part a matter of scale. In the latter regard, Frantz was also notable for enlarging the canvas upon which

575 ‘Machen also die Eisenbahnen die einzelnen europäischen Länder immer kleiner’ (C. Frantz, Die Weltpolitik unter besonderer Bezugsnahme auf Deutschland, III vols., vol. 1 (Chemnitz: Ernst Schmeitzner; 1882), 127)

576 ‘Damit sich also eine wirklich deutsche politische Wissenschaft entwickle, müssen wir, statt uns in Staatsstheorien zu versuchen, vielmehr auf das Vorbild des heiligen römischen Reiches zurückblicken, welches eben nur dadurch an verstehen ist, dass Deutschland als ein überstaatliches und übernationales Wesen erkannt wird.’ (Frantz, "Offener Brief an Richard Wagner", 168-169)


578 ‘Sie muss sich zur Metapolitik erheben, als welche sich zur gemeinen Schulpolitik ähnlich verhält, wie zur Physik die Metaphysik’ (Frantz, "Offener Brief an Richard Wagner", 169)
international relations were discussed, upscaling the frame of analysis from Europe to the world, from the national politics of yesterday to the Weltpolitik (i.e. world-politics) of today.\footnote{Weitzmann notes that Weltpolitik was this was ‘a term he [Frantz] did not create but which he developed more fully than any one had before.’ (W.R. Weitzmann, “Constantin Frantz, Germany and Central Europe: An Ambiguous Legacy”, in Peter M.R. Stirk (ed.), Mitteleuropa: History and Prospects (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press; 1994) 36-60, 51; citing H. Gollwitzer, Geschichte des weltpolitischen Denkens, II vols., vol. I: Vom Zeitalter der Entdeckungen bis zum Beginn des Imperialismus (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht; 1972), 472-483)} Orthodox political maxims were no longer relevant, Frantz claimed, and his new Weltpolitik was needed to analyse the ever-more interconnected present.\footnote{Frantz, 1882-83, Die Weltpolitik unter besonderer Bezugnahme auf Deutschland (III vols)}

‘The combinations multiply, the spheres of action expand; everything goes to a massive scale, and the world powers [Weltmächte] rise above the so-called great powers [Großmächte].’\footnote{‘Die Combinationen vervielfältigen sich, die Wirkungsphären erweitern sich; alles geht in das Massenhafte, und über die bisher sogenannten Großmächte erheben sich die Weltmächte.’ (Frantz, Weltpolitik, I, iv)}

The ‘world powers’ in question were the US and Russia, whose large territorial bases set them apart from the ‘artificial’, and therefore impermanent, world power of Britain.\footnote{Frantz, Weltpolitik, I, Ch. IV: ‘Die neue Welt und Rußland’, 71-101; Weitzmann, “Constantin Frantz, Germany and Central Europe”, 51; S. Neitzel, Weltmacht oder Untergang: die Weltreichslehre im Zeitalter des Imperialismus (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh; 2000), 50} They constituted an existential threat to Europe, thus providing an external imperative to match Frantz’s internal imperatives for Europe to unite. Thus, wrote Frantz, ‘Weltpolitik and federalism are merely two sides of the same coin’.\footnote{‘Weltpolitik und Föderalismus nur zwei Seiten der einen und selben Sache’ (C. Frantz, Die Weltpolitik unter besonderer Bezugnahme auf Deutschland, III vols., vol. III (Chernitz: Ernst Schmeitzner; 1883), 221)} In this two-sided rhetorical framework, and in the dynamic sense of history that underpinned each side, there is much that would be later echoed by Pan-Europeans, though equally Frantz’s Germanocentrism and antisemitism also offered much consonant with National Socialist doctrine. While Frantz would thus prove a contested figure, the concept of Weltpolitik soon escaped his own definition, instead entering the popular lexicon as a byword for Wilhelmine expansionism.\footnote{Weitzmann, "Constantin Frantz, Germany and Central Europe", 55-56}.

By the end of the nineteenth century, then, many of the shared building blocks of Pan-Europeanism and geopolitics had been developed. Though they drew on both the universalist theories of the eighteenth-century philosophes and the revolutionary nationalism of the nineteenth century, the language and arguments that we have traced tord a line in between these poles, rejecting both the

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\textbf{579} Weitzmann notes that Weltpolitik was this was ‘a term he [Frantz] did not create but which he developed more fully than any one had before.’ (W.R. Weitzmann, “Constantin Frantz, Germany and Central Europe: An Ambiguous Legacy”, in Peter M.R. Stirk (ed.), Mitteleuropa: History and Prospects (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press; 1994) 36-60, 51; citing H. Gollwitzer, Geschichte des weltpolitischen Denkens, II vols., vol. I: Vom Zeitalter der Entdeckungen bis zum Beginn des Imperialismus (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht; 1972), 472-483)
\textbf{580} Frantz, 1882-83, Die Weltpolitik unter besonderer Bezugnahme auf Deutschland (III vols)
\textbf{581} ‘Die Combinationen vervielfältigen sich, die Wirkungsphären erweitern sich; alles geht in das Massenhafte, und über die bisher sogenannten Großmächte erheben sich die Weltmächte.’ (Frantz, Weltpolitik, I, iv)
\textbf{582} Frantz, Weltpolitik, I, Ch. IV: ‘Die neue Welt und Rußland’, 71-101; Weitzmann, “Constantin Frantz, Germany and Central Europe”, 51; S. Neitzel, Weltmacht oder Untergang: die Weltreichslehre im Zeitalter des Imperialismus (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh; 2000), 50
\textbf{583} ‘Weltpolitik und Föderalismus nur zwei Seiten der einen und selben Sache’ (C. Frantz, Die Weltpolitik unter besonderer Bezugnahme auf Deutschland, III vols., vol. III (Chernitz: Ernst Schmeitzner; 1883), 221)
\textbf{584} Weitzmann, "Constantin Frantz, Germany and Central Europe", 55-56
\end{flushright}
former’s abstract cosmopolitanism and the latter’s restrictive idealisation of the nation-state. The former was a front for British interests, the latter a front for French interests; neither served German interests. Rather, these writers promoted regionalist ideas for a Mitteleuropean or großdeutsch union, schemes which invoked different logics, and thus conjured a different conception of the spatiality of politics. Namely: (i) an abstract sense of political space, in particular the notion of ‘centrality’ in determining Germany’s political role (for List and von Stein) and even its national character (for Kapp); (ii) a concern for the influence of physical geography upon politics, whether that be List’s imperial-colonial differentiation between temperate and torrid zones, Kohl’s idealisation of the unity of the Danube basin, or Stein’s more general obsession with how landscape determined political development; (iii) an upscaling of the scope of political analysis from Europe to the globe, starting with Schäffle’s vision of Europe facing off against a Russian superpower, and climaxing with Frantz’s notion of Weltpolitik; (iv) use of the metaphor of an organism for the political-economic unit, based upon List’s insistence on a sharp inside/outside bounding of the national economy, moving through Kapp’s early treatment of the state as an organism rather than a machine, to Kapp and Schäffle’s respective justification and examination of this metaphor; and (v) a dynamic view of politics as evolutionary rather than static, with particular regard to the technological innovation of the railroad that was compressing space and enabling polities to unite and grow larger. Though the notion of a Mitteleuropean union remained a political fantasy, these developments in political theory were deeply intertwined with real-world change: notably, the unification of Germany and Italy into integral, ‘modern’ states; the emergence of the United States as a potential superpower; the European emigration to the United States [Auswanderung] that raised concerns about Europe’s populousness and offered firsthand witnesses to the pace and scale of American political life; the extension of European colonial structures across the globe (especially following the ‘scramble for Africa’); and
the attendant ‘closure’ of political space.\textsuperscript{585} It was from these building blocks, these spatio-temporal logics and realities, that both geopolitics and Pan-Europeanism would be constructed.\textsuperscript{586}

### Geopolitik

The emergence of geopolitics in the work of Ratzel, Mackinder and Kjellén, the latter of whom would coin the term in 1899,\textsuperscript{587} has been thoroughly documented by geographers.\textsuperscript{588} Without wishing to retread the links between these figures and interwar geopolitik, it is necessary to draw out some of the links between their work and Pan-Europeanism, as well as linking each of these schools of thought to the early-twentieth-century renewal of the idea of a political Mitteleuropa.

For all the context we have reviewed, Friedrich Ratzel’s role is not to be underplayed. He synthesised and clarified a geopolitical way of thinking, and established it within the discipline of geography, at a point at which geography was veering away from human topics. Ratzel had himself been trained as a zoologist, but began applying biological models to the study of people during a formative spell travelling around North America from 1873 to 1875 as a correspondent for the Kölnische Zeitung.\textsuperscript{589} Like List, Kohl, Fröbel and Kapp before him, Ratzel was profoundly struck by

\begin{itemize}
  \item C.f. Schultz and Natter, "Imagining Mitteleuropa", 278
  \item Writing in Swedish, and explicitly drawing on Ratzel, Kjellén coined both the noun ‘geopolitikens’ (geopolitics) and the adjective ‘geopolitisk’ (geopolitical) in 1899. R. Kjellén, "Studier öfver Sveriges politiska gränser", \textit{Ymer (Tidskrift utgifven af svenska sällskapet för antropologi och geografi)} 19.3 (1899) 283-331, 303, 283 & passim
  \item W. Natter, "Friedrich Ratzel’s Spatial Turn: Identities of Disciplinary Space and its Borders Between the Anthropo-
\end{itemize}
the accelerated processes of urbanisation and economic development that he saw in the US, fuelled by the rapid expansion of commerce and transportation infrastructure.\textsuperscript{590} Having left a natural scientist, Ratzel returned to Europe a geographer,\textsuperscript{591} and set about constructing a scientifically law-seeking human geography that fused an emphasis on man’s connection with the land with an organic model of the nation-state.

Ratzel’s most infamous concept, that of Lebensraum (‘living space’),\textsuperscript{592} was most fully developed in a 1901 paper for a Festgabe in honour of Albert Schäffle.\textsuperscript{593} In this paper, Ratzel interpreted international relations in social-Darwinist fashion as a perpetual fight for space among the state-organisms that Schäffle had described, with the strongest organisms naturally winning the largest territories. Territory was both abstract, quantified by its areal size, and real, since a stronger ‘grip on the land’ would mean greater productivity, thereby reciprocally strengthening the Volk.\textsuperscript{594} There was also a colonial dimension, as Lebensraum was subdivided into ‘living space’ [Wohnraum] and the much larger ‘feeding space’ [Ernährungsraum], to be sought in temperate colonies.\textsuperscript{595} Ratzel’s paper devoted a great deal of attention the borders that separated state-organisms, which he argued were neither fixed nor linear, but were rather dynamic ‘fringes’, ‘regions’ or ‘seams’, of which

\textsuperscript{590} Natter, "Friedrich Ratzel’s Spatial Turn"
\textsuperscript{591} Natter, "Friedrich Ratzel’s Spatial Turn", 176; citing K. Hassert, "Friedrich Ratzel. Sein Leben und Wirken", Geographische Zeitschrift 11.6-7 (1905) 305-325, 361-380
\textsuperscript{592} Though he did not invent it, Ratzel certainly popularised this term. On the specific genealogy of Lebensraum, see W.D. Smith, The ideological origins of Nazi imperialism (New York: Oxford University Press; 1986); Abrahamsson, "On the genealogy of Lebensraum"; M. Halas, "Searching for the Perfect Footnote: Friedrich Ratzel and the Others at the Roots of Lebensraum", Geopolitics 19.1 (2014) 1-18
\textsuperscript{593} F. Ratzel, "Der Lebensraum. Eine biogeographische Studie", in Karl Bücher et al. (eds.), Festgaben für Albert Schäffle zur siebenzigsten Wiederkehr seines Geburtstages am 24. Februar 1901 (Tübingen: H. Laupp'schen Buchhandlung; 1901) 101-89
\textsuperscript{595} Ratzel, "Lebensraum", 158
a line on a map was merely a spatial abstraction and temporal snapshot.\textsuperscript{596} Where in previous theorisations of the state as organism, the border functioned merely as skin, for Ratzel the border was an organ, as well as the battlefield in the fight for space.

If Ratzel’s view of the fight for space proposed a dynamic view of political geography, he accompanied this with a dynamic view of political history. Like Kapp, Schäffle and Frantz, he saw a historical tendency towards a world divided into fewer and larger political spaces, or \textit{großräumige Politik} (‘large-area politics’). Thus, he wrote in 1896 that:

‘The most remarkable trait in the present-day division of the earth—the powerful size of some few states—is a characteristic which has arisen in the last centuries and has been further developed and strengthened in our own time.’\textsuperscript{597}

Specifically, he noted ‘The British Empire (and within it Canada and Australia in their own right), the Asiatic-European empire of Russia, the United States of America, China, and Brazil, are states of a heretofore unprecedented size’.\textsuperscript{598} Ratzel used these empirical observations to hypothesise ‘the laws of the spatial growth of states’,\textsuperscript{599} for which the explanation he offered was twofold: on one hand, he theorised that the area of the state grows with its culture and level of civilisation,\textsuperscript{600} on the other, that the expansion of communication technologies and commerce were responsible for the tendency toward ‘enlargement’ of political space. (This latter circulatory logic was further developed by Arthur Dix, who emphasised the role of means of communication in determining the direction of expansion.)\textsuperscript{601} The implications of Ratzel’s ‘laws’ of political geography were clear, particularly with

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{596} F. Ratzel, \textit{Politische Geographie} (Munich & Leipzig: R. Oldenbourg; 1897), 448; Ratzel, "Lebensraum", 165-166
\item \textsuperscript{598} Ratzel, "The Laws of the Spatial Growth of States", 19
\item \textsuperscript{599} F. Ratzel, "Die Gesetze des räumlichen Wachstums der Staaten. Ein Beitrag zur wissenschaftlichen politischen Geographie", \textit{Petermanns Mitteilungen} 42 (1896) 97-107. First translated in abridged form as F. Ratzel, "The territorial growth of states", \textit{Scottish Geographical Magazine} 12.7 (1896) 351-361; then more fully as Ratzel, "The Laws of the Spatial Growth of States"
\item \textsuperscript{600} R. In his own words, ‘Just as the area of the state grows with its culture, so too do we find that at lower stages of civilization peoples are organized in small states. In fact, the further we descend in levels of civilization, the smaller become the states. Thus the size of a state also becomes one of the measures of its cultural level.’ (Ratzel, "The Laws of the Spatial Growth of States", 19)
\item \textsuperscript{601} A. Dix, \textit{Deutschland auf den Hochstraßen des Weltwirtschaftsverkehrs} (Jena: Gustav Fischer; 1901)
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
regard to the fate of Europe:

‘the drive toward the building of continually larger states continues throughout the entirety of history. We see it active in the present where, in continental Europe, the conviction of the necessity of joining together, at least economically, against the giants of Russia, North America, and the British Empire is awakening.’\(^\text{602}\)

As this passage hints, despite his links to the Pan-German movement,\(^\text{603}\) Ratzel ultimately moved towards supporting the idea of a *Mitteleuropäische* federation.

In a 1901 article for the conservative-nationalist journal *Die Grenzboten*, written from the perspective of a returnee to Europe from America, Ratzel argued that Germany’s central position within Europe burdened it with three pressing tasks in order to survive. The first two, maintenance of its position of power and retention of the German people, both required absolute defence of the borders of nation [*Volksgrenze*] and state [*Staatsgrenzen*]. However, Ratzel warned, the third task potentially ran counter to these imperatives, since Germany also needed to ‘put all her energies into the unification of the *Mitteleuropäische* powers that lie between the world-powers of England, Russia and North America.’\(^\text{604}\) He struck a rather melancholy tone:

‘My old eyes, which have become accustomed to American dimensions, can no longer see the purported contrasts between peoples in Europe as being that significant … At the risk of being denied the character of a realpolitiker, if one tenth the ink that had been spilled on sentimental, boorish enthusiasm had instead been devoted to a *mitteleuropäischen Zollverein*, I would consider it a tremendously propitious national investment.’\(^\text{605}\)

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\(^{602}\) Ratzel, “The Laws of the Spatial Growth of States”, 28

\(^{603}\) C. Andler, *Le Pangermanisme philosophique* (1800 à 1914), Collection de documents sur le Pangermanisme (Paris: Louis Conard; 1917), 86-106; R.J.W. Evans, "Central Europe, Past and Present", *Central Europe* 1.2 (2003) 163-167, 164; Bassin, "Imperialism and the nation state in Ratzel", 482. This connection damned him in the eyes of Masaryk, who wrote that ‘Ratzel was the one who drew the attention of the Pan-germanists to the political and strategical significance of a central location (the fighting impetus from the Centre, as against fighting power from the periphery, etc.)’ (Masaryk, *New Europe*, 8)

\(^{604}\) ‘seine volle Kraft an den Zusammenschluß der mitteleuropäischen Mächte zwischen den Weltmächten England, Rußland und Nordamerika zu setzen.’ (F. Ratzel, "Briefe eines Zurückgekehrten #8", *Grenzboten* 60.51 (1901) 589-595, 591)

\(^{605}\) ‘mit meinen alten Augen, die an amerikanische Dimensionen gewöhnt sind, sehe ich die Unterschiede nicht so groß … Auf die Gefahr hin, daß man mir die Eigenschaft eines Realpolitikers abspricht, muß ich erklären, daß ich den zehntel Teil der Worte und der Tinte, die in der sentimental Burenbegeisterung verschwendet worden sind, auf den mitteleuropäischen Zollverein verwandt als eine ungemein glückliche nationale Anlage betrachten würde.’ (Ratzel, "Briefe eines Zurückgekehrten #8", 594-595; based on translation in Natter, "Friedrich Ratzel’s Spatial Turn", 184)
We see here Ratzel’s scalar logic outweighing the organic unity of the state-Volk-territory; in his own terms, großräumige Politik trumped Nationalitätenpolitik.\(^6^0^6\) Indeed, the nature of the Volk itself was ambivalent in Ratzel’s work, with the reader sometimes invited to see it biologically as a breed or species that needed to avoid intermixing with other groups,\(^6^0^7\) and sometimes told that the biological racism of Gobineau and H.S. Chamberlain was erroneous\(^6^0^8\) and the Volk was defined by a shared connection to the land rather than shared blood.\(^6^0^9\) While many of Ratzel’s followers would enthusiastically apply his theories to the imperial nation-state, Ratzel himself was clear that the nation-state was retrograde, and that a new form of political organisation was necessary; this reasoning was taken up equally enthusiastically by Pan-Europeans.

The German treatment of the spatial and geographical logics that underpinned world politics first appeared in Anglophone literature in the American naval officer and historian Alfred Thayer Mahan’s 1890 text *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*, which asserted the importance of naval dominance in world-politics (and argued that the US needed to usurp Britain’s role controlling the seas). Mahan’s ideas were swiftly re-imported back to Germany, influencing both Ratzel’s 1900 *Das Meer als Quelle der Völkergrösse* (‘The Sea as Source of National Greatness’) and the naval advocacy

\(^6^0^6\) Indeed, elsewhere he was explicit about this: ‘Because spatial growth is founded on a younger and more lasting political force than the idea of a national union, we see the former progress uninterruptedly beyond the latter’ (Ratzel, *Politische Geographie*, 206; quoted in and translated by Bassin, "Imperialism and the nation state in Ratzel", 481)

\(^6^0^7\) Ratzel, "Lebensraum". This ambivalence was compounded by the fact that ‘Rasse’ meant both ‘race’ and ‘breed’, and could thus operate both inside and outside Ratzel’s biological metaphors.


\(^6^0^9\) Indeed, this was another argument against *Nationalitätenpolitik*, which Ratzel argued was insufficiently territorial, and ‘will not be able to hold its own against a geographic policy [geographischen Politik], which will grasp the soil without considering the tribe [Stamm] and the species [Art] of the inhabitants’ (Ratzel, *Politische Geographie*, 31-32). Regarding the Volk specifically, Ratzel clarified in an addition to the 1903 second edition of *Politische Geographie* that the Volk was ‘a politically united body made up of groups and individuals, who need neither to be related ethnically nor linguistically, but who through their common territory are spatially linked together (verbundene)’ (F. Ratzel, *Politische Geographie, oder die Geographie der Staaten, des Verkehrs und des Krieges*, 2nd edn. (Munich & Berlin: R. Oldenbourg; 1903), 5, quoted in and translated by Bassin, "Imperialism and the nation state in Ratzel", 480).
of the secretary of state of the German Imperial Naval Office, Alfred von Tirpitz.\footnote{162}

In Britain, the geographer Halford Mackinder saw an opportunity (or, in his eyes, necessity) to analyse these forces in a continental setting:

‘Neither in London nor in New York were International Politics commonly discussed in the way in which they are discussed in the cafés of Continental Europe. In order, therefore, to appreciate the Continental view we must remove our standpoint from without to within the great ring of the Coasts.’\footnote{611}

Mackinder’s vision was first, and most influentially, laid out in his January 1904 address to the Royal Geographical Society, entitled ‘The Geographical Pivot of History’.\footnote{612} Consciously drawing upon the teachings of ‘Captain Mahan’,\footnote{613} and perhaps unconsciously upon the aquatic-civilisational arguments of Kapp (Carl Schmitt would later explicitly bring together Kapp and Mackinder’s theories),\footnote{614} Mackinder emphasised that the ‘Columbian epoch’ of the expansion of maritime European powers across the globe was at its end, and that a new phase of political history was thus beginning:

‘From the present time forth, in the post-Columbian age, we shall again have to deal with a closed political system, and none the less that it will be one of world-wide scope. Every explosion of social forces, instead of being dissipated in a surrounding circuit of unknown space and barbaric chaos, will be sharply re-echoed from the far side of the globe, and weak elements in the political and economic organism of the world will be shattered in consequence.’\footnote{615}

The chief implications for this newly closed system was that Mahan’s sea power, so crucial in the age of exploration, was about to be eclipsed in importance by land power, aided by the development of

\footnotetext[610]{Tirpitz ordered the translation of Mahan’s *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* into German, and distributed this text amongst his colleagues in the *Reichstag*. See H.H. Herwig, "The Failure of German Sea Power, 1914-1945: Mahan, Tirpitz, and Raeder Reconsidered", *The International History Review* 10.1 (1988) 68-105}

\footnotetext[611]{H.J. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction* (London: Constable and Company; 1919), 94}


\footnotetext[613]{Mackinder, "Geographical Pivot of History", 433}


\footnotetext[615]{Mackinder, "Geographical Pivot of History", 422}
railways (see fig. 18, the continentalist successor to List’s imagined national railway depicted in fig. 17). In the new continental era, the ‘pivot region’ at the centre of the Eurasian landmass was transformed from being an inaccessible, landlocked irrelevance to an invulnerable heartland from which to control the entire continent.

In his 1904 paper, Mackinder was driven by the fear that if Russia forged enough alliances, it would become the preeminent world power; in this, he was echoing the Russophobia of political economists like Frantz and Schäffle, and Pan-Germanists like Lagarde. By 1919, Mackinder was far more interested in the fate of Central Europe, which now fell inside an expanded ‘Heartland’ area; instead of worrying that Germany would play kingmaker, he now worried it would seize the throne itself if it had the chance. He certainly had a keen interest in Mitteleuropäischer aspirations, and in 1903 had commissioned Joseph Partsch (who, upon Ratzel’s death in 1904, would succeed him as professor of geography at Leipzig) to write the ‘Central Europe’ volume of Mackinder’s Regions of the World series. Though Partsch restricted himself to largely apolitical discussion of the natural, cultural and economic unity of the region, he described a Mitteleuropa that stretched from the Low Countries to the Black Sea. This work firmly established Mitteleuropa as a geographical category, and Karl Haushofer for one believed that the credit was Mackinder’s rather than Partsch’s. Curiously, in

616 Impressed with the Trans-Siberian railway, which would be completed later that year, Mackinder confidently predicted that ‘the century will not be old before all Asia is covered with railways.’ (Mackinder, “Geographical Pivot of History”, 434)


619 Isolated efforts to do so had been made before, including Carl Ritter’s mention in an 1863 lecture at the University of Berlin of the “Gebirgsdiagonale für Mitteleuropa”, the 1877 third volume of Elisée Reclus’s Nouvelle géographie universelle, entitled “L’Europe centrale” (the 1883 English translation was entitled “Austria-Hungary, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands”), and Albrecht Penck’s “Physikalische Skizze von Mitteleuropa” in the second volume of Unser Wissen von der Erde (ed. Kirchhoff) (Vienna/Prague/Leipzig, 1887). For discussion of these precedents, see Meyer, “Mitteleuropa in German Political Geography”, 179n4; G.G. Chisholm, “Central Europe as an economic unit”, The Geographical Teacher 9.3 (1917) 122-133, 123

620 Meyer, "Mitteleuropa in German Political Geography", 181n12; citing K. Haushofer, "Mitteleuropa und die Welt", Zeitschrift für Geopolitik 14.1 (1937) 1-4, 1. In his preface, Partsch wrote that ‘he [the series editor, Mackinder] and I were agreed that, in order to secure the unity of the whole work, the plan and division of the material must be settled by the editor for the guidance of his fellow workers’ (Partsch, Central Europe, ix)
1919 Mackinder chose to speak of an ‘East Europe’ that stretched from Germany to Moscow, though he left no doubt of its geo-strategic significance is his famous epigram:

‘Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland:
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island:
Who rules the World-Island commands the World.’

Well aware that in the post-war negotiations the political geography of Europe was ‘fluid’,

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621 Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, 194
622 Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, 143-146
Mackinder argued that war could not be legislated away, and that a solution needed to be etched into Europe’s political geography.\(^{623}\) However, Mackinder was as unabashedly partisan as Frantz had been, and despite expounding a political philosophy of Great Power politics, he advocated for a solution that would neutralize German aspirations, insisting that delegates at the Paris Peace Conference ‘reduce the German people to its proper position in the world’ by dividing East Europe ‘like West Europe’ into ‘self-contained nations’, thus inserting ‘a tier of independent States between Germany and Russia’.

Mackinder’s fears of the potential power of a German-controlled heartland, ‘under modern railway conditions’ no less,\(^{625}\) had been stoked by a surge in German literature during WWI that had advocated for precisely such a political Mitteleuropa. It was a particularly popular topic amongst geographers,\(^{626}\) who had responded to Alfred Hettner’s wartime call to follow Ratzel’s lead and embrace political geography so that German foreign policy might be able to call upon its insights.\(^{627}\)

Perhaps the most significant interventions were made by Hugo Hassinger, who rooted an expanding Mitteleuropa in landschaft geography,\(^{628}\) and Albrecht Penck, whose ‘Zwischeneuropa’ extended...

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\(^{623}\) Thus Mackinder’s warning, depite his support for a League of Nations, that ‘No mere scraps of paper, even though they be the written constitution of a League of Nations, are under the conditions of to-day a sufficient guarantee that the Heartland will not again become the centre of a World-War. … You cannot afford to leave such a condition of affairs in East Europe and the Heartland, as would offer scope for ambition in the future, for you have escaped too narrowly from the recent danger.’ Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, 143, 194

\(^{624}\) Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, 203-205

\(^{625}\) Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, 203


\(^{628}\) H. Hassinger, "Das geographische Wesen Mitteleuropas, nebst einigen grundsätzlichen Bemerkungen über die geographischen Naturgebiete Europas und ihre Begrenzung", *Mitteilungen der k.k. Geographischen Gesellschaft in
Mitteleuropa as far north as Scandinavia and as far south as Greece, and which Penck believed would pave the way for a United States of Europe.\(^6^{29}\)

However, among the general public, by far the most popular of these works was the journalist (and erstwhile Lutheran pastor) Friedrich Naumann’s bestselling 1915 book entitled simply Mitteleuropa.\(^6^{30}\) In his introduction to the 1916 English translation of Naumann’s work (as Central Europe), the British economic historian William Ashley offered a rather double-edged assessment of its influence:

‘If, as I believe to be the case, the idea of an organised and close-knit Central Europe as one of the world-Powers of the future has by this time come to be the dominating thought in German politics, Naumann’s book has undoubtedly done much for its diffusion. … [What] makes his book all the more worthy of serious attention in this country […] it is so largely the formulation of current German thought, and so little, in essence, original’.\(^6^{31}\)

Though Ashley’s apparent ungenerousness owes much to the wartime hysteria, his last point was largely accurate: Naumann’s originality lay in his accessible style, and in his foregrounding of the Mitteleuropa plans that had not been exposed to mainstream political discussion since unification.\(^6^{32}\)

Naumann began with the now-familiar argument that politics was being scaled up:

‘All the allies in the Great War feel without argument that neither now nor in the future can small or even moderate-sized Powers play any large part in the world. Our conceptions of size have entirely changed. … The spirit of large-scale industry and of super-national [überstaatlichen] organisation has seized politics. People think, as Cecil Rhodes once expressed it, “in Continents”’.\(^6^{33}\)


\(^{630}\) F. Naumann, Mitteleuropa (Berlin: Georg Reimer; 1915). Remarkably, it sold more than a hundred thousand copies in its first six months (Meyer, Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action, 206).

\(^{631}\) W.J. Ashley, "Introduction", in Friedrich Naumann (ed.), Central Europe (London: P.S. King and Son; 1916) v-xv, v-vii

\(^{632}\) Referring particularly to von Bruck, Naumann wrote that ‘We must take up these old problems where they were left lying in 1866’ (Die Hilfe 21 (1915) 174; quoted in (and translated by) Meyer, Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action, 196)

\(^{633}\) F. Naumann, Central Europe, trans. Christabel M. Meredith (London: P.S. King and Son; 1916), 4, c.f. Naumann, Mitteleuropa, 4. Arendt later quoted this same passage, noting that ‘These few sentences were quoted in innumerable articles and pamphlets of the time.’ (Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, 235n42)
Naumann proceeded to describe a ‘new super-national structure’ in which there were three great world powers – the British Empire, the US and Russia.\textsuperscript{634} He believed that the present war would determine whether Mitteleuropa could function as a (mostly) self-reliant fourth world power, or whether European nations would be fated to become mere ‘satellite States’ of the three established world powers. Again, this process was seen as driven by time-space compression, with Naumann asking rhetorically: ‘What is a territory of half a million square kilometres to-day? It has become a single day’s journey’.\textsuperscript{635} The force of these logics was, for Naumann, unstoppable: the day of individual states was past, their continued sovereignty illusory at best. Mitteleuropa was not merely advantageous, it was necessary.\textsuperscript{636}

Naumann described the nature of this new Mitteleuropa as an Oberstaat (Christabel Meredith’s contemporary translation was ‘super-State’),\textsuperscript{637} which he saw ‘as a brotherhood of many members, as a defensive alliance, as a single economic district’.\textsuperscript{638} It would begin with the nucleus of a union of Germany and Austria-Hungary, and then welcome accession from Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, perhaps the Netherlands and Switzerland, perhaps even eventually France and Italy.\textsuperscript{639} However, Naumann was extremely wary of Mitteleuropa being perceived as merely a greater Germany, acknowledging that past projects had been ‘almost always conceived from a one-sided German standpoint’, and that such arrogance had harmed their chances of success.\textsuperscript{640} By contrast, Naumann was at pains to point out that in his project, accession would be voluntary, and that while Mitteleuropa would naturally take German as its language, it ‘must from the outset display toleration

\textsuperscript{634} Naumann, \textit{Central Europe}, 182
\textsuperscript{635} Naumann, \textit{Central Europe}, 181
\textsuperscript{636} Naumann explained it thus: ‘People who do not feel enthusiastic about it must yet desire it, since the alternatives are even worse. The intelligent man is he who does of his own free will what he recognises as necessary.’ (Naumann, \textit{Central Europe}, 5)
\textsuperscript{637} Naumann, \textit{Central Europe}, 255
\textsuperscript{638} Naumann, \textit{Central Europe}, 3
\textsuperscript{639} Naumann, \textit{Central Europe}, 2
\textsuperscript{640} Naumann, \textit{Central Europe}, 197
and flexibility in regard to all the neighbouring languages that are associated with it’. Indeed, judged on its content, Naumann’s book was far more conciliatory towards other nationalities that its predecessors had been; reviewing it in The Geographical Teacher, G.C. Chisholm admitted that ‘one may even find in Naumann’s book much that is consonant with the proposals that have been put forward for the formation of a League of Nations’. However, Naumann’s book rarely was judged on its content, and instead it became widely understood simply as an example of the Pan-German militarist desire to dominate Central Europe, and establish an enlarged German state there.

This was the case even among those who spoke in support of Naumann’s plans, including the Swedish political scientist and politician Rudolf Kjellén. Though he coined the name ‘geopolitics’ in a Swedish-language article in 1899, and had expanded on these ideas in his 1905 book Stormakterna (‘The Great Powers’), it wasn’t until 1914 that Kjellén’s Ratzel-inspired political geography began to reach a wider audience. This breakthrough began with the translation of an updated edition of this book (reitled Samtidens stormakter, or ‘The Great Powers of Today’) into German as Die Großmächte der Gegenwart, published a month after the outbreak of war. Kjellén’s most important book in terms of offering a complete theorisation of geopolitics, Staten som lifsform (‘The State as a

641 Naumann, Central Europe, 108
642 Chisholm, "Central Europe as an economic unit", 129
645 R. Kjellén, Samtidens stormakter, Politiska handböcker (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers förlag; 1914); R. Kjellén, Die Großmächte der Gegenwart, trans. C. Koch (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner; 1915 [1914]). Meyer goes so far as to say that the popularity of Kjellén’s book outside of academia meant that it was ‘through this Swedish political scientist [that] Germans outside of intimate geographic circles first became acquainted with Ritter, Ratzel, Deckert, Haushofer, Dix and others.’ (Meyer, "Mitteleuropa in German Political Geography", 185; citing W. Vogel, "Politische Geographie und Geopolitik (1909–1934)", Geographisches Jahrbuch 49 (1934) 79-304)
Living Form’), was published in Sweden just two years later,\textsuperscript{646} with the German translation (as \textit{Der Staat als Lebensform}) being released the following year, 1917.\textsuperscript{647} Though it repeated many of the ideas about the influence of real-world geography (‘general geopolitics’) and abstract space (‘special geopolitics’) that had been assembled by Ratzel,\textsuperscript{648} Kjellén departed from Ratzel et al by pushing the self-contained nature of the state-as-organism to an extreme. He developed a taxonomy of the various dimensions of life that state borders ought to contain and control: that of a territorial realm (\textit{geopolitik}), a \textit{Volk} (etno- or demopolitik), an economy (\textit{ekopolitik}),\textsuperscript{649} a society (\textit{sociopolitik}), and a governmental-constitutional power (\textit{kratopolitik}).\textsuperscript{650} Kjellén’s innovation, no doubt at least partially influenced by the wartime context in which he wrote, was his advocacy of autarky (i.e. economic self-sufficiency) as the politico-economic ideal that the state must aspire to.\textsuperscript{651} As Karl Wittfogel caustically noted in 1929, Kjellén displayed ‘a fine sense for the most recent and forceful monopolistic tendencies of modern imperialism’.\textsuperscript{652} Regarding race, Kjellén believed that the rise of racialised pan-movements indicated that in the future politics would be organised at the scale of race rather than nation, but that in the present such theories were ‘still in the land of mere dreams, or at most at the amorphous, hazy stage’.\textsuperscript{653}

That said, the scale of politics was certainly increasing: ‘The more the earth is organized, the larger the space claimed by great states’.\textsuperscript{654} Applying this logic to Germany, Kjellén argued that while

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\item \textsuperscript{646} R. Kjellén, \textit{Staten som Lifsform} (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers förlag; 1916)
\item \textsuperscript{647} R. Kjellén, \textit{Der Staat als Lebensform}, trans. Margarethe Langfeldt (Leipzig: S. Hirzel; 1917)
\item \textsuperscript{648} Kjellén, \textit{Staat als Lebensform}, 80. Writing in 1916, Kjellén may have been influenced by Einstein’s paper the same year postulating the theory of ‘general relativity’ in contradistinction to his 1904 theorisation of ‘special relativity’ (A. Einstein, "Die Grundlage der allgemeinen Relativitätstheorie", \textit{Annalen der Physik} 354.7 (1916) 769-822, 769)
\item \textsuperscript{649} \textit{Wirtschaftspolitik} in German.
\item \textsuperscript{650} \textit{Herrschaftspolitik} in German. Kjellén, \textit{Staat als Lebensform}, 43. Kjellén’s taxonomies were often further subdivided in his writing, and are not wholly consistent. See Holdar, "The ideal state and the power of geography", 311-312
\item \textsuperscript{651} Kjellén, \textit{Staat als Lebensform}, 76
\item \textsuperscript{652} Wittfogel, "Geopolitics, Geographical Materialism and Marxism", 28
\item \textsuperscript{653} ‘das befindet sich noch im Lande der bloßen Träume oder doch höchstens im formlosen dämmerhaften Stadium des Chaos’ (Kjellén, \textit{Staat als Lebensform}, 148)
\item \textsuperscript{654} ‘Je mehr die Erde organisiert wird, desto mehr muß der weite Raum sich in Form großer Staaten geltend machen’ (Kjellén, \textit{Staat als Lebensform}, 81)
\end{itemize}
Frederick the Great’s Prussia was able to function in the eighteenth century, Bismarck’s Germany was needed in the nineteenth, and in the twentieth century nothing short of Naumann’s Mitteleuropa would suffice.655 ‘Only through unification’, Kjellén wrote, ‘can the present European states preserve their strength against rapidly growing adversaries’. 656 Despite being a non-German himself, Kjellén displayed none of Naumann’s tact, and was unambiguous that Germany’s natural position was to be ‘leader of a federated Central Europe’.657 He repeated sounded the death-knell for small states, writing that ‘Small states seem to have the same fate in store for them in the world of politics as primitive peoples have in the world of culture; they are pushed to the periphery, maintained in marginal areas and border zones, or they disappear’.658

Kjellén died in 1922, but through the interwar period his legacy was taken up by geographers: first by Alexander Supan in his Leitlinien der allgemeinen politischen Geographie,659 and then by the German general-turned-geography professor Karl Haushofer, who enthusiastically adopted the term ‘geopolitics’ as the name for what he claimed was a new integrative discipline.660 He used it too as the title for the journal he established with the publisher Kurt Vowinckel in 1924, by which he would

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655 Kjellén, Staat als Lebensform, 82
656 ‘Nur durch Zusammenschluß können die heutigen europäischen Staaten ihre Widerstandskraft gegenüber schneller wachsenden Gegnern bewahren.’ (Kjellén, Großmächte der Gegenwart, 204; trans informed by trans in P. Hansen and S. Jonsson, Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration and Colonialism (London & New York: Bloomsbury; 2014), 42)
657 ‘als Oberhaupt eines föderierten Zentraleuropa’ (Kjellén, Großmächte der Gegenwart, 204)
658 ‘Den kleinen Staaten ist allem Anschein nach in der Politik dasselbe Schicksal beschieden, das die Naturvölker in der Kulturgeschichte haben - sie werden an die peripherie hinausgedrängt oder in Grenzdistrikten erhalten, oder müssen untergehen.’ (Kjellén, Staat als Lebensform, 89-90; quoted in & translated by Kiss, “Political Geography into Geopolitics”, 639)
659 Supan, Leitlinien der allgemeinen politischen Geographie. This work is notable for developing Ratzel’s idea that Lebensraum was made up of both living space and colonial ‘feeding space’, and formulating the ‘colonial quotient’ by which this could be quantified.
organise and publicise this new discipline: the *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* (*ZfG*).\(^{661}\) (In 1927 it incorporated Arthur Dix’s *Zeitschrift Weltpolitik & Weltwirtschaft*, and was thus given a longer – though rarely used – title: *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik verbunden mit der Zeitschrift Weltpolitik & Weltwirtschaft.*)\(^{662}\)

Haushofer and Kjellén’s lives and work were entangled in a number of ways. They both had formative experiences in Japan just before the war: Haushofer from 1908 to 1910, and Kjellén in 1909, both returning via the Trans-Siberian railway.\(^{663}\) During the war itself, while at the front Haushofer studied (and was impressed by) Kjellén’s work. The same year that the *ZfG* was launched, 1924, Vowinckel published a new translation of Kjellén’s *Der Staat als Lebensform*.\(^{664}\) Six years later, an update of *Die Großmächte der Gegenwart* was published, with authorship attributed to ‘Kjellén-Haushofer’ (with additional input acknowledged from the leading *geopolitikers* Hugo Hassinger, Otto Maull and Erich Obst); in 1933 this was repackaged as the first volume of Haushofer’s geopolitical compendium *Macht und Erde*.\(^{665}\)

Haushofer was not shy in claiming influences, and was equally enthusiastic about the intellectual contributions of Ratzel (whom he had known as a child, since Ratzel was a friend of

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\(^{662}\) This merger was facilitated by Vowinckel’s acquisition of the *Zeitschrift Weltpolitik & Weltwirtschaft*’s publisher, Oldenbourg. On the significance of this merger in expanding the remit of the *ZfG*, see Hepple, "Dudley Stamp and the *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*", 387-388

\(^{663}\) H.H. Herwig, *"Geopolitik: Haushofer, Hitler and Lebensraum"*, *Journal of Strategic Studies* 22.2-3 (1999) 218-241, 222; B. Edström, "Rudolf Kjellén och Japan", *Orientaliska Studier* 89 (1996) 12-25. Travel to Japan might be said to have had a similar effect on geopolitical thinkers of the twentieth century as travel to America had on those of the nineteenth century.

\(^{664}\) R. Kjellén, *Der Staat als Lebensform*, trans. J. Sandmeier, 4th edn. (Berlin-Grunewald: Kurt Vowinckel; 1924)

Haushofer’s father), especially the notions of Lebensraum and dynamic borders; Mahan for introducing a Weltpolitik spatial consciousness to the US; Mackinder, especially the idea of a dynamic balance between continental and oceanic powers; and Mackinder’s student, the British geographer James Fairgrieve. Karl’s wife Martha Haushofer translated Fairgrieve’s 1917 work of resource-focused environmental determinism Geography and World Power into German, which was published by Vowinckel in 1925 with a foreword by Karl and a new subtitle: ‘An introduction to geopolitics’. Finally, Haushofer promoted an organicism that combined the studiously biological analogies of Kapp, Schäffle, Ratzel and Kjellén with a vaguer, more metaphysical analogy of the state as embodying the personality, spirit or will of the Volk, an intellectual tradition that stemmed from Fichte and Hegel, via idealist historians like Ranke and Treitschke, and attributed the growth of the state not to any underlying law, but instead saw it as an expression of the enduring strength of its population. This combination had been expressed by Arthur Dix in 1912: ‘We [i.e. Germany] have only one choice: to grow or to atrophy!’

Haushofer succeeded in attracting a number of prominent geographers and political scientists, many of whom were already publishing work in the same vein, to buy in to the ‘new’ discipline of geopolitics, including Dix, Otto Maull, Erich Obst, Hermann Lautensach, Franz Termer, Hugo Hassinger, Richard Hennig, Robert Sieger, Norbert Krebs, Adolf Grabowsky and the historian Walther Vogel. Their mobilization of the conceptual arsenal that had been developed over the previous century (and systematised and popularised by Ratzel, Mackinder and Kjellén) in the service of

666 ‘A colleague of Karl Haushofer’s father, Max, at Munich Polytechnical University, Ratzel tested his theories during long walks with both Haushofers along the banks of the Isar River.’ (Herwig, "Geopolitik: Haushofer, Hitler and Lebensraum", 220)

667 See K. Haushofer, Grenzen, in ihrer geographischen und politischen Bedeutung, 2nd edn. (Heidelberg, Berlin & Magdeburg: Kurt Vowinckel; 1939), 44

668 Fairgrieve, Geography and World Power; J. Fairgrieve, Geographie und Weltmacht. Eine Einführung in die Geopolitik, trans. Marta Haushofer (Berlin-Grunewald: Kurt Vowinckel; 1925)

669 ‘Wir haben nur eine Wahl: zu wachsen oder zu verkümmern!’ (A. Dix, Deutscher Imperialismus (Leipzig: Theodor Weicher; 1912), 5)
interwar German imperialist ambitions is a story that is rightly familiar, a disciplinary reckoning that began while the geopolitikers were still active, and which even today political geography continues to grapple with.\(^670\) It is not a story that I intend to retell here. Instead, in the following section I explore the various practical ways in which the Pan-European movement intersected with the school of geopolitik, before moving on to an analysis of the theoretical consonances and dissonances between each group’s conception of political space.

**Pan-Europe and Geopolitics**

We have already seen how Haushofer used Coudenhove-Kalergi’s famous world map, a tacit endorsement that speaks both to an overlap in their world-views and an overlap in their styles of argumentation. However, it is important to first sketch the relationship between these two interwar movements, which followed paths that were in some ways parallel, in others inverted. They both revolved around monthly journals, Paneuropa and the ZfG, each founded in 1924 and each broadly operating as an organ for curating, policing and disseminating their political agendas. In both cases, the journal was merely the central element of a spectrum that ran from more academic tomes to popular journalism and radio broadcasts. They were each unambiguously led by a single figure: Coudenhove-Kalergi edited Paneuropa and exerted full control of the Central Bureau of the Pan-European Union; and while Haushofer was merely a co-editor of the ZfG until a shake-up in 1931 left him as sole editor-in-chief, there was no doubt that he was the central personality within the new discipline of geopolitik.

Despite Haushofer’s closeness to Hitler (via Rudolf Hess, Haushofer’s student and Hitler’s

\(^{670}\) See, for example, A.B. Murphy et al., "Is there a politics to geopolitics?", *Progress in Human Geography* 28.5 (2004) 619-640

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acolyte), he and Coudenhove-Kalergi were on visiting terms with one another, the Japanophile Haushofer and the half-Japanese Coudenhove-Kalergi finding plenty of common ground. Indeed, if Coudenhove-Kalergi’s own account is to be believed, he challenged Haushofer on his closeness to Hess:

“If Hess is really such a nice man,” I said, “how is it that he became a Nazi?” Haushofer was not stuck for an answer: “He just happened to meet Hitler—so he became a Nazi. If he had met you, he would have become a supporter of Pan-Europe.”

Haushofer attended the launch of the Munich Pan-European Group in 1929, where he was seated for dinner next to Thomas Mann and Coudenhove-Kalergi’s wife Ida Roland, and in 1931 appeared as a guest lecturer at one of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-European conferences, delivering a talk that Coudenhove-Kalergi published in *Paneuropa*. Coudenhove-Kalergi even invited Haushofer to be on the honorary committee of PEU-Deutschland, an invitation that Haushofer politely declined, but nevertheless marked to be kept in his files.

Strikingly, the pair maintained friendly relations even after Hitler’s 1933 banning of the PEU-Deutschland and burning of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s books had rendered him *persona non grata* in Germany. In 1943, as Haushofer was at the height of his infamy as the leader of a notorious (though fictional) ‘Institute for Geopolitics’ at University of Munich and the purported *éménence grise* behind

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671 For instance, Haushofer’s diary for 22nd Dec 1927 records: «Aussprache mit Graf Coudenhove (Probleme Paneuropas)», while in his own memoirs Coudenhove-Kalergi recalled a house visit shortly after the Reichstag fire of 27 February 1933 (Saint-Gille, *La «Paneuropé*>, 289n184; Coudenhove-Kalergi, *An Idea Conquers The World*, 184)

672 Coudenhove-Kalergi, *An Idea Conquers The World*, 185


674 Haushofer spoke on 8 Jan 1931 in Vienna; the lecture was published as K. Haushofer, "Paneuropa im Lichte der panasiatischen und panpazifischen Bewegung. Vortrag, gesprochen über Einladung der Paneuropa-Union in Wien am 8. Januar 1931", *Paneuropa* 7.1 (1931) 19-32. See also Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Crusade for Pan-Europe*, 156

675 The invitation had been made on on 14 Jul 1928. See Saint-Gille, *La «Paneuropé*>, 290, 290n192
Hitler’s geostrategy, Couenhove-Kalergi defended Haushofer in his English-language autobiography, claiming that the General-Professor was a private critic of the Nazi movement. Furthermore, he considered Haushofer to be ‘a man of rare knowledge and culture, [who] had nothing of the usual arrogance of a Prussian officer, everything of the polite and courteous type of a Bavarian gentleman’. The authenticity of this sentiment might be judged by the fact that at this point, Couenhove-Kalergi’s association with Haushofer was costing him allies. Writing in 1943, Thomas Mann looked back in horror upon his dinner with Haushofer as evidence of the essential moral ambivalence of Pan-Europe, and therefore as an explanation for Mann’s decision not to participate in the 1943 Pan-European Congress in New York. Couenhove-Kalergi replied robustly, arguing:

‘With the same right, you could accuse Churchill of sitting at a table with Mussolini to win Italy for the Allied cause. I tried to do the same with Haushofer as long as he still wavered between Pan-Germanism and Pan-Europeanism, and my only regret is that I did not succeed in pulling Haushofer into our camp.’

Haushofer’s clearest statements reciprocating this respect came after the war, when interviewed by Edmund Walsh in August 1945 to determine his complicity in the Nazi regime. Needless to say, he had a clear incentive to emphasise his links to the prominently anti-Nazi Couenhove-Kalergi, and accordingly boasted of ‘My collaboration with Count Couenhove, in whose pan-European circles in Vienna, Prague, and so on I spoke before 1932, when I was also his

676 This infamy was fuelled by four texts published in the US in 1942: A. Dorpalen, The World of General Haushofer: Geopolitics in Action (Port Washington, NY: Farrar and Rinehart; 1942); J. Mattern, Geopolitik: Doctrine of National Self-Sufficiency and Empire (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press; 1942); H. Weigert, Generals and Geographers: The Twilight of Geopolitics (New York: Oxford University Press; 1942); Whittlesey, German Strategy of World Conquest. See also two 1943 US short propaganda films: the Oscar-nominated Plan for Destruction (dir. Edward Cahn), and Why We Fight #2: The Nazis Strike (dir. Frank Capra & Anatole Litvak), pp. 3:47 to 6:52. For analysis of how Haushofer gained this reputation in the war, see Murphy, "Hitler's Gestrategist". Writing from his wartime exile in the US, Couenhove-Kalergi repeated the legend of Haushofer’s ‘Geopolitical Institute in Munich’ (Couenhove-Kalergi, Crusade for Pan-Europe, 155)

677 Couenhove-Kalergi, Crusade for Pan-Europe, 155-156

678 Couenhove-Kalergi, Crusade for Pan-Europe, 155

679 ‘In Munich we even sat at a table with General Professor Haushofer,- a war geographer, who supplied German imperialism’s pseudo-scientific armour, and whose name is so closely associated with the world-conquest-enterprise of the Nazis that, if it came time to punish the guilty after this war, he would have to be the first one of all to be shot’ (Mann to Couenhove-Kalergi (24 Feb 1943), p.1, ACV, PP 1000/3/6).

guest in Vienna’.

681 After the war, and Haushofer’s suicide in 1946, and amidst the general process of denazification that saw geopolitics expurged from German geography, Coudenhove-Kalergi was one of the few to defend Haushofer, writing in 1949:

‘We [Coudenhove-Kalergi and his wife, Ida Roland] had known him [Haushofer] for years. In his Zeitsschrift für Geopolitik he had always found room for a friendly word about Pan-Europe, which seemed to him to accord with his own idea of Großraum.

…In spite of his Großraumpolitik, Haushofer remained a Bavarian monarchist. He regarded the Third Reich very critically and described Hitler, whom he knew personally, as a typical product of half-education

Coudenhove-Kalergi and Haushofer’s association was not just personal, but professional. Haushofer advertised the ZfG in the pages of Paneuropa, with the tagline ‘Whoever wants Europe – does not forget the world’ (fig. 19), a reminder both of their shared audience, their shared civilizational appeal to defend the interests of Europe, and of their shared belief in tackling politics at the global scale. Likewise, Coudenhove-Kalergi advertised both Paneuropa the book and Paneuropa the journal in the pages of the ZfG, claiming that the PEU was ‘fighting for the unification of Europe on the basis of equality, security and customs union’.

After Hitler’s 1933 banning of the German PEU had curtailed any further such formal cooperation, Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote to Haushofer, asking him to speak to Rudolf Hess about preventing the ban of the Paneuropa journal in Germany. Although in this instance Coudenhove-Kalergi’s plea went unanswered, as we shall see, Haushofer did not consider the ban to prevent him sharing his geographical opinion with Coudenhove-Kalergi in what he considered to be a private capacity.

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683 ‘kämpf für die Einigung Europas auf der Grundlage der Gleichberechtigung, Sicherheit und Zollunion’: ZfG 2(9) (September, 1925), end matter. He also advertised Held oder Heiliger (1927) in ZfG 5(1) (January 1928)

684 Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, Botschafter Europas, 236-237; Orluc, "Europe between Past and Future", 313n235; both citing Coudenhove-Kalergi to Haushofer (19 December 1933), RGVA, 554k/4/369, 217

685 Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, Botschafter Europas, 237
The links between Pan-Europeanism and geopolitik also extended beyond Haushofer and Coudenhove-Kalergi’s friendship. Take, for instance, Adolf Grabowsky, a political scientist whose 1928 book *Staat und Raum* was to prove a central text of geopolitics.\(^\text{686}\) From the 1926/27 academic year, Grabowsky led the ‘Geopolitical Seminar with World Political Exercises’ at the *Deutschen Hochschule für Politik (DHfP)* in Berlin, a liberal-democratic-leaning elite academy for politicians and journalists, set up with impetus from Friedrich Naumann, and funds from the PEU donor Robert A. Grabowsky, *Staat und Raum. Grundlagen räumlichen Denkens in der Weltpolitik* (Berlin: Zentralverlag, 1928)
Bosch.\textsuperscript{687} In the winter of 1927-28, the Geopolitical Seminar organized a lecture cycle specifically on ‘the Pan-European problem’,\textsuperscript{688} which included lectures by both friends and critics of Pan-Europe. The former included the German publicist, author and politician Georg Cleinow, who led the ‘Eurasian Seminar’ at the \textit{DHfP}, while the latter included Grabowsky himself, who lectured on ‘Pan-Europe and Russia’.\textsuperscript{689} In this lecture, and a 1928 article on the same theme,\textsuperscript{690} Grabowsky offered a sharp criticism of Pan-European thinking, but one that both took its target very seriously, and took care to praise both his colleagues like Cleinow who supported the movement, and the ‘humane, very likeable character of Count Coudenhove’.\textsuperscript{691} Grabowsky appreciated him as ‘an excellent speaker and a brilliant writer [whose] speeches and books have form and precision, which is rare in Germany’,\textsuperscript{692} noting furthermore:

‘Even sceptics felt that here a sincere, true believer was at work, a man who, without ulterior motives, committed himself to a cause.’\textsuperscript{693}

Though we will deal with the detail of Grabowsky’s criticisms later, broadly speaking they were that the PEU was inorganic, reactionary (in that it valorised political stasis), overly capitalistic, favoured the French, and drove a wedge between Central Europe and Russia. It is worth noting that after Grabowsky was dismissed from the \textit{DHfP} in 1933 (a Jewish-convert, Grabowsky fled to Switzerland in 1934),\textsuperscript{694} the Geopolitical Seminar was taken over by Karl’s son Albrecht Haushofer, a prominent

\begin{footnotes}
\item[688] A. Grabowsky, "Das Problem Paneuropa", \textit{Zeitschrift für Politik} 17 (1928) 673-704, 700.
\item[690] Grabowsky, "Das Problem Paneuropa".
\item[691] ‘Dazu trat als Attraktion die menschlich sehr sympathische Persönlichkeit des Grafen Coudenhove.’ (Grabowsky, "Das Problem Paneuropa", 673).
\item[692] ‘Er ist ein ausgezeichneter Redner und ein brillanter Schriftsteller. Seine Reden und Bücher haben, was in Deutschland selten ist, Form und Präzision’ (Grabowsky, "Das Problem Paneuropa", 673-674).
\item[693] ‘Auch Widerstrebenende spürten, daß hier ein lauterer, wahrhaft gläubiger Charakter am Werke war, ein Mensch, der sich ohne Hintergedanken für eine Sache einsetzt’ (Grabowsky, "Das Problem Paneuropa", 673).
\item[694] Murphy, \textit{Heroic Earth}, 106; Saint-Gille, \textit{La «Paneurope»}, 291n197. Grabowsky also broke with Haushofer’s circle of his own accord around this time, arguing for a more ‘scientific’ rather than applied geopolitics, in which it would be acknowledged as merely one method for interpreting the world, among many (A. Grabowsky, "Das Problem der
\end{footnotes}
geopolitiker in his own right.\textsuperscript{695} David Thomas Murphy has suggested, albeit cautiously, that this Seminar – Grabowsky sometimes referred to it as an ‘Institut’ in the 1930s – may have been one of the sources for the legend of an Institut für Geopolitik in Munich run by Karl Haushofer.\textsuperscript{696}

Pan-Europe and geopolitics were joined not by one or two links, but by a constellation of overlapping networks. Their literatures intersected, with Coudenhove-Kalergi’s works invariably appearing in geopolitical bibliographies and vice versa.\textsuperscript{697} Erich Obst reviewed many of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s works in the ZfG,\textsuperscript{698} and Obst’s own England, Europa und die Welt was reviewed in Paneuropa.\textsuperscript{699} There was crossover in participation in each of these spheres too. For instance, the Danish archaeologist, cultural geographer and geopolitiker Gudmund Hatt, while on one hand a Nazi collaborator,\textsuperscript{700} on the other hand attended the 1935 fourth Pan-European Congress in Vienna, where he participated in discussion in Commission XI, on unemployment and colonial matters (see chapter IV), arguing for the importance of retaining Anglo-Danish trade links in any economic bloc that excluded Britain.\textsuperscript{701} Ultimately, Pan-Europeanists and geopolitikers were appealing to the same audience, both in terms of men of influence that they might persuade, and the general public that they hoped to educate. Moreover, they were doing it in the same language, one that put faith in the
expansion of politico-economic space, and railed against both the nationalism that was ‘artificially’ balkanising these spaces, and the abstract universalism that paid no regard to the specificity of geography.

Geopolitics of Pan-Europe

Borders

Mention of the connection between Pan-Europe and geopolitics tends to assume the toxicity of the latter, such that analysis of this relationship becomes a matter of measuring the level of guilt-by-association that ought to be attributed to the PEU. However, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s interest in spatial reasoning was immediate and undeniable. Thus, Saint-Gille argues that Coudenhove-Kalergi’s plans were distinguished from other interwar proposals to unite Europe precisely because of their spatiality, in particular their inclusion of the notion of the frontier and the partitioning of the globe into continental blocs.\(^702\) Having staked out a non-determinist picture of the origins of geopolitical thought, we are now in a position from which to take a nuanced view of the way in which Pan-Europe itself used geopolitical arguments, sketching out a picture of global political geography that made its own plans look not only sensible, but necessary. That is, expanding on the pioneering work of Yannick Muet, we must view Coudenhove-Kalergi as one who did geopolitics without necessarily being a geographer – though, as we shall see, he actively pursued connections with geographers.\(^703\)

\(^{702}\) ‘Les idées paneuropéennes se distinguaient d’autres propositions européistes, qui se bornaient à envisager la coopération économique et diplomatique, par une réflexion sur la dimension géographique, incluant la notion de frontière et celle de la partition du globe en grands ensembles.’ (Saint-Gille, La « Paneurope », 287)

\(^{703}\) ‘Qu’ils aient été philosophes, journalistes, économistes, romanciers ou poètes, ces intellectuels pro-européens ont “fait de la géopolitique” sans pour autant être géographes’ (Y. Muet, Les géographes et l’Europe: L’idée européenne dans la pensée géopolitique française de 1919 à 1939 (Geneva: Institut européen de l’Université de Genève; 1996), 25). See also p.2 concerning ‘géopolitologues’
strongest justification for taking such a stance is that the geopolitikers themselves took Coudenhove-Kalergi’s ideas very seriously, believing that ‘Pan-Europe is a problem of geopolitics’. Accordingly, their criticisms were made within a geopolitical frame of reference in which just as many assumption about the nature of politics, history and geography were shared as were contested. In the remainder of this chapter, I analyse the geopolitics of Pan-Europe, both as it was proposed and as it was critiqued, in terms of two key elements of political space: borders and scale.

For Coudenhove-Kalergi, the definition of Europe was simultaneously and inseparably a geographical and ideological issue. Thus the questions of what Europe was and where its borders lay were intrinsically connected in Coudenhove-Kalergi’s writings, and essays he wrote upon either one of these topics would invariably also deal with the other. We can see this in his frequent attempts to build consensus on the Eastern border of Europe, which were both influenced by and sought to engage with contemporary political geographers. However, far from being the idiosyncratic theme that it may at first seem, his interest in defining the Eastern border was in fact a reaction to a specific political dilemma posed by the establishment of the body that Coudenhove-Kalergi’s campaign with Briand (see chapter I) had helped bring about: the League’s Commission of Enquiry for European Union (CEUE).

The dilemma was whether the CEUE, already comprised of the twenty-seven European member states of the League of Nations, ought to invite non-member European states to take part in the Commission’s activities. After a cursory first session in September 1930, at which Aristide Briand was appointed chairman and Eric Drummond secretary, the issue dominated the full second session,

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704 R. Pommrich, "Paneuropa", Weltpolitik und Weltwirtschaft 12 (1926) 453-458; quoted in Schöberl, „Es gibt ein großes und herrliches Land... “, 110
705 For instance, compare the substantively-similar “Europe – Idea and Fact” (ACV, PP 1000/72/6) and “Wo endet Europa?” (“Where does Europe end?”) (ACV, PP 1000/75/5)
706 I use the acronym used at the time for this body, which derives from its French title, Commission d’Étude Union Européenne.
which ran from 16-21 January 1931. This question was doubly thorny: firstly, it re-kindled the smouldering issue of the position of the regionalist CEUE within the universalist League, with the British foreign minister Arthur Henderson even arguing for the inclusion of whichever non-European states might want to participate, whether members of the league or not, on the basis that ‘the ideal and the spirit of the League is to include everybody’.707 And secondly, while most European states were already League members, the non-member states in question were those whose status as ‘European’ was most debatable: namely, Turkey and the USSR.708 Thus issues of League politics were overlain onto an issue of geography. The statesmen present at the meeting were understandably cautious at approaching the latter directly, with the Romanian Nicolae Titulesco warning that ‘We have not to define Europe, because that would lead us into a controversy from which we should never escape’.709 Nevertheless, the nature of the geography invoked was hinted at by Andreas Michalakopoulos, who in relaying the official Greek position that ‘from the economic and even from the geographical point of view, Turkey belongs to Europe rather than Asia’, outlined that states might ‘be considered as belonging to the European structure because of their history, their relations with Europe, or their economic systems’.710 Following a resolution where it was agreed that Turkey and the USSR (along with Iceland and the Free City of Danzig) were to send representatives to the CEUE for the discussion of economic questions only, at the third session of the CEUE the Russian Maxim Litvinoff wryly noted that ‘My presence here will, I am sure, greatly rejoice the hearts of all the geographers of the world, for it confirms, if only partially, the hypothesis that the territory of the former Russian

708 The other territories in this position, Iceland and the Free City of Danzig, were barely mentioned during the session.
709 LoN CEUE, “Minutes of the Second Session of the Commission”, p.20
710 Andreas Michalakopoulos, in LoN CEUE, “Minutes of the Second Session of the Commission”, p.22
Empire is still to be found in Europe’.  

Coudenhove-Kalergi enthusiastically welcomed the convening of the CEUE, claiming that it amounted to a ‘European Senate’, and was ‘no more and no less than the European replica of the Pan-American Union’. By asserting that the CEUE was the very political organ that the PEU had been campaigning for, he thus laid claim to it, and proceeded to treat it as Pan-Europe embodied. The so-called Europa-Konferenz (i.e. the January 1931 second session of the CEUE) was given top billing in Paneuropa, where Coudenhove-Kalergi’s conference report was featured as the lead article. He noted the geographical discussions at the meeting, writing that:

‘a provisional but reasonable solution has been found to the question of the European eastern border [Ostgrenze]: Russia and Turkey are invited to European economic discussions, without being politically affiliated with Pan-Europe’.

Furthermore, he used this attention as a springboard to develop this theme in the following two articles in the issue, “The Soviet Union and us” and “Turkey and us”. Here he again framed the issue geographically, asking

‘The first, fateful question to be passionately contested in the European Senate was that of the eastern border of Europe.

Should Europe stretch as far as the Dniester and the Maritza, or as far as the Pacific Ocean and the Euphrates?’

On the Soviet question, he argued – as he had done consistently since launching the movement – that Russia was a threat that Europe had to defend itself against, rather than consider incorporating. He


712 ‘Denn was sich „Studienkommission für die Europäische Union” nennt, ist nicht mehr und nicht weniger als die europäische Nachbildung der Panamerikanischen Union.’ (R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Europa-Konferenz", Paneuropa 7.1 (1931) 1-5, 1)

713 ‘Die Frage nach der europäischen Ostgrenze fand eine provisorische, aber vernünftige Lösung: Rußland und die Türkei werden zu den europäischen Wirtschaftsbesprechungen eingeladen, ohne daß über ihre politische Zugehörigkeit zu Paneuropa entschieden wird.’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Europa-Konferenz", 4)


715 ‘Die erste Schicksalsfrage, die im Europäischen Senat leidenschaftlich umkämpft wurde, war die europäische Ostgrenze. Soll Europa bis zum Dniester und der Maritza reichen oder bis zum Stillen Ozean und zum Euphrat?’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Sowjetunion und Wir", 7)
argued firstly that Russia would unbalance Pan-Europe, and secondly that Bolshevism was alien to European culture. That is, the inclusion of a Russian element with Pan-Europe would be both unworkable and toxic; in short, it would be political suicide. In his words, ‘nothing would be more senseless and dangerous than the inclusion of this mortal enemy of European culture in the European federation of states’.716

By contrast, he wrote, ‘as Soviet Russia is continually de-Europeanised, Turkey Europeanises at the same pace’.717 He wrote in glowing terms of Mustafa Kemal’s ‘European path’ toward establishing secular democracy in Turkey, describing Kemal as ‘a great leader fighting on Asian soil for European ideas’.718 Meanwhile, the advantages to Europe of a free sea route to the Black Sea meant that such an embrace would be mutually beneficial.719 However, Coudenhove-Kalergi sounded a note of caution too, warning that ‘all these advantages for Europe would be invalid if one day Turkey renounces European culture and, like Arabia, wants to pursue its own Islamic path of national renewal’.720 The cases of both the Soviet Union and Turkey show that for Coudenhove-Kalergi, the borders of Europe were, if not fluid, at the very least highly contingent. What they were contingent upon was rather diffuse, encompassing political systems, economic systems, religion and a vaguely-defined sense of culture, and well as a dose of realist geostrategy, but there was no doubt that the delimitation of Europe’s borders was a matter of social rather than natural science.

716 ‘Darum wäre nichts sinnloser und gefährlicher als die Aufnahme dieses Todfeindes der europäischen Kultur in den europäischen Staatenbund.’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Sowjetunion und Wir", 12)
717 ‘Während im letzten Jahrzehnt Sowjetrußland sich ständig enteuropäisiert - europäisiert sich in gleichem Tempo die Türkei.’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Türkei und Wir", 13)
718 ‘Hier kämpft ein großer Führer auf asiatischem Boden für europäische Ideen.’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Türkei und Wir", 13)
719 As he put it, ‘Europe could only gain from a union with Turkey’. (‘Europa könnte durch den Anschluß der Türkei nur gewinnen.’ Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Türkei und Wir", 13)
720 ‘Alle diese Vorteile für Europa wären aber hinfällig, wenn eines Tages die Türkei sich von der europäischen Kultur losagt und, wie Arabien, eigene islamitische Wege der nationalen Erneuerung gehen will.’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Türkei und Wir", 14)
For the League, the definition of Europe’s borders was a short-lived problem, firstly since Germany’s withdrawal in 1933 and Turkey and the USSR’s accession to the League in 1932 and 1934 respectively meant that Germany was now the only European non-member, fundamentally changing the complexion of the problem from semi-geographical to wholly political; and secondly because the CEUE itself had been effectively mothballed in 1932.\textsuperscript{721} However, for Coudenhove-Kalergi the issue remained at the forefront of his mind, and in 1935 he returned to it, this time seeking to engage a new constituency: academic geographers.\textsuperscript{722} ‘Since the professors of political geography,’ he explained, ‘are primarily responsible for the question of a possible revision of the European eastern frontier, I have addressed a survey to those very people, which reads as follows:

Where, in your opinion, does the eastern border of Europe lie?
I. On the Ural Border?
   - On the Russian-European border?
   - On the Russian-Chinese border?
II. In the Sea of Marmara?
   - On the Bulgarian-Turkish border?
   - On the Turkish-Persian border?
III. Any other limits?\textsuperscript{723}

\textsuperscript{721} See K. Williams to W.R. Bisschop (15 February 1938), LoN 50/8133/5928
\textsuperscript{722} The topic of what constituted a continent, and therefore where one drew the borders of Europe, had of course long occupied geographers. In its modern form it might be traced back to a seminal 1893 paper by Alfred Hettner (A. Hettner, "Über den Begriff der Erdteile und seine geographische Bedeutung", in Georg Kollm (ed.), \textit{Verhandlungen des zehnten Deutschen Geographentages zu Stuttgart am 5., 6. und 7. April 1893} (Berlin: Reimer; 1893) 188-198). For a commentary focusing on the liminal cases of Turkey and Russia, see H.-D. Schultz, "Europa, Russland und die Türkei in der “klassischen” deutschen Geographie”, in Paul Reuber, Anke Strüver, and Günter Wolkersdorfer (eds.), \textit{Politische Geographien Europas: Annäherungen an ein umstrittenes Konstrukt} (Münster: LIT Verlag; 2005) 25-54
\textsuperscript{723} ‘Da in erster Linie die Professoren der politischen Geographie zuständig sind für die Frage einer eventuellen Revision der europäischen Ostgrenze, habe ich eine Rundfrage an dieselben gerichtet, die folgenden Wortlaut hatte:
„Wo liegt nach Ihrer Meinung die Ostgrenze Europas?
An der Uralgrenze?
An der russisch-europäischen Grenze?
An der russisch-chinesischen Grenze?
Am Marmarameer?
An der bulgarisch-türkischen Grenze?
An der türkisch-persischen Grenze?
Eventuelle andere Grenzen?"
These surveys were sent out in April 1935 to Europe’s biggest names in political geography, most of whom responded to these questions. Strikingly, this included political geographers and geopolitikers based in Germany, two years after Hitler’s banning of the PEU. These included the leading historical geopolitiker Walther Vogel of the University of Berlin and the founding co-editor of the Zeitschrift für Geopolitik Franz Termer of the University of Würzburg, and other leading geographers including Walter Behrmann (at Goethe University Frankfurt), Robert Gradmann (at the University of Erlangen), Alfred Hettner (professor emeritus at Heidelberg University), Otto Schlüter (at the University of Halle), Carl Uhlig (at the University of Tübingen), Wilhelm Ule (professor emeritus at the University of Rostock) and Georg Wegemann (at the University of Kiel), as well as Alfred Philippson, who as a Jew had been banned from teaching in 1933 but who remained based in Bonn.

Outside of Germany, leading geopolitikers surveyed included Termer’s replacement as editor at the ZfG, Otto Maull (at the University of Graz), Hugo Hassinger (at the University of Vienna) and Gudmund Hatt (at the University of Copenhagen), while other political geographers across the continent were also surveyed.

In the article reporting his results, Coudenhove-Kalergi began by reiterating that political borders – or at least the Ostgrenze – were human constructs, not naturally given, writing:

‘Over the course of the millennium, the European eastern border has constantly shifted. For it was not geography but politics that defined this frontier.’

He noted that since the Duc de Sully, those attempting to unite Europe have debated this problem, and that since the western orientation of Peter the Great and Catharine the Great, Russia had generally

(R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Wo liegt die Ostgrenze Europas?", Paneuropa 11.10 (1935) 318-322, 319)

Vogel to Coudenhove-Kalergi (30 Apr 1935), PAN/EU 21, 554/4/285, 4-4ob

Philippson was ultimately sent to a concentration camp, but survived the war and returned to lecture at the University of Bonn (Troll, "Geographic Science in Germany", 107n4)

Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Wo liegt die Ostgrenze Europas"

‘Im Laufe der Jahrtausende hat sich die europäische Ostgrenze ständig verschoben. Denn es war nicht die Geographie, sondern die Politik, die diese Grenze bestimmt hat.’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Wo liegt die Ostgrenze Europas", 318)
been deemed as part of Europe, up to the Ural mountains. However, the World War and Russian Revolution had, he suggested, called this consensus into question. He then printed a table that reduced the lengthy and complex responses he had received into simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers to the survey questions. Some alternate answers were summarised, while responses that were more indeterminate or criticised the question were occluded, and marked down as dashes in the table.\(^{728}\) The results of the survey suggested general disagreement as to where Europe’s eastern border lay, which Coudenhove-Kalergi interpreted as proof that ‘it is by no means possible today to keep firmly to the old frontier’, and that ‘the question of the affiliation of Russia and Turkey to Europe is at least problematic’.\(^{729}\)

In 1937, Coudenhove-Kalergi renewed his attempt to build consensus on the location of Europe’s Ostgrenze as part of a wider survey of geographers, historians and cultural historians. This survey was itself conducted as preparation for the Pan-European School Conference, or to give it its full title, the First Pan-European Conference on the Teaching of European Geography and History, to be held from 25-27 November in Vienna.\(^{730}\) Originally intended as merely one element of a larger event, what would have been the fifth Pan-European Conference,\(^{731}\) the other elements of the agenda were soon

\(^{728}\) For the responses, see PAN/EU 21, 554/4/285: Walther Vogel (4-4ob), Fritz Jäger (97-97ob), Otto Maull (129-131), Karl Kogutowicz (104), Francesco Porro de Somenzi (175-179), August Tammekann (210-211); for the write-up, see Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Wo liegt die Ostgrenze Europas".

\(^{729}\) ‘Daß es also heute auf keinen Fall möglich ist, an der alten Grenzziehung eindeutig festzuhalten, sondern daß die Frage der Zugehörigkeit Rußlands und der Türkei zu Europa mindestens problematisch ist.’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Wo liegt die Ostgrenze Europas", 319)

\(^{730}\) ‘Die erste Paneuropa-Konferenz für europäischen Geographie und Geschichtsunterricht’. See Paneuropa: Geographie und Geschichte, ACV, PP 1000/219; p.3

\(^{731}\) After Vienna 1926, Berlin 1930, Basel 1932 and Vienna 1935. The fifth edition did not happen until New York 1943. For the plans as originally advertised in July 1937, see Paneuropa 13(6)
either dropped\textsuperscript{732} or postponed,\textsuperscript{733} leaving the event to be devoted to matters of geography, history and pedagogy. The first day, Thursday 25\textsuperscript{th}, was to be devoted to the education of geography in schools, the second day to history, and the third day to cultural history. However, in the event the first of these, geography, was clearly prioritised, with a full day of discussion, while Friday and Saturday’s programmes were limited to half-days.

This tripartite structure was reproduced in the pre-conference survey sent out to Europe’s leading geographers and historians, who were asked to submit their responses, whether or not they were able to attend the conference itself. The questionnaire comprised five questions under the heading ‘Geography’, seven under ‘History’ and four under ‘Cultural History’. Of the geographical questions, two pertained to Europe’s eastern border, one implicitly and one explicitly. First, Question 1 asked whether to retain the ‘official’ classification of the world into five continents,\textsuperscript{734} or whether to recognise Eurasia as a single continent subdivided into five sub-continents (namely, Europe, the Middle East, India, East Asia and the Sarmatian plains (i.e. Russia)).\textsuperscript{735} As well as tapping into the established geographical debate over whether (and how) to re-divide the earth’s surface into continents – certainly, the geopolitikers had ‘no doubt that the old scholastic classification of the continents is outdated’\textsuperscript{736} – Coudenhover-Kalergi was gesturing towards the specific argument of the geographers Alexander Supan and Ewald Banse (both of whom would go on to write key geopolitical texts).\textsuperscript{737} Supan had in 1913 argued that Eurasia formed a continental whole, and if Europe might be

\textsuperscript{732} As in the case of the sessions on on the press, agriculture and the PEU’s own AGM.

\textsuperscript{733} As in the case of the section devoted to the ‘Economic Centre’, which was re-packaged as a Conference on Natural Resources [Rohstoffkonferenz] and rearranged for 16-19 March 1938. However, the Germany invaded Austria on 12 March 1938, just days before the conference was due to start, ultimately forced the cancellation of this conference. (For conference planning, see Paneuropa 14(1):24-28; 14(2):52-54; 14(3):85-92. For notification of its postponement, see Centre Economique Paneuropéen/Paneuropäische Wirtschaftszentrale, circular to the membership (12 March 1938), received at LoN 15 March 1938, LoN, 10A/25880/22798)

\textsuperscript{734} i.e. Europe, Asia, Africa, America and Australia. Paneuropa: Geographie und Geschichte, ACV, PP 1000/219; p.9

\textsuperscript{735} The equivalence of ‘Sarmatian plains’ and ‘Russia’ was indicated by brackets in the original: ‘Sarmatische Ebene (Rußland)’ Paneuropa: Geographie und Geschichte, ACV, PP 1000/219; p.9

\textsuperscript{736} ‘Es ist kein Zweifel, daß die alte schulmäßige Einteilung der Kontinente überholt ist’ (Grabowsky, "Das Problem Paneuropa", 692)

\textsuperscript{737} Supan, Leitlinien der allgemeinen politischen Geographie; Ewald Banse’s 1932 Raum und Volk im Weltkriege.
described as a subcontinental peninsula, that certainly did not include Russia, which was part of the
Asian ‘trunk’.

Banse, meanwhile, had in 1912 reorganised the earth’s surface into fourteen
continents (see fig. 20), with Russia similarly removed from Europe and allotted its own continent
of ‘Great-Siberia’.

One can also see the influence of Mackinder’s notion of a united ‘Euro-Asia’,
divided into a (Russian) ‘heartland’ and four appendages: peninsular Europe, the ‘Nearer East’, China
and India.

Question 2 addressed the Russian question head-on, essentially repeating the 1935
survey by asking the location of Europe’s eastern border, and (pointedly) whether after the ‘upheaval’
of the world war and Russian revolution, it should still be drawn in the Urals.

Certainly, the questions were leading, and if their wording left any room for ambiguity over
the PEU’s stance, this was clarified by their most famous propaganda tool: the Pan-European World
Map. But if it is perhaps obvious what Coudenhove-Kalergi was trying to prove by asking his
questions, then how successful was the survey at fulfilling those aims? The first thing to note about
the survey responses is that their very breadth suggests a kind of performative Pan-Europeanism, the
organisation itself contributing to the European cooperation, community and consensus it sought to
reveal, albeit with certain conspicuous (and telling) lacunae. As in 1935, he received a wealth of
responses from prominent figures across the continent, including Michel Lhéritier, Marc Bloch,
Henri Hauser,\textsuperscript{745} Oskar Halecki,\textsuperscript{746} and émigré Germans like Fritz Jäger,\textsuperscript{747} Adolf Grabowsky\textsuperscript{748} and Hugo Hassinger.\textsuperscript{749} However, British figures were not surveyed, a marker of another of Europe’s borders not asked in the survey but asserted in its methodology. This elective absence was overshadowed by a more significant absence that Coudenhove-Kalergi had less control over: unlike 1935, this time he received only two responses from academics based in Germany. The first of these was again Willi Ule, the 76 year old emeritus professor at the University of Rostock.\textsuperscript{750} The second, more significantly, was none other than Karl Haushofer himself.\textsuperscript{751} Unfortunately for Coudenhove-Kalergi, for whom a response from Haushofer would have been quite a coup for the survey, Haushofer wrote again a couple of weeks later to ask for his response to be suppressed; this wish was respected,

\textsuperscript{745} PAN/EU 21, 554/4/286; 44
\textsuperscript{746} Paneuropa: Geographie und Geschichte, ACV, PP 1000/219; p.26
\textsuperscript{747} PAN/EU 21, 554/4/286; 48
\textsuperscript{748} Paneuropa: Geographie und Geschichte, ACV, PP 1000/219; p.22-23
\textsuperscript{749} PAN/EU 21, 554/4/286; 43
\textsuperscript{750} Paneuropa: Geographie und Geschichte, ACV, PP 1000/219; p.64
\textsuperscript{751} Haushofer to PEU (received 25 Nov 1937); HAEU, PAN/EU 21, 554/4/284, 166-167

Figure 20: Ewald Banse, ‘The geographical structure of the earth’s surface’ (1912). Source: E. Banse, "Geographie", Petermanns Geographische Mitteilungen 58:1-4, 69-74, 128-131; Tafel 1
and his answers were not printed alongside the other responses in the otherwise comprehensive conference report.\footnote{Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, Botschafter Europas, 338; citing Haushofer to Coudenhouse-Kalergi (received 15 Dec 1937), RGVA, 554k/4/284, 165. Haushofer’s name was similarly omitted from the index of participants in the conference report (Paneuropa: Geographie und Geschichte, ACV, PP 1000/219)}

As before, the content of the responses was mixed. Regarding the European Ostgrenze, the weight of opinion was that political borders were indeed changeable, being responsive to both politics (specifically, Russia’s political alienation from the West) and the ebb and flow of cultural influence as imprinted in the landscape. Reasoning thus, most agreed that Russia had been de-Europeanised, and that the Ostgrenze was now the Western border of the Soviet Union, though Hassinger cautiously argued that Russia was culturally if not politically an agent of the white ‘Europeanisation of the earth’.\footnote{Hassinger, PAN/EU 21, 554/4/286; 43} Grabowsky, previously so critical of the alienation of Russia, now did not dispute Bolshevik Russia was ‘anti-European’, but sardonically suggested that Nazi Germany was equally anti-European, and that therefore the Ostgrenze could be drawn between France and Germany.\footnote{Adolf Grabowsky, in Paneuropa: Geographie und Geschichte, ACV, PP 1000/219; p.22-23; 22.} Even those who argued for the border to remain at the Urals did not lay any claim on their constituting a ‘natural’ border, instead reasoning that as long as Siberia functioned as a colony to which people were deported this border retained meaning,\footnote{‘Solange Sibirien als Land der Deportation benützt wird, ist wohl die Urallinie als Europas Ostgrenze anzusehen.’ Alfred Meissner, a headmaster in Freudenthal/Bruntál, Czechoslovakia. Paneuropa: Geographie und Geschichte, ACV, PP 1000/219; p.44} or the vagueness of the Urals better suited the fact that the border between Europe and Asia had never been ‘sharp’.\footnote{Ule, Paneuropa: Geographie und Geschichte, ACV, PP 1000/219; p.64} Haushofer’s unpublished response was representative of many in asserting that ‘The Ural border was always an administrative and scholarly fiction’.\footnote{‘Die Uralgrenze war immer eine administrative [sic] und Gelehrten-Fiktion.’, Karl Haushofer, “Fragebogen zum beiliegender Program der Schulknoferenz” (received 25 Nov 1937), HAEU, PAN/EU554/4/284, 166} In short, by and large the responses were compatible on one hand with both contemporary geopolitics which held that borders were dynamic rather than fixed and contemporary landscape
geography which laid more emphasis upon man’s influence on the land (the ‘cultural landscape’ first developed by Otto Schlüter\(^{758}\) than the land’s influence on man, and on the other hand with Coudenhove-Kalergi’s overarching argument that the Soviet Union was no longer part of Europe.

However, while these responses were printed in full in the conference report, their influence was confined to these pages. The debate at the conference itself was more focused on pedagogy, and was chiefly attended not by the academic survey respondents, but by a mixture of teachers, administrators in the field of education, and representatives of various sections of the Pan-European Union. When it came to collating the survey respondents’ advice on what should be taught, the three conference conclusions (as publicly published\(^{759}\) were split between acknowledged Pan-European doctrine and vague platitudes:

1. that although in a physical sense Europe and Asia form one continent, Europe’s unity of culture and civilisation makes it act as a continent in its own right.
2. that in an economic and cultural sense the USSR acts as its own unit, and that therefore we can no longer place the border of Europe at the Urals
3. that European unity is not only based on cultural factors, but also on historical and geographical factors.\(^{760}\)

While these conclusions ought not to surprise anyone familiar with Coudenhove-Kalergi’s work from the 1923 *Pan-Europe* onward, they were clearly carefully crafted so as to be broadly compatible with the academic opinions that were received. If one might question his readiness to veer from his starting assumptions, the *Ostgrenze* and School Conference surveys show that he both sought out and prized the imprimatur of academic geography. While Coudenhove-Kalergi’s preoccupation with Europe’s eastern border was certainly indicative of a predilection for thinking his schemes through geographically, it also needs to be read as a response to a specific set of political circumstances that had originally raised the question, and to contemporary geopolitical academic debates about the

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\(^{758}\) This school of thought analysed the landscape as bearing the visible imprint of the cultural group that resided in it. See O. Schlüter, *Die Ziele der Geographie des Menschen* (Munich & Berlin: Oldenbourg; 1906); C.O. Sauer, “Recent Developments in Cultural Geography”, in Edward Cary Hayes (ed.), *Recent Developments in the Social Sciences* (Philadelphia and London: J.B. Lippincott Company; 1927) 154-212, 186-190

\(^{759}\) In both the December 1937 issue of *Paneuropa* and the hefty Conference Report *Paneuropa: Geographie und Geschichte*, ACV, PP 1000/219

\(^{760}\) *Paneuropa: Geographie und Geschichte*, ACV, PP 1000/219; p.3
Where Coudenhove-Kalergi departed from the geopolitical consensus was in refusing to see borders as a political problem in and of themselves, and therefore also refusing to see their revision as a panacea. Rather, the PEU position from its inception was that the redrawing of borders was both inescapably incendiary, since ‘whoever tampers with those frontiers [laid down at Versailles] tampers with the peace of Europe’, and in any case futile:

‘if the frontiers were changed in Central Europe there would not be justice instead of injustice but new injustices would probably be created in the place of the old ones. Therefore the only way to get out of the difficulty in this part of Europe is to make the frontiers invisible, to create a federation of States resembling the structure in Switzerland.’

In short, Coudenhove-Kalergi and the geopolitikers agreed with the Ratzellian idea that borders were to some degree a political fiction, but disagreed that revising them would create any happier an outcome. ‘Europeans’, Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote, ‘must come to realize the truth that the demand for justly drawn frontiers cannot be satisfied’. Naturally, this stance attracted strong criticism among geopolitikers, with Adolf Grabowsky criticising Coudenhove-Kalergi for advocating a reactionary political ‘stasis’ that did not reflect the changing political realities:

‘The disregard of the European border problem practically means the perpetuation of unjust boundaries of the peace treaties. A worse attack on the dynamic of history is unthinkable.’

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761 Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Pan-Europe*, 125
762 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1938, “A Central European View of the European Situation”; speech at Chatham House; ACV, PP 1000/72/1, 1438, p.8. On Switzerland as a model for Europe, see the following section; on the ‘invisible’ borders between Swiss cantons, see Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Europe Must Unite*, 47
763 This understanding extended to the géopolitique of Jacques Ancel, who though critical of German geopolitik, similarly described borders ‘less as being some category of “natural” phenomena as rather “political isobars” indicating the pressures of power at any given time and of necessity changing as the balance of power itself changed.’ (Parker, "Ratzel, the French School and the birth of Alternative Geopolitics", 960; citing J. Ancel, *Géographie des frontières* (Paris: Gallimard; 1938))
764 Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Pan-Europe*, 169
765 ‘Die Nichtachtung des europäischen Grenzproblems bedeutet praktisch die Verewigung der ungerechten
Haushofer echoed this precisely, criticising Pan-Europe for its ‘antidynamic’ acceptance of the status quo.\(^{766}\) By preserving in aspic the perceived injustices of Versailles, the defeated powers would remain wronged and resentful, which Grabowsky described as an ‘unpacifistic result of the supposedly pacifist Pan-European thought’\(^{767}\).

However, the argument over revision was merely a symptom of a deeper disagreement, which ranged Coudenhove-Kalergi against not only geopolitics, but also the Wilsonian doctrine of self-determination. Namely, that rather than accepting the organicist model of the state and its normative spatial congruence between state and nation, Coudenhove-Kalergi advocated a divorce of nation from state, or to adopt an analogy with religion, a national ‘secularisation’ of the state.\(^{768}\) There was no reason, he argued, to accept the ‘dogma’\(^{769}\) that the nation has a blood tie to the state, for ‘nations … are not communities of blood, but communities of spirit’.\(^{770}\) The geographical implications were clear: while states were intrinsically territorial, nations were not, since ‘the nation is a realm of the spirit and cannot be delimited by frontier-lines’; rather, ‘it moves on a different plane’.\(^{771}\) Such talk was anathema to the geopolitikers. As Grabowsky outlined in his critique,

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\text{‘Coudenhove racks his brains over what a nation is, and declares that it is certainly not a blood-communion. Well, no reasonable person denies that racial purity is not present is any nation today; they are all more or less mixed. But for every nation, a certain type of mixture is characteristic … The whole thing is best known as } \text{Volksstum. It is based on blood [Blut], coalesced with a defined soil [Boden], and looks back on a common historical and cultural fate. When Coudenhove calls the nation merely a realm of the spirit, above all he underestimates the deep attachment to the land. Coudenhove judges purely as an intellectual}.
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\(^{766}\) Haushofer, Geopolitik der Pan-Ideen, 80
\(^{767}\) ‘ein unpazifistisches Ergebnis des angeblich so pazifistischen paneuropäischen Gedankens.’ (Grabowsky, "Das Problem Paneuropa", 687)
\(^{768}\) He ran with this metaphor, writing: ‘It is incumbent on every cultured individual to bring it about that, as religion is today, so tomorrow nationality shall be the private concern of every human being. The future separation between Nation and State will be a cultural deed as great as was the separation between Church and State. The concept of a “State People” will be an anachronistic as great as the concept of a State Church, and will give way to the principle: a Free Nation in a Free State.’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 167)
\(^{769}\) Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 152
\(^{770}\) Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 154
\(^{771}\) Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 167-168
and therefore remains on the surface.”  

Grabowsky proceeded to criticise Pan-European thinking for promoting the ‘blurring’ of national sovereignty as the borders between nations dissolve, warning that ‘Blurred states can only give rise to similarly blurred entities’.  

In his recognition of the difference between geopolitical and Pan-European thinking, Grabowsky was correct: Coudenhove-Kalergi was indeed arguing for a deterritorialisation of the nation from the rigid geography of state space. However, as his obsession with Europe’s Ostgrenze would amply demonstrate, he was emphatically not arguing for the deterritorialisation of politics in general: while drawing the limits of the nation was seen as both inflammatory and impossible, drawing the limits of Europe was for Coudenhove-Kalergi clearly a necessity. Put in more theoretical terms, what was being argued for was an up-scaling of the territoriality of the body politic.

**Scale**

There were three key rhetorical strategies Coudenhove-Kalergi employed to argue that politics was being upscaled from the state- to the European-level: first, the assertion that the true, basal interconnections of social solidarity and shared culture were not those of the nation but rather those of European civilisation; second, that a number of the controversial elements of a Pan-European polity (including, most notably, the feasibility of a multi-national state) had already proved their efficacy in two states that functioned almost as metonyms for Pan-Europe; and third, the hitching of scale to a

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772 ‘Coudenhove zerbricht sich den Kopf darüber, was eine Nation sei und erklärt, sie sei jedenfalls keine Blutsgemeinschaft. Nun, kein Vernünftiger leugnet mehr, daß Reinrassigkeit heute bei keiner Nation vorhanden ist, sie sind alle mehr oder weniger gemischt. Aber für jede Nation ist doch ein bestimmter Mischtypus charakteristisch … Das ganze nennt man am besten Volkstum. Es besteht auf der Grundlage des Bluts, verschmilzt mit einem bestimmten Boden und sieht auf ein gemeinsames historisches und kulturelles Schicksal zurück. Wenn Coudenhove die Nation lediglich ein Reich des Geistes nennt, so ist hierbei vor allem die tiefe Schollenbindung verkannt. Coudenhove urteilt rein als Intellektueller und bleibt deshalb an der Oberfläche’ (Grabowsky, "Das Problem Paneuropa", 678)  

773 ‘Aus verwaschenen Staaten kann auch nur wieder ein verwaschenes Gebilde werden’ (Grabowsky, "Das Problem Paneuropa", 698)
progressivist notion of history such that the ‘upscaling of politics’ became reified as a fundamental law of political geography that had to be adhered to if Europeans wanted to retain a leading position in world affairs. Each of these strategies invoked different logics, and were underpinned by different (and occasionally contradictory) notions of time and space, so they must be analysed separately in order to build a complete picture of the role of scale in Pan-European thought.

The first, then, was the assertion of a European nation, though in Coudenhove-Kalergi’s reasoning this was less an attachment of the accoutrements of nationhood to the fabric of Europeanism, and more a recognition that the commonalities of European nations had always been stronger and more significant than their differences. Thus, he wished to respect both the emotive attachment between people and polity, and the specific power of nationalism, but sought to argue for a complementary, supra-national attachment that might harness this power for a Pan-European Union. Indeed, he acknowledged the necessity of such an attachment at the outset of his campaign, in the 1923 Pan-Europe:

‘Before it can start its existence on the political map, Pan-Europe must first take root in the hearts and minds of Europeans. … The Pan-European sense of solidarity, the European sense of patriotism, must establish itself as the crown and complement of the national sentiment.’

Indeed, he proceeded to argue that this task was the only thing preventing Pan-Europe, writing that ‘Psychological, and no longer political, obstacles stand in the way of its federation today’. However, crucially, Coudenhove-Kalergi believed that this sense of European patriotism was not something new that had to be forged, but something latent within Europeans that had to be uncovered. He reasoned,

‘The cultural unity of the Occident gives us the right to speak of a European nation, which is linguistically and politically divided into a variety of groups. If that Pan-European cultural sense succeeds in asserting itself, then every good German, Frenchman, Pole, and Italian will also be a good European.’

774 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 190-191
775 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 121
776 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 163
The problem was one of education, specifically the division of European culture into national literatures since the abandonment of Latin as a common European language, which resulted in a partial view since ‘the nationalist comes to know and to love only the works of his own literature, only the thoughts and deeds of his own heroes’. This partiality needed to be corrected:

‘the peoples of Europe must learn to know, as well as their own, the intellectual leaders of their neighbors, and to estimate how much they owe, or might owe, to them. … In the hearts of Europeans the national pantheon is to be widened till it becomes a European pantheon, in which Goethe would take his place beside Shakespeare, Voltaire beside Nietzsche, Hus beside Spinoza.’

Practically, Coudenhove-Kalergi had a number of prescient suggestions as to how this might be accomplished, which from the outset included ‘linguistic attainments [i.e. education] and the production of numerous translations’ and ‘An inter-European exchange of teachers, students, and children’. These ideas would continue to be developed and fleshed out in the decades that followed. Indeed, if we return to the 1937 Pan-European School Conference, but focus not on the survey but instead on the conference itself, we see precisely these issues being discussed. The ‘conference suggestions’ that made it into the final report included a variety of interesting ideas, including recommendations to expand the teaching of European Economic and Cultural Geography, to teach cross-European intellectual and social movements, to promote the idea that the national and European ideas were mutually enriching, to encourage the use of universal history timelines and maps to enliven these lessons, and the expansion of international students’ correspondence and the cross-border exchange of educational films. In short, the teaching of history and geography was to be the primary site of the inculcation of a sense of pan-European nationalism.

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777 Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Pan-Europe*, 159
778 Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Pan-Europe*, 161-162
779 Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Pan-Europe*, 161
780 Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Pan-Europe*, 171
781 Including specifically ‘map lessons to contrast shattered Europe with the large economic areas [wirtschaftliche Großräume] of the British Empire, USSR, North- and South America and East Asia’ (*Paneuropa: Geographie und Geschichte*, ACV, PP 1000/219, 3)
It is important to point out that Coudenhove-Kalergi was at pains to say that this European identity needed to be more than mere cosmopolitanism:

‘National chauvinism cannot be overcome by an abstract internationalism; it can be overcome only by deepening and broadening national cultures into a general European culture; by spreading the truth that all national cultures in Europe are closely interwoven parts of a great and homogeneous European culture.’782

Nevertheless, the assertion that bonds of belonging could be formed with any other political scale than that of the state was sure to be denounced by the geopolitikers. They saw such claims as emblematic of the artificiality of the Pan-European aspirations, which seemed to them ridiculous when juxtaposed with the vaunted ‘organic’ nature of nationalism. ‘The Pan-European man,’ wrote Grabowsky, ‘is but a caricature of European man’.783 However, behind these accusations of abstraction and artifice, a somewhat darker insinuation lay; namely, that Pan-Europeanism was a vessel for Jewish internationalism. This was this line of Karl Christian von Loesch’s 1932 critique of Pan-Europe:

‘Only mongrels and people not firmly anchored in a Volksstum wish to create a corresponding European nation, a goal which is neither attainable nor worthwhile’.784

This ad hominem attack sought to lump Pan-Europeanism in with other forms of internationalism deemed dangerous to the state, whether Jewish, socialist or capitalist, while reminding readers of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s mixed race background and his Jewish wife. While the venom of this attack is certainly indicative of the antisemitism that underlay suspicion of Coudenhove-Kalergi, it speaks also to sensitivity regarding the need to distantiate Pan-European claims of a European nation from the general issue of European cultural unity, which had widespread support from both liberals and conservatives.

782 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 161
783 ‘der Paneuropäer … ist nur eine Karikatur des europäischen Menschen’, (Grabowsky, "Das Problem Paneuropa", 704)
The second way in which Coudenhove-Kalergi employed scale was by identifying places that, he claimed, metonymically stood for Europe, or at least the Europe envisaged by the PEU. Of course, in the interwar years, the ‘spirit of Locarno’ entered popular discourse, while ‘Geneva’ became indelibly associated with its tenant organisation, the League of Nations. However, in the case of the PEU, two places in particular – Austria and Switzerland – were adopted in a more rigorously analytical fashion, and held not only as representative of a certain political ideal, but as proof positive of the viability of this ideal: each was the subject of dedicated pamphlets extolling their ‘European mission’. In these examples, scale functioned fractal-like, with microcosm and macrocosm mirroring each other: Europe was seen through the lens of its constituent state, while this state was seen through the lens of its capacity to act as a model to follow.

Given Coudenhove-Kalergi’s heritage as an Austrian aristocrat, and upbringing in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the positioning of Austria as a model for Europe was entirely in keeping with his general tendency to see the future of Europe in his own vanished past. Certainly, his sense of nostalgia for the past and patriotism in the present coloured the judgement somewhat, as it did in his private wartime plea to Churchill to restore South Tyrol ‘to its Austrian homeland after years of cruel oppression’ by Italy, or in the postwar speech he gave at his alma mater, the Theresianum Academy in Vienna, on “Austria and Europe”. However, what elevated the significance of Austria beyond mere partiality were Coudenhove-Kalergi’s interwar efforts to more rigorously analyse why it served

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785 Die Sendung der Schweiz heißt: Europa’ (R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, [c.1933] Die Schweiz in Gefahr!: ACV, PP 1000/219, p.5, emphasis in original); Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1933, Österreichs europäische Sendung; ACV, PP 1000/219
786 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi to W.S. Churchill (17 Oct 1944) ACV, PP 1000/3/7. This contrasted with his carefully reasoned and highly detailed public memorandum suggesting the partition and subsequent plebiscite on South Tyrol, to be organised by neutral observers. See “Memorandum: Solution of the problem of the Southern Tyrol or Alto Adige and Trentino” (n.d.), ACV, PP 1000/71/12
787 “Oesterreich und Europa”, speech given at Theresianischen Akademie (21 Apr 1964), ACV, PP 1000/72/7
as a model; how, in his words, ‘History, geography and culture determine Austria to be the standard-bearer of the European idea; the focus of European culture; the centre of the European community’.\textsuperscript{788}

In fact, the argument for Austria as a model for Europe to follow was made in two different registers. The first of these was a more technical analysis of Austrian political innovations that could prove useful precedents. For example, in 1929 he looked back to the agreements upon which the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary was established in 1867, noting that the ‘minimum communion’ between the polities entailed the setting up of three joint ministries: a joint Treasury, a joint Ministry of War and a joint Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the implication, of course, was that these were also the minimum first steps for a Pan-European state.\textsuperscript{789} A more common touchstone was the multinationalism of the Habsburg state, and its citizens:

‘This European landscape has shaped European people. People with open hearts and open eyes; free from nationalist one-sidedness. For innumerable races and peoples have mixed to create the Austrian people.’\textsuperscript{790}

In Coudenhove-Kalergi’s eyes, the Habsburg Empire managed ‘to connect all these great and small nations through a common, supranational [übernationalen] patriotism’,\textsuperscript{791} of the sort that he wished to replicate in his European nation. He even argued that this apparent acceptance of multinationalism meant that an ‘Austrian solution’ to the unification of all-deutschland was not the ethnically homogenous state that (German-based) Pan-Germans envisaged, but one that respected all nations, and could guarantee equal rights and security to minority nations; he called this ‘the German mission

\textsuperscript{788} ‘Geschichte, Geographie und Kultur bestimmen Österreich zum Bannträger des europäischen Gedankens; zum Brennpunkt der europäischen Kultur; zum Mittelpunkt der europäischen Gemeinschaft.’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1933, Österreichs europäische Sendung; ACV, PP 1000/219, p.3)

\textsuperscript{789} R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Die Schweiz als Vorbild", Paneuropa 5.10 (1929) 1-5, 4

\textsuperscript{790} ‘Diese europäische Landschaft hat europäische Menschen gestaltet. Menschen mit offenen Herzen und offenen Augen; frei von nationalistischer Einsicht. Denn unzählige Rassen und Völker haben sich gemischt, um den österreichischen Menschen zu schaffen.’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1933, Österreichs europäische Sendung; ACV, PP 1000/219, 5; emph in orig)

\textsuperscript{791} ‘all diese großen und kleinen Nationen zu verbinden durch einen gemeinsamen, übernationalen Patriotismus.’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1933, Österreichs europäische Sendung; ACV, PP 1000/219, 5)
of Austria’. Quite aside from the fact that this outlook was (as we have seen) not borne out by the rabidly antisemitic and ultra-nationalistic tenor of Austrian Pan-Germanism, the Austria of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s imagination was clearly set against an Anschluss that would merely incorporate Austria into an enlarged German state. Rather, he offered his own take on the concept, arguing that in fact

‘Pan-Europe means Anschluss: not only to Germany, but also to the Danube states, to Italy, to Switzerland. Anschluss all round.’

Austrians would choose such a path, he reasoned, not only because they were acculturated to multinationalism, but because it would upgrade Austria’s own standing and field of influence. Having been rendered a minor regional power at Versailles, Austria’s options were to become a peripheral province under a German Anschluss, a significant regional power leading a multinational Mitteleuropa that excluded Germany, or a European power broker within Pan-Europe. The choice was clear: as he wrote in 1930, ‘Austria’s future is now no longer Mitteleuropean but Pan-European’.

This rationalist discussion of Austria’s contribution to developing ‘European’ multi-national politics, past and present, was accompanied by a more emotionally charged, almost spiritual register, one which was yet clearer in its debt to the concepts and terminology of geopolitics. For instance, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s 1933 article began:

‘Each state has a life-giving idea that animates its political form. A historic mission. The mission of Austria is called: Europe.’

This register too invoked history and geography, though in much broader strokes. Geographically, the

792 Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1933, Österreichs europäische Sendung; ACV, PP 1000/219, 12
793 ‘Paneuropa bedeutet Anschluß: nicht nur an Deutschland, sondern auch an die Donaustaten, an Italien, an die Schweiz. Anschluß all round’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1933, Österreichs europäische Sendung; ACV, PP 1000/219, 13)
794 ‘Österreichs Zukunft ist heute nicht mehr mitteleuropäisch, sondern paneuropäisch.’ (R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Mitteleuropa", Paneuropa 6.3 (1930) 85-91, 87)
795 ‘Jeder Staat hat eine lebenspendende Idee, die seine politischen Formen beseelt. Eine historische Sendung. Diese Sendung Österreichs heißt: Europa.’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1933, Österreichs europäische Sendung; ACV, PP 1000/219, 3; emph in orig)
argument ran that Austria lay at the centre of Europe, the crossing point of its great natural and man-made thoroughfares:

‘On the path of the Danube, the most powerful river in Europe; on the massif of the Alps, the central high mountain range of Europe.

At the crossroads of the European roads leading from west to east and from north to south; from Scandinavia and Germany to Italy, and from France and Spain to the Orient.’

In other words, Austria’s centrality heightened the stakes of her mission, forcing her to ‘choose either to become the battlefield of a new world war - or the centre of the European cultural community’.

However, paradoxically, this argument about Austria’s role at the centre of Europe was complemented by an argument that she had for centuries fulfilled a role at the border of Europe. Historically, Coudenhove-Kalergi claimed, Austria had acted as a bulwark against the various ‘barbarians’ of the East: the Avars, the Mongols, the Turks, Islam, and now Bolshevism. He called this Austria’s ‘thousand-year fight for Europe’, thus adapting both the Nazis’ claims of a ‘thousand-year Reich’, and the Christian millennialism that influenced it. This marginality was cause for suspicion among critics of Pan-Europe, who agreed that Austria metonymically stood for Pan-Europe, but saw this negatively. In Hitler’s Zweites Buch, part of his direct criticism of Pan-Europe was precisely Coudenhove-Kalergi’s attachment to Austria, and its capital in particular: ‘It is the rootless spirit of the old Reich capital of Vienna – that hybrid city of Orient and Occident – that speaks to us in this way’. In a way, Hitler’s argument was the same as Coudenhove-Kalergi’s: each agreed that multi-national Vienna lay at the margins of a Europe of insular nation-states, and at the heart of a

796 ‘An der Straße der Donau, des mächtigsten Stromes Europas; an dem Massiv der Alpen, dem zentralen Hochgebirge Europas. [...] An der Kreuzung der europäischen Wege, die von Westen nach Osten führen und von Norden nach Süden; von Skandinavien und Deutschland nach Italien und von Frankreich und Spanien nach dem Orient’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1933, Österreichs europäische Sendung; ACV, PP 1000/219, 5; emph in orig)
797 ‘Es kann wählen: entweder Kriegsschauplatz zu werden eines neuen Weltkrieges - oder Mittelpunkt der europäischen Kulturgemeinschaft.’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1933, Österreichs europäische Sendung; ACV, PP 1000/219, 13-14; emph in orig)
798 Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1933, Österreichs europäische Sendung; ACV, PP 1000/219, 4
However, Austria was not the only model for Pan-Europe, and was indeed eclipsed in this regard by Switzerland. The connections between Switzerland and internationalism are well established, and in the interwar period the League’s Geneva base made this association inescapable. That said, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s reasoning for citing Switzerland as a model to follow in numerous pamphlets, articles and chapters, and the attention he devoted to canvassing opinion there, ran along somewhat different lines, and did not touch upon its significance as a residence of international organisations. For Coudenhove-Kalergi, the essence of Switzerland was not international, but European.

Like Austria, Switzerland was invoked in two different registers: one more technical, and one more abstract. Writing in the first register, Coudenhove-Kalergi argued that ‘all the problems facing Pan-Europe on a large scale are to be found in microcosm in Switzerland, and Switzerland has solved all these problems in ingenious ways’. The first of these problems was that of multinationalism. ‘Switzerland,’ Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote, ‘daily delivers by its mere existence proof that the European national hatred is artificial and unnecessary; that the three greatest nations of the continent, German, French and Italian, can live together peacefully in full equality and work together in an

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801 Coudenhove-Kalergi, [c.1933] *Die Schweiz in Gefahr!*; ACV, PP 1000/219; *Schweizer National- und Ständeräte zum Programm der Paneuropa-Union / L'opinion de Conseillers Nationaux et de Conseillers des Etats sur le programme de l'Union Paneuropéenne* (Zurich/Vienna: Paneuropa-Verlag; c.1937) (ACV, PP1000, 219)


804 These arguments, of course, were not unique to Coudenhove-Kalergi: see, for example, D.d. Rougemont and C.T. Muret, *The Heart of Europe: Switzerland* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce; 1941)

805 ‘Denn alle Probleme, denen Paneuropa im großen gegenübersteht, finden sich im kleinen in der Schweiz; und alle diese Probleme hat die Schweiz in genialer Weise gelöst.’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Schweiz als Vorbild", 1)
organized polity’. The pertinence of this lesson, he argued, meant that a federal Europe needed to take its cues not from the USA, whose linguistic unity made its circumstances incomparable, or the 1815 German Confederation [Deutscher Bund], which had proved ineffective, but rather from the Swiss Confederation [Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft]. Switzerland had ‘shown the way to make boundaries between states and even between national units invisible, to respect national and religious minorities, to find a sound compromise between the independence of federated states and the benefits of a political and economic union’. In short, ‘To find peace and union, Europe would only have to copy large parts of the Swiss constitution and adapt a number of Swiss principles and institutions to its wider problems’. In addition to these constitutional lessons, Coudenhove-Kalergi also wished to ape its policy of neutrality, its ability to stand above the squabbles of nations, which had survived the ‘acid test’ of WWI. He wrote admiringly that ‘Switzerland has performed the miracle of preserving its neutrality and inner peace, while Germans, French, Italians, and Austrians fought at its borders’. In deed and in thought, Switzerland was nothing less than the vanguard of Pan-European politics; ‘the realization of Pan-Europa’, Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote, ‘means the moral conquest of Europe by Switzerland’.

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807 See, for example, Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1933, Österreichs europäische Sendung; ACV, PP 1000/219, 9
808 He called the German Confederation a ‘monstrosity’ [Mißgeburt]; see Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Schweiz als Vorbild", 4
809 Though generally inconsistent on whether the PEU should be federal or confederal, when referring to Switzerland he often spoke of a ‘European Eidgenossenschaft’ to emphasise the point that it should look to the Swiss rather than the German example (Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Schweiz als Vorbild", 4; Coudenhove-Kalergi, [c.1933] Die Schweiz in Gefahr!; ACV, PP 1000/219, p.10)
810 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Crusade for Pan-Europe, 143
812 ‘Die Schweiz hat das Wunder vollbracht, ihre Neutralität und ihren inneren Frieden zu wahren, während an ihren Grenzen Deutsche und Franzosen, Italiener und Österreicher miteinander kämpften.’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Schweiz als Vorbild", 3)
813 ‘die Verwirklichung Paneuropas bedeutet die moralische Eroberung Europas durch die Schweiz’, Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Schweiz als Vorbild", 1; see also Coudenhove-Kalergi, [c.1933] Die Schweiz in Gefahr!; ACV, PP 1000/219, p.10
From 1933, Coudenhove-Kalergi began to strike a different tone, maintaining that Pan-Europe needed to aspire to the Swiss model, but arguing that the Swiss now themselves equally needed Pan-Europe to be its guarantor, in order to survive in its current form. Switzerland, he argued, faced an existential dilemma of Shakespearean proportions: to be or not to be. Militarily, in a world of Great Powers and modern warfare, Switzerland needed a powerful backer lest it suffer the same fate as Belgium in 1914. Socio-politically, Switzerland needed Europe to buy into the notion political multinationalism, lest it too fall to the ideology that held the borders of state, nation and language to be normatively congruent. As Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote, ‘if the belief prevails that nation and linguistic community are identical, if extreme nationalism prevails in Europe, Switzerland cannot hold firm against the three great nations that surround it. Only a renewal of the European idea ensures the future of Switzerland’

In other words, the Swiss example and the Pan-Europe that would be built in its image were mutually reinforcing. This attempt not only to portray Switzerland as showing the way to Pan-Europe, but to convince the Swiss that they needed to actively lead Europe there, may be seen in two surveys designed to canvass the opinion of Swiss politicians. In 1926, the PEU co-organised with the ‘Schweizerischen Vereinigung für eine europäische Staaten-Union’ (Swiss Association for a

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815 ‘The European peace program is now more urgent for Switzerland than in former times because of the high probability that in any future world war Switzerland’s neutrality will be no more respected than was the neutrality of Belgium in the past: lest Switzerland become not only an area of transit, but a theatre of war.’ (‘Das europäische Friedensprogramm ist heute für die Schweiz dringender als in früheren Zeiten, weil die große Wahrscheinlichkeit besteht, daß in einem künftigen Weltkrieg die Neutralität der Schweiz ebensowenig respektiert wird, wie im vergangenen die Neutralität Belgiens: daß also die Schweiz nicht nur Durchmarschgebiet wird, sondern Kriegsschauplatz.’ Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Die europäische Schweiz", 188)

816 ‘If the extreme nationalism in Europe triumphs, ... the state borders will be adjusted to the linguistic borders.’ (“Siegert der extreme Nationalismus in Europa, ... die Staatsgrenzen werden den Sprachgrenzen angeglichen werden”; Coudenhove-Kalergi, [c.1933] Die Schweiz in Gefahr!; ACV, PP 1000/219, 3)

817 ‘wenn der Glaube sich durchsetzt, daß Nation und Sprachgemeinschaft identisch sind, wenn der extreme Nationalismus in Europa siegt, kann die Schweiz sich gegen die drei großen Nationen, die sie umgeben, nicht halten. Nur eine Erneuerung der europäischen Idee sichert die Zukunft der Schweiz’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Die europäische Schweiz", 188)

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European Union) the distribution of a survey among the members of the Swiss National Council (i.e. lower house) and Council of States (i.e. upper house), asking 3 questions:

1. Do you think the creation of the United States of Europe is desirable?
2. Do you think the creation of the United States of Europe is possible?
3. Do you believe that Switzerland could and should take the initiative in some way?"818

Despite the PEU’s involvement, the survey was deliberately not couched in Pan-European terms, so as to allow the respondents to reply in the general rather than on the specifics of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s scheme.819 The response rate was low (61 out of 300), but the responses themselves were broadly positive on all three questions. Some respondents, like National Councilor Hans Oprecht, even took the same line that Coudenhove-Kalergi would, writing that ‘The Swiss Confederation constitutes a political model for the United States of Europe’.820 A decade later, in 1937, the PEU decided to repeat the exercise, again surveying the members of the Swiss Councils, but this time asking which of nine listed Pan-European policies they supported.821 The 108 respondents who agreed for their submissions to be made public were collated in a booklet listing their responses. Even now that the survey was specifically and explicitly tied to the political programme of the PEU, the

818 ‘1. Halten Sie die Schaffung der Vereinigten Staaten von Europa für wünschenswert?
2. Halten Sie die Schaffung der Vereinigten Staaten von Europa für möglich?

819 As Werner Schmid said in an article reporting the results, ‘The description of the problem of the United States of Europe in any one way, such as the Coudenhoven pan-European program, was deliberately avoided. Every respondent should be given the opportunity to imagine for themselves, as he sees fit, to think of its emergence however he wanted to’ (‘Dabei wurde absichtlich vermieden, das Problem der Vereinigten Staaten von Europa in irgend einer Weise, etwa im Sinne des Coudenhoveschen paneuropäischen Programms, zu umschreiben. Jeder Befragte sollte die Möglichkeit haben, sich dieselben vorzustellen, wie es ihm Paßte, ihre Entstehung sich zu denken, wie er wollte.’, Schmid, "Vereinigte Staaten von Europa", 196)


821 Briefly, these were the establishment of a European: 1) federation, 2) federal court. 3) military alliance, 4) customs union, 5) collective colonial system, 6) currency, as well as 7) respect for national culture as the foundation of European cultural community, 8) protection of national and religious minorities, and 9) the collaboratation of Europe with other groups of states within a universal League of Nations. (Schweizer National- und Ständeräte zum Programm der Paneuropa-Union / L’opinion de Conseillers Nationaux et de Conseillers des Etats sur le programme de l’Union Paneuropéenne (Zurich/Vienna: Paneuropa-Verlag; c.1937) (ACV, PP1000, 219; p.5) These were the nine policies that had been publicised in 1933 in Coudenhove-Kalergi, [c.1933] Die Schweiz in Gefahr; ACV, PP 1000/219; pp.11-19
responses were still broadly positive on every count, ranging from near unanimity on the protection of minorities, the creation of a European federal court, and collaboration with other continental groupings within the framework of the League of Nations, to a slim majority on the contentious issues of a European military alliance and common colonial system (see chapter IV). The prevailing tone of the accompanying comments was sober rather than enthusiastic; as Markus Kutter has observed, ‘sympathy for the demands of the Pan-European Union was accompanied by a cautious, sometimes rather melancholic scepticism of their realisation’. Nevertheless, the former won out. After a decade that had seen the worrying resurgence of atavistic politics, Swiss politicians were more than receptive to Coudenhove-Kalergi’s message that a Pan-Europe constructed in their image might be necessary for Switzerland to survive.

Like Austria, the invocation of Switzerland as a model for Pan-Europe also rested on a specific geographical imaginary of Switzerland as the ‘heart of Europe’. Like Austria, it was held to lie at the centre of Europe; indeed, the fact that it was (like Austria) landlocked was used as evidence that a continued intensification of autarkic politics across Europe would prove disastrous, as it would be cut off from the world-ocean, and thus also the world-market. Like Austria, Coudenhove-Kalergi promised that the creation of Pan-Europe would ‘turn its central position in the heart of the continent, which is now a disadvantage, into its greatest advantage’, by embracing its ‘natural’ role as a ‘mediator’. Where Switzerland stood apart was its height, which was used to connote a ‘natural’

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823 ‘war die Sympathie für die Forderungen der Paneuropa Union begleitet von einer vorsichtigen, manchmal eher melancholischen Skepsis der Verwirklichung gegenüber’, Kutter, "Vereinigte Staaten von Europa", 4-5
824 ‘Kern Europas’, Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Schweiz als Vorbild", 1
825 Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Die europäische Schweiz", 188
826 ‘verwandelt sich ihre zentrale Lage im Herzen des Kontinents, die heute ein Nachteil ist, in den größten Vorteil.’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Die europäische Schweiz", 188)
827 Coudenhove-Kalergi, [c.1933] Die Schweiz in Gefahr!; ACV, PP 1000/219, p.5
impartiality. As Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote:

‘From the heights of the Bernese mountains, I had the feeling of overlooking Europe’s petty conflicts and visualizing the moral problems of our civilization’.  

This sense of altitude was not merely a device that added colour to such personal reminiscences, a gesture to the Alpine sublime of the Romantics, rather, it was an integral part of the glory of Switzerland:

‘In the midst of our dismembered continent, protected by high mountains, stands this citadel of liberty. A lighthouse directing the course of Europe through the nights and storms of our era toward brighter shores and a peaceful future.’

Switzerland was both a beacon and a conductor for enlightened supranationalism, thanks to their position literally above the fray. It was through Switzerland that the people of Europe could claim to be ‘closest to heaven’, and it would be through it that Europe could reach political salvation.

The third way in which scale was invoked in Pan-European thought was as a dynamic force, an underlying political law of time and space, of history and geography. Contra the geopolitikers’ accusation, based on Coudenhove-Kalergi’s refusal to countenance revising the Versailles borders, that Pan-European thinking was damned by its reactionary acceptance of political stasis, it was in fact premised upon a foundational dynamism. This dynamism can be seen front and centre, if a little vaguely, in the choice of title for his first autobiography: 

"Europa erwacht!", or ‘Europe awakes!’

As we have already seen (chapter II), a progressivist understanding of history was a fundamental part

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828 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Crusade for Pan-Europe, 140. Coudenhove-Kalergi was referring to his philosophical works, which he would write in his Swiss summer house near Gstaad.


830 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Crusade for Pan-Europe, 147

831 ‘The people of Europe, who are closest to heaven, invented the form which can unite our continent: Switzerland.’ ‘Das Volk Europas, das dem Himmel am nächsten ist, hat die Form erfunden, die unseren Erdteil einigen kann: die Schweiz.’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Schweiz als Vorbild", 1)

832 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Europa erwacht
of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s argument for Pan-Europe. However, what we must now add is that this progressivism had a foundational spatial aspect, which understood ‘scale’ as not fixed, but dynamic.

That is, rather than the state being assumed to be the ‘natural’, ahistorical scale of politics, Coudenhove-Kalergi argued that politics was continually being up-scaled. From a wide angle, this took on the appearance of a natural law of politics:

‘The path from men to the universe leads through concentric circles: men build families, families communes, communes cantons, cantons states, states continents, continents the planets, the planets the solar system, solar systems the universe … The federalist system corresponds to this natural world order.’

This schema was not wholly original: it had been hinted at by progressivist thinkers since Turgot, Condorcet and Kant, further developed (as we have seen) by Kapp and Ratzel, and spelled out clearly by Fried. Indeed, it is mostly implicit in Coudenhove-Kalergi’s writing, where the scope of analysis was more typically narrowed to include the nineteenth-century unifications of Germany and Italy, and the twentieth-century contention that the age of the state was in the process of being superseded by a new age, which would be defined by larger-scale political units. Occasionally, it gestured too to a future utopia of truly global governance:

‘Just as the successive unifications of Germany, Italy, and Poland were necessary stages on the road to a united Europe, so the unification of Europe will be a necessary stage on the road

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833 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, The Totalitarian State Against Man, trans. Andrew Mcfadyean (London: Frederick Muller; 1938), 190

834 Turgot had in 1750 written of how ‘manners are softened, the human mind becomes more enlightened, and separate nations are brought closer to one another. Finally commercial and political ties unite all parts of the globe, and the whole human race, through alternate periods of rest and unrest, of weal and woe, goes on advancing, although at a slow pace, towards greater perfection.’ (A.-R.-J. Turgot, "A philosophical review of the successive advances of the human mind", in Ronald L. Meek (ed.), Turgot on progress, sociology and economics, trans. Ronald L. Meek (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1973) 41-60, 41. In the 1780s and 1790s, Condorcet and Kant were among the first to write of the formation of (con)federations not as diplomatic agreements, but as a natural product of peoples being ‘drawn into closer intimacy’ as part of the process of civilisation; see M.-J.-A.-N.C. Condorcet, Marquis de, Outlines of an historical view of the progress of the human mind, being a posthumous work of the late M. de Condorcet (Philadelphia: Lang & Ustick; 1796), 281; I. Kant, "Idea for a Universal History from a cosmopolitical point of view", in W. Hastie (ed.), Kant’s principles of politics, including his essay on Perpetual peace. A contribution to political science, trans. W. Hastie (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark; 1891) 1-29

835 Fried had written of ‘the fact that the whole course of world-history is a process of constantly increasing organization, that an uninterrupted line of progress leads from isolated primitive man up to modern Pan-Americanism … [T]his evolution of the human race in history is simply the expression of a universal natural law that leads from chaos to world-organization as from cell to Homo Sapiens.’ (Fried, Restoration of Europe, 27, emphasis in original)
to a united humanity."836

As White notes, Coudenhove-Kalergi ‘was deeply convinced that … history was passing, perhaps had passed, out of the age of the local national state’.837 Thus, when Coudenhove-Kalergi warned of dis-united European states being out-competed militarily and/or economically by rival continental organisations, he consistently portrayed this threat in terms of the small-scale polity being left behind, while the large-scale polities led the way forward.

The engine for this progressivism was technologically driven time-space compression. As Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote, ‘Every day the world grows smaller; through the progress of science as applied to communications, cities and countries are ever being brought more closely together’.838 He cited Friedrich List’s argument that the railroad necessitated the creation of a German Customs Union, and argued that the aeroplane now necessitated the creation of a Pan-European Union;839 if proof were needed of the desirability of large integrated economic markets, one need only look to the success of the US. Militarily too, new technology like the aeroplane had radically altered the concept of a battlefront.840 The fact that politics had not kept pace with these developments was, Coudenhove-Kalergi argued (again, following Fried),841 the source of significant tension:

‘If the science of politics fails to adapt itself to the science of communications, the resulting tension must inevitably lead to terrible catastrophes. The spatio-temporal rapprochement of neighboring peoples must be followed by a political rapprochement, … else [Europe] will be in danger of blindly staggering into another war and of suffocating in a very sea of gas-

836 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 94
837 White, "The Europeanism of Coudenhove-Kalergi", 29
838 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 9; see also Coudenhove-Kalergi, Europe Must Unite, 43; c.f. S. Kern, The Culture of Time and Space, 1880-1918 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 1983)
839 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Europe Must Unite, 45
840 It thus engendered even more complex spatialities than those of scale, since the aeroplane introduced a vertical dimension to the battlefield. Coudenhove-Kalergi warned that ‘The War of the Future will be waged, across the line of battle, against the rear; above all, against the enemy capitals. … No distinction will be made between front and rear, or between combatants and non-combatants.’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 109-110)
841 Fried had argued that ‘the political relations of nations and the spirit in which they are conducted have not kept pace with this mighty force … [W]hile the conditions of actual life have presented a picture of ever-increasing coöperation, order and organization, international relations have been conducted according to principles preserved from the era of complete isolation and self-sufficiency. … Friction occurred because of insufficient adjustment to the new conditions of life; it might have been removed by heeding the world-demand for organization.’ (Fried, Restoration of Europe, 12-14)
The matter of reconstructing politics at the supranational scale was thereby presented not as a ground-breaking invention, but as a consolidation that would merely bring politics into line with the up-scaling of life that had already occurred in other spheres. Technology was the driver behind the time-space compression that demanded that politics be up-scaled, but it also threatened a war both imminent and exponentially more destructive if these prompts were ignored.

The most significant role that this dynamic sense of scale played in Pan-European thought was to contest the primacy of the nation-state. The argument that the state was obsolete as a political form was amplified by recourse to an analogy that cast it as downright primitive: that of the State as Man in a Hobbesian state of nature, that is, a condition of anarchy. Fleshing out this analogy, Coudenhove-Kalergi described the situation of Europe:

‘Within a narrow space there live twenty-six human beings … They wish on no account to forego their ill-conceived freedom; and hence they prefer a condition of absolute anarchy to any form of association. Hence, too, they are determined to settle their conflicts of interest and their differences of opinion by means of duels and free-for-all fights.’

The implications were clear: just as people had formed commonwealths so as not to live in anarchy, so states needed to form their own commonwealth in order to escape ‘world anarchy’. In making this argument, he drew on two political thinkers who during the First World War had blamed the outbreak of that war not on the actions of any particular person, state or event, but rather on the ‘international anarchy’ of the prevailing state-system. Like Mackinder, they saw that the path to lasting peace necessitated a transformation of Europe’s political geography, though their solution was radically different. The first of these thinkers, Alfred Fried, had argued in his 1915 book The

842 Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Pan-Europe*, 10-11
843 The analogy of states being as men in a state of nature, as well as the description of this as anarchy, was Hobbes’ own. As Hedley Bull argued, ‘we are entitled to infer that all of what Hobbes says about the life of individual men in the state of nature may be read as a description of the condition of states in relation to one another’ (H. Bull, "Hobbes and the International Anarchy", *Social Research* 48.4 (1981) 717-738, 720-721)
844 Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Pan-Europe*, 105-106
845 Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Pan-Europe*, 94
Restoration of Europe that ‘The present war is the logical outcome of the kind of “peace” which preceded it’, which was better described as ‘latent war’. Likewise, the British political scientist Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson had argued in his 1916 book The European Anarchy that ‘responsibility [for the outbreak of WWI] is embedded in and conditioned by a responsibility deeper and more general—the responsibility of all the Powers alike for the European anarchy’. The idea that the sovereign state was the natural scale of politics, let alone Ratzel and Kjellén’s reification of the state as a naturally expansionist organism or ‘super-personality’, was held to be inherently violent and unstable. Both Fried and Dickinson had demanded that the end of the war needed to bring not just a cessation of hostilities, but fundamental political change; for Fried this was the establishment of a Pan-European Union, for Dickinson a League of Nations. Coudenhove-Kalergi, writing five years after the end of the war, said that this demand had not been met:

‘The World War changed only the political map of Europe, not its political system. Now, as before, international anarchy, oppression of the weaker by the stronger, latent war, economic disunion, and political intrigue prevail everywhere. European politics of today resemble those of yesterday more than those of tomorrow.’

The persistence of the scale of the state as the locus of politics was thus doubly backwards. Not only did it represent a stalling, a failure to keep pace with the progressive up-scaling of politics, it also returned the state to the primitive and inherently violent condition of anarchy.

Not only had the Versailles settlement failed to resolve the pre-war ‘international anarchy’,

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846 Fried, Restoration of Europe, 10, 16
847 G.L. Dickinson, The European Anarchy (London: George Allen & Unwin; 1916), 136. Though Dickinson cited Fried as being representative of a pacifist strain of German thought opposed to imperialistic Pan-Germanism, he did not credit him further, and any lines of mutual influence are unclear.
848 Dickinson took strong issue with Kjellén, specifically with the idea that ‘The “State” … is a Being, that must grow like other beings’, as it naturalised inter-state conflict (G.L. Dickinson, The Choice Before Us (London: George Allen & Unwin; 1917), 95)
849 ‘Whatever be the issue of this war, one thing is certain: it will bring no lasting peace to Europe unless it brings a radical change both in the spirit and in the organization of international politics.’ (Dickinson, European Anarchy, 136-137). Fried used the analogy of restoration, arguing that ‘No mere recovering of shattered roofs, no mere re-erecting and repainting of façades, will be enough. The foundation was rotten, and that was what caused the catastrophe.’ (Fried, Restoration of Europe, 3)
850 Fried, Restoration of Europe, 142; Dickinson, The Choice Before Us, Ch. 10: “A League of Nations”, pp.170-190
851 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, xii
Coudenhove-Kalergi argued that it had exacerbated it, in two divergent ways. On one hand, he attacked the establishment of a League of Nations (of the kind that Dickinson and others had campaigned for) for having violated the natural hierarchy of scale. It did so by being based upon a scalar structure that ‘overleaps the Pan-American as well as the Pan-European organization’, jumping directly from the scale of the state to that of the globe.\footnote{Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 89-90} On this basis, he criticised the League for its ‘abstract structure—rendering it impersonal and producing no response in the sentimental life of mankind, which, starting from the family, passes by degrees through nations and groups of nations, and culminates in the ideal of a world-embracing humanity’.\footnote{Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 89} This line of attack was thus consonant with the geopolitikers’ critique of the League (and indeed of Pan-Europe itself), the only difference being what each party considered to be ‘organic’ politics. On the other hand, Coudenhove-Kalergi simultaneously attacked the Versailles settlement for its ‘balkanisation’ of Europe according the the doctrine of national self-determination, which he saw as actively regressive. In his eyes, Europe was not only missing the boat, but heading in the wrong direction:

‘While in the big world the process of integration goes steadily on, Europe is regressing further and further toward atomization. Austria-Hungary, Western Russia, and European Turkey have dissolved themselves into a multitude of petty states. Scandinavia has split into three realms; likewise in Germany and in Jugo-Slavia very powerful currents are moving toward a division of the Empire into separate states.’\footnote{Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 13}

Again, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s criticism aligned with that of the geopolitikers: self-determination was an artificial imposition that ignored the natural order of things. All in all, Versailles had both expanded and shrunk the scale of politics, but it had done so not by allowing for dynamic scale, but by redoubling its attachment to the scale of the nation-state. With regard to the insistence upon a dynamic view of scale, then, Pan-Europeanism was broadly consonant with geopolitics, so much so that the geopolitiker Gudmund Hatt’s argument that ‘the division of the world into economic-geographical
greater spaces advances with the relentlessness of a law [of] nature’ might equally have served as a summary of Pan-European thought on the matter.\(^\text{855}\)

The three key scalar arguments used in the promotion of Pan-Europe – the promotion of a European body politic, the use of metonymy, and the mobilizing of a dynamic narrative of scale – were not entirely congruent, yet they were certainly used in combination, and were often folded into one another. Thus, Austria and Switzerland were held not just to represent the best of Europe, but the future of Europe. The European nation was not just dormant, but imminent, waiting to burst through the shackles of nationalism. The clearest example of this meshing of scalar narratives was Coudenhove-Kalergi’s retelling of the Piedmont insurrection, which had played a key early role in the *Risorgimento*. Speaking at Chatham House in June 1939, Coudenhove-Kalergi appealed to Britain and France to take the lead in bringing about Pan-Europe:

> ‘Piedmont, a little Italian State, stood against the great empire of the Habsburgs, against the Empire of the Pope, but it won the struggle because it was allied with the future. It was allied not with States, but with nations. It was allied with all Italians who desired liberty and union, in Venice, in Milan, in Florence, in Naples, and so, by this alliance with the future, Piedmont became stronger than all the rest of the States, became stronger than Austria, stronger than the Pope, and united and conquered Italy. If Great Britain and France follow this example they will have the whole of Europe behind them. It is not a question of the governments following; the nations will follow. The nations will be your allies, and not only the little nations in Europe, but the great part of the German and Italian nations.’\(^\text{856}\)

Here we see Coudenhove-Kalergi simultaneously invoking the notions that Europe’s destiny could be seen in one of its constituent parts, that politics was being progressively upscaled from province to state to continent, and that a European public lay in wait to acclaim and subscribe to a European state. What unified these arguments was the sense that real-world politics was being dragged along by an undercurrent of natural law, a set of historical-geographical truths that indicated, as H.G. Wells put it, the shape of things to come.\(^\text{857}\)

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\(^{855}\) G. Hatt, quoted in Larsen, "Geopolitics on trial", 33

\(^{856}\) Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Europe To-Morrow", 628

\(^{857}\) H.G. Wells, *The Shape of Things to Come: the ultimate revolution* (London: Hutchinson & Co; 1933)
Conclusion

On the surface, the relationship between Pan-Europeanism and geopolitics was one of open antagonism. Geopolitikers criticised the concept of Pan-Europe as being superficial or artificial, by which they meant that it was not grounded enough in the ‘realities’ of race, culture, and the attachment of the Volk to the ‘land’. By contrast to the supposedly organic nation-state, Pan-Europe was attacked as being somehow lifeless, or to use the geopolitiker Walther Wüst’s term, ‘stillborn’. However, underneath all this bluster, the situation was far more complex, with many significant continuities, mutual influences and shared relationships coexisting with genuine points of disagreement, difference and outright antipathy. As Gerry Kearns has written, there was ‘continuity rather than a distinction’ between geopolitik and other, apparently rival forms of geostrategic thinking.

This chapter has analysed three dimensions of the relationship between Pan-Europeanism and geopolitics. First, a hitherto unappreciated shared set of influences that contributed to the parallel construction of each group’s political-geographical imagination. This included the traditionally acknowledged ‘founding fathers’ of geopolitics – that is, Ratzel, Kjellén and Mackinder – but extended also to a much deeper nineteenth-century body of thought that included figures like List, Frantz, Kapp, Partsch and Naumann. The importance of making this point is not simply to add depth to geopolitical theory. Rather, it is to show that if one replaces the oft-assumed analytical focus on Hitlerian notions like Lebensraum with a focus on, say, pan-regions, which was certainly no less prominent in the public consciousness of the time, then a new network of influences becomes visible. With a quarter-turn of the analytic kaleidoscope, the picture changes dramatically. Moreover, there are compelling reasons to concentrate our gaze upon pan-regions, a concept that was explicitly co-

859 Kearns, Geopolitics and Empire, 22
opted by both Haushofer and Coudenhove-Kalergi as a central pillar in their respective visions of political space.

Second, a personal connection existed between Pan-Europeans and geopolitikers, one built around the strong relationship between Coudenhove-Kalergi and Haushofer, but which extended to the mutual engagement of the wider circles around their movements. Geopolitikers both took an active part in Pan-European events, participating in Pan-European conferences and surveys, and likewise included a Pan-European element in their own activities, discussing and teaching its doctrines in geopolitical seminars and events. Their respective monthly journals, Paneuropa and the ZfG, were both launched in the same year, referred to each other’s literatures, and in large part shared a common target audience.

And third, the theory of Pan-Europeanism was itself highly geopolitical in both content and style, while retaining key differences from German geopolitik in the political solutions it recommended. Pan-Europeanism shared with geopolitics an obsession with political borders, and acknowledgement that they were human constructs contingent upon historical and geographical realities rather than eternal natural frontiers. However, this central premise was used to justify radically different political positions, mostly starkly opposing positions on the fraught question of whether the borders of Versailles ought to be revised. Another shared concern was that of scale. Though not novel, the insistence of both Pan-Europeans and geopolitikers upon a progressivist up-scaling of politics nevertheless retained its radical edge vis-à-vis the orthodox politics of the nation-state. This organic and dynamic notion of scale was also antithetical to the national-universal scalar dualism of League of Nations-style liberal internationalism, in which scale was fixed and nested. The chief point of difference between the scalar teleologies theorised in Pan-Europeanism and geopolitics was that while the former believed that an up-scaled super-state made the nationality principle obsolete, an argument that had great pedigree in Germany where this principle had often been seen as an attack on großdeutsch politics that served only French (or British) interests, the latter idealised
the connection between *Volk* and state, ultimately invoking the dynamism of scale to support expansionist geostrategy.

In terms of the style in which these arguments were made, Pan-Europeanism shared with *geopolitik* a contradictory nature. On one hand, they shared a proudly realist outlook, putting forth rational-actor justifications in a manner that bridged *realpolitik* and later international relations. On the other hand, each also shared an almost mystical element, including the use of progressivist, dynamic understandings of political space to invoke an essentially pre-destined future in which politics would necessarily be organised at the continental scale. This latter form of argumentation replaced the quotidian logics of power politics with a new logic that transcended its rules by working backwards from an apparently inevitable future. For many academics this embrace of futurist elements seemed to lend geopolitical work a cartoonish quality, with Richard Hartshorne writing that the purveyor of geopolitics ‘reaches far into the area of political science, where his lack of complete training betrays him into fallacious and exaggerated conclusions, to say nothing of gross national partisanship’.

While Pan-Europeanism steadfastly opposed nationalism, its striving for a general audience led it toward exactly the type of ‘exaggerated conclusions’ that Hartshorne despaired of. Nevertheless, Coudenhove-Kalergi enthusiastically and persistently sought to substantiate Pan-European ideas by situating them within academic geography. Though undoubtedly subservient to Pan-Europe’s ultimate political goals, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s desire to appeal to professional geographers offers an insight that might well act as a corrective to present-day evaluations of geopolitics, in that it refocuses attention away from the confluence of geopolitics and the Nazi state, and towards the place of geopolitics within the academic field of geography.

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860 Hartshorne, "Recent Developments in Political Geography, I", 798
IV. Exploiting Eurafrica (1923-1939)

Europe is the daughter of Asia - the mother of America - but the governess of Africa.

Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1929

all the plans for Paneuropa will be without a foundation if they wish to make of the union of the continent a self-contained structure.

Giuseppe De Michelis, 1934

the development and colonization of Africa means the expansion, enhancement and security of Europe.

Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1929

Introduction

As we have seen, ‘Pan-Europe’ drew from a deep well of historical schemes for European political integration, and was justified by recourse to a logic borrowed and adapted from the new discipline of geopolitics. However, the incorporation of African territory as an integral part of a continental-scale ‘European’ political project, rather than the state-scale enterprise that extant understandings of colonialism assumed it to be, was a novelty popularised by the Pan-European Union, as was the

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862 G. De Michelis, World Reorganisation on Corporative Lines (London: George Allen & Unwin; 1935), 167

theorisation of this new geopolitical entity as ‘Eurafrica’. Indeed, it was the way in which the PEU made the colonial aspect of European integration explicit that set it apart from other proponents of a European federal link (see fig. 21, juxtaposing the visions of Coudenhove-Kalergi and Briand). By engaging with Europe’s colonial present, Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi and the like-minded writers he published in the *Paneuropa* journal sketched out a distinctive colonial future within his vision of the new planetary geopolitics, a third path that fell somewhere between the imperialism embodied by the British Empire and the Mandate-based liberal internationalism of the League of Nations.

Eurafrica was a multi-faceted entity, justified on multiple grounds. First, it offered a share in the colonial experience to those European nations who had either had their colonies stripped at Versailles (Germany), or through ‘historical accident’ had never had colonies. Second, by doing so it promised to rationalise resources and trade in such a way that Europe would gain access to raw materials, and Africa would gain access to a market by which it might profit from these riches. And third, it also enabled the rationalisation of population pressures, as the overpopulated European states could re-settle in underpopulated Africa, undertake infrastructural projects that would help develop lands previously thought be inhospitable, and oversee the education of the local population. Each of these points was said to underline the ‘natural’ complementarity of Africa and Europe: participation in Eurafrica would be mutually beneficial. However, as we shall see, each of these notions was underpinned by assumptions of European superiority, and in the end the ultimate motivations for Eurafrica were the solution of European, not African problems. By looking more closely at the PEU’s plans for Eurafrica, and the arguments deployed to justify them, we can catch in reflection the exaggerated outlines of many of the Pan-European project’s internal contradictions. Eurafrica contained a connection to biological racism that belied the PEU’s usual refusal to engage with issues of race; it was sympathetic to German political arguments, yet its most vocal supporters were largely francophone; it was in many ways neo-colonial, yet was ultimately taken up by anti-colonial movements; and of all the Pan-European schemes it was at once the most utopian and yet in many
ways also the most successful.

For the impact made by Eurafrica in a very short space of time was nothing short of remarkable. Although the first reference to Eurafrica as a political term only appeared in 1929, just five years later the Italian geographer Paolo D’Agostino Orsini di Camerota opened his book, which

Figure 21: Briand and Coudenhove-Kalergi’s competing visions of European unity. Source: Schweizer Illustrierte Zeitung, in AVCUS, 2 Z 19
he gave the title *Eurafrica*, by writing that ‘One finds these days a great deal of talk of Eurafrica’.\footnote{864} Even in those five short years, a number of influential books had been published on the topic, rendering what had so recently appeared an awkward neologism into a commonplace, found everywhere from the textbooks of geopolitics to speculative science-fiction.\footnote{865} From nowhere, ‘Eurafrica’ had become ubiquitous, and the ideology behind it had seeped into the popular consciousness: as Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson argue, ‘the general idea of an internationalization and supranationalization of colonialism in Africa was one of the least controversial and most popular foreign policy ideas of the interwar period’.\footnote{866} Today, the breadth of the term’s use and immediacy of its uptake have muddied its provenance somewhat, with credit given to various sources, all of whom play a part in the story, including D’Agostino Orsini di Camerota,\footnote{867} the French Professor of Political Economy Eugène Guernier,\footnote{868} and the German geographers Karl Haushofer\footnote{869} and Erich Obst.\footnote{870} However, at the time attribution was much more clear-cut: the term was believed to have been coined by Coudenhove-Kalergi, and the idea was likewise indelibly associated with his Pan-European


\footnotetext[866]{Hansen and Jonsson, *Eurafrica*, 32; see also J. Steffek and F. Antonini, "Towards Eurafrica! Fascism, Corporatism and Italy's Colonial Expansion", in Ian Hall (ed.), *Radicals and Reactionaries in Twentieth-Century International Thought* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan; 2015) 145-169, 16}


\footnotetext[869]{Atkinson, "Geopolitics and the Geographical Imagination in Fascist Italy", 195n62}

\footnotetext[870]{O'Grail and Van Der Wusten, "Political Geography of Panregions", 5, citing H. Heske, "Der Traum von Afrika: Zur politischen Wissenschaftsgeschichte uer Kolonialgeographie", in Henning Heske (ed.), *Ernte-Dank? Landwirtschaft zwischen Agrobusiness, Gentechnik und traditionellem Landbau* (Giessen: Focus; 1987) 204-222}
movement. Indeed, that first printed reference to Eurafrica was a 1929 article by Coudenhove-Kalergi in the Paneuropa journal entitled “Africa”, published in both German and French editions.

It was with good reason that the French historian Charles-Robert Ageron called Coudenhove-Kalergi ‘the undisputed inventor of the idea of “Eurafrica”’. 

**Historical context of ‘Eurafrica’**

However, this is only half-true. Though Coudenhove-Kalergi was the first to use Eurafrica as a political term, its use as a physical term goes back a little further, and sheds light on some of the problematic assumptions that would continue to haunt Eurafrican notions, particularly the ways in which they touch on issues of race and physical geography. Likewise, the suggestion that African colonies play an integral role in European unification, and plans for their international governance, also had important late nineteenth-century precedents.

As a term, Eurafrica (later translated into French and German respectively as Eurafrique and Eurafrika) first appeared in print in the American ethnologist Daniel Garrison Brinton’s 1890 collection of his lectures, entitled Races and Peoples. A scientific racist, Brinton was attempting to

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871 De Michelis, *World Reorganisation on Corporative Lines*, 171; R. Mangin, “1er Etude sur les Etats Fédérés d’Europe”, in Henry De Jouvenel (ed.), *La Fédération Européenne: Les Meilleurs des Cinq Cents Projets soumis au Concours de La Revue Des Vivants* (Paris: Editions de La Revue Des Vivants; 1930) 11-132, 74. Jules Destriée gave partial credit to Coudenhove-Kalergi, writing in June 1929 that ‘An article of Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, in Paneuropa, reminded me of a project I had designed during the war, in Italy, that had me so passionate and that I had since almost forgotten’. (J. Destriée, “L’Afrique, colonie européenne”, *Pour en finir avec la guerre, par une organisation fédérative de l’Europe, la constitution d’une police internationale et la reconnaissance pour les citoyens du droit de refuser le service militaire pour le crime de guerre d’agression* (Brussels: L’Eglantine; 1931 [1929]) 49-52; quoted in Duchenne, *Esquisses d’une Europe nouvelle*, 294n583; my translation). An exception to this consensus was Guernier, who himself apparently ‘claimed to have coined the expression Eurafrique as far back as 1923’ (Whiteman, *The Rise and Fall of Eurafrique*, 29, 466n3)


reconcile the idea of an originary (and therefore superior) white, ‘Causasian’ race with new evidence apparently suggesting that early man came not from the Caucasus, but from Mediterranean Africa. Brinton squared this circle by appealing to the physical geography of the early Quaternary. Citing (somewhat misleadingly) Thomas Henry Huxley’s 1877 Physiography, Brinton claimed that the primary factor in the development of separate races was a physical geography in which a submerged Sahara and land-bridges across the Mediterranean meant that the continental structure at the time of early man was better described as a southern ‘Aust-Africa’ and a northern ‘Eurafrica’ (see fig. 22). Each proto-continent, in Brinton’s view, was essentially self-contained, allowing each race (Eurafricans, Austafrians, and so on) to develop in relative isolation. In his own words,

‘At the dawn of history, all the clearly marked subspecies of man bore distinct relations in number and distribution to the great continental areas into which the habitable land of the globe is divided. Nearly the whole of Europe and its geographical appendix, North Africa, were in the possession of the white race’

The geopolitical overtones were clear: Eurafrica, where humanity developed first and furthest, naturally possessed both a racial and territorial unity.

Meanwhile, those pushing for the political unity of Europe were also starting to grapple with the issue of how European powers’ rapidly expanding African territories fitted into this scheme. The most famous proponent of a United States of Europe, Victor Hugo, was one of the first to address the issue of Africa in an 1879 speech at the Restaurant Bonvalet in Paris, at a banquet commemorating the 1848 abolition of slavery. Introducing Hugo, the abolitionist writer Victor Schœlcher assured him that his speech would encourage the ‘wonderful philanthropic movement that today appears, by turning the interest of Europe to the land of black men, to want to repair the harm she did to him

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As intimated, Huxley is rather less clear on the matter than Brinton suggests (T.H. Huxley, Physiography: An Introduction to the Study of Nature (London: Macmillan and Co.; 1877), 308). It is pertinent to note here that Huxley’s Physiography was hugely influential in the development of a conception of physical geography that foregrounded causation as the central principle in understanding the world, a conception that Brinton was very much working within. (c.f. D.R. Stoddart, "That Victorian Science": Huxley’s Physiography and Its Impact on Geography”, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 66 (1975) 17-40)

Brinton, Races and Peoples, 94
there'.

Hugo accepted this invitation to look forward, and did so in overtly geographical terms:

‘In the nineteenth century the white has made the black into a man; in the twentieth century Europe will make a world out of Africa. (Applause.) To remake a new Africa, to render the old Africa amenable to civilisation, this is the problem. Europe will solve it.’

In speaking of ‘Europe’, Hugo wasn’t just invoking the abstract notion of European civilisation (though he was certainly doing this too); he was also invoking the specific notion of political

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cooperation among European states. In fact, Hugo hoped that this African mission, undertaken at first by the Southern European nations of France, Italy and Spain, and possibly Britain, might set an example for the authoritarian regimes of North Europe (by which he meant Germany and Russia) to follow. This is what he meant when he said that,

‘the United States of the South will sketch a clear outline of the United States of Europe. (Bravos.) No hate, no violence, no anger. It is the great march towards harmony, brotherhood and peace.’

In other words, the ‘remaking’ of Africa not only depended on European unity, but would itself actively contribute to the uniting of Europe.

In Hugo’s vision, the Mediterranean played a doubled role, as an agent for both connection and division. On one hand, it was rendered as a ‘lake of civilisation’, which brought the Latin nations of Europe together. On the other, however, Hugo continued, it was ‘certainly not for nothing that the Mediterranean borders on one side the old world and on the other the unknown world, that is to say on one side all civilization and on the other all barbarity’. This speaks to the uncompromising way in which he viewed Africa. If the context in which he made this talk allowed for a certain implicit understanding that the underdevelopment of Africa was a result of European exploitation, Hugo’s bluntness in appraising Africa is still remarkable: ‘This wild Africa,’ he explained, ‘has two aspects: peopled, it’s barbarism; deserted, it’s savagery’. However, he continued, viewed with a modern, European eye, the savagery of the African landscape contained potential: ‘Huge hydraulic systems are prepared by nature and waiting for the man; one sees the points where cities germinate; … this


880 Hugo, ”Discours sur l’Afrique”, 124-125. Original: ‘La Méditerranée est un lac de civilisation; ce n’est certes pas pour rien que la Méditerranée a sur l’un de ses bords le vieil univers et sur l’autre l’univers ignoré, c’est-à-dire d’un côté toute la civilisation et de l’autre toute la barbarie.’

881 Hugo, ”Discours sur l’Afrique”, 126. Original: ‘Cette Afrique farouche n’a que deux aspects: peuplée, c’est la barbarie; déserte, c’est la sauvagerie’
universe, which alarmed the Romans, attracts the French'.\(^{882}\) To counteract both Africa’s barbarism and her savagery, what was required was European colonisation: to bring civilisation to the people, and modern technical expertise to tame the environment. Thus, Hugo’s prediction for Europe’s twentieth century: ‘Geographically, …the destiny of men is to the south’,\(^ {883}\) followed by his prescription: ‘The time has come to tell this illustrious group of nations: Unite! Go south!’\(^ {884}\)

Europe’s licence to do so rested on a patchwork of mutually supporting justifications, including the essential emptiness of Africa, the economic obligation to utilise this unused land, the humanitarian and Christian obligations to civilise the people, and the needs of Europe, for whom African colonisation might offer both an outlet to release pressure from her own social and political problems, and a demonstration of the virtues of liberal-internationalist (secular, democratic, pacifist and co-operative) governance. Hugo’s rousing conclusion touched on all of these points:

‘Come on, People! Seize this land. Take it. … God gave the earth to men, God offers Africa to Europe. Take it. Where kings bring war, bring harmony. Take it, not for the gun, but for the plough; not for the sword, but for trade; not for battle but for industry; not for conquest but for brotherhood. (\textit{Prolonged applause.})

Pour your overflow in this Africa, and thereby solve your social issues, change your proletarians into proprietors. Go ye! Make roads, make ports, make cities; be fruitful, grow, colonize and multiply; so that, on this earth, increasingly liberated from priests and princes, the divine Spirit is affirmed by the peace and the human spirit by the freedom!’\(^ {885}\)

In fact, it was the priests and princes who would remain firmly in control of European colonialism as the scramble for Africa took hold. Hugo’s civilizational discourses were certainly deployed, but by national interests for whom conquest and competition were the name of the game.

\(^{882}\) Hugo, "Discours sur l'Afrique", 126. Original: ‘De gigantesques appareils hydrauliques sont préparés par la nature et attendent l’homme; on voit les points où germeront des villes; … cet univers, qui effrayait les romains, attire les français.’


\(^{884}\) Hugo, "Discours sur l'Afrique", 125. Original: ‘Le moment est venu de dire à ce groupe illustre de nations: Unissez-vous! allez au sud.’

\(^{885}\) Hugo, "Discours sur l'Afrique", 128. Original: ‘Allez, Peuples! emparez-vous de cette terre. Prenez-la. … Dieu donne la terre aux hommes, Dieu offre l’Afrique à l’Europe. Prenez-la. Où les rois apporteraient la guerre, apportez la concorde. Prenez-la, non pour le canon, mais pour la charrue; non pour le sabre, mais pour le commerce; non pour la bataille, mais pour l’industrie; non pour la conquête, mais pour la fraternité. (\textit{Applaudissements prolongés.)}) [//] Versez votre trop-plein dans cette Afrique, et du même coup résolvez vos questions sociales, changez vos prolétaires en propriétaires. Allez, faîtes! faites des routes, faites des ports, faites des villes; croissez, cultivez, colonisez, multipliez; et que, sur cette terre, de plus en plus dégagée des prêtres et des princes, l’Esprit divin s’affirme par la paix et l’Esprit humain par la liberté!’
This was never clearer than at the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, at once the apogee and the great negation of Hugo’s plans. On one hand, it did indeed see the European powers working in concert to ‘remake a new Africa’, principally by asserting a European model of sovereignty on African space (and formally subordinating native claims to sovereignty). Perhaps the most interesting concession to internationalism agreed at Berlin was the establishment of ‘free navigation’ (i.e. shared European sovereignty) on the Congo and Niger rivers, and free trade in the ‘neutral’ territory of the basin and mouth of the Congo. However, these schemes were of limited success, with de facto national sovereignty soon being exerted in these special territories. Indeed, the supposedly internationalist Congo Free State was not only subject to de facto Belgian rule, but earned infamy as a site of notorious and appalling European misrule, the experiment finally ending with Belgian annexation in 1908.

In more general terms, the greater legacy of the Berlin Conference was to confirm that such internationalism was the exception rather than the rule, the rule in question being the division of African space into separate imperial spheres of influence. In short, while the Berlin Conference symbolised European cooperation in the conquest of Africa, it confirmed that this conquest would ultimately divide rather than unite European powers, that African territory would (in the main) be split rather than shared.

The idea of colonialism being anything other than a national-imperial project was not raised again until the First World War, with the question of what to do with German colonies in the case of an Allied victory. Both Vladimir Lenin’s November 1917 ‘Decree on Peace’, giving notice of Russia’s withdrawal from the War, and Woodrow Wilson’s January 1918 ‘Fourteen Points’, declaring the principles upon which peace negotiations would take place, agreed that nations had a right to self-

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While Lenin advocated an end to unwelcome imperialism "tout court", European socialist parties instead leaned towards Wilson’s insistence on impartial adjustment of colonial claims, based on the interests of the population concerned, by a supra-national League of Nations. However, these socialist parties combined this with their pre-existing advocacy of a United States of Europe quite alien to Wilson’s universalism. The results were often quite original suggestions that combined the internationalist ambition and principles that had guided the 1885 establishment of the Congo Free State with an enlarged regionalist scope, as in the February 1918 Inter-Allied Labour and Socialist Conference’s ‘Memorandum on War Aims’:

‘As regards more especially the colonies of all the belligerents in Tropical Africa, from sea to sea, including the whole of the region north of the Zambesi and south of the Sahara, … the Conference declares in favour of a system of control, established by international agreement under the League of Nations and maintained by its guarantee, which, whilst respecting national sovereignty, would be alike inspired by broad conceptions of economic freedom and concerned to safeguard the rights of the natives under the best conditions possible for them.’

However, in the end it was decided at Versailles that Wilson’s promise of an ‘impartial adjustment of colonial claims’ was to be interpreted as the preservation of the integrity of Allied overseas territory and the stripping of the overseas territory of the defeated powers, to be given over to a new ‘Mandate’ system primarily devised by the South African-British military leader Jan Smuts. Each Mandate was to be held ‘in trust’ by one of the Allied powers until such time as they might be capable of self-government, and the whole system overseen by the new League of Nations.

888 V.I. Lenin, "Decree on Peace" (8 November 1917); Inter-Allied Labour and Socialist Conference, "Memorandum on War Aims Agreed Upon at the Inter-Allied Labour and Socialist Conference, Central Hall, Westminster, London, S.W., February 20-24, 1918", in Paul U. Kellogg and Arthur Gleason (eds.), British Labor and the War: Reconstructors for a New World (New York: Boni and Liveright; 1919 [1918]) 352-366, 355

889 Inter-Allied Labour and Socialist Conference, "Memorandum on War Aims", 361. The Memorandum quoted the 14 February 1915 Declaration of the Conference of the Socialist and Labour Parties of the Allied Nations in order to reaffirm that ‘The victory of the Allied Powers must be a victory for popular liberty, for unity, independence, and autonomy of the nations in the peaceful Federation of the United States of Europe and the world.’ (p.353) For more on wartime plans for united European action in Africa, see Erella, "Political Imagination, Sexuality and Love in the Eurafrique Debate", 245; and especially Ageron, "L'idée d'Eurafrique"

890 Article 119 of the Peace Treaty of Versailles stated that ‘Germany renounces in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights and titles over her overseas possessions.’
The ‘trust’ invoked was the ‘sacred trust of civilisation’ specified in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and Germany’s exclusion from this system was justified on the grounds that its pre-war colonial negligence had broken this trust. This ‘Colonial Guilt Lie’ (die koloniale Schuldübe), as the last Governor of German East Africa (and future president of the German Colonial Society) Heinrich Schnee would later term it, was perhaps best encapsulated in the Allied and Associated Powers’ 16 June 1919 reply to German protests regarding the prospective Versailles settlement:

‘Germany’s dereliction in the sphere of colonial civilization has been revealed too completely to admit of the Allied and Associated Powers consenting to make a second experiment and of their assuming the responsibility of again abandoning thirteen or fourteen millions of natives to a fate from which the war has delivered them.’

Thus the traditional narrative of Europe’s mission civilisatrice, or the ‘White Man’s Burden’, which had been successfully deployed to justify the rapid advance of European sovereignty over Africa over the previous half-century, was re-deployed in two contrasting ways. First, it was placed at the heart of the League’s Mandate system, thereby raising the scale of judgement (if not direct sovereignty) from that of the imperial state to that of the League. And second, it was used as a weapon between European states: rather than a shared European endeavour, the development of Africa was rendered an inter-state competition.

This rather uncomfortable mixture of vague internationalist sentiment with nationalist boasts about colonial development would mark early-1920s analyses of colonialism by the future Pan-Europeans Albert Sarraut and Joseph Caillaux. For all of Wilson’s idealism, and the momentum

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893 A. Sarraut, La Mise en Valeur des Colonies Françaises (Paris: Payot; 1923); J. Caillaux, Devant L’Histoire: Mes Prisons, 2nd edn. (Paris: Éditions de la Sirène; 1920), 346. Interestingly, Sarraut’s engagement with internationalism was based on the circulation of natural resources, which would become a theme of later Pan-
that seemed to be behind his principles of self-determination and an international structure of
governance, the Mandate system brought neither principle to Africa in any significant way, while both
reinforcing racist assumptions of a European *mission civilisatrice* in Africa and corrupting its
internationalist underpinnings by a tacit reassertion of the ultimate supremacy of the imperial state.
Nevertheless, from Brinton to Hugo, from Berlin to Versailles, almost all of the building blocks of
Eurafrica had been developed. From Brinton we have the suggestion of a natural unity of Europe and
Africa, literally fused together to form Eurafrica (the diminution of the Mediterranean pseudo-
scientifically validating Hugo’s reference to it as a mere lake), and its association with a system of
racial essentialism and inequality. From Hugo we have the rendering of Africa as empty and wild,
requiring massive European projects and infrastructure to make it habitable, but whose colonisation
might both solve European social problems and promote European unity. From the Berlin Conference
we have the promotion of the idea of a supra-national free trade area as an integral part of continental
development, and the solidification of the idea that such development required (and legitimated)
European agency and ultimate sovereignty. And from Versailles we have the theoretical upscaling of
authority over African territory to an international organisation, in theory at least a new geography of
political sovereignty, responsive to socialist critiques of the moral failures and exploitativeness of
state-scale imperialism.

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European writings. He reasoned that aside from the ‘generous altruism’ that motivated internationalist interventions
on issues like slavery, alcoholism or opiate addiction, there was an economic motive: ‘there is the expression of a
universal economic interest which, stimulated by the growing needs of the world for raw materials, turns to the
virgin territories where vast unused resources lie and expects the masters of these areas to finally deliver this wealth
to the global circulation’ (Sarraut, *La Mise en Valeur des Colonies Françaises*, 29). Original: ‘il y a l’expression
d’un intérêt économique universel qui, stimulé par les besoins grandissants du monde en matières premières, se
tourne vers les vierges territoires où reposent d’immenses ressources inutilisées et attend que les maîtres de ces
domaines livrent enfin ces richesses à la circulation mondiale.’

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Eurafrica and the Pan-European Union

_Eurafrica as idea, 1923-1928_

Although the Pan-European Union did not employ the specific term Eurafrica until 1929, as an idea it was immediately obvious in the PEU’s most influential and widespread piece of propaganda: the Pan-European World Map (see fig. 2). As we have seen, it arrestingly depicted Coudenhove-Kalergi’s description of a ‘Pan-Europe’ that straddled the Mediterranean, bounded to the east by a line running south from Petsamo (on the Finno-Russian border) to Katanga (the south-easternmost province of Belgian Congo) and to the west by the Atlantic Ocean (excluding the British Isles), thus forming ‘a clear-cut geographical unit…based on a common civilization, a common history and common traditions’.

Coloured black and unsullied by internal state borders, this block stood proud of the various forms of hatching that marked the other four global power-blocs. It was, in short, the clearest possible visual statement of the unity of Europe with its African colonies in a supra-national, Pan-European whole.

Coudenhove-Kalergi was clear from the outset that Europe’s colonies were to form an integral part of his vision of European unification:

‘the European territories of the Pan-European state-group form but a fraction of its power-complex. In order rightly to estimate the future possibilities of Pan-Europe, its colonies must also be taken into account.’

He further distinguished between ‘Pan-Europe’s continuous empire in Africa’ and ‘Pan-Europe’s scattered colonies’, implicitly prioritising the former. Indeed, the weight placed on ‘continuous empire’ is made clear by suggestions for a rationalisation of territories, which included ‘Colonial readjustment in Africa by an exchange of England’s West African colonies for equally valuable East African colonies belonging to Europe’, and the selling off of Pan-Europe’s ‘scattered’ American

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894 Coudenhove-Kalergi, _An Idea Conquers The World_, 81
895 Coudenhove-Kalergi, _Pan-Europe_, 32-33
colonies (i.e. French Guiana & Suriname).\(^{896}\)

If Pan-Europe’s ‘power-complex’ was measured in population and area, these measures were also seen as proxies for potential resources and capacity to extract them. Old Europe’s small area, Coudenhove-Kalergi argued, meant that it lacked raw materials, and was therefore reliant on importing resources. However,

‘By unifying its organization and rationally opening up its African colonial empire, which is very nearly equal to Asiatic Russia in extent, Pan-Europe could itself produce all the raw materials and foodstuffs it requires, and thus also become independent in a material way.’\(^{897}\)

This said, in order to make use of African land and resources and ‘convert it into the future granary and source of raw materials for Europe’,\(^{898}\) its wildness had first to be tamed. Coudenhove-Kalergi listed ‘two main tasks [that] would have to be accomplished: First, the partial transformation of the Sahara Desert into agricultural land; Second, the extirpation from Central Africa of sleeping-sickness, which renders cattle-breeding and colonization impossible in the most fertile districts’.\(^{899}\) The echo of Hugo is strong here, with Coudenhove-Kalergi’s modern European eye (ahead of the modern European bodies of physical colonists) able to ‘render the old Africa amenable to civilisation’.

The attractiveness of African land and resources was mirrored by the unsustainability of the status quo. Without Pan-Europe, European states would soon be caught between the external danger of expansionist superpowers in a closed world, and the internal danger of intra-European political tension between colony-owning and non-colony-owning states. With Pan-Europe, both these dangers would be averted, to the advantage of all European states:

‘To the European colonial Powers would be guaranteed the possession of their colonies, which, in isolation, they would sooner or later be bound to lose to World Powers.

On the other hand, those European peoples who, as the result of their geographical position and historical destiny, did not receive fair treatment at the time when the extra-European world was divided up—such as Germans, Poles, Czechs, Scandinavians, and

\(^{896}\) Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Pan-Europe*, 48-49
\(^{897}\) Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Pan-Europe*, 34
\(^{898}\) Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Pan-Europe*, 179
\(^{899}\) Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Pan-Europe*, 179-180

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Balkan peoples—would find, in the great African colonial empire, a field for the release of their economic energies.”

In short, from the very start of the Pan-European movement, Europe’s shared African colonies were simply integral. They gave Pan-Europe the territory to form a rough balance of power with competing continental blocs, the land and resources to be economically self-sufficient, and the means to resolve the internal grievances and demographic pressures of European states.

Adoption of ‘Eurafrica’, 1929-1939

This vision of Europe united with its African empire was given the name ‘Eurafrica’ in Coudenhove-Kalergi’s lead article to the February 1929 edition of Paneuropa, entitled “Africa”. This was the journal’s first article to take the issue as its sole focus, and Coudenhove-Kalergi’s awareness of its significance is indicated by the simultaneous distribution of edited versions of this article as a press release, in German, French and English. In the article, Coudenhove-Kalergi began with a series of geographical metaphors:

‘Africa is our South America.

Africa is the tropical Europe. Gibraltar is our Panama. Politically, West Africa is the southern continuation of Europe beyond these straits.

Europe is a house with many apartments and many tenants – but Africa is its garden. Whereas the Soviet Union separates us from Asia, and the Atlantic Ocean separates us from America – the Mediterranean connects Europe and Africa more than it separates them. So Africa has become our closest neighbour and its destiny a part of our own destiny.

From this perspective Pan-Europe is enlarged to Eurafrica – the small Pan-Europe to a large political continent, stretching from Lapland to Angola, comprising 21 million km² and 360 million people. In the foreseeable future it will be possible to cross this continent under the Straits of Gibraltar with the railroad.

…Europe is the head of Eurafrica – Africa its body. The future of Africa depends on

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900 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 178-179
what Europe knows to make of it.’

We see here Coudenhove-Kalergi embracing the concept he had earlier merely danced around, picking up its logical threads and running with them.

His destination was at once more specific and more open-ended than it had been previously. While concluding in general terms that securing German and Italian participation in Europe’s colonisation of Africa was critical both for African development and for European peace, Coudenhove-Kalergi offered three possibilities by which this might take place. These were: first, the redistribution of colonial mandates (namely, those of Cameroon and Togo, which could be shared between Germany and Italy); second, the outsourcing of colonisation to ‘chartered companies’, including those from non-colony-owning states; and third, ‘the personal and economic equality of all European colonists and pioneers on African soil, regardless of native language and citizenship’.

This third solution was clearly Coudenhove-Kalergi’s preference. By declaring that ‘This [third] solution is within the spirit of the General Act of the Berlin Conference and, among all the proposals, most within the spirit of Pan-Europe’, he aligned the PEU and the 1884-85 Berlin Conference on

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903 Coudenhove-Kalergi uses the English term ‘chartered company’, a nod to the role of such companies in the development of the British Empire. He cites the President of the German Reichsbank, Hjalmar Schacht as a supporter of this plan.


905 Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Afrika", 17; original: ‘Diese Lösung liegt im Sinne der Kongoakte und, unter allen
the same historical trajectory. Indeed, the next step suggested by Coudenhove-Kalergi was the convocation of a new ‘Africa Conference’, brokered by Britain, at which these options could be frankly discussed, and a ‘common colonisation programme’ worked out.\(^906\)

In the following section, I will begin unpacking some of the issues that these assertions raise, and take a closer look at the ideological framework that supported Coudenhove-Kalergi’s plans for Eurafrica. First, though, I wish to track its role within the Pan-European movement from this moment until the outbreak of war. The first question we must ask is why, if the idea of Eurafrica was such an obvious component of a future Pan-European Union, it was only addressed in February 1929? After all, Coudenhove-Kalergi was about to declare an alliance with Aristide Briand’s campaign to create a United States of Europe, and Briand had avoided the colonial question – so why did Coudenhove-Kalergi seize this moment to address it, potentially flagging up their differences?

Coudenhove-Kalergi was not the first to see a consonance between on one hand Pan-European plans for European unity in the development and colonisation of Africa, and on the other German demands for the return of her African colonies. The latter was a popular position within Germany, encapsulated by Hans Grimm’s wildly successful 1926 colonial novel \textit{Volk ohne Raum} (‘A People Without Space’), in which Germany’s African colonies were represented as giving the German people the space they need to reach their mental and cultural potential, and alleviate social problems at home.\(^907\) Both the formulation \textit{Volk ohne Raum} and the message of the book were sympathetic to both mainstream German foreign policy (Gustav Stresemann had in fact used the phrase at the 1925 Berlin Colonial Week and Exhibition),\(^908\) and the work of the \textit{geopolitikers} (though Grimm doesn’t use the

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{Vorschlägen, am meisten im Sinne Paneuropas.’} See also R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, “The African Problem” (n.d. [c.1929]), RGVA, 554/5/53, 118-126, 124
\item R. Heynen, \textit{Degeneration and Revolution: Radical Cultural Politics and the Body in Weimar Germany} (Leiden & Boston: Brill; 2015), 476
\end{itemize}}
term, his book did more than any other to popularise the concept of Lebensraum, and was thus championed by Karl Haushofer. 1926 also saw the publication of a special issue of the Zeitschrift für Geopolitik on the theme of colonialism, featuring a lead article by Erich Obst entitled “We are reclaiming our colonies”, arguing that this claim ought to be pursued in Africa rather than Asia. The compatibility of this with Pan-European plans was highlighted by the German diplomat Alfred Zintgraff (son of the African explorer Eugen Zintgraff) in a 1928 lecture at the General Meeting of the German Colonial Society (Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft, or DKG) in Stuttgart, entitled ‘Pan-Europe and the colonial question’. Zintgraff argued that since the German entry to the League of Nations in 1926 and the supposed unmasking of the ‘Colonial Guilt Lie’, she had an ‘incontrovertible legal right’ to the return of her colonies, but that a Pan-European common plan for the development of Africa with the ‘active co-operation’ of Germans would solve this problem. Coudenhove-Kalergi certainly knew of Zintgraff’s views, and his endorsement (at least in general terms) can be deduced from his publication of an article by Zintgraff on ‘The Colonizability of Africa’ in the December 1929 issue of Paneuropa. It does not seem too much of a stretch to surmise that Coudenhove-Kalergi’s own February 1929 article on Eurafrica was partially prompted by Zintgraff’s lecture, whether to capitalise on the sentiment that Zintgraff represented, or to clarify what the Pan-European position was on these issues that were fast gaining traction in Germany.

910 E. Obst, ”Wir fordern unsere Kolonien zurück”, Zeitschrift für Geopolitik 3.3 (1926) 151-160. Obst’s stated logic was that Asian lands had reached a stage of development that merited self-government, whereas those in Africa (and the South Seas) still required a German ‘friend and teacher’ (Obst, ”Wir fordern unsere Kolonien zurück”, 153). In addition to Obst’s Eurafrican reasoning, there was a clear political motive for supporting self-determination for French and British colonies in the Middle East and Asia. See Wittfogel, “Geopolitics, Geographical Materialism and Marxism", 30
911 Alfred Zintgraff, “Paneuropa und die koloniale Frage”, lecture held at General Meeting of the DKG (June 2, 1928), Der Kolonialfreund 6, no. 7/8 (1928); HAEU, PAN/EU 27, 771/1/194
912 Alfred Zintgraff, “Paneuropa and die koloniale Frage”, c.f. Schnee, German Colonization Past and Future
913 A. Zintgraff, ”Die Besiedlungsfähigkeit Afrikas”, Paneuropa 5.10 (1929) 24-36. The neologism ‘Besiedlungsfähigkeit’ had been coined in A. Leue, Die Besiedlungsfähigkeit Deutsch-Ostafrikas, ein Beitrag zur Auswanderungsfrage (Leipzig: Wilhelm Weicher; 1904)
This is not to suggest that Coudenhove-Kalergi’s alliance with Briand was incidental. Indeed, the May 1930 edition of *Paneuropa* – timed to coincide with both the second Pan-European Congress in Berlin, and the release of Briand’s “Memorandum on the Organisation of a System of European Federal Union”914 – contained a ‘sketch’ of a European Pact, a ‘basis for discussion’ upon which negotiation of such as European Federal Union might proceed. Article 13 of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s proposal for a Pact specified that:

‘All European citizens enjoy economic equality in the tropical colonies of European states in Africa. In the other colonies of the states they enjoy at least most-favoured-nation treatment as against citizens of states that do not belong to the alliance.’915

In its care to respect State sovereignty, to work within (and hence be subordinate to) the League of Nations, to be compatible with the mandate system, and to prioritise the economic over the political, Article 13 clearly represented a version of Pan-European colonial policy carefully tailored to mesh with Briand’s Memorandum. And yet, in its very mention of Europe’s African colonies it markedly diverged from the Memorandum’s deliberate silence on this issue. This silence was part of a larger strategy on the part of the Memorandum’s authors, Aristide Briand and Alexis Leger, to limit the scope of the proposal, ‘in order to increase the prospects of unanimous acceptance of an initial concrete proposal capable of reconciling all the interests and special conditions involved’.916 Coudenhove-Kalergi’s gamble, his justification for diverging from Briand at this critical time, was that he believed that the colonial question was better solved than ignored, and that the solution he offered had the potential to ‘transform the colonial question from a divisive to a unifying element for

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916 *Briand-Leger Memorandum*, 14
Europe’.  

Certainly, Briand’s tactic of avoidance did not pay dividends, for the colonial problem would prove to be a common objection in the State responses to the Memorandum.  

Coudenhove-Kalergi made one last attempt to secure Eurafrica through the League in his December 1933 ‘Plan for a Reform of the League of Nations’, which suggested an overhaul of the mandate system. Under this new Plan, Class A-mandates (i.e. the former Ottoman territories in the Middle East) would be turned into protectorates, and Class B and C mandates turned into colonies of the mandatory powers, with the added tweak that Germany and Italy would receive (unspecified) colonial compensation.  

Turning back to the Pan-European Union after the League ignored his suggestions, Coudenhove-Kalergi argued in his 1934 book Europa erwacht! ‘that the European colonial empire would give the continent “a new sense, a new mission”’, arguments echoed by the influential French advocate of Eurafrica Eugène Guernier both in his own books and in a January 1935 article in Paneuropa.  

In May 1935, Eurafrica was one of the topics of discussion at the fourth Pan-European Congress in Vienna. The Congress was organised into eleven Commissions, of which the last of these, Commission XI, was dedicated to ‘Europäische Arbeitslosigkeit, Kolonial-, Bevölkerungs- und Siedlungsprobleme’ (‘European unemployment, colonial, population and settlement problems’). As the title suggests, the discussion eschewed overtly political arguments, instead discussing

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919 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, “Plan for a Reform of the League of Nations”, Pan-European Union, Hofburg, Vienna (December 1933), received by the League 6 February 1934; LoN 50/8258/8258, Jacket 1; p.7  
920 Orluc, "Europe between Past and Future", 69; quoting Coudenhove-Kalergi, Europa erwacht, 198  
Eurafrica in economic and demographic terms, with the issue of African colonisation folded into the issue of European unemployment. The commission proceedings show much discussion and support for a rational organisation of a (Pan-)European colonisation programme, with the German-Jewish historian Alfred Stern calling for the establishment of a ‘Pan-European colonial mandate’ (paneuropäischen Kolonialmandats). However, as a means to alleviate unemployment, the idea of a forty-hour working week found more favour, and Commission XI’s eventual Resolution effectively sidestepped any firm statement on colonial issues, instead recommending the setting up of a ‘permanent commission’ so that the issues could be studied further.

As the Vienna congress was meeting to discuss the economic necessity of Eurafrica, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s gloomy warnings about its political necessity were coming to pass. The Abyssinian crisis was exactly the sort of European rift that he had predicted, and the League proved unable to broker an agreement between Abyssinia and Italy. Coudenhove-Kalergi attempted to intervene, pleading again for an ‘Africa Conference’ that would at least defuse tensions between European states, if not placate the Abyssinians. However, as his intervention was going to press, Italy finally invaded Abyssinia, prompting the League to impose (limited) sanctions. Germany, which by this point had withdrawn from the League, chose to remain silent, and imposed no sanctions, thus signalling its tacit support of Italy’s actions. On one hand, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s vision of an intra-European war between colony-owning and non-colony-owning states was proving correct, as was his prediction that it would have an African spark. However, on the other hand, Coudenhove-Kalergi had always been receptive to the idea that Abyssinia was part of Italy’s ‘natural’ sphere of influence in Africa, and he viewed Italy’s eventual seizure of sovereignty there as something of an inevitability.

923 "Kommissions-Beratungen: Kommission XI"
924 "Die Resolutionen: Kommission XI", 175
925 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Der abessinische Konflikt", Paneuropa 11.9 (1935) 277-281; Orluc, "Europe between Past and Future", 302
926 See, for example, R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Reparationen und Kolonien", Paneuropa 8.1 (1932) 7-11, 11
Meeting with Benito Mussolini just two days after the capture of Addis Ababa in May 1936, Coudenhove-Kalergi tried to persuade him into an alliance with France (and Austria) rather than Germany by promising him that such an alliance ‘would have the further advantage of opening North Africa to Italian colonization’. European influence over Africa was complete (aside from the American-backed Liberia), but rather than uniting Europe, it had divided her to the point of catastrophe.

Although Coudenhove-Kalergi’s negotiations with Mussolini ended in failure, ironically his notion of Eurafrika was given a new lease of life in Italy, part of a wider trend post-Abyssinia, as Eurafrika became more loosely tied to the PEU and its support, previously markedly francophone, became more diffuse. While D’Agostino Orsini di Camerota and De Michelis had long advocated Eurafrika, renewed Italian interest was sparked (and Mussolini’s imprimatur given) by the 1938 Volta Conference organised by the Italian Royal Academy in Rome. The theme for this conference was ‘Africa’, and it attracted prestigious delegates, including Bronislaw Malinowski, Louis Bertrand, Albert Demangeon and Karl Haushofer. As at the 1932 Volta Conference, the idea of European unity was embraced, though it was of course a particular version (what we might today call Axis or fascist internationalism), which existed in an ambivalent relationship with Pan-Europe.

927 Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers The World, 206. Coudenhove-Kalergi believed that ‘A Franco-Italian alliance would include automatically Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Balkan bloc, and Belgium. Backed by Britain and eventually by Russia, it might evolve into a European federation’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, Crusade for Pan-Europe, 169).
928 Ellena, ”Political Imagination, Sexuality and Love in the Eurafrican Debate”, 254-255.
Nevertheless, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s term Eurafrica was enthusiastically appropriated by the new Italian monthly journal *Geopolitica*, launched in January 1939, which embraced it ‘as being *squisitamente geopolitiche* (exquisitely geopolitical),’ while Haushofer himself eventually contributed to the discussion with a 1938 article entitled ‘*Eurafrica*’.

One of the last articles on Eurafrica in the *Paneuropa* journal was a 1936 piece by the Sudeten-German Anton Gall suggesting the creation of a series of giant inland lakes in the Sahara in order to develop the land there (see fig. 23). While these plans appear fanciful today, Gall was by no means alone in suggesting them, and in fact these mega-engineering projects were a notable recurring element of German plans for Eurafrica, especially in the Nazi period. Their connection to Pan-Europe can be surmised from the name of the first such project, the German architect Herman Sörgel’s ‘Panropa Project’, first published in a 1929 pamphlet outlining Sörgel’s plan to erect a series of dams (most notably across the Straits of Gibraltar) that would enable the lowering of the Mediterranean (thus creating new land to settle and cultivate), to irrigate the Sahara, and to create a Eurafrikan political union. In 1932, Sörgel repackaged this idea in a Nazi-friendly science fiction novel, with *Panropa* now going by the name *Atlantropa*, the title of the novel. Sörgel attempted to copy

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931 Atkinson, "Geopolitics and the Geographical Imagination in Fascist Italy", 197
932 K. Haushofer, "Eurafrika?", *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* 15 (1938) 888
933 A. Gall, "Europas Zukunft", *Paneuropa* 12.10 (1936) 226-232
936 Sörgel, *Atlantropa*; c.f. Muller, "An Imagined National Socialist Colonial Adventure"
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s strategy as a publicist, starting his own *Atlantropa* organisation, while his 1938 book *Die drei grossen “A”: Amerika, Atlantropa, Asien* was an attempt to develop a vision of global politics that was transparently indebted to Coudenhove-Kalergi and the *geopolitikers*.937 Meanwhile, a whole raft of other authors also wrote novels premised upon Sörgel’s geoengineering plans: this new genre of Eurafrikan-science-fiction-thriller-cum-propaganda-tract included Georg Güntsche’s 1930 *Panropa*, Wolfgang Lindroder’s 1936 *Die Brücke des Schicksals* (‘The Bridge of Destiny’), Walther Kegel’s 1937 *Dämme im Mittelmeer* (‘Dams of the Mediterranean’), Titus Taeschner’s 1935 *Atlantropa* and 1938 *Eurofrika, die Macht der Zukunft* (‘Eurofrica, the Power of the Future’), and the Swiss author John Knittel’s 1939 *Power for Sale*.938

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The third direction in which Eurafrica was turned at the end of the interwar period, with similarly ambivalent ties to the Pan-European movement, was its appearance in Britain. It garnered heavyweight support on both sides of the aisle, in the figures of the Conservative MP Leo Amery and the Labour MP Ernest Bevin. Amery was a long-time supporter of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s, and while he was utterly opposed to the restitution of German colonies, he believed a colonial Pan-Europe, built along the lines of (and existing parallel to) the British Commonwealth, would satisfy German demands for colonial access. Bevin too supported this position, though his interpretation was notable for including Britain and her colonies; Bevin’s ‘Euro-Africa’ would thus embrace the entire African continent.

If each of these ways in which Eurafrica was picked up in the last years of the interwar period – namely, the geopolitics of axis imperialism, politically charged science fiction and the hitching of Pan-Europe to the coattails of the British Commonwealth – departed from Pan-European doctrine and organisational control, they each also shared core elements with Coudenhove-Kalergi’s vision. These elements in turn often derived from the late-nineteenth century notions that we began with. In order to unpack the discursive power that made Eurafrica so appealing so quickly to so many disparate groups (both ideologically and geographically), in the final section I pick out three broad pillars that supported and justified it: an argument about political justice in a world in which justice was no longer meant to be political, an economic argument about resources that naturalised neomercantilist notions


of autarky, and an demographic argument based on racist underpinnings that rendered Africa empty.

**The theorisation of Eurafrika**

*International justice*

Though Schnee’s apparent debunking of the ‘Colonial Guilt Lie’ was certainly most popular in Germany, where it served to mend nationalist pride, stoked feelings of victimisation, and rhymed conceptually with the ‘War Guilt Lie’, it found sympathetic ears elsewhere too. The US Secretary of State and Commissioner to Negotiate Peace at the Paris Peace Conference, Robert Lansing, admitted in his 1921 account of the negotiation of the Treaty of Versailles that few believed that the stripping of Germany’s colonies was the result of an ‘impartial’ assessment of her prior mismanagement of them:

‘If the advocates of the [mandate] system intended to avoid through its operation the appearance of taking enemy territory as the spoils of war, it was a subterfuge which deceived no one.’

Even Leo Amery, who in 1937 defended the seizure of German colonies as ‘nothing beyond the ordinary verdict of history … of a war which after all did not start with a Belgian invasion of Germany’, regretted the ‘unctuous rectitude’ of justifying it by reference to Germany’s record of colonial administration. As the historian Wolfe Schmokel would later argue, ‘there is no doubt that the Allied statesmen at Versailles, by their needlessly vindictive and insulting language and their continued use of wartime propaganda as facts, had supplied the German colonial revisionists with

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942 Amery, "The Problem of the Cession of Mandated Territories in Relation to the World Situation", 6, 4. Amery does try to temper this embarrassment by reasserting that ‘it is fair to remember that that [German] administration had grave blots.’ (4)
their strongest arguments’.  

They were certainly arguments that the PEU was receptive to. Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote in 1932 that:

‘Germany has not forgotten that it lost its colonies by a breach of trust of the Allied Powers. That it surrendered in 1918 after the Allies had recognized Wilson’s Fourteen Points as the basis for peace.’

He continued by quoting Wilson’s Fifth Point, concerning the impartial arbitration of colonial claims, noting that this Point was breached in Versailles, and that the pretext of German mistreatment of natives ‘has long been refuted by impeccable testimonies of expert witnesses from Allied and neutral nations’. This state of affairs, he concluded,

‘embittered the German patriot more than the loss of the colonies itself. So they demand colonies not so much for the colonies sake, but as an expression of their equal footing as a great power and in the name of international justice.’

On the issue of whether to accede to this demand for the restitution of German colonies, Coudenhove-Kalergi was more equivocal. In the main, he was keen to stress that the solution should not be state-level transferral of territory, but rather some form of supranational cooperation that would diminish the significance of state sovereignty, if not transcend it absolutely. However, in the early 1930s, he did advance the idea of transferring the mandates for Cameroon and Togo to Germany, perhaps to be shared with Italy, reasoning that ‘They would redress a large part of the injustice that Germany

943 Schmokel, Dream of Empire, 66
946 Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Reparationen und Kolonien", 9. Original: ‘Dieser Tatbestand erbittert die deutschen Patrioten mehr als der Verlust der Kolonien an sich. So fördern sie Kolonien nicht so sehr um der Kolonien willen, sondern als Ausdruck ihrer gleichberechtigten Großmachtstellung und im Namen internationaler Gerechtigkeit.’ See also a 1939 speech in which Coudenhove-Kalergi, channelling the voice of the ‘typical’ German for an English audience, reported the belief that: ‘Germany must be given equality in Europe. If Germany again surrendered and changed her regime, she must know that she would not be treated as she had been at Versailles, where she had not been treated equally or honourably, where she had been not only impoverished but dishonoured.’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Europe To-Morrow", 640)
suffered in Versailles, and thus be a decisive step towards European reconciliation’. Though he would later row back from this, saying in 1939 that ‘it would be a danger to give [Germany’s former colonies] back to her’, he never shied away from sympathising with the injustice of their seizure, thus laying himself open to accusations of appeasing German expansionism.

However, this charge falls flat on two counts. First, the pursuit of African colonies was not an official concern of the German government, either in Weimar or Nazi administrations, until the late 1930s. This was despite the popularity of the colonial movement among the German public, as evidenced, for example, by the activity of the Kolonialgesellschaft, the popularity of books by writers like Schnee and Grimm, or the memorialisation of German colonialism in monuments like the striking brick elephant in Bremen, built in 1931 to a design by the famous Berlin sculptor Fritz Behn (see fig. 24). Even Hitler’s policy of expansionism was in the first years of Nazi rule confined to European soil. Hitler made his disdain for African colonialism clear in Mein Kampf (1925-1926), dismissing the clamour for the recovery of German colonies as ‘the quite unrealizable, purely fantastic babble of windy parlor patriots and Babbitty coffee-house politicians’, and criticising the very concept of colonialism as geographically unbalanced:

‘Many European States today are comparable to pyramids standing on their points. Their European territory is ridiculously small as compared with their burden of colonies’

Indeed, he wrote in horror of France’s African empire as tending towards a

‘European-African mulatto State. A mighty self-contained area of settlement from the Rhine to the Congo filled with an inferior race developing out of continual hybridization.'

(December 1933), received by the League 6 February 1934; LoN 50/8258/8258, Jacket 1, 1544, p.6
948 Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Reparationen und Kolonien", 10 Original: ‘Sie wäre die Wiedergutmachung eines großen Teiles des Unrechtes, das Deutschland in Versailles erlitten hat, und damit eine entscheidende Etappe zur europäischen Versöhnung.’
949 Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Europe To-Morrow", 640
950 M.E. Townsend, "The German colonies and the Third Reich", Political Science Quarterly 53.2 (1938) 186-206 As Townsend notes, the exception to this rule was Hjalmar Schacht, President of the Reichsbank, whose case for Eurafrican/German colonialism was economic.
951 Officially called the Reichskolonialehrendenkmal, this monument still stands today, though with the inscription to ‘our colonies’ removed and since 1989 re-dedicated as an anti-colonial monument (Antikolonialdenkmal).
952 A. Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans. John Chamberlain et al. (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock; 1939), 924
953 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 180
954 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 937-938
For the Hitler of Mein Kampf, Eurafrica was not a dream but a nightmare. While the Nazis would (from around 1934) gradually come to embrace the colonial movement, which after all shared with Nazi foreign policy the chief goal of revising the Versailles Treaty, it was the Nazi ideology that had to bend to incorporate colonial thinking rather than vice versa.

The second count on which the charge of appeasement fails is that the Pan-European solution was not only about the specific political injustice of the stripping of German colonies under rationalist pretences (itself just one part of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s frustration at what he saw as the betrayal of Wilson’s ideals at Versailles), but also about the broader historical injustices that meant that countries like Czechoslovakia and Poland did not have access to colonies. This broader injustice found expression in the fear of a future European civil war between a Western-European bloc of colony-owning states, supported by London, and an Eastern bloc of non-colony-owning states, supported by Moscow. Coudenhove-Kalergi used the analogy of the American Civil War, casting the Western group as the slave-owning Confederates, unwilling to give up their economic advantage, and the Eastern

Figure 24: Fritz Behn’s colonial monument, Bremen, erected 1931. Photograph by Joachim Zeller
group as the Unionists, acting in their own economic interests though under an idealist banner of freedom. In this case, the freedom in question was anti-colonial national liberation, though Coudenhove-Kalergi warned that ‘the slogan of the right of self determination of coloured people … would only be a pretext for Eastern Europe to drive out the Western powers and to take their place’. In other words, the fact that some European states had access to colonies while others did not had created a political tinderbox. Speaking of Djibouti, a French exclave newly surrounded by European powers since the Italian conquest of Abyssinia, Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote that ‘it may be that this African spark could ignite a European fire that could scorch the whole culture of the West’. The way to defuse this situation (and therefore avoid European civil war) was not to revisit the injustices of the past, but to look to a cooperative future in which such national injustices lost their meaning and melted away. For Coudenhove-Kalergi and the Pan-Europeans, Eurafrica was this future.

**Natural resources**

If mentions of international justice drew attention to political debates around sovereignty, and used landmass and population as proxies for power and prestige, they were comprehensively outweighed by a second level of analysis which focused instead on economic debates, which used landmass and population as proxies for natural resources and markets. Such debates summoned alternative geographies of Eurafrica, based not on the political boundaries of states, but on the physical geography of resource distribution, or the supra-state economic geography by which those resources could (and should) circulate.

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The presence of natural resources in Pan-European arguments for Eurafrica was often vague and drawn in exceedingly broad strokes, yet was almost inevitably present in some capacity. Since William Stanley Jevons’ 1865 *The Coal Question*, natural resources had slowly begun to be interpreted as a political driver, a hidden cause of political intrigues and foreign policy, and a reliable and quantifiable guide to future political developments. In the interwar period, this understanding had hit the mainstream: in Quincy Howe’s introduction to Frank Hanighen and Anton Zischka’s 1935 book *The Secret War: The War for Oil* (Zischka would later become a prominent proponent of Eurafrica), Howe criticised luminaries like Walter Lippmann and Arthur Salter for basing their commentaries on ‘confused emotions and interests’ instead of the ‘accurate prophesy’ that Hanighen and Zischka’s focus on oil allowed. This interest in resources was reflected in the pages of the *Paneuropa* journal, with articles by the exiled German journalist Richard Lewinsohn on “Europe’s New Oil-Basis” and by Franz Zrzavý on “The European Resource Problem”. A ‘Pan-European Resource Conference’ [*Paneuropäische Rohstoffkonferenz*] was organised to be held in Vienna from 16-19 March 1938, only for the German invasion on 12 March to force the conference’s cancellation. Land itself was also treated as a resource, as in Zrzavý’s PEU working paper on “The European Agricultural Capacity”. The common theme is each of these articles was that Europe’s resources were limited, and that steps had to be taken to secure their supply from outside of Europe. Curiously, although resources were often quantified, they were rarely mapped; this geographical

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960 R. Lewinsohn, "Europas neue Oelbasis", *Paneuropa* 11.3 (1935) 72-75; F.J. Zrzavý, "Das europäische Rohstoffproblem", *Paneuropa* 13.6 (1937) 162-167
961 See *Paneuropa* 14(1):24-28; 14(2):52-54; 14(3):85-92. For notification of the postponement of the conference, see Centre Économique Paneuropéenne/Paneuropäische Wirtschaftszentrale to League of Nations (12 March 1938), LoN, 10A/25880/22798, 29
962 F.J. Zrzavý, *Die europäische Agrarkapazität* (Vienna: Paneuropa-Verlag; 1934)
vagueness was perhaps influenced by German colonial propagandists who got around the fact that the African mandated territories were relatively mineral-poor by appealing to ‘the theories of the geographer Adolf Wagner, according to whom minerals were distributed more or less evenly over the earth’s surface’.  

Where a careful reading of African geography did come in to play was in the development of the mega-engineering projects necessary to tame the African landscape, still thought of (as it was by Hugo) in terms of its savagery and massive scale. Coudenhove-Kalergi described it as ‘a battle of human fantasy and technique against an allpowerful [sic] tropical nature’. The most massive and most savage landscape of all, the Sahara, was the subject of Anton Gall’s ambitious plans. He wrote that while modern navigation had conquered the empty spaces of the Atlantic and Pacific, ‘we still await the plan for a trans-Saharan railway, let alone its execution’. However, his ambition was not only to make the Sahara navigable, but to render its land usable; that is, ‘the “economic conquest of the Sahara desert”’. As we have seen, Gall’s plans, echoing those of Sörgel, were to divert the waters of the Nile and the Niger in order to create ‘8 to 10 huge inland lakes, each approximately the size of Lake Chad (about one third of Bohemia)’ (see fig. 23). This ‘development’ of African space was crucial not just for its boosting of Eurafrican agricultural capacity, but for its connection of Europe and African into a contiguous geographical region in all senses of the term. As Gall wrote, the aim was the creation of ‘a vast cultural and economic territory of the first rank, a Europe coupled on an economic, geological and geopolitical basis, eternally upgradeable, with a resource, sales and settlement area comprising the entire neighbouring continent’. Furthermore, even the act of

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963 Schmokel, *Dream of Empire*, 60; citing P. Leutwein, *Die Deutsche Kolonialfrage* (Berlin: Safari-Verlag; 1937), 47
undertaking such grand projects would bring about a sense of communality. As Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote, in terms that recall Grimm’s romanticisation of the wide African vistas in which Europeans could reach their own inner potential,⁹⁶⁹

‘This common task would employ and unite them [sic] the best forces of Europe. It would widen the horizon of Europe and raise it above the petty trifles of the mothercountry.’⁹⁷⁰

Indeed, casting an eye further east, Coudenhove-Kalergi suggested elsewhere that ‘The joint development of Africa could become a major task for the European nations: fantastic and captivating as the Russian Five-Year Plan’.⁹⁷¹

Africa had the space and resources, and Europe had the technical know-how to develop them; Africa had surplus materials, and Europe was a market hungry for them. Even if the Sahara presented a challenge to Eurafibbean contiguity, Pan-European arguments played heavily upon this supposedly natural complementarity between the two continents. As one (unnamed) proponent of Eurafrica put it,

‘The symbiosis of Europe and Africa is controlled by a very simple reality. The African soil is too poor for Africa to be able to do without Europe. The African subsoil is too rich for Europe to be able to do without Africa.’⁹⁷²

Or, in the more technical language of De Michelis, who admitted that he was ‘largely following Coudenhove-Kalergi in his useful articles in Paneuropa’,⁹⁷³

‘Africa today is the continent already predestined and predisposed for a new organisation which will serve to develop, together with the lands and the mineral wealth, the forces of the native populations themselves in such a way as to supply Europe the raw materials and the foodstuffs of which it will have need for the increase of its factories and for the well-being of

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⁹⁶⁹ Smith, "The Colonial Novel as Political Propaganda", 220; citing Grimm, Volk ohne Raum, 384-385
⁹⁷³ De Michelis, World Reorganisation on Corporate Lines, 171n*
its population; and will serve also to raise the purchasing capacity and the level of civilisation of the non-European races and thereby provide assured outlets for the increased industrial activity of Europe and set up an intense exchange of goods and services between the two continents.

...Africa is – and cannot fail to be – considered and recognised as *strictly complementary to Europe*, from which it is separated by a great lake, the Mediterraneaean, which once before had the glorious mission of uniting the two continents in economic and political life.*974

In the Pan-European literature, this notion of complementarity was both explicit and explicitly imbalanced, with Coudenhove-Kalergi referring to Africa as the ‘natural and ideal supplement [*Ergänzung*] of Europe’,975 and Gall calling it Europe’s ‘second continent’.976

The notion that Europe needed such a complement rested on one of the most influential political discourses in the interwar period: that of autarky, which held that states ought to be economically self-sufficient, and not beholden to imports. Thus Europe’s lack of natural resources (either at the state scale or collectively), when seen through the lens of autarky, was an enormous problem. This problem was equally acute whether one saw autarky as a positive ideal to be striven for, or as a reluctant necessity imposed by the post-Versailles political system and the tendency towards rising trade barriers. At the national scale, autarky lay at the heart of Hjalmar Schacht’s influential economic argument for the return of Germany’s colonies, first deployed at the spring 1929 Young Conference in Paris, when Schacht presented a memorandum claiming that Germany’s inability to pay her reparations stemmed in part from the loss of her colonies, which were an ‘essential condition for her [Germany’s] economic survival’ since they (allegedly) constituted her supply of raw

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974 De Michelis, *World Reorganisation on Corporative Lines*, 170-174; emphasis in original
975 This is how the phrase is rendered in the slightly awkwardly translated “The African Problem” (RGVA, 554/5/53, 118-126, 118); the original is ‘die natürliche und ideale Ergänzung Europas’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Afrika", 3).
976 See also the proceedings of the 1935 Kommission XI, which reaffirmed Africa’s status as ‘a supplement of the European continent, which Europe assists by maintaining its secular mission as a pioneer of civilization.’ (“Kommissions-Beratungen: Kommission XI”, *Paneuropa* 11, no. 6/8, 191. Original: ‘eine Ergänzung des europäischen Kontinents…. Europa behilflich zu sein, seine säkulare Mission eines Wegbereiters der Zivilisation aufrechtzuerhalten.’)
976 Gall, "Europas Zukunft", 228
materials. Though this argument was dismissed out of hand by Schacht’s negotiating partners – he later reported being ‘laughed at’ – it was taken up wholeheartedly by Coudenhove-Kalergi, who devoted an entire Paneuropa article to developing this point, explicitly and approvingly referring to Schacht’s argument in Paris. Schacht and Coudenhove-Kalergi agreed that the political problem of European peace depended on the economic problem of Germany’s viability as a such-sufficient economy, which in turn depended on German access to African colonies. Or, to reduce this formula to a maxim, as formulated by Schacht, ‘a nation which is cut off from the essential necessities of life must be a source of unrest in the world’.

However, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s support for this line of reasoning must be weighed against his larger argument, which was that the national scale was too small for autarky to ever be achieved, and that we ought instead to think of autarky on a continental scale. While national autarky encouraged trade barriers and hence inhibited the circulation of raw materials, preventing the market from functioning as a means of resource allocation, continental autarky allowed for such a market-driven circulation to take place internally. In this respect, Euraficn plans were modelled after the British Empire and the system of Imperial Preference, as championed by Leo Amery, who described its logic as ‘mutual trade, preferential against the world outside, between countries whose products are essentially complementary to each other; and countries so numerous and with resources so varied as to afford all the market and the resources for large-scale production and large-scale selling’. In turn, Amery supported Pan-European plans for ‘getting the countries of Europe as a whole, with their

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978 Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Reparationen und Kolonien", 8. This was despite Schacht’s hostility to the PEU, specifically its reluctance to negotiate the Versailles borders, in H. Schacht, *The End of Reparations*, trans. Lewis Gannett (New York: Jonathan Cape and Harrison Smith; 1931) (c.f. H. Taylor, "Book review: The End of Reparations", *Political Science Quarterly* 46.3 (1931) 438-441, 440)

979 Schacht, *The End of Reparations*; H. Schacht, "German trade and German debts", *Foreign Affairs* 13.1 (1934) 1-5; Schacht, "Germany's colonial demands"; Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Reparationen und Kolonien"

980 Schacht, "Germany's colonial demands", 228

981 Amery, "The Problem of the Cession of Mandated Territories in Relation to the World Situation", 15
colonies, to come together to form a system parallel to that which we are building up in the British Empire. The ‘natural’ complementarity of Europe and Africa, combining Africa’s wealth of resources (both land and minerals) with Europe’s ability to develop and provide a market for them, made Eurafrica the self-sufficient economic unit *par excellence*.

**Colonisation**

The circulation of goods throughout the Eurafrican bloc was to be accompanied, and indeed enabled, by the circulation of people. However, this circulation was almost exclusively considered not in terms of African immigration to Europe, but rather the reverse: the colonisation of Africa by white Europeans. As Coudenhove-Kalergi made clear, ‘In order to develop Africa, Europe must not only control but also colonize it’. Europe was overpopulated, with surplus labour visible in high unemployment rates, while Africa had surplus land; this element of Eurafrican complementarity led naturally in Pan-European arguments to the need for population transfer. However, as we shall see, these arguments were at best casually imperialistic, assuming an essentially empty Africa to be parcelled out by and for Europeans, and at worst explicitly racist.

Like the rationalisation of resources, the rationalisation of population was based on an (albeit sketchy) understanding of physical geography. This was most fully developed in Alfred Zintgraff’s mapping of the ‘colonizability’ of Africa, published in *Paneuropa* in 1929. Zintgraff drew on ‘the

982 Amery, "The Problem of the Cession of Mandated Territories in Relation to the World Situation", 15-16
983 I have found only one mention of African immigration into Europe in Pan-European literature. However, this mention was unambiguously racist, with Coudenhove-Kalergi writing that Europe ‘must prevent black workers and soldiers from immigrating in large numbers to Europe’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Afrika", 5, original: ‘Es [Europa] muß verhindern, daß schwarze Arbeiter und Soldaten in größerer Zahl nach Europa einwandern’). C.f. R.C. Reinders, "Racialism on the Left: E.D. Morel and the "Black Horror on the Rhine"", *International Review of Social History* 13.1 (1968) 1-28

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famous Geographer’ Fritz Jäger’s map of the basins and uplands (Becken und Schwellen) of Africa, published the previous year (see fig. 25).\textsuperscript{985} Zintgraff combined Jäger’s topographical mapping with his own argument that the highlands of Africa (i.e. Jäger’s Schwellen) would offer the most favourable conditions for permanent European settlement.\textsuperscript{986} Zintgraff’s conviction that this colonisation should be organised in a purely technical manner led him to dissent from Coudenhove-Kalergi’s division of the continent into British and Pan-European halves, though he admitted that this stance was influenced by the fact that majority of the potential settlement areas he identified lay in British Africa.\textsuperscript{987} For his part, Coudenhove-Kalergi was more sceptical about such environmentally determinist notions, arguing that ‘This fight against the tropical heat will be no more difficult than the more-than-millennial struggle of Europeans against the northern cold’, and that the problems of climate would be countered by the development of technical solutions like central cooling systems, underground houses and cities, ointments to protect against the sun, and so on.\textsuperscript{988}

The idea of population transfer as a technical matter had mainstream acceptance; it was after all only in 1923 that the League had overseen a population exchange agreement between Greece and Turkey. The Director General of the International Labour Office (ILO), Albert Thomas, agreed that migration was a problem of economics (and vice versa), and that undertaking improvement works in Africa might help solve Europe’s unemployment crisis.\textsuperscript{989} Giuseppe De Michelis, who had equally impeccable credentials as an international civil servant – he was the Italian representative to the ILO and the director of the International Institute of Agriculture (IIA) – was clearer still, arguing that ‘to relieve the congestion in overcrowded countries by transferring their surplus to unpopulated areas,

\textsuperscript{986} Zintgraff, ”Die Besiedlungsfähigkeit Afrikas”, 24-25
\textsuperscript{987} Zintgraff, ”Die Besiedlungsfähigkeit Afrikas”, 33-34
\textsuperscript{988} Coudenhove-Kalergi, ”Afrika”, 8. Original: ‘Dieser Kampf gegen die tropische Hitze wird nicht schwieriger sein als der mehrtausendjährige Kampf des Europäers gegen die nordische Kälte.’
\textsuperscript{989} De Michelis, World Reorganisation on Corporative Lines, 62; Hansen and Jonsson, Eurafrika, 53
would open the way to the full exploitation and consummation of the economic potentialities of the world’. In his view, colonization was merely the least inhumane, and most rational (since it was guided by ‘a spirit of enquiry and progress’) of a long history of economically motivated movements.

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of people, from slavery, through indentured labour and the settlement of penal colonies.991

De Michelis was namechecked in support of the economic necessity of the coordinated European colonization of Africa at “Commission XI” of the 4th PEU Congress in Vienna in May 1935.992 The Commission saw speeches by Max Grunwald, a retired Chief Rabbi and historian who argued that emigration to African could give Europe’s unemployed a ‘refuge’ in which to make themselves useful, and Artur Biber, the Chairman of the Economic Committee of the Chamber of Engineers for Vienna, Lower Austria and Burgenland, who gave a detailed breakdown of the numbers that such a scheme might run to (300 000 per year, over ten years, for a decadal total of 3 million European settlers in Africa), and how it was to be financed.993 Eugène Guernier was more optimistic still, writing in Paneuropa that:

‘a primed Africa will be able to digest a European immigration of approximately 15 to 20 million individuals. With a migration rhythm [Wanderungsrythmus] of 500,000 souls per year such a flow of men can ensure Europe 30 to 50 years of tranquillity, prosperity and peace.’994

How exactly this was to be organised was generally elided, though Biber did offer that ‘The [African] colony should be a mirror image of Europe’, by which he meant that like the PEU’s plans for its European territory, it ought to be split into national divisions under a supranational [übernational] federal authority.995 More typical was some sort of deferral, like Coudenhove-Kalergi’s assurance that a ‘common colonization program’ would be worked out at an Africa Conference, to be brokered by Britain.996

991 De Michelis, World Reorganisation on Corporative Lines, 65
992 "Kommissions-Beratungen: Kommission XI". De Michelis’s 1934 book had made similar arguments, and as we have seen was itself explicitly indebted to Coudenhove-Kalergi’s own work (De Michelis, World Reorganisation on Corporative Lines). For more on De Michelis and the consonances of corporativism and Eurafrican thinking, see Steffek, "Fascist Internationalism"; Steffek and Antonini, "Towards Eurafrica"
996 Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Afrika", 17
However, behind all the talk of technical rationisations and common action, this colonisation was envisaged as primarily German- (and, to a lesser degree, Italian-) led. As the argument ran, it was Germany in which the problems of unemployment (interpreted as a symptom of ‘overpopulation’) were starkest, so an apolitical solution to this economic problem was naturally to ‘manage’ the settlement of Germans in Europe’s African territories. Even without executive action to manage these flows, Coudenhove-Kalergi argued that since none of the extant colonial powers (apart from Belgium) were overpopulated, their populations had no incentive to emigrate to the colonies, so Europe relied upon German population pressure to drive its colonisation programme.997 We see here the tacit acknowledgement of the logic of Lebensraum, perhaps most explicit in Coudenhove-Kalergi’s rallying call that for inhabitants of overpopulated nations, ‘it is possible to build a second and greater Europe, where millions and millions of Europeans might find a new homeland, Europeans for whom their fatherland now is too narrow’.998 However, the Pan-European understanding of Lebensraum differed from the Nazis’, in two key respects. First, as we have seen, Nazi ideology only endorsed the expansion of German Lebensraum in continental Europe; even after the shift to a Kolonialpolitik in the late 1930s, African colonies were seen as spaces from which to extract raw materials rather than spaces of settlement.999 And second, Pan-European Lebensraum was up-scaled from the nation to the continent, such that ‘Africa is … the living space of Europe’.1000 As Coudenhove-Kalergi argued, ‘one … ought to say to them [Germany]: You speak of Lebensraum. What Lebensraum do you want? If they then answer that they want two or three colonies and Central and Eastern Europe between Russia and Germany, they should be told: We offer to you a much larger Lebensraum. We offer you the whole of Europe and a great part of Africa if you really only want living space, a space where you can be free in your commerce, in your life; but if you want living space for domination, then you will not have anything; but if we construct a federated Europe, then the whole of Europe will be your living space, and then you will have

997 This is why ‘The development and conquest of Africa is only possible with the participation of the Germans and Italians.’
999 Schmokel, Dream of Empire, 49-50
much more than if you conquer one or two countries.‘

Thus, by re-scaling Lebensraum Coudenhove-Kalergi attempted to negotiate a compromise between admitting the vital force of population pressure and sidestepping the cynical (ab)use of this idea by nationalists; between allowing for a German-dominated colonisation and obtaining the consent of the Western-European colonial powers; between the demands of Realpolitik and the façade of technical, economistic justifications.

Of course, by using economistic rhetorics to justify the European colonisation of African land, Coudenhove-Kalergi was also up-scaling the cynicism of the nationalists to the continental level. However, while intra-European tensions were papered over with a veneer of apolitical rationalisations, when it came to justifying European imperialism in Africa per se, the Pan-European reasoning tended to fall back on the more traditional notions of the European mission civilisatrice. Accordingly, stress was placed on Europe’s Christian duty of care for native populations in Africa, with its attendant assumptions of African primitivism. Indeed, a common touchstone was the French colonial administrator Marshal Hubert Lyautey, held up as an exemplar of good colonial development for his belief that ‘The object of colonising penetration is not to dispossess or to assimilate the native, but to associate with him, equipping him in a modern way’. However, there was also a recognition that Europe’s colonial legacy in Africa was not unblemished, with Coudenhove-Kalergi admitting that ‘The Europeans did not come to Africa as an older brother, nor as a guardian, nor as a teacher and guide – but mostly as a despot and oppressor’. Instead, Coudenhove-Kalergi argued, the role Europe ought to take was that of Africa’s liberator: by acting as her saviour – medically, theologically and developmentally – Europe could ‘pay’ for all that Africa gave her. These lines of reasoning, along with the vague promises of an eventual time when European guardianship of Africa might come

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1001 Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Europe To-Morrow", 630
1002 Quoted in De Michelis, World Reorganisation on Corporative Lines, 75
1004 Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Afrika", 5
to an end, struck a similar tone to the ‘sacred trust of civilisation’ invoked by the League’s mandates; like the League, the PEU had to work hard to repair confidence in international colonial governance after the infamy of the Congo Free State.

The final element in the Pan-European justification of colonisation was its explicit treatment of race. Indeed, for Coudenhove-Kalergi the colonial question 
\textit{introduced} the notion of race to Europe:

‘The possession of Africa unfurls for Europe the question of race, which it has otherwise been spared, since Eurafrika combines the most civilised people [\textit{Kulturvölker}] of the white race with the most primitive peoples [\textit{Naturvölkern}] of the black.’\textsuperscript{1005}

In so doing, he brought the racial primitivism that underpinned the Pan-European treatment of Africa to the surface. However, beyond this there were even more sinister racial prejudices. First, references to ‘the question of race’ effectively framed the co-existence of human races as inherently problematic, a framing made unambiguous in the English-language edited version of the same article, in which Coudenhove-Kalergi looked in fright at multiracial America, arguing that ‘Europe must from the very beginning take into consideration the importance of the nigger question which represents to-day the heaviest burden of the American future’.

\textsuperscript{1006} Second, Pan-Europeans treated the establishment of white colonial elites as a valuable resource, if not an outright precondition for ‘development’. Thus, both Coudenhove-Kalergi and Grunwald argued that a significant advantage France might gain from allowing German colonisation in its colonial territory would be the formation of a white elite.\textsuperscript{1007}


\textsuperscript{1007} Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote that ‘a developed colony with a white elite, with railways, roads, factories, plantations and ports, is more valuable and profitable for the motherland than the possession of uninhabited steppes, swamps and jungles’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Afrika", 15. Original: ‘eine erschlossene Kolonie mit einer weissen Oberschicht, mit Eisenbahnen, Strassen, Fabriken, Plantagen und Häfen für das Mutterland wertvoller und einträglicher ist als der Besitz unbewohnter Steppen, Säumpfe und Urwälder.’), while Grunwald claimed that German colonisation would provide ‘Replenishment by whites, where the French form a significant minority’ (Grunwald, "Afrika und das Emigrantenproblem", 231. Original: ‘Auffüllung durch Weisse, wo die Franzosen eine erhebliche Minderheit bilden.’)
Third (and most fundamentally), this was justified by reference to an explicit statement of racial inequality:

‘Its [Europe’s] relationship to black Africa in the decades to come cannot be built on equality, but on dominion, education and guidance. This requirement, which contradicts the principle of self-determination, corresponds to the fact of the inequality of human races.’\textsuperscript{1008}

Coudenhove-Kalergi attempted to turn this racist argument to directly support European unity, arguing that ‘the solidarity of race precedes the solidarity of citizenship’: that is, that Europeans had to realise that they shared more with each other than with their black subjects.\textsuperscript{1009} Like Daniel Garrison Brinton’s initial invention of Eurafrica, then, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Eurafrica was explicitly racist. It is true, as Liliana Ellena points out, that in Coudenhove-Kalergi’s writings ‘the term “race” appears only in connection with the comparison of non-Europeans as marked and raced’.\textsuperscript{1010} Certainly, this use of race in Eurafrican arguments stands in stark contrast to Coudenhove-Kalergi’s refusal to countenance biological racism in intra-European contexts. However, this contrast simply adds to the weight of evidence that for Pan-Europeans, when it came to Africa, different rules applied. Eurafrica represented not only an essential unity of the continents of Europe and Africa, but also an essential division between them.

\textbf{Conclusion}

For Pan-Europeans, Eurafrica was a stable entity that could nevertheless be seen from multiple viewpoints, and sold on multiple grounds (political, economic, demographic) depending on the


\textsuperscript{1009} Coudenhove-Kalergi, ”Afrika”, 5. Original: ‘die Solidarität der Rasse der Solidarität der Staatsbürgerschaft vorangeht.’

\textsuperscript{1010} Ellena, ”Political Imagination, Sexuality and Love in the Eurafrican Debate”, 249
context. Taking a step back, we can identify three key insights that these arguments for Eurafrica reveal about the implicit geographies upon which they were mounted, geographies whose impressions could be detected far beyond the limits of the PEU.

First, it rested on a peculiarly doubled vision of African space, which flipped in meaning depending on which scale one looked at. At the state scale African space was seen as ‘closed’ (i.e. fully carved up by European states), and therefore threatening, since disputes over African territory could easily reflect violence back into Europe, while the imbalance of colony ownership stoked European tension. This connection between the ‘closure’ of political space and a fragile or precarious political situation was shared widely, and perhaps best expressed by Halford Mackinder:

‘Do you realise that we have now made the circuit of the world, and that every system is now a closed system, and that you can now alter nothing without altering the balance of everything’

However, when seen at the supranational (or ‘Pan-European’) scale, African space was marked not by its fullness, but by its emptiness, wherein lay its great promise. At this scale, Africa was not a ‘spark’, but a valve through which spatially-rendered ‘pressures’ (political, economic or demographic) could be released. It emptiness was an invitation: it was as if the old Crusading justification of extra-European terra nullius, as evoked by Victor Hugo in his 1879 exhortation for Europe to ‘take’ Africa, though exhausted at the state level, could be resurrected at the Pan-European level, re-imagined as Pan-European terra communis.

Second, Africa was seen as a crucible in which a united Europe, or at the very least European solidarity, could be forged. If the colonies had long been sites of experimentation in new technologies of governance by imperial powers, here Africa was to be the site of experimentation for a whole new

1011 Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, 260. For more on the discourse of closed space in this period, see Kearns, "Closed space and political practice".

1012 As Atkinson writes of Italian conceptions of Eurafrica, ‘The one constant factor in these arguments was the way in which Africa was considered as little more than a resource or commodity, an expanse of empty resource-laden space which was to be contested and controlled by various of the European colonial powers.’ (Atkinson, "Geopolitics and the Geographical Imagination in Fascist Italy", 186)
scale of governance. In this, the General Act of the Berlin Conference loomed large, both as a precedent for this sort of ambition, and as a failure that had to be overcome. European co-operation in Africa, it was hoped, would both performatively create and prove the efficacy of supranational governance, so that it could be introduced in Europe itself. As Carlo Sforza wrote,

‘Simultaneously, and despite the parochialism of the Governments at home, a sort of international solidarity was slowly evolving in the colonies. … Out of interest if not out of good will, an embryonic European understanding had at last been found in Africa. We could hate one another in Europe, but we felt that between two neighbouring colonies the interest in common was as great as between two white men meeting in the desert.’\(^{1013}\)

This notion of Europe finding itself in Africa attained quasi-mystical overtones, as in the talk of Africa ‘widening the horizon of Europe’; Africa was represented as Europe’s mission, quest or destiny in ways that served to reflect the focus squarely back on Europe. As Grunwald put it in his pithy maxim, ‘Save Africa for Europe means: save Europe through Africa’.\(^{1014}\) All of which, as Ellena notes, ‘overturns the common belief that Europe is the source rather than the result of colonialism’.\(^{1015}\)

Third, if Eurafrieca was framed as an attempt to fix colonialism, it again did so in a doubled sense, balancing two competing motives. On one hand, it was an attempt to fix colonialism in the sense that it was try to rectify what was by then seen as an outmoded form of politics. On the other hand, it was so in the sense that it was attempting to retain the fundamental power structures of colonialism, fixed in place. This balancing act, at once preserving and superseding the familiar spatiality of colonialism, led to two secondary contradictions, or differences of opinion, regarding a) the achievability, and b) the advisability of Eurafrieca.

On the former, from a certain light, Eurafrieca seemed consonant enough with established

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1013 C. Sforza, *Europe and Europeans: A Study in Historical Psychology and International Politics* (London: George G. Harrap & Co.; 1936), 202-203. Sforza was referring to the pre-1914 situation, though as can be deduced from his nostalgic tone, he too was arguing for ‘a sort of European Consortium’ through which to administer African colonies. (Sforza, *Europe and Europeans*, 215)


1015 Ellena, "Political Imagination, Sexuality and Love in the Eurafrieca Debate", 242

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interests to be feasible, with De Michelis writing that ‘The construction of what has aptly been called Eurafrica is, on the other hand, a problem of which the solution is not so difficult nor so remote’.\textsuperscript{1016} The traction that Eurafrica gained in a short stretch of time across a range of different audiences suggests that such a scheme certainly had a significant constituency. Yet from the embrace of mega-engineering schemes to the fanciful plans for mass migration, the Pan-European plans for Eurafrica seemed unable to avoid straying into patent utopianism; as Yannick Muet argues, of all the Pan-European projects to be given this epithet, Eurafrica was the one that most deserved it.\textsuperscript{1017}

On the issue of the advisability of Eurafrica, meanwhile, it was attacked from both sides. Those who thought the idea of voluntarily ceding direct sovereignty of colonies to a supranational authority utopian were naturally inclined to believe that it was overly radical, that it had swung too far from either conventional colonialism or the structures of the League to be worth considering. However, for those sympathetic to the growing tide of anti-colonialism, and specifically the Pan-Africanism that had been visibly growing in strength since the First Pan-African Conference in London in 1900, Eurafrica was not only insufficiently radical, it was downright reactionary. This was perhaps most forcefully expressed by the German journalist and pacifist Carl von Ossietzky in a 1930 article in the leftist magazine he edited, \textit{Die Weltbühne}:

‘Coudenhove’s Europe proclaims for itself the right to oppress and loot that part of humanity which has not yet learned to defend itself. Does Coudenhove not know that for a long time there has been a movement: “Africa for the Africans”? Today it is time to cleanse the blood from European hands, to abolish colonial imperialism, and not to declare the current situation, shaken and rotten to the core, as sacrosanct.’\textsuperscript{1018}

For all its support, Eurafrica was in the interwar years simply too radical for colonials, and not radical

\textsuperscript{1016} De Michelis, \textit{World Reorganisation on Corporative Lines}, 173
\textsuperscript{1017} ‘Most of the ideas developed by the author of Pan-Europe, contrary to what many of his contemporaries believed, were far from utopian. However, this one was.’ (Muet, \textit{Les géographes et l’Europe}, 69). Original: ‘La plupart des idées développées par l’auteur de Pan-Europe, contrairement à ce que pensaient beaucoup de ses contemporains, étaient loin d’être utopiques. Mais celle-ci l’était particulièrement.’
\textsuperscript{1018} C.v. Ossietzky, “Coudenhove und Briand”, \textit{Die Weltbühne} 26.22 (27 May 1930 1930) 783-785, in HAEU, PAN/EU 1, 500/1/683, 86-87, 784-785 [86ob-87]. Translation informed by Orluc, “Europe between Past and Future”, 71
enough for anti-colonials.

The irony is that following WWII, Eurafrica re-emerged as a powerful political imaginary – a journal was even founded in 1951 under the name *Eurafrique* – and it did so precisely because, as Hansen & Jonsson argue, Eurafrica possessed the ‘ability to encompass contradictory historical tendencies and satisfy opposing political interests’, such that it was able to ‘appeal to colonialists and anti-colonialist alike’. It was thus under the banner of Eurafrica that the transition was finally made in the reconfiguration of Europe’s relationship with African, ‘between colonial and postcolonial, pre- and post- European integration, white supremacy and “partnership”, “colonial exploitation” and “development”, “civilizing mission” and “third-world aid”’. In short, once the notion of Eurafrica had been liberated from the organisational control of (and ideological association with) the PEU, the balancing act that had previously been blamed for its failure was converted into the key to its success.

Hansen & Jonsson adopt Fredric Jameson’s notion of a ‘vanishing mediator’ to describe the way in which ‘Eurafrica produced the preconditions for its own disappearance’, by creating the conditions in which the narratives of decolonisation and European integration could take hold, each of which purported to be ‘new beginnings’ and therefore ensure the erasure of Eurafrica’s role in this history. Post-war residual colonial ambitions and enthusiasm, they argue, should not be seen as having slowed the development of integration/decolonisation: on the contrary, by ushering in the ‘vanishing mediator’ of Eurafrica, they contributed to it. One might equally, it seems, view the PEU as itself a vanishing mediator at the previous stage in this history. By bringing together a melange of

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1019 *It [Eurafrique] was founded in 1951 in Algiers, as a part of the association *Amis du Sahara* (Friends of the Sahara), whose principal responsibility had been organizing a popular automobile race in North Africa.’ (J.K. Gosnell, “France, Empire, Europe: Out of Africa?”, *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 26.2 (2006) 203-212, 206)

1020 Hansen and Jonsson, *Eurafrique*, 252

1021 Hansen and Jonsson, *Eurafrique*, 256-257

disparate influences into the coherent entity of Eurafrica, Pan-Europeans were certainly responsible for its creation. And equally, the success of Eurafrica required the disappearance of the PEU from the stage. Though their idiosyncratic, neo-colonial vision of Eurafrica was subsequently softened, its racist and more overtly exploitative aspects hidden from view or simply forgotten, there is no doubting the crucial role of the PEU in the development of this geography.
Conclusion

The time and space of Pan-Europe

On 14 September 1946, Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi departed his Swiss summer house in Gstaad and made the short journey to Bursinel on Lake Geneva, where Winston Churchill was summering at Villa Choisi. It had been a meeting that both men had been keen to set up ever since Coudenhove-Kalergi had returned to Europe in June, in order to discuss their respective ideas for the post-war reconstruction of Europe’s political geography. Over lunch, the two men talked of Churchill’s upcoming lecture at Zurich University, which he planned to use to launch his campaign for the unification of Europe.

While at Choisi, Churchill had been spending his time painting, and after lunch he showed Coudenhove-Kalergi the fruits of his labours (fig. 26):

‘After lunch he took me to see his latest canvas. … He was busy painting a large landscape of the Lake of Geneva with an old cedar tree in the foreground. His paintings are in keeping with his character and literary style: bold and large, with strong impressive contours and brilliant colours, but without much attention to detail.’

These are the faculties that Churchill called upon five days later in expressing his vision of ‘a kind of United States of Europe’ in Zurich. Coudenhove-Kalergi, listening to the speech on the radio, was delighted to hear Churchill explicitly pay tribute to him and his organisation, immediately telegramming his appreciation and writing to tell Churchill that ‘your speech made me one of the

1023 Churchill had sent Coudenhove-Kalergi a radio-telegram to this effect while the latter was still sailing across the Atlantic (W.S. Churchill to R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi (15 Jun 1946), ACV, PP 1000/4/1; c.f. Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers The World, 262). Coudenhove-Kalergi was equally enthusiastic, writing that ‘I should feel very sorry not to see the man I admire most among my contemporaries while only a few miles separate us’ (R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi to W.S. Churchill (4 Sep 1946), ACV, PP 1000/4/2).

1024 Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers The World, 267-268

happiest men on earth – I cannot express my feelings of gratitude for all it meant for Europe, for the Pan European Movement and for me!" While Churchill’s tribute may have been politic, there is no doubt that it was also genuine. From the assumption of a world still structured in a colonial manner, to the equivalence drawn between a united Europe and the British Empire, to an essential ambivalence regarding the precise nature of these relations, Churchill’s credentials as a Europeanist were from the start tied to Pan-Europeanism; today’s debates over Churchill’s credentials as a Europeanist would profit from remembering this.

Coudenhove-Kalergi was a skilled writer, and his description of Churchill’s painting style – published in his 1953 autobiography *An Idea Conquers the World* – was a clear allusion both to the specific character of the Zurich speech and to Churchill’s politics more generally. However, in picking out the traits he most admired in Churchill, we can also detect an unconscious admission of

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Coudenhove-Kalergi’s own views concerning the desirable characteristics of a political leader, the qualities that he aspired to himself. Certainly, the mention of impressive contours and bold colours echo two descriptions of Coudenhove-Kalergi that he chose to include in *An Idea Conquers the World*. First, that of Churchill himself, whose 1930 article on a ‘United States of Europe’ was re-edited to constitute the introduction to the volume, and featured the line: ‘The form of Count Kalergi’s theme may be crude, erroneous and impracticable, but the impulse and the inspiration are true.’  

And second, that of Benito Mussolini, another leader Coudenhove-Kalergi tried to win over, who was quoted as having told Coudenhove-Kalergi that:

‘Your policy is, as it were, geometrical. It has the merit of perfect logic, but is in my opinion quite impracticable.’

Each of these might generously be called backhanded compliments; in highlighting the supposed impracticability of Pan-Europe, they were subscribing to the common criticism that it was a utopian idea that was simply too radical to be realised. (While in many ways such critics were proved correct, it should be said in defence that this accusation overlooks the flexibility and pragmatism with which the campaign for Pan-Europe adapted to the changing political situation.)

Despite their critical edge, Coudenhove-Kalergi took pride in Churchill and Mussolini’s remarks, not just because they placed him shoulder-to-shoulder with the century’s great political figures, but because they located the merits of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s plans in the contours of the Count’s vision, the boldness of his brushstrokes.

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1028 Churchill, United States of Europe, CAC, CHAR 8/303, 4-12, 8; Churchill, "Introduction"
1029 Quoted in Coudenhove-Kalergi, *An Idea Conquers The World*, 206
1030 This view might be attested to by the British Conservative politician and diplomat Duff Cooper, who previously ‘had vaguely classed this movement [Pan-Europe] in my mind with the various other idealistic and impractical schemes for ensuring international peace’. After speaking with Coudenhove-Kalergi however, Cooper was left ‘much impressed by the views that he expressed, by his grasp of the European situation and by the practical character of his programme’ (A.D. Cooper, *The Second World War: First Phase* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; 1939), 92-93)
This thesis has therefore attempted to do justice to Pan-Europeanism by focusing the lens of analysis at precisely this level, reading the specifics for what they tell us about the outline. It has concentrated upon the sense of spacetime invoked by Pan-Europeanism: the ways in which it contorted the geometry of political space, and attached historiographic ballast and momentum to the idea of a politically united Europe.

Regarding the former, I have analysed the role of space in Pan-Europe by developing the intellectual genealogy of an ‘alternative geopolitics’ that is centred not on the geostrategy of Hitler’s Germany, but on Pan-European thought. The implications of such a shift are significant, importing certain literatures that have until now been absent from historical and political geography, and re-reading others that we might think of as more familiar, but doing so from an unfamiliar angle. A host of nineteenth-century political economists and geographers, who are habitually left out of conventional histories of geopolitics (and largely from geography as a whole), can been seen from this new perspective to have profoundly influenced the way in which political space was conceptualised. Likewise, the intersecting history of pan-movements, whether in the primary texts of the key figures or in the circulating political campaigns and academic secondary literature on pan-movements that was so abundant in the first part of the twentieth century, demands to be seen not as a curiosity but as a crucial way in which politics was re-envisioned in this period. This constituted nothing less than a new way of seeing politics, and ought to inform the recent wave of work on the simultaneous, competing ascent of globality as a structuring ideal of political space in the theory and practice of international politics.1031

Meanwhile, a re-orienting of analytic focus to Pan-Europeanism also forces us to re-evaluate those commonly held to be the progenitors of geopolitics – Ratzel, Mackinder and Kjellén – and by doing so to see new sides to their respective lives, works and legacies. Finally, by bringing geopolitik itself into communication with Pan-European texts and contexts, this work too is defamiliarised, with each side of the conversation asking new questions of the other. Reorienting geopolitik away from the Haushofer-Hitler axis is not a matter of recuperating it from its Nazi associations, but rather of on one hand showing it to be multi-dimensional, and on the other hand of answering Hannah Arendt’s question of the extent to which pan-movements too are implicated in the development of imperialist geostrategy in the interwar period and beyond.

Regarding the role of time in Pan-Europeanism, we have seen that Coudenhove-Kalergi offered a progressivist and historicist treatment of time, in an intellectual climate in which neither were in favour. That is to say, Pan-Europe rested on the idea that history was underpinned by certain logics and progressed in certain directions; and that one needed to pay attention to the lessons of history (that is, to uncover its logics) in order to make political decisions in the present. His primary claim, one woven through Pan-European events, imagery and literature, was that the lesson offered by the canon of European peace leagues was above all else one of European unity.

These statements require considerable context to fully understand and appreciate which elements were borrowed and which were novel to Pan-Europeanism. To begin with, in order to make sense of the interwar situation in which a strong anti-historicist attitude pervaded political writing, and thereby appreciate the unorthodoxy of cleaving to a historicist approach that holds the past to be relevant to the politics of the present, it has been necessary to engage with both the interwar political

\[1032\] In this respect, on Mackinder, see also Kearns, *Geopolitics and Empire*; on Ratzel, see also J. Verne, "The neglected “gift” of Ratzel for/from the Indian Ocean: thoughts on mobilities, materialities and relational spaces", *Geographica Helvetica* 72.1 (2017) 85–92; “Geo- and biopolitics in historical perspective”, St John’s College, University of Oxford (25-26 May 2017), special issue with the *Journal of Historical Geography* forthcoming.

\[1033\] C.f. the ongoing debate over Haushofer’s influence upon Hitler: Herwig, *The Demon of Geopolitics*; Murphy, "Hitler’s Geosstrategist"

\[1034\] Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, 222
and historical literatures, and the more recent theorists on the nature of time and historicity. Likewise, in order to unpick the contribution of Pan-Europeanism to the construction of a defined historical literature on European integration, we have had to examine the way in which these texts coalesced into a literature, and the ways in which the essential meaning of this literature shifted.

The clearest message we can draw from these investigations is that the literature of the history of the idea of European unity itself needs to be historicised. It too often suffers both from complacency borne of over-familiarity and from the Whiggish imposition of a narrative of the march toward European unity; the symptoms of these ills are a flattening of texts that are starved of sufficient contextual depth, and a reluctance to read them differently. Indeed, we have seen how the curation of a canon of federal schemes for supra-national political union and its interpretation as specifically ‘European’ is a twentieth-century innovation, a result of the careful folding together of the nineteenth-century literatures of pacifism and international law. While the responsibility for this re-branding does not lie exclusively with Coudenhove-Kalergi, his Pan-European writings were perhaps most enthusiastic in imputing a European essence to this literature, and curating it accordingly. Beyond the specific need to rethink the literature of the history of the idea of European unity, however, there is also a more subtle but more general implication regarding ‘canonicity’, or how canons are made and remade. The present study has shone light on the complex set of processes through which canons are made, and moreover shown that these processes themselves have a historical geography. The shifting ways in which citation was performed and texts refracted through one another, the shifting meanings and motives of such practices, the shifting functions of (re-)publishing, circulation and translation, all played a key role in the accumulation of a recognisable ‘canon’, and all radically

\[1035\] In the most recent contribution to this literature, Pasture agrees that it suffers from a fondness for Whiggish, linear narratives, yet his own work does not always succeed in escaping from these problems (Pasture, \textit{Imagining European Unity since 1000 AD})

challenge the very categories (texts, authorship, citation) through which we think through these questions.

The innovativeness and influence of the Pan-European conception of political spacetime is demonstrated by the speed with which ‘Eurafrica’ became part of interwar political discourse. Eurafrica was the clearest example of the way in which the geometry of politics described by Pan-Europeanism differed from that of the League of Nations or the British Empire. There would be no distinction drawn between Allied colonies and the Mandates stripped from the Central Powers; rather, there would be collectively managed Pan-European colonies that did not discriminate between European nationals. Three broad arguments were put forward in favour of this system: that it would salve tensions between colony-owning and non-colony-owning European states by putting them on an equal footing, that it would grant Europe a necessary resource-base in order for it to compete effectively with the giant and resource-rich territories of Pan-America and the Soviet Union, and that it would offer an outlet for the ‘population pressure’ afflicting certain European states, thereby also providing the manpower and expertise needed to exploit African resources. Quite aside from the implicit racism of a paternalist mentality that African views need not be sought on the matter, Pan-European writings on Eurafrica often betrayed an explicit racism that held the inequality of ‘black’ and ‘white’ races to be self-evident.

The idea of Eurafrica proved extremely popular, and while it continued to be associated with Coudenhove-Kalergi and the Pan-European movement, it quickly spun beyond their control, gaining traction in both Franco-British imperialism and Germano-Italian fascist imperialism, while also informing a sub-genre of politically charged science fiction. Indeed, its influence continued to be felt in the post-war period, especially in France where it offered a means by which to participate in both Europeanism and colonialism.\(^{1037}\) In some ways, the breadth and depth of purchase that the idea of Eurafrica possessed indicates that Pan-Europeanism had a far larger role in shaping political discourse

\(^{1037}\) Hansen and Jonsson, *Eurafrica*
than it is commonly granted. If so, however, it also constitutes a dual warning: on one hand, that if we are willing to see influence, we must also contend with the idea that Pan-Europeanism was complicit in creating and bolstering a political imagination that was deeply racialised; and on the other hand that it is impossible to see European history in isolation, and that the European politics of today cannot easily be detached from the colonialism that was until relatively recently a defining feature.

Afterlives

Notwithstanding the minor swell of academic attention that Coudenhove-Kalergi and the Pan-European movement have received since the millennium (see chapter I), outside of this literature Coudenhove-Kalergi remains a mostly forgotten figure. His public memorials are few and far between: on the outskirts of Vienna, one may find the ‘Europa-Platz Coudenhove-Kalergi’ in Klosterneuburg, featuring a bust by the Austrian sculptor Thomas Kosma, and ‘Coudenhove-Kalergi-Park’ in Hietzing. In Paris there is a ‘Place Richard-de-Coudenhove-Kalergi’ in the 16th arrondissement. Meanwhile, the history of the PEU is recalled by a new PEU: the ‘Pan-European University’, a private university in Bratislava established in 2004, which adopted its present name in 2010 in honour of the Pan-European movement, but in whose promotional material any deeper connection to the movement is conspicuous by its absence.1038

However, for two specific constituencies, the posthumous presence of Coudenhove-Kalergi looms large. Firstly, within the Pan-European Union itself, which survives to this day, in broadly the

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1038 Paneurópska vysoká škola (PEVŠ) in Slovak, though the English name and acronym is also officially used. See https://www.paneurouni.com/en/about-us/information/ (last accessed 31 March 2018). The university does possess a plaque with a bust of Coudenhove-Kalergi alongside a map of Europe, unveiled in 2014 (P. Fischer, “The Pan-European University in Bratislava remembers Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi”, European Letters of the European Society Coudenhove-Kalergi (3 December 2014))
same form in which it was established in 1923: a central, international organisation, with affiliated
national chapters across Europe. Coudenhove-Kalergi had continued to preside over the organisation
until his death in 1972, whereupon control passed over to another Austrian aristocrat: Otto von
Habsburg, the longtime heir apparent to the House of Habsburg. Under Otto, the organisation was re-
oriented towards a conception of Europe both Catholic and catholic, lobbying for a larger Europe
than the Western version represented by the EEC. Both aspects aided in the latter-day organisation’s
most prominent accomplishment: the ‘Pan-European Picnic’ on the Austrian-Hungarian border in
August 1989, a pivotal flashpoint in the fall of the Iron Curtain. Otto also oversaw the association of
the PEU with the European Parliament, and from the very first direct elections to the Parliament in
1979 the PEU has maintained a presence among its MEPs (which included Otto himself from 1979
to 1999). Today, the ‘Pan-Europa Parliamentary Group’ in the European Parliament boasts over 120
members, encompassing nearly all member states, and meets regularly during the sessions of the
Parliament in Strasbourg. In 2004, aged 92, Otto retired from the presidency of the PEU, and was
succeeded in the role by the French politician (and former MEP) Alain Terrenoire. Terrenoire remains
in the position today, though the Habsburg involvement is continued by Otto’s son Karl (another
former MEP) who has presided over the Austrian branch of the PEU since 1986, and has been a vice-
president of the central PEU since 2015.

Alongside the PEU, a parallel organisation has sought to keep the memory of Coudenhove-
Kalergi alive: the ‘Coudenhove-Kalergi Foundation’, established in 1978, and since 2008 renamed
the ‘European Society Coudenhove-Kalergi’ (ES-CK).1039 This group, whose membership overlaps
with the PEU, focuses on preserving the interwar history of Pan-Europeanism via the commemoration
of Coudenhove-Kalergi through public and private memorials (including those already mentioned),

1039 See http://www.coudenhove-kalergi-society.eu/ (last accessed 31 March 2018)
the republication of his works,\textsuperscript{1040} and the production and distribution of ‘European Letters’ that feature short commentaries upon Pan-Europe’s past, present and future.\textsuperscript{1041} The ES-CK has also played a significant role in ensuring the Coudenhove-Kalergi archives are open to researchers, first in Geneva and now in Lausanne, as well as lobbying for the restitution of the central PEU archives from Moscow. Lastly, it also organises the biennial ‘European Prize Coudenhove-Kalergi’, most recently awarded to the British politician Kenneth Clarke in 2016.\textsuperscript{1042}

However, there is another constituency for whom Coudenhove-Kalergi is by no means a marginalised figured who ought to be dusted off and reinterpreted; they believe that his history has not been ‘forgotten’, but covered up. This group speak of a ‘Kalergi Plan’, which they say remains at the heart of the EU today. This secret plan is, they allege, for the European elite to retain political power by encouraging mass non-white immigration into Europe in order to engineer a multiracial, submissive population. They call this a ‘white genocide’.

The evidence for this is a mixture of antisemitic insinuation based on Coudenhove-Kalergi’s associations with prominent Jewish bankers, and a decontextualised (and often mis-translated) reading of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s philosophical works in which he discussed his ideas about race and leadership.\textsuperscript{1043} This radical reinterpretation of Coudenhove-Kalergi began with the Austrian convicted

\textsuperscript{1040} They have edited two volumes, attributed to the German-language name of the organisation: Coudenhove-Kalergi Stiftung (ed.), \textit{Ausgewählte Schriften zu Europa} (Vienna/Graz: neuer wissenschaftlicher Verlag; 2006); Europagesellschaft Coudenhove-Kalergi (ed.), \textit{Leben und Wirken} (Vienna/Graz: neuer wissenschaftlicher Verlag; 2010)

\textsuperscript{1041} See http://www.coudenhove-kalergi-society.eu/Europaeische-Briefe (last accessed 31 March 2018)

\textsuperscript{1042} For a list of winners, see http://www.coudenhove-kalergi-society.eu/Europapreistraeger (last accessed 31 March 2018)

\textsuperscript{1043} In fact, the quotations used are almost exclusively drawn from one source: R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, \textit{Praktischer Idealismus} (Vienna/Leipzig: Paneuropa Verlag; 1925)
Holocaust-denier Gerd Honsik, who in 2005 published from his Spanish exile a book entitled ‘Goodbye, Europe: the Kalergi Plan: a legal racism’, in which he argued that the real goal of European union, masterminded by Coudenhove-Kalergi, was that ‘through ethnic mixing, the white race must be replaced by an easily controllable mestizo race’.

This theory starting getting wider traction from the end of 2012, when Honsik’s theory of a ‘Kalergi Plan’ started appearing in blogposts online, juxtaposed with commentaries attacking the present-day European policies by which this Plan was supposedly being put into action: namely, EU policies for integration, the protection of minorities, and the alleged encouragement of mass non-white immigration. This theory has since been shared across a range of far right and neo-nazi networks, along the way being translated into and through many languages, building a corpus of self-citing knowledge while still balanced upon the same small external evidence base. It has even been aired within the European Parliament, in a speech given by the British National Party MEP Nick Griffin during a session on asylum. Griffin introduced Coudenhove-Kalergi as the ‘godfather of the European Union’, and spoke about the Count’s alleged plan for the ‘biggest genocide in human history’, the ‘breeding-out’ of ‘indigenous Europeans’ via ‘the encouragement of mass non-white immigration’.

Asylum, Griffin claimed, was merely the latest guise under which this Plan was

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1044 Honsik was convicted (to 18 months jail) of spreading Nazi propaganda in 1992 (he fled to Spain until extradited – under the new (pan-)European arrest warrant – in 2007), and again of racism, incitement to racial hatred, and Nazi propaganda in 2009 (to 5 years, reduced to 4 on appeal, of which 2 were served before early release due to advanced age and his social integration in Spain in 2011)

1045 Original: ‘mediante el cruzamiento étnico, la raza blanca debe ser sustituida por una raza mestiza cómodamente dominable.’ (G. Honsik, Adiós, Europa: el plan Kalergi: un racismo legal: las 28 tesis para acabar con nuestros pueblos (Barcelona: Bright-Rainbow; 2005), 20)

1046 The first such example was an Italian blog post on 11 December 2012 by Riccardo Percivaldi on the website Identità.com: http://xn--identit-fwa.com/blog/2012/12/11/il-piano-kalergi-il-genocidio-dei-popoli-europei/ (last accessed 31 March 2018)

1047 All of these terms and ideas are simply lifted from various far right blogposts. For official records of his speech, and response to a question asked by the Portuguese MEP Ana Gomes, see http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20140312+ITEM-014+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=3-872-000; http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20140312+ITEM-014+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=3-874-000 (both last accessed 31 March 2018)
being implemented. Similar sentiments have since been aired by other prominent figures of the European New Right, including the Czech former prime minister and president Václav Klaus, and the Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán. The weight of the imprimatur of such figures is clear from the conclusion of a blog post gleefully reporting their comments, which asks: ‘Are you now beginning to see that the Coudenhove-Kalergi [Plan] is a lot more real than some “right wing conspiracy theory”’?1049

Why Coudenhove-Kalergi? Perhaps because he occupies a significant enough role in the well-worn story of European integration to be plausibly implicated in its alleged inner workings, but is also obscure enough for his part in the story to be moulded according to the teller’s desires (or fears). On one hand, his obscurity is interpreted as intrigue: it is alleged that his books are today banned in Germany (they aren’t), that the ‘Europe Prize Coudenhove-Kalergi’ is a secret honour (it is entirely public), and that the present-day Pan-European Union and the EU are complicit in suppressing the ‘white genocide’ at the heart of their Plan. On the other hand, the few commemorations of Coudenhove-Kalergi, such as the Place Richard-de-Coudenhove-Kalergi in Paris, are interpreted as a marker of the EU’s outrageous hubris. Given the new enthusiasm for taking down statues of General Lee and Christopher Columbus, the French right-wing commentator Bruno Riondel sardonically asks, shouldn’t we also re-name the Place Coudenhove-Kalergi?1050

These theories are troubling for the ease with which deeply racist and antisemitic politics has slipped back into the political consciousness, and the worrying consequences are clear to see both in the electoral successes of the new Right and in the rise of nativist and racist rhetoric in the public

1048 See, for example, ČTK [Czech News Agency], "Former president Václav Klaus says immigration crisis is calculated means to united Europe", Prague Daily Monitor, 4 January 2016; Viktor Orbán (15 March 2016); in “Orbán’s historic speech puts Hungary on war footing”, uploaded by ‘Vlad Tepesblog’, 2:00-2.45, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EbINrdyAXlE (last accessed 5 September 2017)
1050 B. Riondel, "Faut-il débaptiser la place Richard-de-Coudenhove-Kalergi?", Boulevard Voltaire (5 September 2017)
sphere, particularly in relation to immigration and asylum. In relation to this thesis, however, they are troubling because they raise a difficult set of questions about the role of biography in disentangling a life from the myths that emanate from it. What is biography if not the very creation of a myth, the rounding of a life into a coherent story? As Virginia Woolf said, the biographer’s task is to arrange the facts of a life, ‘shaping the whole so that we perceive the outline’.

As we have seen, until recently Coudenhove-Kalergi himself had had great success in shaping his own life and afterlife, cultivating his own mythology and thereby controlling his own narrative. The ‘Kalergi Plan’ seizes upon the discussion of race that Coudenhove-Kalergi left out of his own account, and uses it to propagate its own inverted mythology, metamorphosing hero into demon.

Yet there is also a degree to which the ‘Kalergi Plan’ narrative is a consequence of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s linear arrangement of the facts of his life: it is dependent both on the active authorial presence that Coudenhove-Kalergi attributed himself, and on the idea that the European project itself is a comprehensible, rational plan. The seductiveness of the ‘Kalergi Plan’ is not only that it aligns with extant forms of nationalism, antisemitism and racism, but that it offers a simple, intelligible and internally coherent account of the European elites’ motives and strategy, and a single human to whom the European project can be traced. In this respect, the far-right demonisation of Pan-Europe is not wholly dissimilar either to the institutional celebration of the ‘fathers’ and ‘grandfathers’ of Europe, which prizes a simple, coherent, Whiggish narrative over contextualism and complexity. While it is tempting to complain that both the memory of Coudenhove-Kalergi and the very art of biography are being outraged by the spectre of the ‘Kalergi Plan’, perhaps this spectre should alert us to the beguiling danger of a coherent self and story that lies at the heart of biography.

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1051 See, for example, the special issue: “Mediatization and Politicization of Refugee Crisis in Europe” in Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies 16.1-2 (2018)

1052 Woolf, "The Art of Biography", 126

At his lowest ebb, shortly before his death in 1972, Coudenhove-Kalergi seemed to transfer his previously unshakeable confidence in himself to his organisation, writing:

‘Every political movement has periods of flood and periods of ebb. The last twenty years have been a period of ebb for Pan-Europe. The time is ripe for a new flood: under new leaders, in a new spirit.’  

Perhaps in this muted concession of personal defeat in the name of collective victory, there is a lesson for the apparent defeat of the spirit of Pan-Europeanism constituted by the UK’s decision to leave the EU. Now, as then, the historical arc that points toward a united Europe seems bowed to breaking point. For Eurosceptics, the breaking of this arc is something to celebrate. In his Valentine’s Day statement speech on Brexit, the British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson criticised the ‘expressly teleological’ character of the EU for prioritising the political goal of a European state, at the expense (in Johnson’s eyes) of British interests. The argument Johnson was trying to make was that Brexit represented not a rejection of European culture or civilisation, but merely the rejection of the political narrative of European integration. His preferred political teleology, it seems, is either nationalist, globalist, or perhaps – given his nostalgic enthusiasm for the Commonwealth – imperialist. 

The new spirit of pan-Europeanism that Johnson advocated was by contrast decidedly apolitical: one of continued trade links, stag parties and Spanish retirements, but without (or at least outside of) political union.

However, this is not the only way to read the present moment. For Europhiles, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s words carry a different meaning. They suggest that Brexit is a setback rather than a defeat,

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1055 B. Johnson, “Uniting for a Great Brexit: Foreign Secretary’s speech” (14 February 2018)
1056 The speech contained contradictory remarks both celebrating nationalist ‘desire for self-government of the people, by the people, for the people’ (a reference to Lincoln’s 1863 Gettysburg Address, a Civil War analogy that belied Johnson’s conciliatory intentions), and expressing the ambition that ‘Brexit is about re-engaging this country with its global identity’ (Johnson, “Uniting for a Great Brexit”)
and that now might be the time to relieve the old leaders, to rethink the old spirit, and thereby to bring about a renaissance that would reinvigorate the European movement. Certainly, the example of the PEU reminds us that history did not start in 1945, and that if it really does have an arc, it is neither linear nor unbroken. What we so easily refer to as the European project has suffered far more grievous blows in the past, and if it is true that democracy is central to the European project, then a democratic decision to leave the EU perhaps ought not to be interpreted as an anti-European step.

Second, and rather more fundamentally, it invites us to complicate our understanding of time, and futurity in particular. Here I want to return to the artist whose intervention I started with, Tacita Dean. Although her artwork for the referendum campaign (see Introduction, fig. 1) seems to buy wholeheartedly into the notion of Europe-as-future, somewhat ironically, Dean’s wider body of work offers some of the best examples of the ways in which a linear view of history can be undercut by contemplating past futures, raising issues of nostalgia, ruin and obsolescence.

Take, for instance, Dean’s 2005 work ‘Palast’, in which we see reflections of the cupolas of Berlin Cathedral (Berliner Dom), a turn-of-the-century landmark of the Wilhelmine German Empire built in a Neo-Renaissance style, in the windows of the derelict Palace of the Republic (Palast der Republik), a 1970s landmark of East Germany (fig. 27). However, the distorted forms of these reflections are suggestive too of the nearby TV Tower (Fernsehturm), a futurist monument constructed in 1960s East Germany whose popularity and symbolic prominence today is as great as (if not greater than) that of the Cathedral. Thus what we are seeing is one past literally reflected in another, but the reflection is uncertain, such that we cannot tell whether it is the historicist or the futurist past-future that is being referenced. Moreover, the mirror in which we are looking is itself a reminder of a forgotten future, a past-future that was disposed of. This contemplation of multiple past-futures, or retro-futurisms, destabilises any simple notions of an arc of history.

Likewise, the historical geography of the Pan-European Union scrambles the simplicity of the narrative of ever-greater union, a narrative that it was responsible for carving into the political
imagination. At the most fundamental level, it is evidence that the story of European integration encompasses failures as well as successes. If we allow for more complexity, we can read the lesson as being that success and failure are rather one-dimensional criteria, which are always liable to revision. If we are to judge the PEU in terms of the imminence of Pan-Europe as a political entity, then its zenith was undoubtedly Briand’s call for a united Europe at the 10th Assembly of the League of Nations in 1929, widely understood to have been planned in concert with Coudenhove-Kalergi. However, the short-term consequences of this event were the drafting of the Briand-Leger memorandum, which met only a lukewarm response, and the establishment of the CEUE, which proved to be a huge disappointment, in the words of Arnold Zurcher ‘scarcely a shadow of what had originally been intended’.¹⁰⁵⁷ Such is the chain of thought by which Coudenhove-Kalergi and the


Figure 27: Tacita Dean, Palast IV (2005). Photogravure. Source: Government Art Collection 18204/4
PEU have earned their glib epitaph, commonplace in the scholarship on interwar politics and European integration: that it was a failure, perhaps a noble failure, perhaps ahead of its time, but ultimately a failure nonetheless.

This conclusion is profoundly unsatisfactory. To whom were Coudenhove-Kalergi and the PEU a failure? The very term implies the worst sort of presentism, the scrutiny of the past according to the values of today, and such analysis has in recent years been rightly shunned in scholarship on the League of Nations.\textsuperscript{1058} Coudenhove-Kalergi himself never tired of claiming successes, even when they strained credibility. Even after becoming marginalised from the European institutions established after World War II, he never failed to see their establishment as a personal vindication and a fillip for Pan-Europe, which made his late confession of a ‘period of ebb’ all the more shocking. Clearly, to speak of success and failure is necessarily to invite questions of the criteria by which we are to judge such things. At a time in which the moral certainty that a politically united Europe is indeed part of our future is fast evaporating, such criteria cannot help but be politically compromised.

Taking a cue from Dean’s \textit{Palast}, this thesis has shifted the angle from which we view the historical geography of Pan-Europe, and taken note of how its reflection has altered. The past-future of Pan-Europe is in some ways not such a bad likeness to our present. First and foremost, we live in a time of European Union, an idea that for so long was dismissed as a utopian fantasy. The doctrine of ‘ever-closer union’, which has been at the heart of the European project’s mission statement for over 60 years, was built on the foundation of a narrative of the progressive upscaling of politics that was heavily promoted by Pan-Europeanism.\textsuperscript{1059} ‘Fortress Europe’ is built upon the simultaneous erasure of Europe’s internal borders and hardening of its external borders, while admitting that the

\textsuperscript{1058} C.f. S. Pedersen, "Back to the League of Nations", \textit{The American Historical Review} 112.4 (2007) 1091-1117
\textsuperscript{1059} ‘Ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe’ was spelled out as a foundational aim in the first line of the preamble to the 1957 Treaty of Rome (\url{http://ec.europa.eu/archives/emu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf}, last accessed 31 March 2018). For further analysis of its continuing presence in EU treaties, see V. Miller, ""Ever Closer Union" in the EU Treaties and Court of Justice case law", \textit{House of Commons Library Briefing Paper} 07230 (16 November 2015)
latter are politically contingent and liable to change; the PEU was advocating much the same thing. We might also think of the insistence that the European project be consistently branded, accompanied by its own flag, not to mention the strains of the final movement of Beethoven’s 9th. Or, pertinently for the present moment, we might think of a foreign policy most fully fleshed out in relation to the two ambiguously European powers: a distrustful verging on hostile relationship with Russia, and a friendly if slightly distant relationship with Britain.

And yet, if we look from another angle, the reflection begins to look quite alien. Pan-Europe’s association with Eurafrica may remind us of an element of the post-war story of European integration that has been papered over, but today such colonial attitudes are an ugly reminder of dramatically changed mores, their assumptions of European supremacy rightly castigated as racist and ignorant. Coudenhove-Kalergi’s strong-armed presidency of his organisation, and attempts to weave his own life story into his organisation’s politics, seem at odds with his professed commitment to democracy and are instead reminiscent of the type of personality cult encouraged by authoritarian and populist regimes that today’s European institutions habitually dissociate themselves from. And the close association of Pan-Europe with geopolitik, which for so long was repudiated by human geography as ‘intellectual poison’, cannot help but invite suspicion and political scrutiny today, as geographers continue to wrestle with the toxic legacy of geopolitics.

Pan-Europe thus encompasses both the past-future that has guided European politics in the intervening decades, one admittedly stuttering now, and the past-futures that have been discarded,

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1060 While it is true that Bruce Gilley’s 2017 article “The Case for Colonialism” (in Third World Quarterly) may indicate a growing confidence to air unashamedly pro-colonial views, I take my lead instead from the wholesale rejection of these views that the article provoked, eventually (though indirectly) leading to the article’s withdrawal. See N.J. Robinson, “A quick reminder of why colonialism was bad”, Current Affairs, (2017)

1061 On the contemporary EU’s ability and willingness to offer ‘a liberal pushback in an increasingly illiberal world’, see (amongst others) K.E. Smith, “The European Union in an Illiberal World”, Current History 116.788 (2017) 83-87, quotation from p.83

1062 C.f. Hartshorne, ”Political geography”, 176. On the continuing debates, see for example G. Ó Tuathail, “Foreword: Arguing about geopolitics”, in Klaus Dodds, Merje Kuus, and Joanne Sharp (eds.), The Ashgate Research Companion to Critical Geopolitics (Farnham & Burlington, VT: Ashgate; 2013); I.M. Keighren, ”History and philosophy of geography II: The excluded, the evil, and the anarchic”, Progress in Human Geography (2017)
forgotten, or submerged along the way. Its reflection, like that of the *Palast*, is at once familiar and strange. Let us welcome this ambivalence, both as a comment upon the history that we have traced, and upon the act of tracing by which we come to terms with it. It alerts us to a more complex conception of time, not one of harbingers and precursors but of multiple, competing narratives each jostling to put in place their preferred vision, each rearranging the plot points of history to suit their own ends. And in the present moment, it offers the European project the means to incorporate a richer variety of pasts into its past, and hence open itself to a richer selection of futures.
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